

**ATTI PARLAMENTARI**

**XVI LEGISLATURA**

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# **CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI**

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**n. 4**

## **R E L A Z I O N E**

### **SULL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA CONVENZIONE CHE ISTITUISCE L'UFFICIO EUROPEO DI POLIZIA (EUROPOL) (Anno 2010)**

*(Articolo 6, comma 2, della legge 23 marzo 1998, n. 93)*

**PRESENTATA DAL MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO**

**(CANCELLIERI)**

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*Trasmessa alla Presidenza il 27 giugno 2012*

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## 1. Evoluzione del Quadro Normativo

L'Ufficio Europeo di polizia – EUROPOL è l'Agenzia dell'Unione europea che si occupa di intelligence criminale nel contesto dell'applicazione della legge, con il compito di migliorare l'efficacia e la cooperazione delle autorità competenti degli Stati Membri nella prevenzione e la lotta a forme gravi di criminalità organizzata internazionale e al terrorismo. Lo scopo precipuo dell'Europol è di contribuire significativamente alle attività delle Forze di Polizia nell'Unione europea contro la criminalità organizzata e il terrorismo, concentrandosi in particolare sulle organizzazioni criminali.

L'intervento di Europol non è più subordinato all'esistenza di una struttura criminale organizzata e l'estensione del suo mandato ha prodotto importanti effetti per l'attività di competenza, anche per quanto riguarda le squadre investigative comuni, la richiesta di esecuzione di indagini, il riciclaggio di denaro.

Lo "status" di Agenzia è stato ufficialmente acquisito il 1° Gennaio 2010, allorché è entrata in vigore la Decisione del Consiglio dell'Unione Europea 2000/371/GAI del 6 Aprile 2009, con importanti e favorevoli conseguenze, fra le quali, oltre a quelle operative, quella relativa al finanziamento di Europol, che ora avviene mediante il bilancio comunitario, e l'applicazione dello statuto dei funzionari delle Comunità europee al personale di Europol.

Nella prospettiva di facilitare, promuovere e rafforzare il coordinamento delle azioni operative delle autorità degli Stati membri competenti in materia di sicurezza interna è stato costituito – con Decisione del Consiglio 2010/131/UE del 25 febbraio 2010 - il "comitato permanente per la cooperazione operativa in materia di sicurezza interna" (COSI). Il Comitato assicura l'efficace cooperazione e coordinamento nella cooperazione di polizia e doganale nonché tra le autorità preposte al controllo e alla protezione delle frontiere esterne. Vi rientra anche, se del caso, la cooperazione giudiziaria in materia penale per quanto riguarda l'aspetto operativo nell'ambito della sicurezza interna. Il comitato permanente valuta altresì l'efficacia della cooperazione operativa, individua eventuali carenze e adotta le appropriate raccomandazioni concrete per farvi fronte, ma non partecipa alla condotta delle operazioni e all'elaborazione di atti legislativi.

Nell'eventualità che si verifichi all'interno dell'Unione europea un attacco terroristico o un disastro naturale o causato dall'uomo, il comitato permanente assisterà il Consiglio nel rispetto della clausola di solidarietà riportata nell'articolo 222 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea (TFUE).

Il comitato permanente contribuirà ad assicurare la coerenza dell'operato di Eurojust, di Europol, dell'Agenzia europea alle frontiere esterne (Frontex) e di altri organismi pertinenti che saranno invitati ad assistere alle riunioni del comitato permanente in qualità di osservatori.

## 2. L'Unità Nazionale Europol, i Referenti nazionali e la gestione del flusso informativo

L'Unità Nazionale Europol (UNE) è l'unico organo di collegamento tra Europol e le competenti strutture italiane di polizia, per la gestione dei reciproci flussi informativi secondo la legislazione nazionale (art. 2 del Decreto Interministeriale nr. 214 del 21 febbraio 1996) ed è inserita nel Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia della Direzione Centrale della Polizia Criminale.

Essa interloquisce con i servizi nazionali di polizia competenti per la prevenzione e la lotta contro la criminalità, cioè gli uffici destinatari od originatori, per conto delle rispettive strutture territoriali, di informazioni raccolte e diffuse attraverso il canale Europol, individuati quali "Referenti nazionali", e cioè:

- il II Reparto del Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri;
- il II Reparto del Comando Generale della Guardia di Finanza;
- la Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga;
- la Direzione Investigativa Antimafia;
- il Servizio Centrale Operativo della Polizia di Stato.

Detti Referenti nazionali attivano l'UNE, o vengono da questa interessati, sulla base delle direttive del Consiglio Generale per la lotta alla criminalità organizzata del 21 gennaio 1992 e del Ministro dell'Interno del 26 marzo 1998, in tema di coordinamento delle Forze di Polizia e di maggiore efficacia delle attività informative e di sicurezza nel settore della criminalità organizzata.

Le direttive in parola sono basate sul "principio della reciprocità informativa", inteso come reciproco scambio di informazioni tra le Forze di Polizia, integrato dal "principio della circolarità informativa", secondo cui l'UNE, nell'assegnare e distribuire le richieste di informazione provenienti dall'Europol, pur incaricando "per competenza" un Referente, ne informa "per conoscenza" gli altri.

Nello specifico, la richiesta di attivazione di Europol deve:

- riguardare informazioni connesse con le materie che rientrano nel mandato di Europol (tutte le forme di crimine organizzato elencate nell'allegato A con riferimento all'art. 4 della citata Decisione);
- vedere coinvolti due o più Stati membri dell'Unione Europea;
- trarre origine dal presupposto che operi una struttura criminale o che si tratti di una forma grave di criminalità.

Il Comando/Ufficio che sta svolgendo le indagini e necessita dello scambio informativo, trasmette la richiesta al Referente Nazionale che, a sua volta - e dopo la preliminare valutazione di competenza - la inoltra all'Unità Nazionale Europol.

L'Unità Nazionale Europol invia le richieste ai dipendenti Ufficiali di collegamento presso il *desk* dell'Ufficio Europeo di Polizia. Questi ultimi interessano gli Ufficiali di collegamento degli altri Paesi membri dell'UE, affinché richiedano le notizie alle Forze di Polizia dei rispettivi Stati.

A norma dell'art. 9 della Decisione del Consiglio "ogni unità nazionale distacca presso Europol almeno un ufficiale di collegamento" (1° comma); "gli Ufficiali di collegamento costituiscono gli uffici nazionali di collegamento presso Europol e sono incaricati dalle rispettive unità nazionali di difendere gli interessi di queste ultime nell'ambito di Europol conformemente alla legislazione nazionale dello Stato membro di origine e nel rispetto delle disposizioni applicabili al funzionamento di Europol" (2° comma).

Il flusso informativo di riscontro alle richieste inviate, perviene dall'Ufficio di collegamento italiano attraverso l'Unità Nazionale, che provvede a veicolarlo ai Comandi/Uffici che hanno originato la richiesta, attraverso i preposti Referenti Nazionali.

Il personale attualmente effettivo all'Unità Nazionale Europol, in mancanza di un organico ancora da definire, è il seguente:

Direttore dell'Unità Nazionale: attualmente Colonnello CC (incarico a rotazione),

1^ Sezione: Funzionario Polizia di Stato;

2^ Sezione: Ufficiale Arma Carabinieri;

3^ Sezione: Ufficiale Guardia di Finanza.

Sono inoltre effettivi, all'Unità Nazionale Europol, complessivamente:

- Polizia di Stato: n. 5 unità;
- Carabinieri: n. 5 (4 unità effettive + 1 aggregato dalla DIA);
- Guardia di Finanza: n. 5 unità.

Il totale del personale operante in sede è di complessive 18 unità, oltre al Direttore dell'UNE.

In qualità di ufficiali di collegamento presso la sede di Europol a L'Aia (Paesi Bassi), al 31 dicembre 2010, operavano:

- Arma dei Carabinieri: n. 1 Ufficiale;
- Guardia di Finanza: n. 1 Ufficiale;
- Polizia di Stato: n. 1 Funzionario e n. 2 Ispettori.

Il personale distaccato a L'Aja assicura principalmente lo scambio informativo tra Europol e l'Unità Nazionale e tra gli Stati Membri e l'Italia (attraverso l'Unità Nazionale).

Viene effettuata, in prevalenza, la traduzione dei messaggi che provengono dai Referenti nazionali (Arma dei Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Servizio Centrale Operativo della Polizia di Stato, D.C.S.A e D.I.A), dall'italiano all'inglese e, spesso, dall'inglese all'italiano anche dei messaggi che dagli Stati Membri e da Europol vengono indirizzati alle forze di polizia italiane tramite l'Unità Nazionale. Gli ufficiali di collegamenti sono altresì coinvolti direttamente nella gestione, preparazione e svolgimento delle seguenti altre materie:

- meeting e seminari cui vengono invitati gli esperti nazionali provenienti dai referenti;
- riunioni degli AWF cui gli ufficiali di collegamento partecipano quali rappresentanti dello Stato;
- meeting dei Capi di Unità Nazionale;
- riunioni della Task Force dei Capi delle Polizie o di meeting connessi;
- riunioni del Consiglio di Amministrazione, dei Comitati "ad hoc", del

Consiglio di Programma e degli altri enti di gestione e programmazione di Europol;

- progetti COSPOL avviati nell'ambito della Task Force dei Capi delle Polizie (EPCTF), ora COSI (Comitato permanente per la cooperazione operativa in materia di sicurezza interna);
- bandi di concorso per il reclutamento del personale.

Spesso il personale impiegato presso il *desk* italiano è richiesto per la partecipazioni a fasi operative/conclusive di attività di indagini, che lo vedono impegnato nella partecipazione e/o gestione di Sale Operative comuni (anche in missione in altri Stati differenti dalla sede di servizio), dove, nella maggior parte dei casi, è presente anche l'Ufficio Mobile di Europol, che permette lo scambio info-operativo in tempo reale attraverso il sistema SIENA e l'accesso alle banche dati di Europol per necessità di analisi.

### 3. Il sistema di informazione (EIS) e il sistema di analisi di Europol (AWF)

Lo scambio informativo di cui si è fatto cenno nel precedente paragrafo avviene mediante l'utilizzo, da parte di Europol e delle Unità Nazionali, di un'applicazione informatica denominata *S.I.E.N.A. (Secure Information Exchange Network Application)*, che permette la gestione telematica delle richieste di informazioni da veicolare ai vari Paesi o ad Europol stesso, utilizzando una rete protetta e veloce. Tale applicazione ha sostituito, dal 1° luglio 2009, la precedente piattaforma *INFO-EX (Information Exchange)*, che veniva utilizzata per inviare e ricevere le richieste di informazioni. La validità e gli alti standard di sicurezza informatica del sistema SIENA hanno indotto alcuni Stati membri ad estenderne l'accesso e l'utilizzo anche ai servizi territoriali di polizia, per la veicolazione del flusso informativo con i rispettivi Uffici di Collegamento presso Europol. In Italia, l'accesso al sistema SIENA è possibile, attualmente, solo a livello di Unità Nazionale, non essendo ancora stato esteso ai Referenti nazionali, in attesa che si dia esecuzione ad un progetto già approntato e che consentirà la connessione sicura al network anche dei Referenti Nazionali. Allorché sarà operativo, il flusso informativo generato avrà una portata tale, ipotizzandosi la successiva estensione anche a livello territoriale, che sarà necessario valutare sin d'ora un incremento dell'organico dell'Unità Nazionale, poiché solo quest'ultima potrà "validare" le richieste di informazioni provenienti dai Referenti Nazionali, da veicolare all'Ufficio di collegamento presso Europol e viceversa.

Il "valore aggiunto" offerto da Europol è rappresentato dal supporto di analisi che caratterizza la struttura e ne costituisce il fondamentale contributo da offrire alle indagini condotte dalle Autorità degli Stati membri. Consiste nella raccolta sistematica delle informazioni relative ad attività investigative in corso nei vari Paesi e nella loro rielaborazione in chiave analitica per offrire - alle Forze di Polizia che li mettono a disposizione - un "feedback" che contenga ulteriori informazioni analizzate ed integrate con quelle di altri Paesi.

L'analisi operativa trova la sua esplicazione nel Sistema di Informazione Europol, banca dati denominata *EIS (Europol Information System)*.

#### **Il sistema di informazione Europol (EIS)**

L'obiettivo principale del sistema di informazione Europol (EIS) è fornire supporto agli Stati membri e all'Europol stesso nella lotta alle forme gravi di criminalità e terrorismo internazionali.

Tale sistema permette di conservare, ricercare, visualizzare e collegare informazioni riguardanti reati transnazionali, consentendo alle autorità incaricate dell'applicazione della legge in tutta Europa di collaborare in maniera efficace alle rispettive indagini. Il sistema rileva automaticamente gli eventuali collegamenti e agevola la condivisione di informazioni sensibili in maniera SICURA e AFFIDABILE.

L'EIS è stato realizzato dall'unità per lo sviluppo di software dell'Europol. Operativo dal mese di ottobre 2005, il sistema è ubicato presso la sede dell'Europol, all'Aia (Paesi Bassi) ed è consultabile in 21 lingue dalle autorità incaricate dell'applicazione della legge di tutti gli Stati membri dell'UE.

### Titolarità dei dati

Nell'EIS, i dati possono essere immessi manualmente o automaticamente e restano interamente sotto il controllo dell'ente che li ha inseriti (titolare dei dati), per cui non possono essere modificati in alcun modo né dall'Europol né da un altro Stato membro. Al titolare, che risponde dell'accuratezza dei dati e della loro affidabilità, spetta inoltre verificarne i termini di conservazione nonché garantirne il costante aggiornamento.

Infatti, per alimentare il sistema, già nel mese di dicembre del 2008 è diventato pienamente operativo presso l'Unità Nazionale italiana il software *Europol Information System Automatic Data Loader*, appositamente realizzato per procedere in forma automatizzata al trasferimento dei dati provenienti dalle Forze di Polizia nazionali all'"EIS", tramite l'Unità Nazionale che ha il compito di verificare, validare ed inviare al detto Sistema Informativo, dislocato a L'Aia (Olanda), i dati relativi a quelle categorie di crimini internazionali stabilite dalla Decisione del Consiglio che istituisce EUROPOL, il cui inserimento finora avveniva in modo manuale. Nell'anno 2010 sono stati inseriti dall'Unità Nazionale Europol ben 2830 dati.

### Condivisione delle informazioni


Gli utenti possono accedere direttamente a tutti i dati memorizzati nell'EIS, fatte salve eventuali restrizioni giuridiche quali, per esempio, l'intelligence su reati futuri. In tali casi, se occorrono ulteriori ragguagli, gli utenti possono rivolgersi al rispettivo ufficio di collegamento presso l'Europol. I dati possono essere diffusi e/o utilizzati soltanto nel rispetto dei codici di trattamento e dei livelli di protezione Europol applicati dal titolare delle informazioni.




















### Tipo di dati e modalità d'immissione

I dati contenuti nell'EIS sono ripartiti per categorie (*oggetti*) (p. es. persone fisiche, autoveicoli, documenti d'identità ecc.) che vanno poste in collegamento per poter ottenere un quadro strutturato relativo a ciascun caso criminale.

A destra sono riportate le diverse categorie di dati memorizzabili nell'EIS.


I dati archiviati nel sistema possono essere visionati in vario modo: per esempio, tramite una visualizzazione grafica (*Chart View*) è possibile vedere le informazioni memorizzate e approfondire i collegamenti tra le varie categorie.



	<b>Reati</b> Breve descrizione del caso
	<b>Informazioni sui referenti</b> Riferimenti dell'unità cui rivolgersi qualora occorran ulteriori informazioni sul caso
	<b>Persone fisiche</b> Individui sospettati o condannati per reati già commessi, oppure soggetti sospettabili di futuro coinvolgimento
	<b>Alias</b>
	<b>Mezzi di trasporto</b> Autovetture, imbarcazioni ecc.
	<b>Mezzi di comunicazione</b> Numeri di telefono, indirizzi di posta elettronica, URL, indirizzi IP ecc.
	<b>Strumenti di pagamento</b> Carte di credito e altre carte di pagamento
	<b>Documenti d'identità</b>
	<b>Organizzazioni criminali</b>
	<b>Stupefacenti</b> Cannabis, cocaina, eroina, stimolanti ecc.
	<b>Armi da fuoco</b>
	<b>Valute</b> Valuta, banconote e monete falsificate
	<b>Dispositivi</b> Stampanti, computer portatili ecc.
	<b>Sostanze chimiche</b>
	<b>Organizzazioni</b> Persone giuridiche, quali società
	<b>Operazioni finanziarie</b>
	<b>Conti</b>
	<b>Bombe</b>
	<b>Allegati</b> Impronte digitali, immagini, filmati, documenti

### Perché usare l'EIS

L'EIS è al tempo stesso un vantaggio e una responsabilità condivisi dagli Stati membri dell'UE e dall'Europol che possono, infatti, considerarsi titolari di un conto all'interno del sistema di cui sono responsabili. Le informazioni depositate sono messe a disposizione di altri investigatori dell'UE e automaticamente raffrontate a quelle presenti nel sistema inserite da altri Stati membri. Ciò al fine di stabilire punti di collegamento, migliorare l'intelligence a disposizione e selezionare ulteriori piste d'indagine. Stando alle attuali statistiche, sussiste una corrispondenza ogni 200 soggetti memorizzati nel sistema.



### Uno sguardo al futuro

Entro breve, fra gli utenti del sistema di informazione saranno comprese, oltre alle Unità Nazionali Europol, altre autorità competenti incaricate dell'applicazione della legge negli Stati membri dell'UE che potranno interrogare direttamente il sistema.

Si prevede che in futuro l'EIS offrirà funzioni idonee a stabilire corrispondenze tra dati biometrici, quali profili del DNA, impronte digitali e fotografie. Inoltre, SIENA, la nuova piattaforma per lo scambio di informazioni operative tra l'Europol e i suoi partner, sarà in grado di dialogare con il sistema di informazione a ulteriore arricchimento delle informazioni di polizia.

Dall'avvio del sistema, il numero di registrazioni è andato aumentando in modo considerevole. Ciascuno Stato membro ha provveduto a fornire dati e sono almeno 16 gli Stati membri che saranno presto in grado di collegare le proprie banche dati nazionali al sistema per il caricamento automatico di dati, ampliando in tal modo il suo contenuto e, di conseguenza, la percentuale di riscontri.

### Il sistema di analisi di Europol (AWF)

All'EIS si affiancano gli *AWF* (*Analytical Work Files*) i cui dati sono alimentati e condivisi solo dagli Stati membri che vi partecipano e/o anche da Parti Terze che vi aderiscono. Si tratta di una serie di archivi di lavoro tematici, che consentono l'immagazzinamento e la trattazione dei dati riguardanti uno specifico fenomeno criminale, rientrante nell'area di mandato di Europol e valutato di particolare interesse in relazione alle priorità stabilite nella politica di contrasto alla criminalità degli Stati membri e dell'Unione e all'esistenza di attività di indagine in corso che riguardino il fenomeno in questione.

In particolare, uno Stato membro attraverso la propria Unità nazionale (interessata dal proprio Referente nazionale) richiede la collaborazione di Europol, nel momento in cui l'attività investigativa coinvolga più Paesi per verificare che gli stessi abbiano analoghe indagini in corso e consente agli analisti di individuare la rete criminale operante nei vari Stati coinvolti.

Talvolta, per esigenze analitiche connesse a una specifica indagine che interessa due o più Stati membri partecipanti ad uno stesso AWF, può essere costituito un *Target Group* ad hoc, che generalmente ha la stessa denominazione dell'operazione in corso e nel cui ambito avviene la raccolta e la condivisione dei dati, limitatamente ai soli Paesi che lo hanno costituito. All'interno del *Target Group*, in sostanza, si realizza ciò che normalmente avviene all'interno dell'AWF, ma in maniera circoscritta. Lo scopo dei *Target Group* è lo stesso degli AWF, ma focalizzato su una singola e specifica operazione e a supporto dell'attività di indagine condotta dai servizi di polizia degli Stati membri che lo hanno costituito.

Europol, attraverso propri rappresentanti, può partecipare alle azioni comuni in caso di operazioni di polizia che interessano più Stati, al fine di agevolare in maniera istantanea l'analisi dei dati che man mano emergono (attraverso un apposito ufficio mobile).

Europol ha un accordo strategico ed operativo con Eurojust. Per questioni operative, lo scambio di informazioni può avvenire solo a livello di AWF, laddove Eurojust ne faccia parte, in quanto Eurojust non può attivare le Unità nazionali. Il punto di contatto è solo a livello centrale (Eurojust L'Aia – Europol L'Aia).

In ambito Europol si procede solo a scambio di informazioni di polizia fino alla conclusione delle indagini e alla emissione di eventuali MAE e/o altre attività di carattere giudiziario, nel qual caso le A.G. interessate coinvolgono Eurojust per un coordinamento delle attività di competenza.

### **Prospettive di evoluzione degli AWF**

Nel 2010 è stata avviata la discussa su una proposta volta alla riorganizzazione dell'insieme degli AWF attualmente presenti presso l'Ufficio Europeo di Polizia.

Tale proposta prevede, sostanzialmente, la riduzione del numero di AWF da 23 a 2 e comporterebbe la creazione di due “macro-AWF”, uno concernente la criminalità organizzata, l'altro riguardante il terrorismo.

Il primo accorperebbe 18 degli attuali AWF ed il secondo 5. Gli originari Archivi di Analisi diventerebbero i *Focal Point* dei 2 macro-AWF, mentre i *Focal Point* attualmente esistenti verrebbero rinominati *Target Group*.

Infine, il personale di Europol costituente i team impiegati nelle diverse Unità rimarrebbe invariato, compresi i Project Manager.

I benefici della riorganizzazione in argomento, dal punto di vista di Europol, sembrerebbero innumerevoli:

- una maggiore flessibilità nell'apertura/chiusura e modifica dei *Focal Point* rispetto ai precedenti AWF, le cui procedure impiegavano un periodo di tempo più lungo;
- la presenza di un unico database per ogni AWF, che comporterebbe:
  - una maggiore capacità di analisi e cross-check dei dati;
  - la possibilità di evitare sovrapposizioni di competenze;
  - la possibilità di evitare duplicazioni nell'archiviazione dei dati.
- l'opportunità per Europol di gestire in modo più flessibile ed efficiente le risorse, allocandole a seconda delle contingenti necessità investigative degli Stati Membri.

Questo sistema consentirebbe infatti, nel caso di operazioni che coinvolgano più *hub* (le aree geografiche in cui Europol ha diviso operativamente l'Europa) e più tipologie di reato, di costituire team dedicati, utilizzando il personale delle varie componenti di Europol interessate.

#### 4. Attività svolta nelle principali aree di mandato

Come è noto, l'Europol sostiene le attività delle autorità incaricate dell'applicazione della legge negli Stati Membri, principalmente contro:

- Traffico illecito di stupefacenti,
- Reti di immigrazione clandestina,
- Terrorismo,
- Falsificazione di monete (contraffazione dell'euro) e di altri mezzi di pagamento,
- Tratta degli esseri umani, compresa pornografia infantile,
- Traffico illecito di veicoli rubati,
- Riciclaggio di denaro.

La richiesta di attivazione di Europol deve:

- riguardare informazioni connesse con le materie che rientrano nel mandato di Europol (tutte le forme di crimine organizzato elencate nell'allegato A con riferimento all'art. 4 della citata Decisione);
- vedere coinvolti due o più Stati membri dell'Unione Europea;
- trarre origine dal presupposto che operi una struttura criminale o che si tratti di una forma grave di criminalità.

Anche nel corso del 2010, l'attività dell'Unità Nazionale Europol ha riguardato le seguenti aree di mandato:

##### a. Immigrazione clandestina

L'immigrazione clandestina ed i suoi legami con il crimine organizzato restano una priorità per l'Unione Europea, tanto che l'approccio comune a tali fenomeni da parte delle Forze di Polizia degli Stati Membri, si evidenzia come assoluta necessità.

Nello specifico settore, la cooperazione in ambito Europol si estrinseca, oltre che nel consueto scambio di informazioni, anche nella partecipazione all'AWF (*Analytical Work File* - Archivio di Lavoro ai fini dell'Analisi - ) denominato **"CHECKPOINT"**.

Questo archivio di analisi, racchiude al suo interno una serie di Target Group, ad alcuni dei quali partecipa l'Italia:

- il Target Group **"STORM"**, il cui scopo è quello di contrastare il continuo aumento del traffico di clandestini provenienti dall'Iraq, attraverso l'individuazione e lo smantellamento della rete criminale che si appoggia ai loro connazionali già presenti in Europa.  
In tale ambito si è svolto lo scorso **01.09.2010**, presso Europol, un meeting operativo a cui ha partecipato un esperto nazionale, al fine di condividere e coordinare con i Paesi coinvolti (prevalentemente Germania, Belgio, Regno Unito e Paesi Bassi) le varie attività investigative intraprese.

- il Target Group “**EBANO**”, avente come obiettivo l’analisi dello scambio informativo sui flussi migratori illeciti provenienti dall’Africa, ma che presenta la criticità di non ricevere un costante flusso di informazioni riferito alle problematiche comuni di rilevanza internazionale, ma solo quelle relative a singoli eventi.

Nell’ambito dei suddetti Target Group sono in corso numerosi scambi informativi con i Paesi membri in considerazione delle numerose indagini in corso da parte delle rispettive Autorità di Polizia. In data 09-10 novembre 2010 si è svolto l’annuale “*Analysis Working Group Meeting*” a cui hanno partecipato gli esperti nazionali delle varie Forze di Polizia.

#### **b. Tratta degli esseri umani**

Dal 2007 è attivo l’AWF denominato “**PHOENIX**”, in sostituzione dell’AWF “**MARITSA**”, modifica scaturita dalla necessità, palesata soprattutto a livello operativo, di dotarsi di un archivio di analisi nel quale convogliare i dati relativi al fenomeno della tratta degli esseri umani nella sua globalità.

Tale AWF è strettamente correlato al progetto denominato COSPOL THB (Trafficking in Human Beings – Tratta degli esseri umani), attivo in seno alla Task Force dei Capi delle Polizie, ora COSI.

In data 5 gennaio 2010, nell’ambito di una vasta indagine denominata “**Garnet**”, avviata a suo tempo dalle Autorità britanniche, la Squadra Mobile della Questura di Firenze ed il Servizio Centrale Operativo, con l’ausilio coordinato di EUROPOL, INTERPOL e SIRENE, hanno effettuato un’importante operazione di polizia che ha interessato l’Italia ed altri Paesi europei e che ha consentito di smantellare una rete criminale internazionale, finalizzata all’immigrazione clandestina di cittadini cinesi.

L’A.G. precedente ha emesso un’ordinanza di custodia cautelare in carcere per nove persone, accusate di avere partecipato ad un’associazione diretta a commettere delitti in materia di immigrazione nonché i connessi reati di falso documentale e di uso di atti falsi, funzionali alla realizzazione dell’attività principale.

Tali reati, in particolare, consistevano nel dirigere, organizzare ed effettuare il trasporto di un numero cospicuo di stranieri dalla Cina in Italia ed in altri Stati europei, anche utilizzando servizi aerei e ferroviari internazionali e servendosi di passaporti e altri documenti contraffatti o alterati; i clandestini venivano successivamente trasferiti da questi Stati in Inghilterra, Irlanda e Canada.

In particolare, dall’indagine, avviata nel giugno del 2007, è emerso che l’organizzazione operava avvalendosi di una base logistica in Cina e della collaborazione di referenti (definite “teste di serpente” nel gergo dell’associazione) in Italia dove i clandestini facevano tappa, prima di raggiungere altri 4 Paesi ove erano indotti al mercato del lavoro nero.

E’ emerso anche che i familiari dei clandestini (“merce” nel linguaggio convenzionale del sodalizio criminale) per il trasporto dalla Cina, versavano all’organizzazione 17.000 euro in tre rate; che ai cittadini clandestini venivano forniti documenti contraffatti e che prima dell’imbarco sui voli di linea ai

clandestini venivano fornite istruzioni per distruggere tutti i documenti durante il volo, prima di giungere al controllo di frontiera.

La fase esecutiva dei provvedimenti è stata preceduta da contatti e riunioni tenutesi presso la sede di Europol dell'Aja dagli investigatori fiorentini con i rappresentanti dei Paesi europei coinvolti e dell'Awf Phoenix, ovvero presso l'Unità Nazionale Europol in Roma, ove hanno partecipato oltre agli investigatori fiorentini, rappresentanti di Interpol, Sirene, Europol, del Servizio Centrale Operativo della Polizia di Stato ed Ufficiali di collegamento in Italia dei Paesi coinvolti.

L'apporto di EUROPOL nella complessa indagine, seguita fin dalla sua fase preliminare, è stato determinante nel creare le giuste sinergie tra i diversi Organismi di polizia europei e, in particolare, nel fornire supporto all'attività info-investigativa tramite l'archivio di analisi denominato AWF "PHOENIX"; quest'ultimo ha consentito di analizzare tutti i dati raccolti dai diversi Paesi coinvolti nell'indagine, contribuendo a far emergere le connessioni tra le diverse investigazioni intraprese.

Sempre nell'ambito del suddetto AWF Phoenix, nel mese di giugno 2010 nel corso dell'indagine "SAHEL", coordinata dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia de L'Aquila, il Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale Carabinieri ha tratto in arresto nr. 26 soggetti, di cui 20 nigeriani e 6 italiani. L'inchiesta è scattata dalla denuncia di una 25enne nigeriana, vittima di sfruttamento sessuale da parte di tre connazionali successivamente fermati. Il sodalizio criminale reclutava giovani donne in Nigeria e, dopo averle sottoposte ad un rito magico voodoo con il quale le sottomettevano psicologicamente, le inducevano a firmare un contratto in seguito al quale venivano trasferite in Italia per essere costrette alla prostituzione con ogni tipo di ricatto e violenza, non ultima quella dell'interruzione della gravidanza attraverso la somministrazione di farmaci per provocare l'aborto anche durante la fase di gestazionale avanzata. Per questi motivi, con l'accusa di associazione per delinquere finalizzata alla tratta di esseri umani, riduzione in schiavitù, favoreggiamento dell'immigrazione clandestina, sfruttamento della prostituzione, riciclaggio e interruzione abusiva di gravidanza i carabinieri del Ros hanno sgominato una banda nigeriana, articolato in cellule strutturate su base familiare e dislocate in Italia e all'estero, che gestiva l'intera filiera criminale dal reclutamento delle vittime in madrepatria al loro trasferimento in Europa e, infine, allo sfruttamento sessuale nei luoghi di destinazione finale.

Tale operazione è stata preceduta da incontri preliminari svoltosi presso la sede dell'Europol nel dicembre del 2009 in cui hanno partecipato rappresentanti del citato Ufficio analisi e dei Paesi coinvolti.

Lo scambio informativo è, comunque, continuato tra i Paesi membri dell'Unione europea e, in tale contesto, sono state avviate attività info-operative che vedono tuttora impegnati i competenti organi investigativi della Polizia di Stato, dell'Arma dei Carabinieri e della Guardia di Finanza.

Il flusso prodotto dalle indagini è puntualmente canalizzato nel Sistema Informativo di Europol per consentire a tutti gli Stati membri di rilevare collegamenti con proprie attività nazionali e, in caso positivo, fornire agli analisti di Europol elementi per l'elaborazione dei dati in modo da poter individuare eventuali collegamenti internazionali ed alimentare ulteriormente l'attività investigativa sul territorio.

### c. Pedopornografia infantile

In ordine alla specifica area di mandato, Europol si occupa del reato di pedofilia, nelle sue varie forme (*on line*, tratta di minori, sfruttamento e abuso, turismo sessuale), sotto il profilo dell'analisi del fenomeno, anche attraverso la stesura di rapporti e bollettini redatti sulla base dei contributi forniti dai Paesi Membri.

Nel particolare settore, oltre al consueto scambio informativo da e verso gli altri Stati Membri curato dall'Unità Nazionale Europol, l'Italia ha aderito all'AWF "TWINS", dedicato al fenomeno criminale della pedofilia, che è tuttora il principale strumento di supporto investigativo di svariate operazioni coordinate tra più Paesi. In tale ambito, per agevolare lo scambio del delicato e cospicuo materiale relativo alle indagini, l'AWF si è adottato di uno specifico software (GROOVE network), evitando così l'obsoleto sistema dello scambio di CD o DVD.

Nell'ambito dell'AWF Twins, nel luglio 2010, la Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni, al termine di un'articolata attività investigative nel settore del contrasto alla produzione, diffusione e condivisione di materiale pedo-pornografico attraverso la rete internet, spesso condotta con ricorso a tecniche sottocopertura, ha tratto in arresto in diverse regioni italiane, nr. 6 soggetti sorpresi a detenere e condividere ingentissimi quantitativi di materiale pornografico riguardante minori. La sofisticata attività investigativa, condotta dal Compartimento della Polizia Postale Piemonte di concerto con il Centro nazionale per il contrasto alla pedopornografia online e coordinata dalla procura della repubblica di Torino si è protratta per oltre due anni nel corso dei quali gli agenti sottocopertura sono riusciti ad infiltrare riservatissimi canali di comunicazione in tempo reale, all'interno dei quali hanno fatto uscire allo scoperto pedofili che, accettando l'amicizia degli agenti, hanno consentito l'accesso a video e immagini realizzate mediante lo sfruttamento sessuale di soggetti minori degli anni 18. L'eccezionale investigazione ha portato, altresì, all'individuazione di una settantina di utenti stranieri responsabili della diffusione di copioso materiale pedopornografico, residenti in 26 Stati. La Procura di Torino ha richiesto l'intervento di Eurojust per impegnare le A.G. estere ad assicurare una contemporanea operatività in quanto molti dei soggetti coinvolti erano in comunicazione tra loro.

In tale contesto, nello stesso mese di luglio, l'AWF Twins ha partecipato alla riunione tenutasi alla sede di Eurojust al fine di acquisire i contributi scaturiti dalla citata operazione.

Si rappresenta, altresì, che l'attività d'indagine è ancora in corso e che la stessa prevederà ulteriori sviluppi nell'immediato futuro.

Sono inoltre in corso scambi informativi in merito a diverse indagini condotte oltre che dalle Autorità italiane anche da quelle belghe, olandesi, danesi, svedesi e britanniche, nei confronti di soggetti che scambiano materiale pedo-pornografico on-line.

In data 08 giugno 2010 presso Europol si è svolto l'annuale "Analysis Working Group Meeting" in cui hanno partecipato gli esperti nazionali delle varie Forze di Polizia.

Nell'ambito della specifica materia, Europol ha altresì sostenuto il progetto denominato CIRCAMP (COSPOL Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project) da quando è stato lanciato nel 2004 sotto la Presidenza olandese dell'Unione Europea. Attualmente, il Belgio è il nuovo *Driver* del progetto CIRCAMP, mentre

il Regno Unito ne è *Co-Driver* dal 2004. Il nuovo piano di intervento del CIRCAMP è stato recentemente discusso in un preliminare incontro svoltosi a Roma, dove si è convenuto di dare al progetto maggiore operatività. Al riguardo, lo stesso sarà focalizzato in cinque diverse iniziative da attuare nel corso del 2011. Queste operazioni saranno indirizzate in differenti aree web visitate dai pedofili online. Gruppi di lavoro di delegati dei vari Paesi coinvolti condurranno ciascuna operazione ed Europol provvederà a fornire supporto analitico. In ogni caso Europol coordinerà le azioni comuni che si terranno nell'ambito del progetto CIRCAMP dai Paesi organizzatori.

#### **d. Traffico di veicoli rubati**

Lo scambio informativo è costante ed ha consentito, nel corso dell'anno, di coordinare l'attività investigativa degli organi di polizia degli altri Paesi europei con il Servizio di Polizia Stradale, non solo per la ricerca di autoveicoli rubati ma anche per fronteggiare il fenomeno criminale del furto di autobus, presente soprattutto nell'area centrale europea ed quello delle autovetture di lusso.

Inoltre, Europol nel 2002 ha promosso un gruppo di lavoro composto da rappresentanti del BKA tedesco, del LKA bavarese e del Ministero dell'Interno austriaco, cui ha collaborato anche la Polizia Stradale italiana ed il Servizio Nazionale Criminale svedese, che ha realizzato un catalogo europeo per l'identificazione dei veicoli, in formato cd-rom, denominato EUVID (*European Vehicle Identification Database*). Tale catalogo contiene un manuale informatizzato per il controllo della genuinità di telai e documenti di circolazione. Tale supporto ha ottenuto un diffuso apprezzamento da parte degli operatori di polizia dei Paesi ai quali è stato distribuito da Europol. L'ultima edizione è quella relativa al 2008.

#### **e. Attività delittuose compiute da bande di motociclisti.**

In ordine alla specifica area di mandato, dal settembre 1999 è attivo l'AWF "MONITOR", con lo scopo di contrastare le attività delittuose compiute ad opera di bande di motociclisti, nell'ambito del quale sono in corso scambi informativi tra i vari Paesi membri in merito alle indagini condotte dai Paesi aderenti e sempre relativamente ai crimini commessi da bande di motociclisti.

In data 03-04 giugno 2010 presso Europol si è svolto il "16th Operational Meeting".

#### **f. Terrorismo**

Sul piano della cooperazione tra Forze di Polizia, una delle priorità di Europol riguarda la lotta al terrorismo.

Nello specifico settore, meritano di essere segnalati:

#### **Realizzazione del Rapporto TE-SAT**

Il TE-SAT (EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report) è un rapporto pubblico prodotto annualmente da Europol sulla base di informazioni fornite dagli Stati Membri, realizzato al fine di fornire un quadro della situazione del terrorismo nell'Unione Europea e le tendenze dello sviluppo di questo fenomeno.

Il TE-SAT è un documento non classificato e non contiene informazioni riservate o informazioni che potrebbero mettere a rischio le indagini in corso.

Per la realizzazione di questo rapporto Europol raccoglie ed elabora dati su attentati terroristici avvenuti in Europa e, quando disponibili, dati su atti compiuti fuori dall'UE ma a danno di suoi interessi.

I dati, raccolti con il termine di "*terrorism offences*", riguardano quelli espressamente previsti dall' Art.1 della Council Framework Decision del 13 Giugno 2002 sulla lotta al terrorismo (2002/475/JHA), alla quale tutti gli Stati Membri hanno adeguato le loro legislazioni.

### **Progetto “Bomb Data Base”**

Il progetto derivato da un'iniziativa intrapresa dalla Task Force sulla sicurezza degli esplosivi in seno alla Commissione Europea, è volto alla creazione di una banca dati europea sugli ordigni e materiali esplosivi, consultabile dalle Forze di Polizia di tutti gli Stati Membri.

Nel mese di gennaio 2010 è stato predisposto l'accesso al sistema sul portale web di Europol con riserva da parte dei responsabili del progetto, di fornire al più presto le istruzioni per configurare gli account richiesti da ciascun Stato Membro per l'uso dell'EBDS, fornendo nel contempo un supporto addestrativo del sistema.

Il collegamento tecnico-informatico con le Forze di Polizia interessate sarà possibile solo dopo la costituzione di linee sicure, peraltro in via di definizione da parte dei competenti Uffici della Direzione Centrale della Polizia Criminale.

### **Progetto “EWS – Early Warning System”**

Si tratta di un progetto spagnolo denominato "*Early Warning System (EWS) for Explosives, CBRN and Weapons*", nel quale Europol è partner, così come Francia, Germania e Portogallo. Esso è co-finanziato dalla Commissione Europea.

Detto progetto, che doveva essere finalizzato entro la fine del 2009, ha avuto avvio nel novembre 2010.

L'EWS ha la finalità di creare un affidabile scambio informativo tra gli Stati Membri riguardo alla minaccia di attacchi terroristi o che risultino coinvolti in incidenti che vedono l'utilizzo di esplosivi (*Explosives, CBRN and weapons*) per finalità terroristiche. Il sistema esclude le organizzazioni criminali collegate agli incidenti. L'idea è quella di “allertare” gli Stati Membri (attraverso la circolazione dei “*warning messages*”) sulla minaccia di incidenti/attacchi e di avviare una collaborazione attraverso la quale si possa accrescere la conoscenza sullo specifico settore, ovvero sui “means” utilizzati per attacchi terroristici.

### **La banca dati AWF “HYDRA” sull'estremismo islamico**

Tale piattaforma per lo scambio e l'analisi delle informazioni nel caso in questione raccoglie ed elabora dati sul terrorismo islamico.

Tra le attività svolte, vi sono anche le risposte da fornire agli Stati Membri, il supporto alle investigazioni, la redazione di rapporti strategici sulle tendenze emergenti, il colmare le lacune riscontrate nei work files, e lo stimolare gli Stati Membri a contribuire ai progetti avviati.

Nell'ambito dell'AWF si è sviluppata la collaborazione tra alcuni Paesi tra cui l'Italia, nell'ambito del Target Group “INSILAL” - una complessa attività investigativa nei confronti di organizzazioni caritatevoli presenti in Europa, che è tesa ad accertare la partecipazione delle stesse al finanziamento del terrorismo

internazionale - ed il Target Group **"POTTER"** - nato con le finalità di raccogliere informazioni, fornite dalle Forze di Polizia degli Stati Membri, sul conto di soggetti individuati essere una potenziale minaccia terroristica.

#### **La banca dati AWF "DOLPHIN"**

L'AWF in questione costituisce una piattaforma per lo scambio di informazioni sulle organizzazioni terroristiche che minacciano l'Europa.

Nel suo ambito continuano gli sviluppi investigativi nell'ambito della c.d. "Operazione Mediterraneo", che ha visto la partecipazione dell'Italia ed è ora volta a favorire l'ulteriore scambio informativo tra Italia, Spagna e Grecia sulle attività dei gruppi e dei militanti di area anarco-insurrezionalista.

Di recente apertura nell'ambito dell'AWF Dolphin è il Target Group **"LODGE"** connesso alle problematiche scaturite dai recenti attacchi portati dall'estremismo animalista (*Animal Right Extremism*)

#### **La banca dati AWF "CHECK THE WEB".**

Il 18.12.2009 è stato dato avvio all'AWF **"Check The Web"**.

Lo scopo dell'archivio di analisi è quello di sostenere le Autorità competenti degli Stati Membri, ai sensi dell'Articolo 3 della Decisione del Consiglio che ha istituito Europol, nel prevenire e nel combattere il terrorismo di matrice islamica, condividendo l'analisi sull'uso di Internet da parte dell'estremismo islamico. Particolare attenzione viene dedicata ai siti web, alle dichiarazioni, ai video ed agli scritti di organizzazioni terroristiche islamiche pubblicati su Internet.

L'esigenza della creazione dell'AWF in argomento è emersa alle luce delle limitazioni sui dati personali previste per il portale **"Check the Web"**, alle quali, al contrario, non è sottoposto un *Analysis Work File*.

All'archivio di analisi hanno aderito tutti i 27 Stati Membri dell'U.E.

#### **La banca dati AWF "Maritime Piracy".**

Il 18.01.2010, con procedura d'urgenza, è stato dato avvio all'AWF **"MARITIME PIRACY"**.

Lo scopo dell'archivio di analisi è quello di sostenere le Autorità competenti degli Stati Membri, nel prevenire e nel combattere i crimini commessi o in procinto di essere commessi nel corso di rapine in mare o in atti di pirateria che mettano a rischio la vita, l'incolumità fisica, la libertà personale o la proprietà, e perseguirne gli autori che siano individui, gruppi, reti od organizzazioni.

All'archivio di analisi hanno aderito oltre all'Italia, Belgio, Bulgaria, Danimarca, Germania, Grecia, Malta, Olanda, Spagna, Gran Bretagna, Eurojust and Interpol

#### **"Counter Proliferation Program"**

Il programma nasce dalla necessità di contrastare la minaccia derivante dalla proliferazione delle armi, soprattutto di quelle di distruzione di massa. Europol, nello specifico, provvede a fornire sostegno operativo alle indagini degli Stati Membri, diffondendo prodotti analitici di carattere strategico.

Il *Counter Proliferation Program* si occupa in particolare dei seguenti aspetti delle aree di mandato:

- uso illecito di sostanze chimiche, biologiche, radioattive e nucleari;
- traffico illecito di materiale radioattivo e nucleare ;

- traffico illecito di armi, munizioni ed esplosivi.

Gli obiettivi del Counter Proliferation Program sono duplici: da un lato si cerca di attuare un collegamento tra le Forze di Polizia e la comunità scientifica, dall'altro di sviluppare una maggiore consapevolezza della minaccia.

Nell'ambito di questo progetto, Europol svolge un importante ruolo di collegamento ed è partner delle istituzioni europee e di organizzazioni internazionali quali l'IAEA, l'Istituto degli elementi transuranici, il *Joint Research Centre*, il *Justice Freedom and Security* ed il *Rapid Alert System*.

### **Realizzazione di bollettini di informazione basati su fonti aperte**

Europol cura l'elaborazione e la diffusione, con cadenza periodica, di rassegne delle fonti aperte quali il *Counter Terrorism Monthly Report* ed il *CBRN Bulletin*; questi bollettini sono rappresentativi del panorama delle informazioni diffuse dai media ed afferenti alla specifica materia.

## **g. Traffico di armi**

### **1. Attività svolta**

L'analisi degli specifici dati svolta da Europol permette di acquisire una migliore comprensione del fenomeno, di individuare i gruppi criminali coinvolti, il modus operandi e le rotte del traffico di armi, con il fine ultimo di rendere sempre più efficace l'attività di contrasto da parte delle Forze di Polizia italiane ed europee agli specifici reati.

In questo particolare settore, Europol fornisce supporto all'ATF (Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms), partecipa allo European Firearms Expert Group ed offre un contributo per le operazioni c.d. ad "alto impatto"; queste ultime sono operazioni straordinarie che si svolgono annualmente e che coinvolgono tutti i Paesi europei.

### **2. Realizzazione di bollettini di informazione**

Nell'ambito dell'area di mandato del "Traffico illecito di Armi e Munizioni", l'Unità antiterrorismo O4 di Europol redige altresì un rapporto annuale denominato "*Situation Report on the illicit Trafficking of Arms*", basato sulle informazioni fornite direttamente dagli Stati Membri.

## **h. Criminalità Organizzata**

Il sostegno alle indagini da parte di Europol avviene attraverso i due principali archivi di analisi: l'AWF "EEOC TOP 100" e l'AWF "Copper".

### **AWF "EEOC TOP 100"**

L'AWF EEOC sviluppa l'analisi e la gestione globale di dati derivanti da "intelligence" in materia di organizzazioni criminali dei Paesi dell'Est Europa. Nel suo ambito si è concluso, nei primi mesi del 2010, il sottoprogetto "STORK", così denominato in relazione ad un'omonima indagine avviata dalla Polizia austriaca nei confronti di un sodalizio criminale moldavo responsabile in loco di un elevato numero di furti con scasso. Il suddetto Target Group, al quale, come noto, avevano aderito Austria, Germania, Francia, Italia e Portogallo - tutti Paesi

impegnati in attività di contrasto alla criminalità organizzata moldava - voleva rispondere all'esigenza di coordinare, attraverso Europol, una più efficace "azione comune" per fronteggiare il fenomeno.

#### **AWF "COPPER"**

L'AWF Copper svolge attività di analisi nei confronti delle organizzazioni criminali albanesi. Nel contrasto al fenomeno, estremamente valido si è rivelato il supporto dell'Ufficio di Europol in concomitanza con la particolare metodologia di cooperazione di polizia a livello UE, concretizzata nel progetto COSPOL, nata nell'ambito della Task Force dei Capi della Polizia per migliorare l'efficienza operativa.

Nella fattispecie si segnala l'operazione denominata "Margherita" che risulta essere un proseguimento della precedente operazione "Andromeda" che ha visto appunto il coinvolgimento di Europol e dei Paesi interessati al Cospol group WBOC ("*Western Balcan Organised Crime*") di cui l'Italia è paese Driver.

La suddetta indagine è stata condotta dalla Guardia di Finanza di Pisa e coordinata dalla Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga sotto la direzione della DDA di Firenze.

A conclusione della precedente attività denominata "Andromeda" è stata individuata, anche sulla scorta dell'analisi operativa effettuata da Europol per il tramite dell'Unità Nazionale, un'associazione per delinquere composta da cittadini di origine albanese dedita al traffico di cocaina, dal Belgio verso numerosi Paesi europei, in particolare Italia e Regno Unito.

Sono tuttora in corso le indagini riguardo all'operazione "Margherita" che hanno al momento consentito di delineare, sebbene facenti parte di un unico sodalizio criminale, i due differenti livelli delle articolazioni criminali, l'una composta prevalentemente da cittadini albanesi originari delle città di Tirana e Berat responsabile del reperimento della cocaina presso i produttori colombiani e l'altra responsabile della materiale distribuzione della droga, composta prevalentemente da cittadini albanesi della provincia di Valona.

Altra attività investigativa condotta con il supporto di Europol, denominata "Vortice2", è stata avviata dal Nucleo Investigativo Carabinieri di Ferrara, che ha visto una fase iniziale volta alla disarticolazione di un sodalizio criminale dedito al traffico internazionale di cocaina, ritenuto a capo di una più ampia associazione per delinquere finalizzata al citato reato. Quest'ultima organizzazione, operante in Emilia Romagna, è risultata completamente integrata in alcune cosche del calabrese e di un clan camorristico campano. Le indagini condotte nei confronti di tale consorteria si sono concluse con il deferimento all'Autorità Giudiziaria di 76 persone - ritenute responsabili di associazione per delinquere finalizzata al traffico di sostanze stupefacenti, favoreggiamento personale e riciclaggio - alcuni dei quali tratti in arresto, mentre per altri risulta un provvedimento restrittivo al vaglio della Magistratura.

Successive attività investigative facevano emergere delle responsabilità anche a carico di quattro cittadini albanesi, ai quali è stata contestata l'ipotesi di cui all'art. 74 del D.P.R. 309/1990 - Associazione per delinquere finalizzata al traffico di sostanze stupefacenti - due dei quali considerati al vertice del sodalizio indagato. Gli stessi sono stati identificati anche attraverso il supporto fornito da Europol nello specifico dell'AWF 03-030 Copper e da Eurojust, nonché le attività di cooperazione internazionale sviluppate con la Polizia Federale Belga, la quale ha avviato, sulla base delle indicazioni fornite dall'Arma, un'autonoma investigazione.

**i. Reati Informatici****AWF “CYBORG”**

Tale Archivio di Analisi, attivato nell'aprile 2009, ha lo scopo di fornire un valido supporto agli operatori di polizia per combattere le forme di criminalità legate ai crimini informatici.

La necessità di tale tipo di AWF deriva da uno studio di fattibilità precedentemente elaborato, in esito al quale è emerso come tale fenomenologia criminale sia in costante aumento, rendendosi necessaria un'adeguata attività di contrasto.

Particolare attenzione è stata rivolta nel contrasto al fenomeno del cosiddetto “*Phishing*” (raccolta dati finanziari e personali tra gli utenti della rete per fini illeciti).

**j. Contraffazione monetaria**

Nell'ambito dell'attività di contrasto alla contraffazione monetaria condotta nel 2010, si evidenziano, in particolare, le seguenti operazioni, attualmente oggetto di cospicuo scambio informativo:

- Nel febbraio 2010 la Romania ha avviato un'indagine incentrata su un soggetto di nazionalità rumena residente in Italia, il quale, nel corso di frequenti viaggi verso il suo Paese, riforniva i suoi connazionali di valuta contraffatta da 100 Euro, con indicativo EUA0100P00018, diffusa in diversi Stati Membri.

Con riferimento alla stesso indicativo di contraffazione, il Comando Carabinieri Antifalsificazione Monetaria sta coordinando contestualmente due indagini nelle province di Lucca e Arezzo che hanno consentito, allo stato attuale, di delineare una rete di distribuzione di banconote false operante in Toscana e all'estero e di trarre in arresto quattro soggetti, di cui tre di nazionalità rumena e uno macedone. Le indagini, tuttora in corso, sono finalizzate a smantellare il canale di smercio verso la Romania, nonché a scoprire l'origine della valuta contraffatta, verosimilmente la regione Campania.

Allo stato attuale, a seguito di un meeting operativo svoltosi il 22 luglio 2010 e finanziato da Europol, è stato concordato che le indagini condotte nei due Paesi saranno sviluppate contemporaneamente.

- A seguito del sequestro di 14.500 Euro in banconote false da 100, operato in un aeroporto rumeno, il collaterale ha avviato un'operazione in collaborazione con il nostro Paese. Dalle indagini, condotte in Italia dal Nucleo Speciale di Polizia Valutaria della Guardia di Finanza, e tuttora in corso, è stato evidenziato che una rete di distribuzione composta da cittadini rumeni si rifornirebbe in Italia da una stamperia clandestina situata nei dintorni di Roma. Un primo meeting operativo, a cui hanno partecipato rappresentanti di Italia, Romania ed Europol, si è tenuto presso il Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia il 26 ottobre 2010. Attualmente, lo scambio informativo continua ed è previsto un prossimo meeting operativo nei primi mesi del 2011.
- Il 22 aprile 2010 la polizia polacca ha portato a termine un'operazione che ha consentito di trarre in arresto a Lublino 14 membri di un sodalizio criminale

dedito alla distribuzione in tutto il territorio europeo di banconote contraffatte da 50 e 100 euro (indicativi EUA0100 P00007 e EUA0050 P00005). L'operazione, denominata "Most", ha coinvolto più di 120 agenti di polizia, ed è stata portata a termine dopo tre anni di intense indagini condotte in cooperazione fra Polonia, Spagna e Italia con il supporto di Europol, che nella circostanza ha inviato "sul campo" propri analisti con al seguito l'ufficio mobile. Altre due operazioni, supportate da Europol e collegate alla citata operazione, erano state condotte nell'aprile e nel settembre 2009 ed avevano consentito di trarre in arresto complessivamente più di 80 criminali. L'operazione "Most" comprende più filoni di indagine relativi a diverse organizzazioni criminali polacche attive in diversi Paesi dell'Unione Europea ed ha visto, sin dal suo avvio nel giugno 2008, il coinvolgimento di Europol, che ha fornito supporto analitico, logistico, finanziario, addestrativo, coordinando altresì i Paesi coinvolti (Polonia, Spagna, Italia e Germania). Nel corso di tutta l'indagine Europol ha organizzato diverse riunioni operative e in due occasioni ha fornito il supporto dell'ufficio mobile. L'operazione, considerata una delle più grandi e complesse condotta dalla polizia polacca, ha consentito di smantellare una delle più pericolose organizzazioni criminali dedite alla distribuzione di denaro contraffatto. Il supporto di Europol è stato altamente apprezzato dagli investigatori e dal Capo della Polizia polacca.

- Il 21 ottobre 2010 le Autorità tedesche hanno tratto in arresto otto membri di un sodalizio criminale attivo nel procacciamento e successiva distribuzione di banconote contraffatte dall'Italia in Germania. Contestualmente, sono stati sequestrati 108.250 euro in banconote contraffatte (nr. 1455 pezzi con indicativo 20P2, nr. 801 indicativo 50P30 e nr. 391 con indicativo 100P7). Nell'operazione il Team dell'AWF Soya ha fornito supporto analitico e finanziario.

Nella specifica area di mandato della contraffazione monetaria, si segnala infine che, dall'8 al 10 dicembre 2010 si è svolto a Sarajevo (Bosnia ed Herzegovina) il "3° *Western Balkan and Turkey Expert Group*" (*WeBTEG*) meeting, organizzato da Europol al fine di rafforzare la cooperazione di polizia nell'area balcanica. Al meeting hanno presenziato i rappresentanti della Commissione Europea/OLAF, di Europol, di Eurojust, i delegati dell'Italia, della Turchia, dell'Albania, e degli altri stati della ex Jugoslavia (Croazia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia,, Bosnia-Erzegovina). Durante la riunione sono state trattate tematiche relative alle caratteristiche delle organizzazioni criminali italiane e bulgare dedite alla falsificazione monetaria e di quelle dedite alle frodi con carte di pagamento. In particolare, è emerso che le organizzazioni criminali bulgare dedite al falso monetario risultano particolarmente specializzate nel campo tipografico, mentre quelle dedite alle frodi con carte di pagamento sono particolarmente attive nella produzione di *skimmer* ed altri congegni elettronici utilizzati per carpire fraudolentemente i codici. I gruppi criminali italiani sono particolarmente attivi nella produzione e distribuzione di valuta contraffatta e risultano coinvolti anche nella produzione di carte di credito clonate e documenti falsi, avvalendosi di cittadini bulgari e romeni per carpire i codici.

### **AWF “SOYA”**

Nell’ambito dell’attività svolta dall’archivio di analisi nel corso del 2010, sono continuate le riunioni periodiche - l’ultima il 21 ottobre 2010 - del Working Group sul Focal Point “**PENINSULA**” fra Italia, Spagna e Francia, finalizzate allo scambio informativo su casi operativi e indagini in corso. Tale gruppo di lavoro opera su uno degli obiettivi ritenuti prioritari per il contrasto della falsificazione monetaria, che comprende le tipologie di contraffazione prodotte in Italia, nell’area campana, e diffuse negli altri Stati Membri dell’Unione.

In particolare, si evidenzia l’operazione condotta nel mese di agosto 2010 dal Comando Carabinieri Antifalsificazione Monetaria in Ponticelli (Napoli), denominata “La Banda degli Onesti”, che ha portato alla scoperta e al successivo smantellamento di una stamperia clandestina completamente attrezzata per la produzione di banconote false da € 50, appartenenti alla classe di contraffazione EUA50P5, ritenuta la più insidiosa in circolazione in Europa.

In considerazione della rilevanza dell’operazione, nel mese di agosto personale di Europol è giunto in Italia e, unitamente a personale del Comando Carabinieri Antifalsificazione Monetaria, ha effettuato una visita presso il locali ove era ubicata la stamperia sottoposta a sequestro.

### **k. Pirateria commerciale**

#### **AWF “COPY”**

Relativamente all’area di mandato in argomento, l’archivio di analisi dell’AWF COPY, in attività dal 1° marzo 2008, convoglia i dati in materia di contraffazione e pirateria commerciale.

Attualmente partecipano all’AWF Belgio, Bulgaria, Francia, Finlandia, Germania, Grecia, Inghilterra, Italia, Portogallo, Romania, Spagna e Ungheria, e sono altresì associati Interpol ed Eurojust.

In tale ambito, Europol sta valutando la possibilità di includere la tematica della contraffazione dei farmaci nell’AWF COPY, considerata come una delle priorità strategiche da seguire, attese le connotazioni internazionali delle organizzazioni criminali coinvolte. La diffusione di tale fenomeno, infatti, ha assunto una portata globale ed il numero di prodotti interessati è aumentato esponenzialmente, registrando casi di contraffazione sia di medicinali che di dispositivi medici. Parallelamente all’incremento della domanda di prodotti contraffatti è stata avvertita l’esigenza, a livello istituzionale, di promuovere campagne informative per sensibilizzare l’opinione pubblica sui pericoli connessi all’assunzione di prodotti farmaceutici contraffatti.

Nello specifico, è stato verificato che le organizzazioni criminali che operano nel settore farmaceutico hanno una struttura compartimentata diretta da pochi capi, mentre il *modus operandi* varia in base alle differenti responsabilità degli associati con due diversi livelli “gestionali”: uno strategico ed uno tattico, che operano con le stesse tecniche delle grandi organizzazioni criminali, con basi strategiche ubicate nello stesso Paese/Nazione dove il prodotto finale viene venduto. La maggior parte dei medicinali contraffatti, invece, viene prodotta e confezionata in Asia o nell’Europa dell’Est, ove la normativa di settore è più permeabile, la manodopera è a basso costo e sono meno tutelati i diritti di proprietà intellettuale.

Per l'Italia, il Comando Carabinieri per la Tutela della Salute è l'unica Forza di Polizia a concorrere all'iniziativa. In particolare, i Nuclei Antisofisticazione e Sanità (N.A.S.) hanno verificato che, nel 59% dei casi, la vendita di farmaci on-line cela una truffa vera e propria, in quanto a fronte del pagamento effettuato non corrisponde alcuna spedizione. Inoltre, l'analisi quantitativa e qualitativa dei farmaci recapitati ha confermato che nel 95% dei casi si trattava di farmaci contraffatti e/o illegali pericolosi per la salute pubblica.

In materia di pirateria commerciale:

- a. il 10 maggio 2010, nell'ambito di una vasta indagine denominata "Gomorrahl", il Nucleo di Polizia Tributaria della Guardia di Finanza di Napoli, con il supporto di Europol, ha effettuato un'importante operazione di polizia che ha interessato l'Italia e altri Paesi europei, fra i quali Germania, Francia, Spagna e Svezia, con il coinvolgimento del canale di cooperazione giudiziaria Eurojust.

L'operazione, originatasi nel 2009, ha consentito di colpire una rete criminale internazionale, dedita allo smercio di generatori elettrici contraffatti, ad opera di soggetti provenienti soprattutto dalla città di Napoli e presumibilmente affiliati alla camorra. L'attività di indagine è stata coordinata in Italia dalla Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia del capoluogo campano, che ha emesso provvedimenti restrittivi della libertà personale nei confronti di vari soggetti. Nello specifico, l'operazione ha consentito di trarre in arresto sette dei nove soggetti colpiti da ordinanza di custodia cautelare, nonché di sequestrare beni per un valore stimato di oltre 10 milioni di euro (compreso un conto corrente bancario, sul quale erano depositati *bond* per un controvalore di circa 4 milioni di euro). La suddetta operazione ha avuto ampio risalto anche sugli organi di informazione nazionali.

L'apporto di EUROPOL nella complessa indagine, seguita fin dalla sua fase preliminare, è stato determinante nel creare le giuste sinergie tra i diversi Organismi di polizia europei e, in particolare, nel fornire valido supporto all'attività info-investigativa attraverso il sotto-progetto "GOMORRAHI", costituito nell'ambito del presente archivio di analisi che ha consentito di analizzare tutti i dati raccolti dai diversi Paesi coinvolti nel fenomeno criminale in argomento, contribuendo a far emergere le connessioni tra le diverse investigazioni intraprese.

Nel quadro di tale investigazione, si evidenzia la riunione operativa tenutasi nella città di Napoli nei giorni dal 10 al 12 maggio 2010 (fase "pre-operativa") tra gli investigatori del capoluogo campano e gli analisti di Europol, che, per l'occasione, hanno impiegato l'Ufficio Mobile di Europol. Tale incontro è servito per pianificare l'operazione, che si è concretizzata nei giorni dal 19 al 21 maggio ("action day").

- b. il 7 settembre si è svolta una vasta operazione nell'ambito dell'indagine convenzionalmente denominata "VOS" ("Volpe" in belga), con l'obiettivo di smantellare l'80% della pirateria informatica esistente in Belgio ed Olanda, che ha un volume d'affari stimato in 30 milioni di Euro. Nell'ambito dell'indagine erano stati localizzati 27 server dislocati in 10 Stati Membri (BE-NL-CZ-UK-CH-HU-FR-SE-IT-PL). L'operazione - coordinata dall'Unità del crimine informatico della Polizia Federale di Bruxelles, attraverso una sala operativa allestita presso Europol - ha

coinvolto, per gli aspetti operativi, i seguenti Stati Membri: Francia, Italia, Paesi Bassi, Polonia, Regno Unito, Repubblica Ceca, Svezia, Ungheria, Norvegia e Svizzera. Per l'Italia ha partecipato personale della Polizia Postale di Vicenza e Venezia, che ha proceduto, presso la sede operativa di una ditta di Vicenza, al sequestro di un server ricevuto dall'Olanda ed alla denuncia del titolare per associazione a delinquere finalizzata alla pirateria informatica sui diritti d'autore.

#### **I. Contraffazione di altri Mezzi di Pagamento**

##### **AWF “TERMINAL”**

Esso sostiene, con l'analisi, l'azione delle Autorità competenti degli Stati Membri in materia di prevenzione e repressione delle attività di organizzazioni criminali coinvolte in fatti delittuosi riguardanti le carte di pagamento, con particolare riferimento alla sottrazione di dati o copiatura elettronica di qualunque tipo di carta di pagamento (*skimming*). Al citato AWF, attualmente aderiscono i seguenti Stati Membri: Austria, Belgio, Bulgaria, Cipro, Repubblica Ceca, Danimarca, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Ungheria, Irlanda, Italia, Lettonia, Lituania, Lussemburgo, Malta, Olanda, Polonia, Portogallo, Romania, Repubblica Slovacca, Slovenia, Spagna, Svezia, Regno Unito, nonché i seguenti Stati Terzi: Australia, Canada, Norvegia e Stati Uniti

**Anche per l'anno 2010** si segnala un considerevole aumento del già cospicuo scambio informativo concernente casi di contraffazione. Come negli anni precedenti, risultano coinvolti in tali contesti principalmente cittadini rumeni e bulgari, operanti in svariati Stati Membri dell'Unione Europea e con collegamenti in Italia.

Sulla base dell'attività operativa nel settore, è stato possibile registrare, quali più recenti tendenze, un nuovo aumento dei casi relativi all'alterazione degli sportelli bancomat (ATM), rispetto alla manipolazione degli apparati POS presso gli esercizi commerciali, maggiormente diffusa in passato. Ciò potrebbe essere dovuto al miglioramento della tecnologia utilizzata per la sicurezza degli apparati POS di ultima generazione, più difficilmente manipolabili, e alle maggiori difficoltà incontrate dai criminali nel porre in essere i loro *modi operandi* presso gli esercizi commerciali.

Per l'Italia si registra il supporto costante di Guardia di Finanza, dell'Arma dei Carabinieri e Polizia Postale.

Si segnala, infine, un intenso scambio informativo intercorso tra il Servizio della Polizia Postale ed il competente Ufficio bulgaro del “*General Directorate Combating Organized Crime*”, in relazione ad un sodalizio criminale bulgaro specializzato in *skimming* ed attivo anche in Italia. In tale contesto, lo scorso 7 dicembre è stato organizzato a Sofia, con la collaborazione dell'AWF Terminal, un meeting operativo tra i rappresentanti dei due Organismi in parola, al fine di coordinarne le informazioni in possesso di entrambi, anche in relazione alle investigazioni tuttora in corso.

**m. Stupefacenti**

Nel corso dell'anno sono state portate a termine numerose consegne controllate di stupefacenti in cooperazione con la Gran Bretagna e la Spagna, che hanno portato al sequestro di sostanze stupefacenti (cocaina, hashish e marijuana) e all'arresto dei responsabili del traffico.

**AWF “SYNERGY”**

Questo file di analisi ha l'obiettivo di individuare le organizzazioni criminali dedite al traffico di droghe sintetiche e precursori, attraverso un'attività di analisi delle informazioni fornite dagli Stati partecipanti, in ordine ai più rilevanti sequestri delle predette sostanze. E' tutt'ora attivo un intenso scambio informativo.

**AWF “COLA”**

Il progetto “COLA”, al quale partecipano 14 Stati Membri, mira alla raccolta dei dati inerenti la rete del traffico di droga, operante nell'Unione Europea, avente collegamenti con i gruppi criminali Latino-Americani.

Nell'ambito del progetto COSPOL, ove l'Italia figura quale Driver, si sono evidenziate le seguenti operazioni:

- **ELLENIKA**, svolta con il supporto analitico di Europol, nei confronti di organizzazioni criminali albanesi, bosniache, croate e serbe, che ha portato al sequestro di 13 kg di eroina;
- **P.H.**, svolta con il supporto di analisi operativa, nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale nigeriana, dedita al traffico di eroina, che ha portato, sino ad oggi, all'arresto di 10 soggetti;
- **CARONTE**, svolta con il supporto di analisi operativa, nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale dell'Africa occidentale, che ha portato, sino ad oggi, al sequestro di kg.21 di eroina e all'arresto di 15 soggetti;
- **ZIA CONNECTION**, svolta con il supporto di analisi operativa, nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale composta da nord africani in Italia e dedita al traffico di eroina dalla Turchia, che ha portato, sino ad oggi, all'arresto di 5 soggetti e al sequestro di kg.5 di eroina;
- **KRISSY**, che ha portato, a tutt'oggi, a diversi arresti;
- **TRUCK**, svolta nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale albanese, attiva in Italia per il traffico di eroina, che ha portato, sino ad oggi, all'arresto di 6 sogetti ed al sequestro di kg.12 di eroina;
- **DEJAVU 2010**, svolta nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale albanese, che ha portato, ad oggi, all'arresto di un soggetto ed al sequestro di kg.8;
- **HELLAS**, svolta nei confronti di un'organizzazione criminale albanese, dedita al traffico di eroina in molti Paesi europei e nell'area dei Balcani;
- **KORAB**, iniziata a seguito del sequestro di kg.100 di eroina e all'arresto di due soggetti di nazionalità bulgara.

**AWF “HEROIN”**

Esso è un file di analisi sulle organizzazioni criminali turche dedite al traffico di eroina ed alle relative attività di riciclaggio di denaro attraverso le vie dei Balcani e nuove varianti.

**AWF “CANNABIS”**

Tale archivio di analisi è stato formalmente aperto il 25 gennaio 2010 e si pone come obiettivo l'analisi delle informazioni e dei dati di indagine relativi al traffico di *cannabis*, che coinvolge gli Stati Membri dell'Unione Europea, l'identificazione dei trend criminali, e l'individuazione di strategie comuni, finalizzate a disarticolare le organizzazioni criminali responsabili di tale traffico illecito. Al citato AWF, hanno aderito Belgio, Bulgaria, Cipro, Repubblica Ceca, Danimarca, Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Ungheria, Irlanda, Italia, Lettonia, Olanda, Polonia, Portogallo, Romania, Repubblica Slovacca, Spagna, Svezia e Gran Bretagna.

**n. Contrabbando di sigarette**

Lo scambio informativo in questo specifico settore si mantiene su livelli non elevati.

Pur non essendo state concluse operazioni di particolare rilievo, si segnalano comunque numerosi sequestri di tabacchi lavorati esteri, effettuati in Italia dal Corpo della Guardia di Finanza.

**AWF “SMOKE”**

Si pone come obiettivo principale la lotta al contrabbando di sigarette e di tabacchi in genere, nonché l'individuazione e lo smantellamento di fabbriche clandestine per la relativa produzione.

Nel corso del 2010, numerose sono state le richieste pervenute da Europol circa sequestri di sigarette effettuati in Italia dalla Guardia di Finanza, unitamente alle Autorità Doganali. Tra i principali porti interessati dal fenomeno del contrabbando vi sono quelli di Ancona, Brindisi e Gioia Tauro. Secondo una stima, nel corso dell'anno sono stati sequestrate circa 21.000 tonnellate di T.L.E.

**o. Riciclaggio – Transazioni finanziarie sospette****AWF “SUSTRANS”**

Proseguono le attività dell'archivio di analisi avviato nel novembre 2001 col fine di raccogliere, conservare, analizzare e scambiare rilevanti informazioni atte ad identificare i soggetti coinvolti nella rete internazionale di riciclaggio di denaro e nelle transazioni finanziarie sospette, al fine di supportare le competenti Autorità nazionali degli Stati Membri nella prevenzione e nella lotta a tutte le forme di criminalità ricomprese nel mandato Europol e collegate a tale tipo di fenomeno.

In tale contesto, si registra un costante flusso informativo soprattutto con alcuni Stati Membri, fra i quali l'Olanda, la Francia, e la Spagna, pur non essendovi state, nel corso del 2010, operazioni congiunte con l'Italia.


In seno all'AWF Sustrans, è stato inoltre costituito il sottoprogetto "EUDEFT", finalizzato al rafforzamento delle tecniche utilizzate nelle investigazioni finanziarie e dell'attività di intelligence, per la prevenzione e il contrasto delle attività illecite poste in essere dalle organizzazioni criminali negli Stati Membri dell'Unione Europea. Promotori di tale progetto sono la *National Policing Improvement Agency* del Regno Unito, la Scuola di Polizia Tributaria della Guardia di Finanza e la Scuola di Perfezionamento per le Forze di Polizia per l'Italia, e la *Guardia Civil* spagnola.

### 5. Entità dell'impegno operativo dell'Unità Nazionale Europol

Alla luce di quanto rappresentato paragrafo 3, appare evidente l'entità del flusso informativo gestito dall'Unità Nazionale, che, in particolare negli ultimi due anni, ha mostrato un evidente aumento.

Nel trascorso anno, lo sforzo compiuto dal personale ha consentito di incrementare ulteriormente la quantità di informazioni trattate, evidenziando una crescita esponenziale delle richieste di informazioni inoltrate all'Ufficio di Collegamento presso Europol e delle risposte pervenute (grafico 1):


Grafico 1



Scambio di informazioni via S.I.E.N.A. nel biennio 2009/2010.

L'aumento sopra evidenziato ha riguardato tutte le aree di mandato Europol, così come previste dalla Decisione del Consiglio e ad esso corrisponde un analogo numero di trattazioni sul sistema di messaggistica utilizzato dalla DCPC (denominato ARIANNA) e attraverso l'applicativo Outlook (grafico 2):

Grafico 2



Scambio di informazioni via Arianna/Outlook nel biennio 2009/2010.

## 6. Ulteriori contributi

Nell'ambito dei Progetti COSPOL, l'Unità Nazionale e l'Ufficio di Collegamento sostengono il flusso informativo da e per gli AWF di cui si avvalgono i Paesi aderenti e soprattutto l'Italia per i progetti di cui è "Driver", "Co-Driver" e "Forerunner", e precisamente:

- progetto COSPOL WBOC "**Western Balcan Organized Crime**", in qualità di **Driver** (personale della 1<sup>a</sup> Divisione Affari Generali del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia);
- progetto COSPOL "**Heroin Trafficking**" in qualità di **Driver** (personale della Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga);
- progetto COSPOL "**Organised Crime Exploiting ICT**" in qualità di **Co-Driver** (personale della 1<sup>a</sup> Divisione Affari Generali del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia nonché personale del Servizio Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni);
- progetto COSPOL "**Cocaine**" in qualità di **Forerunner** (personale della Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga);
- progetto COSPOL "**Synthetic Drug**" in qualità di **Forerunner** (personale della Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga);
- progetto COSPOL "**CIRCAMP – Cospol Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project**" in qualità di **Forerunner** del progetto (personale del Servizio Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni);
- progetto COSPOL "**Facilitated illegal immigration**" in qualità di **Forerunner** del progetto (personale della Direzione Centrale dell'Immigrazione e della Polizia di Frontiere);
- progetto COSPOL "**Trafficking in Human Beings**" in qualità di **Forerunner** del progetto (partecipa personale della Direzione Centrale Anticrimine della Polizia di Stato e personale del Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri – II Reparto - Ufficio Criminalità Organizzata).

Come noto, COSPOL è l'acronimo inglese che sta per **Comprehensive, Operational, Strategic Planning for the Police** (Pianificazione Globale Strategica Operativa per la Polizia) e può essere visto come lo strumento pratico e operativo della Task Force dei Capi della Polizia - ora COSI - che opera su un numero ridotto di progetti che riflettono le priorità individuate nella Valutazione della Minaccia posta dalla Criminalità Organizzata (OCTA) e approvate dal Consiglio. Esso è stato concepito quale strumento multilaterale di polizia volto a dare supporto all'Europol e ai suoi Archivi di Analisi (AWF).


## 7. Statistiche


In questo paragrafo si riportano le statistiche relative allo scambio informativo, mediante l'utilizzo dell'applicazione SIENA, intercorso tra l'Italia e gli altri Stati membri, attraverso l'Unità Nazionale Europol e i suoi Ufficiali di Collegamento distaccati a L'Aja. Viene evidenziata, inoltre, la quantità dei dati inseriti nella banca dati EIS, la cui alimentazione è possibile, come sottolineato in precedenza, solo grazie ai contributi che le Forze di Polizia inviano all'Unità Nazionale, sulla base dei dati e delle informazioni emersi nel corso delle attività di indagine.

Infine, sono riportati i dati statistici relativi alle assunzioni del personale di Europol nel 2010, cioè il numero dei candidati che hanno partecipato ai concorsi banditi dall'Ufficio Europeo di Polizia e di coloro che sono stati selezionati, distinti per nazionalità.


### SIENA


#### 1. Casi iniziati attraverso SIENA







**2. Messaggi scambiati attraverso SIENA**









### 3. Lo scambio informativo riferito agli Stati membri





	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010					
Germany	917	Belgium	928	France	678	France	826	United Kingdom	980	Germany	1361
France	744	France	699	United Kingdom	568	United Kingdom	750	Germany	973	United Kingdom	1163
Austria	479	Germany	631	Germany	562	Germany	661	France	947	France	929
United Kingdom	466	United Kingdom	400	Austria	500	Austria	514	Austria	528	Spain	619
Belgium	359	Austria	382	Belgium	351	Spain	361	Spain	480	Belgium	488
Spain	334	Spain	381	Spain	350	Hungary	343	Belgium	372	The Netherlands	459
Portugal	273	The Netherlands	316	Hungary	337	Sweden	272	The Netherlands	310	Austria	445
The Netherlands	243	Portugal	257	The Netherlands	287	The Netherlands	265	Sweden	308	Italy	414
Denmark	242	Denmark	232	Sweden	270	Belgium	261	Hungary	292	Sweden	337
Italy	194	Sweden	222	Portugal	266	Romania	236	Italy	268	Hungary	274
Sweden	170	Hungary	201	Cyprus	196	Portugal	216	Denmark	250	Denmark	240
Hungary	135	Lithuania	143	Denmark	164	Greece	195	Portugal	239	Portugal	236
Lithuania	119	Cyprus	142	Greece	159	Denmark	192	Ireland	194	Greece	218
Greece	109	Italy	125	Italy	139	Cyprus	191	Greece	179	Romania	210
Finland	98	Greece	116	Lithuania	139	Italy	146	Romania	176	Bulgaria	186
Czech Republic	88	Czech Republic	96	Romania	103	Ireland	136	Finland	168	Czech Republic	174
Slovak Republic	87	Finland	89	Finland	88	Finland	126	Lithuania	153	Finland	165
Poland	85	Ireland	77	Poland	87	Lithuania	122	Bulgaria	148	Cyprus	143
Cyprus	78	Poland	73	Slovenia	85	Czech Republic	80	Cyprus	145	Poland	142
Slovenia	77	Slovak Republic	63	Czech Republic	70	Slovenia	76	Slovak Republic	129	Lithuania	134
Ireland	51	Estonia	54	Bulgaria	69	Poland	69	Czech Republic	126	Slovak Republic	134
Estonia	31	Slovenia	51	Ireland	69	Bulgaria	68	Poland	113	Latvia	128
Latvia	28	Latvia	46	Estonia	50	Estonia	52	Latvia	75	Ireland	117
Malta	24	Malta	39	Slovak Republic	47	Latvia	50	Slovenia	71	Estonia	93
Luxembourg	12	Luxembourg	14	Latvia	41	Slovak Republic	50	Estonia	66	Slovenia	76
				Malta	25	Luxembourg	26	Malta	46	Malta	37
				Luxembourg	22	Malta	20	Luxembourg	24	Luxembourg	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>5443</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5777</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5722</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>6304</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>7760</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>8957</b>










2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
Germany	14542	France	17621	France	17890	Germany	20507	Germany	17822
France	12528	Germany	16797	Germany	17884	France	18270	France	15070
United King	9947	United King.	12362	United King.	15274	United King.	15882	United King.	13243
Spain	9260	The Netherl.	10197	The Netherl.	11008	The Netherl.	12643	The Netherl.	9898
The Netherl.	8911	Spain	9724	Spain	9980	Belgium	11134	Spain	9022
Belgium	8780	Sweden	9233	Cyprus	9520	Austria	10808	Belgium	8428
Sweden	7525	Belgium	8891	Sweden	9369	Spain	10055	Sweden	8322
Denmark	6212	Austria	8046	Belgium	9159	Sweden	9352	Austria	8088
Austria	6139	Cyprus	7523	Austria	7885	Italy	8098	Italy	7445
Lithuania	5683	Italy	6247	Italy	7148	Denmark	7369	Denmark	6424
Italy	5534	Lithuania	6146	Denmark	6852	Hungary	6710	Romania	5826
Cyprus	5052	Denmark	5743	Hungary	5875	Latvia	6112	Hungary	5757
Greece	4645	Hungary	5576	Greece	5852	Lithuania	6053	Czech Rep.	5707
Czech Rep.	4612	Portugal	5569	Lithuania	5387	Czech Rep.	5742	Bulgaria	5040
Hungary	4064	Czech Rep.	4906	Romania	5374	Cyprus	5500	Lithuania	4707
Slovak Rep.	4040	Greece	4863	Czech Rep.	5305	Finland	5340	Portugal	4689
Portugal	3750	Romania	4744	Ireland	4798	Slovak Rep.	5282	Finland	4316
Finland	3644	Slovenia	4483	Portugal	4445	Poland	5221	Latvia	4307
Slovenia	3221	Finland	4392	Latvia	4243	Romania	5196	Poland	4072
Poland	2659	Poland	3659	Poland	4238	Portugal	5145	Greece	3860
Latvia	2616	Ireland	3650	Finland	4218	Greece	5061	Slovak Rep.	3693
Estonia	2480	Bulgaria	3395	Bulgaria	3982	Bulgaria	4850	Ireland	3513
Ireland	2395	Slovak Rep.	3320	Slovak Rep.	3814	Ireland	4433	Estonia	2987
Malta	2213	Latvia	3096	Slovenia	3671	Estonia	3869	Cyprus	2910
Luxemb.	1791	Estonia	2948	Estonia	3416	Malta	2841	Luxembourg	2896
		Luxemb.	2428	Luxemb.	2244	Slovenia	2803	Slovenia	2856
		Malta	2420	Malta	2190	Luxembourg	2681	Malta	2175
<b>Total</b>	<b>142243</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>177979</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>191021</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>206957</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>173073</b>

## LA BANCA DATI EIS (EUROPOL INFORMATION SYSTEM)


### 1. Contenuto dell'EIS










EIS - Input actions in 2010





**STATISTICHE CONCORSI**

Dal grafico sopra riportato si evince che, anche per l'anno 2010, a fronte dell'elevato numero di candidature presentate dall'Italia (il secondo più alto, dopo la Romania), il numero dei connazionali preselezionati e, tra questi, il numero di coloro che sono risultati vincitori del concorso, risulta assolutamente esiguo rispetto alle differenti posizioni di impiego messe a concorso. Invero, queste ultime avrebbero potuto consentire la individuazione di professionalità adeguate ma non hanno trovato un positivo riscontro nella fase concorsuale già dalla valutazione delle *application form*, spesso non adeguate ai requisiti richiesti ai candidati da Europol nei bandi di concorso.

## 8. Considerazioni e conclusioni

Il quadro complessivo fin qui delineato consente di osservare che:

- il coinvolgimento di Europol, anche alla luce dei cambiamenti normativi evidenziati nel primo paragrafo - che hanno trasformato l'Ufficio Europeo di Polizia in Agenzia dell'Unione, con il conseguente ampliamento dell'area di mandato - è sempre più richiesto da parte dell'Unione Europea;
- sebbene i contributi che le Forze di Polizia nazionali offrono o richiedono ad Europol, attraverso i Referenti e l'Unità Nazionale, siano in crescita, ancora il numero dei casi iniziati ed il complessivo volume di scambio informativo sembrano essere inferiori rispetto alle potenzialità italiane, nonché non pienamente adeguati rispetto agli impegni formalmente assunti dall'Italia e ai fenomeni criminali transnazionali che emergono dai rapporti ufficiali e dall'impatto mediatico che hanno negli altri Stati membri;
- nello specifico, si rileva che il numero dei contributi inviati dai Referenti Nazionali all'UNE per l'alimentazione del sistema informativo di Europol (EIS) e degli Archivi di Analisi (AWF), risulta ancora esiguo, soprattutto in relazione all'intensa attività di indagine condotta sul territorio nazionale, da cui scaturiscono spesso operazioni di servizio di rilievo europeo i cui risultati non vengono messi a disposizione, tramite l'UNE, dell'Ufficio Europeo di Polizia e, di conseguenza, delle Forze di Polizia di tutti gli Stati membri, privandosi della possibilità di conoscere se emergano collegamenti con altre analoghe attività condotte in ambito UE. Ciò appare dovuto ancora ad una mancanza di consapevolezza delle reali potenzialità di Europol e degli strumenti che esso offre a sostegno dell'azione degli Stati membri nel contrasto al terrorismo, alla criminalità organizzata e alle altre forme gravi di criminalità.

Alla luce di quanto evidenziato, è auspicabile che le Forze di Polizia italiane, anche opportunamente "sensibilizzate" in tal senso dai vertici istituzionali, prendano maggiore coscienza dell'importanza di Europol e dei valori aggiunti che esso offre e, coerentemente con gli impegni internazionali assunti dall'Italia all'atto della ratifica della Convenzione Europol prima, e del successivo recepimento della Decisione del Consiglio in seguito, contribuiscano a rafforzare questo strumento di cooperazione, rendendone l'azione effettiva ed efficace, nell'esclusivo interesse della lotta alla criminalità transazionale e a sostegno dell'attività di contrasto condotta in territorio nazionale.

Ciò consentirà da un lato di ridurre l'asfissia informativa di cui si è parlato in precedenza, favorendo una più consapevole e convinta condivisione delle informazioni; dall'altro, consentirà di superare lo scetticismo circa le reali potenzialità di Europol e dei "servizi" che esso pone a disposizione degli Stati Membri.

**Documenti allegati:**

- **Amended Budget 2010;**
- **Budget and Staff Establishment Plan 2010**
- **Child sexual exploitation fact sheet 2010**
- **Cocaine;**
- **Europol Review 2009;**
- **Tesat 2010.**

## Amended Budget 2010

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Budget 2010 File No 2210-262	Amendments File No 2210-268 & File No 2210-273 and transfers	Amended Budget 2010
<b>9</b>	<b>REVENUE</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>	<b>12,754,958</b>	<b>92,823,108</b>
<b>9 0</b>	<b>Subsidies and contributions</b>			
9 0 0	Regular subsidy from the Community	79,724,150	-	79,724,150
9 0 1	Other subsidies and grants	P.M.	263,438	263,438
9 0 1	Other subsidies and grants	P.M.	263,438	263,438
	<b>Chapter 9 0 - Total</b>	<b>79,724,150</b>	<b>263,438</b>	<b>79,987,588</b>
<b>9 1</b>	<b>Host State contribution</b>			
9 1 0	Host State contribution	244,000	1,135,060	1,380,060
9 1 0	Host State contribution	244,000	1,135,060	1,380,060
	<b>Chapter 9 1 - Total</b>	<b>244,000</b>	<b>1,135,060</b>	<b>1,380,060</b>
<b>9 2</b>	<b>Other revenue</b>			
9 2 0	Other revenue	100,000	-	100,000
9 2 0	Other revenue	P.M.	2,790,850	2,790,850
9 2 1	Proceeds of taxation of staff	P.M.	2,790,850	2,790,850
	<b>Chapter 9 2 - Total</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>2,790,850</b>	<b>2,890,850</b>
<b>9 3</b>	<b>Art 58.4 Europol Council Decision</b>			
9 3 0	Art 58.4 Europol Council Decision	P.M.	6,744,291	6,744,291
9 3 0	Member States contributions	P.M.	109,267	109,267
9 3 0	Host State contribution	P.M.	1,225,274	1,225,274
9 3 0	Grants	P.M.	1,225,274	1,225,274
9 3 0	Community subsidy	P.M.	485,778	485,778
	<b>Chapter 9 3 - Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>8,564,610</b>	<b>8,564,610</b>
	<b>TITLE 9 -- TOTAL</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>	<b>12,754,958</b>	<b>92,823,108</b>

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Budget 2010 File No 2210-262	Amendments File No 2210-268 and transfers	Amended Budget 2010
<b>1</b>	<b>STAFF</b>	<b>48,143,000</b>	<b>3,270,810</b>	<b>51,413,810</b>
<b>1 1</b>	<b>Staff in active employment</b>			
1 1 0	Temporary staff holding a post provided for in the establishment plan			
1100	Basic salaries	28,425,000	-19,364,501	9,060,499
1101	Family allowances	1,805,000	-705,000	1,100,000
1102	Expatriation and foreign-residence allowances	3,889,000	-7,402,000	1,487,000
1 1 1	Other staff			
1110	Contract staff	1,958,000	715,000	2,673,000
1111	Seconded national experts (non-operational)	75,000	-75,000	-
1 1 2	Employer's social security contributions for temporary agents			
1120	Insurance against sickness	1,145,000	-825,001	319,999
1121	Insurance against accidents and occupational disease	-	74,000	74,000
1122	Insurance against unemployment	465,000	-344,374	120,626
1 1 3	Miscellaneous allowances and grants for temporary agents			
1130	Childbirth and death allowances and grants	15,000	-9,450	5,550
1131	Travel expenses for annual leave	500,000	-105,000	395,000
1 1 4	Overtime, shiftwork and standby duty			
1140	Overtime	17,500	-15,000	2,500
1141	Shift work and standby duty	17,500	34,555	52,055
1 1 5	Allowances and expenses on entering and leaving the service and on transfer			
1150	Expenditure related to Recruitment	728,000	-570,000	158,000
1151	Travel expenses on taking up duties and at end of contract	181,000	-158,000	23,000
1152	Installation, resettlement and transfer allowances for temporary agents	110,000	-10,000	100,000
1153	Removal expenses for temporary agents	90,000	-35,000	55,000
1154	Temporary daily subsistence allowances for temporary agents	115,000	-110,000	5,000
1 1 6	Salary weightings			
1160	Salary weightings	3,125,000	-2,180,000	945,000
1 1 7	Security Staff			
1170	Contract staff (Security)	2,342,000	-2,342,000	-
1171	Salaries and allowances for Local Security Staff	P.M.	1,007,060	1,007,060
1172	Security Missions	4,000	-	4,000
1173	Training for Security Staff	85,000	-	85,000
1174	Other expenditure for Security Staff	40,000	-	40,000
1 1 8	Staff expenditure for continuation of staff contracts under the Europol Convention			
1180	Europol Staff	P.M.	27,570,001	27,570,001
1181	Local Staff	P.M.	433,720	433,720
1182	Salary Adjustments	290,000	-290,000	-
1183	Unemployment allowance	P.M.	-	-
1184	Pensions under Europol convention	P.M.	3,489,000	3,489,000
	<b>Chapter 1 1 — Total</b>	<b>45,422,000</b>	<b>3,783,010</b>	<b>49,205,010</b>
<b>1 2</b>	<b>Administrative Missions</b>			
1 2 0	Administrative Missions			
1200	Administrative Missions	330,500	-83,000	247,500
	<b>Chapter 1 2 — Total</b>	<b>330,500</b>	<b>-83,000</b>	<b>247,500</b>
<b>1 3</b>	<b>Sociomedical infrastructure</b>			
1 3 0	Restaurants and canteens			
1300	Catering costs	592,000	15,000	607,000
1301	Restaurant equipment	179,500	-17,000	162,500
1 3 1	Medical service			
1310	Medical service	138,500	120,000	258,500
1 3 2	Sports activities and social events			
1320	Sports activities	45,000	-	45,000
1321	Social events	60,000	-	60,000
1 3 3	Staff Committee			
1330	Staff Committee	10,000	-	10,000
1 3 4	Special allowances and grants			
1340	Special allowances and grants	P.M.	-	-
1 3 5	Other sociomedical expenditure			
1350	Other sociomedical expenditure	5,000	-	5,000
	<b>Chapter 1 3 — Total</b>	<b>1,030,000</b>	<b>118,000</b>	<b>1,148,000</b>
<b>1 4</b>	<b>Training</b>			
1 4 0	Training of staff			
1400	Training of staff	511,000	-115,000	396,000
	<b>Chapter 1 4 — Total</b>	<b>511,000</b>	<b>-115,000</b>	<b>396,000</b>
<b>1 5</b>	<b>Other staff-related expenditure</b>			
1 5 0	PMO Services			
1500	PMO Translation and Interpretation Services	P.M.	-	-
1501	PMO Management costs	350,000	-230,000	120,000
1 5 1	Supplementary clerical and interim services			
1510	Supplementary clerical and interim services	206,200	-116,200	90,000
1 5 2	Other external services			
1520	Other external services	160,000	-86,000	74,000
	<b>Chapter 1 5 — Total</b>	<b>716,200</b>	<b>-432,200</b>	<b>284,000</b>
<b>1 6</b>	<b>Entertainment and representation expenses</b>			
1 6 0	Entertainment and representation expenses			
1600	General entertainment and representation expenses	133,300	-	133,300
	<b>Chapter 1 6 — Total</b>	<b>133,300</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>133,300</b>
	<b>TITLE 1 — TOTAL</b>	<b>48,143,000</b>	<b>3,270,810</b>	<b>51,413,810</b>

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Budget 2010 File No 2210-262	A Amendments File No 2210-266 File No 2210-273 and transfers	Amended Budget 2010
<b>2</b>	<b>OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE</b>	<b>12,090,000</b>	<b>9,056,710</b>	<b>21,146,710</b>
<b>2 0</b>	<b>Rental of buildings and associated costs</b>			
2 0 0	Rent			
2 0 1	Insurance of building(s)	P.M.	-	-
2 0 2	Water, gas, electricity and local taxes	636,600	-79,500	557,100
2 0 3	Cleaning and maintenance	496,500	-179,000	317,500
2 0 4	Security of buildings and persons			
2 0 4 0	Security equipment	104,000	-	104,000
2 0 4 1	Security services	P.M.	-	-
2 0 4 2	Health and safety at work	66,050	-32,000	34,050
2 0 5	Other building related expenditure			
2 0 5 0	Other building related expenditure	387,700	658,000	1,045,700
	<b>Chapter 2 0 — Total</b>	<b>1,907,350</b>	<b>367,500</b>	<b>2,274,850</b>
<b>2 1</b>	<b>Administrative information technology</b>			
2 1 0	Costs of administrative information technology equipment and related expenditure			
2 1 0 0	Purchase of administrative information technology equipment	252,500	1,323,000	1,575,500
2 1 0 1	Purchase of administrative software and licenses	432,500	-331,000	101,500
2 1 0 2	Maintenance and repair of administrative information technology equipment	50,500	-	50,500
2 1 0 3	Maintenance of administrative software and licenses	409,500	-122,000	287,500
2 1 0 4	Administrative consultancy and studies	186,000	67,000	253,000
2 1 0 5	Administrative system integration services	125,000	-91,000	34,000
2 1 0 6	Other administrative data processing expenditure	P.M.	-	-
	<b>Chapter 2 1 — Total</b>	<b>1,456,000</b>	<b>846,000</b>	<b>2,302,000</b>
<b>2 2</b>	<b>Movable property and associated costs</b>			
2 2 0	Technical equipment and installations			
2 2 0 0	Technical equipment and installations	211,950	-92,000	119,950
2 2 1	Furniture and other acquisitions			
2 2 1 0	Furniture and other acquisitions	3,121,350	-82,000	3,039,350
2 2 2	Transport equipment			
2 2 2 0	Purchases and long-term lease of transport equipment	117,500	26,000	143,500
2 2 2 1	Maintenance, repair and other expenditures of transport equipment	32,350	-	32,350
2 2 2 2	Car insurance	35,000	-	35,000
2 2 2 3	Fuel	55,000	-10,000	45,000
2 2 3	Documentation and Open Sources			
2 2 3 0	Library expenses, purchase of books, subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals	35,000	-	35,000
2 2 3 1	Open sources	290,000	-	290,000
	<b>Chapter 2 2 — Total</b>	<b>3,898,150</b>	<b>-158,000</b>	<b>3,740,150</b>
<b>2 3</b>	<b>Current administrative expenditure</b>			
2 3 0	Stationery and office supplies			
2 3 0 0	Stationery and office supplies	76,500	-	76,500
2 3 1	Financial charges			
2 3 1 0	Bank charges	6,450	-	6,450
2 3 1 1	Exchange-rate losses	P.M.	-	-
2 3 2	Legal expenses and damages			
2 3 2 0	Legal expenses	80,000	-	80,000
2 3 2 1	Damages and compensation	P.M.	730,000	730,000
2 3 3	Other administrative expenditure			
2 3 3 0	Miscellaneous insurance	14,000	20,500	34,500
2 3 3 1	Uniforms and working clothes	3,000	-	3,000
2 3 3 2	Administrative translation services	620,000	-526,000	94,000
2 3 3 3	Official publications, tender publications and reproduction of documents	180,000	-47,000	133,000
2 3 3 4	External administrative expertise	95,000	-3,000	92,000
2 3 3 5	Administrative meetings	47,500	-3,000	44,500
2 3 3 6	Other expenditure	332,550	-19,000	313,550
2 3 4	Communication and information activities			
2 3 4 0	Communication and information activities	5,000	-5,000	-
	<b>Chapter 2 3 — Total</b>	<b>1,462,000</b>	<b>147,500</b>	<b>1,609,500</b>
<b>2 4</b>	<b>Postal charges and telecommunications</b>			
2 4 0	Postal and delivery charges			
2 4 0 0	Postal and delivery charges	70,000	12,000	82,000
2 4 1	Administrative Telecommunications			
2 4 1 0	Administrative Telecommunications subscriptions and charges	330,000	-15,000	315,000
2 4 1 1	Purchase, installation and maintenance of administrative telecommunications hardware	P.M.	-	-
2 4 1 2	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operational telecommunications software	P.M.	-	-
	<b>Chapter 2 4 — Total</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>-3,000</b>	<b>397,000</b>
<b>2 5</b>	<b>Statutory expenditure</b>			
2 5 0	Management Board			
2 5 0 0	Management Board Meetings	1,894,500	-360,000	1,534,500
2 5 0 1	Management Board Working Groups	206,500	-132,000	74,500
2 5 0 2	Management Board Secretariat	39,500	-16,000	23,500
2 5 1	Joint Supervisory Body			
2 5 1 0	Joint Supervisory Body Costs	759,000	-199,900	559,100
2 5 1 1	Appeals costs	5,000	-	5,000
2 5 2	Internal auditor			
2 5 2 0	Internal auditor	15,000	-	15,000
2 5 3	Auditing			
2 5 3 0	Auditing	47,000	-	47,000
	<b>Chapter 2 5 - Total</b>	<b>2,966,500</b>	<b>-707,900</b>	<b>2,258,600</b>
<b>2 6</b>	<b>Art 58.4 Europol Council Decision</b>			
2 6 0	Art 58.4 Europol Council Decision			
2 6 0 0	Member States contributions	P.M.	6,744,291	6,744,291
2 6 0 1	Host State contribution	P.M.	109,267	109,267
2 6 0 2	Grants	P.M.	1,225,274	1,225,274
2 6 0 3	Community subsidy	P.M.	485,778	485,778
	<b>Chapter 2 6 - Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>8,564,610</b>	<b>8,564,610</b>
	<b>TITLE 2 — TOTAL</b>	<b>12,090,000</b>	<b>9,056,710</b>	<b>21,146,710</b>

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Budget 2010 File No 2210-262	Amendments File No 2210-266 File No 2210-273 and transfers	Amended Budget 2010
<b>3</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>19,835,150</b>	<b>427,438</b>	<b>20,262,588</b>
<b>3 0</b>	<b>Operations</b>			
3 0 0	Expenditure for strategic and operational activities			
3000	Meetings	252,000	50,000	302,000
3001	Translations	57,000	-28,000	29,000
3002	Printing	49,000	-30,500	18,500
3003	Missions	916,000	133,000	1,049,000
3004	external expertise	56,900	-25,000	31,900
3005	Expertise training for third parties	82,600	25,000	107,600
3006	Operational equipment	91,500	-	91,500
3007	Operational subsidies	150,000	234,000	384,000
3008	Operational training	274,400	-33,500	240,900
3 0 1	Liaison Bureaux outside the Netherlands			
3010	Liaison Bureaux outside the Netherlands	63,250	-	63,250
	<b>Chapter 3 0 — Total</b>	<b>1,993,650</b>	<b>325,000</b>	<b>2,317,650</b>
<b>3 1</b>	<b>Operational information technology</b>			
3 1 0	Operational information technology and related expenditure			
3100	Purchase of operational information technology equipment	3,790,300	749,700	4,540,000
3101	Purchase of operational software and licenses	1,720,600	-123,000	1,597,600
3102	Maintenance and repair of operational information technology equipment	707,700	-178,700	529,000
3103	Maintenance of operational software and licenses	2,355,400	922,000	3,277,400
3104	Operational consultancy and studies	1,050,000	-85,000	965,000
3105	Operational system integration services	622,000	80,000	702,000
3106	Other operational information technology expenditure	110,000	-79,000	31,000
	<b>Chapter 3 1 — Total</b>	<b>10,356,000</b>	<b>1,286,000</b>	<b>11,642,000</b>
<b>3 2</b>	<b>Telecommunication costs for operational activities</b>			
3 2 0	Telecommunication costs for operational activities			
3200	Operational telecommunications subscriptions and charges	1,880,000	115,000	1,995,000
3201	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operational telecommunications hardware	4,265,000	-919,000	3,366,000
3202	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operational telecommunications software	300,000	-293,000	7,000
	<b>Chapter 3 2 — Total</b>	<b>6,465,000</b>	<b>-1,097,000</b>	<b>5,368,000</b>
<b>3 3</b>	<b>Seconded National Experts (Operational)</b>			
3 3 0	Seconded National Experts (Operational)			
3300	Seconded National Experts (Operational)	884,000	-284,000	600,000
	<b>Chapter 3 3 — Total</b>	<b>884,000</b>	<b>-284,000</b>	<b>600,000</b>
<b>3 4</b>	<b>Police Chiefs Task Force</b>			
3 4 0	Police Chiefs Task Force			
3400	Interpretation services and equipment PCTF	36,400	-36,000	400
3401	Other expenditure PCTF	13,600	-8,000	5,600
	<b>Chapter 3 4 — Total</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>-44,000</b>	<b>6,000</b>
<b>3 5</b>	<b>Heads of Europol National Units</b>			
3 5 0	Heads of Europol National Units			
3500	Interpretation services and equipment for HENU meetings	85,000	-22,000	63,000
3501	Other expenditure for HENU meetings	2,500	-	2,500
	<b>Chapter 3 5 — Total</b>	<b>87,500</b>	<b>-22,000</b>	<b>65,500</b>
<b>3 6</b>	<b>Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants</b>			
3 6 0	Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants			
3600	Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants	P.M.	263,438	263,438
	<b>Chapter 3 6 — Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>263,438</b>	<b>263,438</b>
	<b>Title 3 — TOTAL</b>	<b>19,835,150</b>	<b>427,438</b>	<b>20,262,588</b>
	<b>Total revenue (Title 9)</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>	<b>12,754,958</b>	<b>92,823,108</b>
	<b>Total expenditure (Titles 1-3)</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>	<b>12,754,958</b>	<b>92,823,108</b>

**Final Budget and Staff Establishment Plan 2010**

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Draft Outcome 2008	Budget 2009	Budget 2010
<b>9</b>	<b>REVENUE</b>	<b>65,004,650</b>	<b>68,104,841</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>
<b>9 0</b>	<b>Subsidies and contributions</b>			
9 0 0	Regular subsidy from the Community			
9000	Regular subsidy from the Community	58,799,500	62,358,000	79,724,150
9 0 1	Other subsidies and grants			
9010	Other subsidies and grants	160,281	103,841	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 9 0 - Total</b>	<b>58,959,782</b>	<b>62,461,841</b>	<b>79,724,150</b>
<b>9 1</b>	<b>Host State contribution</b>			
9 1 0	Host State contribution			
9100	Host State contribution	2,525,196	2,593,000	244,000
	<b>Chapter 9 1 - Total</b>	<b>2,525,196</b>	<b>2,593,000</b>	<b>244,000</b>
<b>9 2</b>	<b>Other revenue</b>			
9 2 0	Other revenue			
9200	Other revenue	1,384,244	705,000	100,000
9201	Proceeds of taxation of staff	2,135,427	2,345,000	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 9 2 - Total</b>	<b>3,519,672</b>	<b>3,050,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>
	<b>TITLE 9 — TOTAL</b>	<b>65,004,650</b>	<b>68,104,841</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>

## XVI LEGISLATURA — DISEGNI DI LEGGE E RELAZIONI — DOCUMENTI

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Draft Outcome 2008	Budget 2009	Budget 2010
<b>1</b>	<b>STAFF</b>	<b>45,632,026</b>	<b>48,655,000</b>	<b>48,143,000</b>
<b>1 1</b>	<b>Staff in active employment</b>			
1 1 0	Temporary staff holding a post provided for in the establishment plan			
1100	Basic salaries	26,230,312	27,972,000	28,425,000
1101	Family allowances	3,844,596	4,100,000	1,805,000
1102	Expatriation and foreign-residence allowances	2,831,439	3,019,000	3,889,000
1 1 1	Other staff			
1110	Contract staff	1,642,919	1,685,000	1,958,000
1111	Seconded national experts (non-operational)	-	-	75,000
1 1 2	Employer's social security contributions for temporary agents			
1120	Insurance against sickness	980,425	1,045,000	1,145,000
1121	Insurance against accidents and occupational disease	-	-	-
1122	Insurance against unemployment	200,394	214,000	465,000
1 1 3	Miscellaneous allowances and grants for temporary agents			
1130	Childbirth and death allowances and grants	7,340	9,000	15,000
1131	Travel expenses for annual leave	247,485	264,000	500,000
1 1 4	Overtime, shiftwork and standby duty			
1140	Overtime	699	1,000	17,500
1141	Shift work and standby duty	149,033	159,000	17,500
1 1 5	Allowances and expenses on entering and leaving the service and on transfer			
1150	Expenditure related to Recruitment	553,203	520,000	728,000
1151	Travel expenses on taking up duties and at end of contract	190,554	203,000	181,000
1152	Installation, resettlement and transfer allowances for temporary agents	110,321	118,000	110,000
1153	Removal expenses for temporary agents	90,263	96,000	90,000
1154	Temporary daily subsistence allowances for temporary agents	-	-	115,000
1 1 6	Salary weightings			
1160	Salary weightings	-	-	3,125,000
1 1 7	Security Staff			
1170	Contract staff (Security)	-	-	2,342,000
1171	Salaries and allowances for Local Security Staff	2,187,797	2,226,000	P.M.
1172	Security Missions	2,381	4,000	4,000
1173	Training for Security Staff	78,570	85,000	85,000
1174	Other expenditure for Security Staff	67,754	40,000	40,000
1 1 8	Staff expenditure for continuation of staff contracts under the Europol Convention			
1180	Europol Staff	-	-	P.M.
1181	Local Staff	-	-	P.M.
1182	Salary Adjustments	319,000	395,000	290,000
1183	Unemployment allowance	-	-	P.M.
1184	Pensions under Europol convention	4,133,168	4,407,000	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 1 1 — Total</b>	<b>43,867,652</b>	<b>46,562,000</b>	<b>45,422,000</b>
<b>1 2</b>	<b>Administrative Missions</b>			
1 2 0	Administrative Missions			
1200	Administrative Missions	261,099	336,000	330,500
	<b>Chapter 1 2 — Total</b>	<b>261,099</b>	<b>336,000</b>	<b>330,500</b>
<b>1 3</b>	<b>Sociomedical infrastructure</b>			
1 3 0	Restaurants and canteens			
1300	Catering costs	558,953	565,000	592,000
1301	Restaurant equipment	18,846	20,000	179,500
1 3 1	Medical service			
1310	Medical service	127,108	180,000	138,500
1 3 2	Sports activities and social events			
1320	Sports activities	39,000	45,000	45,000
1321	Social events	41,922	60,000	60,000
1 3 3	Staff Committee			
1330	Staff Committee	3,682	12,000	10,000
1 3 4	Special allowances and grants			
1340	Special allowances and grants	-	-	P.M.
1 3 5	Other sociomedical expenditure			
1350	Other sociomedical expenditure	-	5,000	5,000
	<b>Chapter 1 3 — Total</b>	<b>789,511</b>	<b>887,000</b>	<b>1,030,000</b>
<b>1 4</b>	<b>Training</b>			
1 4 0	Training of staff			
1400	Training of staff	372,337	495,000	511,000
	<b>Chapter 1 4 — Total</b>	<b>372,337</b>	<b>495,000</b>	<b>511,000</b>
<b>1 5</b>	<b>Other staff-related expenditure</b>			
1 5 0	PMO Services			
1500	PMO Translation and interpretation services	-	-	P.M.
1501	PMO Management costs	16,804	10,000	350,000
1 5 1	Supplementary clerical and interim services			
1510	Supplementary clerical and interim services	191,738	236,000	206,200
1 5 2	Other external services			
1520	Other external services	-	-	160,000
	<b>Chapter 1 5 — Total</b>	<b>208,542</b>	<b>245,000</b>	<b>716,200</b>
<b>1 6</b>	<b>Entertainment and representation expenses</b>			
1 6 0	Entertainment and representation expenses			
1600	General entertainment and representation expenses	132,885	130,000	133,300
	<b>Chapter 1 6 — Total</b>	<b>132,885</b>	<b>130,000</b>	<b>133,300</b>
	<b>TITLE 1 — TOTAL</b>	<b>45,632,026</b>	<b>48,655,000</b>	<b>48,143,000</b>

## XVI LEGISLATURA — DISEGNI DI LEGGE E RELAZIONI — DOCUMENTI

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Draft Outcome 2008	Budget 2009	Budget 2010
<b>2</b>	<b>OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE</b>	<b>6,282,674</b>	<b>7,532,000</b>	<b>12,090,000</b>
<b>2 0</b>	<b>Rental of buildings and associated costs</b>			
2 0 0	Rent	-	-	P.M.
2000	Rent	-	-	P.M.
2 0 1	Insurance of building(s)	-	-	P.M.
2010	Insurance of building(s)	-	-	P.M.
2 0 2	Water, gas, electricity and local taxes			
2020	Water, gas, electricity and local taxes	440,280	522,000	636,500
2 0 3	Cleaning and maintenance			
2030	Cleaning and treatment of waste	297,873	385,000	496,500
2031	Maintenance, installations and alterations	83,061	211,000	216,500
2 0 4	Security of buildings and persons			
2040	Security equipment	101,631	100,000	104,000
2041	Security services	-	-	P.M.
2042	Health and safety at work	-	-	66,050
2 0 5	Other building related expenditure			
2050	Other building related expenditure	-	30,000	387,700
	<b>Chapter 2 0 — Total</b>	<b>922,844</b>	<b>1,246,000</b>	<b>1,907,350</b>
<b>2 1</b>	<b>Administrative information technology</b>			
2 1 0	Costs of administrative information technology equipment and related expenditure			
2100	Purchase of administrative information technology equipment	428,965	470,000	252,500
2101	Purchase of administrative software and licenses	185,992	205,000	432,500
2102	Maintenance and repair of administrative information technology equipment	84,073	90,000	50,500
2103	Maintenance of administrative software and licenses	176,101	190,000	409,500
2104	Administrative consultancy and studies	79,987	85,000	186,000
2105	Administrative system integration services	63,755	60,000	125,000
2106	Other administrative data processing expenditure	-	-	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 2 1 — Total</b>	<b>1,008,873</b>	<b>1,100,000</b>	<b>1,456,000</b>
<b>2 2</b>	<b>Movable property and associated costs</b>			
2 2 0	Technical equipment and installations			
2200	Technical equipment and installations	-	10,000	211,950
2 2 1	Furniture and other acquisitions			
2210	Furniture and other acquisitions	19,424	15,000	3,121,350
2 2 2	Transport equipment			
2220	Purchases and long-term lease of transport equipment	85,341	160,000	117,500
2221	Maintenance, repair and other expenditures of transport equipment	29,831	40,000	32,350
2222	Car insurance	29,223	30,000	35,000
2223	Fuel	23,823	40,000	55,000
2 2 3	Documentation and Open Sources			
2230	Library expenses, purchase of books, subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals	34,297	35,000	35,000
2231	Open sources	239,632	265,000	290,000
	<b>Chapter 2 2 — Total</b>	<b>461,571</b>	<b>595,000</b>	<b>3,898,150</b>
<b>2 3</b>	<b>Current administrative expenditure</b>			
2 3 0	Stationery and office supplies			
2300	Stationery and office supplies	80,890	80,000	76,500
2 3 1	Financial charges			
2310	Bank charges	6,500	7,000	8,450
2311	Exchange-rate losses	-	-	P.M.
2 3 2	Legal expenses and damages			
2320	Legal expenses	39,713	100,000	80,000
2321	Damages and compensation	-	-	P.M.
2 3 3	Other administrative expenditure			
2330	Miscellaneous insurance	15,343	30,000	14,000
2331	Uniforms and working clothes	-	3,000	3,000
2332	Administrative translation services	514,824	577,000	620,000
2333	Official publications, tender publications and reproduction of documents	87,318	90,000	180,000
2334	External administrative expertise	195,502	139,000	95,000
2335	Administrative meetings	37,003	43,000	47,500
2336	Other expenditure	82,481	98,000	332,550
2 3 4	Communication and information activities			
2340	Communication and information activities	-	5,000	5,000
	<b>Chapter 2 3 — Total</b>	<b>1,059,574</b>	<b>1,172,000</b>	<b>1,462,000</b>
<b>2 4</b>	<b>Postal charges and telecommunications</b>			
2 4 0	Postal and delivery charges			
2400	Postal and delivery charges	51,677	55,000	70,000
2 4 1	Administrative Telecommunications			
2410	Administrative Telecommunications subscriptions and charges	292,352	250,000	330,000
2411	Purchase, installation and maintenance of administrative telecommunications hardware	-	-	P.M.
2412	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operational telecommunications software	-	-	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 2 4 — Total</b>	<b>344,030</b>	<b>305,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>
<b>2 5</b>	<b>Statutory expenditure</b>			
2 5 0	Management Board			
2500	Management Board Meetings	1,797,808	1,925,000	1,894,500
2501	Management Board Working Groups	160,402	154,000	206,500
2502	Management Board Secretariat	14,219	465,000	39,500
2 5 1	Joint Supervisory Body			
2510	Joint Supervisory Body Costs	463,101	610,000	759,000
2511	Appeals costs	-	-	5,000
2 5 2	Internal auditor			
2520	Internal auditor	6,028	13,000	15,000
2 5 3	Auditing			
2530	Auditing	44,223	45,000	47,000
	<b>Chapter 2 5 - Total</b>	<b>2,485,781</b>	<b>3,212,000</b>	<b>2,966,500</b>
	<b>TITLE 2 — TOTAL</b>	<b>6,282,674</b>	<b>7,632,000</b>	<b>12,090,000</b>

## XVI LEGISLATURA — DISEGNI DI LEGGE E RELAZIONI — DOCUMENTI

Title Chapter Article Item	Heading	Draft Outcome 2008	Budget 2009	Budget 2010
<b>3</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>11,279,193</b>	<b>11,714,000</b>	<b>19,835,150</b>
<b>3 0</b>	<b>Operations</b>			
3 0 0	Expenditure for strategic and operational activities			
3000	Meetings	303,281	400,000	252,000
3001	Translations	189,176	92,000	57,000
3002	Printing	86,432	122,000	49,000
3003	Missions	914,797	1,124,000	916,000
3004	External expertise	15,734	5,000	57,500
3005	Expertise training for third parties	100,268	80,000	82,000
3006	Operational equipment	4,788	23,000	91,500
3007	Operational subsidies	101,821	150,000	150,000
3008	Operational training	199,585	223,000	274,400
3 0 1	Liaison Bureaux outside the Netherlands			
3010	Liaison Bureaux outside the Netherlands	32,956	40,000	63,250
	<b>Chapter 3 0 — Total</b>	<b>1,948,839</b>	<b>2,259,000</b>	<b>1,992,650</b>
<b>3 1</b>	<b>Operational information technology</b>			
3 1 0	Operational information technology and related expenditure			
3100	Purchase of operational information technology equipment	2,329,171	2,420,000	3,790,300
3101	Purchase of operational software and licenses	1,075,161	1,120,000	1,720,600
3102	Maintenance and repair of operational information technology equipment	549,175	570,000	707,700
3103	Maintenance of operational software and licenses	1,286,201	1,340,000	2,355,400
3104	Operational consultancy and studies	564,276	585,000	1,050,000
3105	Operational system integration services	334,267	350,000	622,000
3106	Other operational information technology expenditure	59,115	60,000	110,000
	<b>Chapter 3 1 — Total</b>	<b>6,197,366</b>	<b>6,445,000</b>	<b>10,356,000</b>
<b>3 2</b>	<b>Telecommunication costs for operational activities</b>			
3 2 0	Telecommunication costs for operational activities			
3200	Operational telecommunications subscriptions and charges	840,184	835,000	1,880,000
3201	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operational telecommunications hardware	1,851,031	1,910,000	4,285,000
3202	Purchase, installation and maintenance of operation telecommunications software	176,093	135,000	300,000
	<b>Chapter 3 2 — Total</b>	<b>2,867,308</b>	<b>2,880,000</b>	<b>6,465,000</b>
<b>3 3</b>	<b>Seconded National Experts (Operational)</b>			
3 3 0	Seconded National Experts (Operational)			
3300	Seconded National Experts (Operational)	-	-	884,000
	<b>Chapter 3 3 — Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>884,000</b>
<b>3 4</b>	<b>Police Chiefs Task Force</b>			
3 4 0	Police Chiefs Task Force			
3400	Interpretation services and equipment PCTF	16,281	35,000	36,400
3401	Other expenditure PCTF	25,146	15,000	13,600
	<b>Chapter 3 4 — Total</b>	<b>41,427</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>50,000</b>
<b>3 5</b>	<b>Heads of Europol National Units</b>			
3 5 0	Heads of Europol National Units			
3500	Interpretation services and equipment for HENU meetings	59,416	75,000	85,000
3501	Other expenditure for HENU meetings	4,556	5,000	2,500
	<b>Chapter 3 5 — Total</b>	<b>63,971</b>	<b>80,000</b>	<b>87,500</b>
<b>3 6</b>	<b>Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants</b>			
3 6 0	Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants			
3600	Operational expenditure related to subsidies and grants	160,282	103,841	P.M.
	<b>Chapter 3 4 — Total</b>	<b>160,282</b>	<b>103,841</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>Title 3 — TOTAL</b>	<b>11,279,193</b>	<b>11,817,841</b>	<b>19,835,150</b>
	<b>Total revenue (Title 9)</b>	<b>65,004,650</b>	<b>68,104,841</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>
	<b>Total expenditure (Titles 1-3)</b>	<b>63,193,892</b>	<b>66,104,841</b>	<b>80,068,150</b>

## Staff Establishment Plan

Temporary Agents	Year 2010		
	Permanent	Temporary	Total
AD16	0	0	0
AD15	0	0	0
AD14	0	1	1
AD13	0	3	3
AD12	0	3	3
AD11	0	23	23
AD10	0	0	0
AD9	0	70	70
AD8	0	80	80
AD7	0	123	123
AD6	0	52	52
AD5	0	36	36
<b>Total AD</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>391</b>
AST11	0	0	0
AST10	0	0	0
AST9	0	0	0
AST8	0	0	0
AST7	0	4	4
AST6	0	13	13
AST5	0	3	3
AST4	0	40	40
AST3	0	2	2
AST2	0	0	0
AST1	0	0	0
<b>Total AST</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>453</b>

## Estimated number of contract agents and seconded national experts

Contract agents posts	Year 2010
FG IV	7
FG III	64
FG II	2
FG I	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>
Seconded National Experts	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>95</b>



## CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 2010 FACT SHEET

### Introduction

'**Child sexual exploitation**' refers to the sexual abuse of a human being below the age of 18. Among other things, it includes the production of child abuse images and online dissemination as particularly serious forms of crime committed against children.

The distribution of images depicting the sexual exploitation of children is mainly facilitated by improper use of the Internet, as the apparent anonymity offered by this means of communication makes it difficult to successfully locate and identify the offenders and to save child victims from further exploitation.

It must be emphasised that the discovery of illegal material is only the beginning, of an investigation into the actual sexual exploitation (e.g. rape, sexual assault) of a child; there is a clear distinction between specific legislation on the offences related to the production, distribution/sale and possession of child sexual exploitation material and specific legislation on the sexual offences committed against children.

While there is no doubt that sexual abuse and exploitation of children is a serious problem, there is a lack of accurate and reliable statistics on the nature of the phenomenon and the numbers of children involved, mainly due to differences in national definitions of different child sexual abuse and exploitation offences.

On 29 March 2010, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a new Directive on combating sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, following up on a previous proposal tabled in 2009, with the aim of replacing the current EU legislation (*Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA*) which now seems to be out of date. The new Directive, if approved, will follow the Lanzarote (Spain), October 2007<sup>1</sup> Council of Europe "*Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Exploitation*" and it will cover actions on the following different aspects:

- **Criminal law:** criminalisation of serious forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation currently not covered by EU legislation, with **Articles 3 and 4** aiming at punishing the intentional conduct of recruiting or coercing a child into prostitution or into pornographic performances or profiting from or otherwise exploiting a child for such purposes, and establishing provisions that punish all the offences related to child pornography which already fall under the Europol mandate as listed in the Council Decision establishing the Europol Police Office, applicable from 1 January 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Council of Europe – European Treaty Series – No 201: Of the 47 CoE Member States, 8 have not yet signed it and only Denmark, The Netherlands, San Marino, Albania, Greece and Serbia have ratified it. The Convention has entered into force (situation on 02/08/2010 – source: Council of Europe – Treaty Office <http://conventions.coe.int>).

- **Developments in the IT environment:** new forms of sexual abuse and exploitation facilitated by the use of the Internet would be criminalised (e.g. grooming or viewing child abusive material (CAM) without downloading the files).
- **Criminal investigation and initiation of proceedings:** a number of provisions would be introduced to assist with investigating offences and the bringing about of charges, in the absence of reporting by the child victim.
- **Offences committed abroad:** rules on jurisdiction would be amended to ensure that child sexual abusers or exploiters from the EU face prosecution including if they commit their crimes in a non-EU country.
- **Protection of victims:** new provisions would ensure that abused children have easy access to legal remedies and do not suffer as a result of participating in criminal proceedings.
- **Prevention of offences:** special programmes should be accessible for offenders to prevent them from committing new offences. National mechanisms to block access to websites with child pornography, which are most often located outside the EU, should be put in place under the supervision of judicial services or the police.

### **Child sexual exploitation and the Internet**

The Internet as a mass medium is extensively used in connection with sexual material; it is used for the sale and purchase of adult pornographic material and sexual devices, for advertising contacts for explicit sexual purposes, and to distribute child sexual exploitation content, providing a platform for online grooming of innocent children with the abusive material reaching the Internet, constituting a permanent re-victimisation of the depicted child.

The first international common commitment to tackle the distribution of child sexual exploitation material on the Internet was expressed at the International Conference on "Combating Child Pornography on the Internet", held in Vienna in 1999, where it was stated that, "*Child Pornography on the Internet is a growing problem, and as more of the world comes online, it will continue to grow in the future since it does not know or respect borders*".

Several European and worldwide operations have resulted in the identification of thousands of suspects in relation to offences committed against children, with numbers apparently growing over the years, confirming the development of the issue. A great leap forward is now needed in order to fight the producers and the people who profit from this serious crime.

Fighting child sexual exploitation, including the proliferation of child sexual exploitation material on the Internet, is a constant challenge for law enforcement, due to technological innovations which provide easier and faster access to the material to the offenders, while apparently allowing greater anonymity. It is argued that this development has created a wider market and demand for such illegal material which has inevitably led to an increase in child sexual exploitation.

It is clear, though, that an effective partnership approach is required between law enforcement agencies, judicial authorities, the ICT industry, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the banking sector and non-governmental organizations. The

contribution provided by officially recognised hotlines, which receive Internet related child sexual exploitation information, should also be acknowledged.

In most Member States, the need to establish close co-operation between law enforcement and ISPs has been identified, both for crime prevention and investigation. ISPs can assist by providing data that can be used in the identification and prosecution of offenders and also by adopting procedures and codes of conduct that can limit the exploitation of the Internet by child sex offenders. Several Member States have built up specialised units for combating child sexual exploitation on the Internet, as dealing with this topic requires specialised knowledge and expertise.

### **Trends**

The following trends are in evidence at this present time:

- The involvement of worldwide criminal networks in offering pay-per-view websites is apparently decreasing, as a result of major international law enforcement efforts and cooperation over the last two years;
- Criminals seem to be focusing on hidden channels where private access is granted only to those who have been 'selected'. This 'selection' derives from the amount and kind of images that can be shared and it is based on respect and trust;
- Child sex offenders and their networks make more and more use of sophisticated software in order to try to protect their anonymity, to make use of online storage and to use advanced encryption techniques to counteract digital forensic examination by police;
- Child sex offenders travel to specific countries where children are offered by their families or other facilitators in order to be sexually exploited and to produce illegal material that is distributed through the Internet;
- Sometimes, illegal material is self-produced by teenagers or children who underestimate the risks of distributing their images or movie files;
- In some other cases, children are persuaded or coerced into producing the material by child sex predators through online grooming;
- Online grooming and the solicitation of sexual messages through mobile phones and multimedia devices ('sexting') are dangerous realities which need constant attention from a responsible society.

### **Core issues**

In order to tackle these specific forms of crime in the most effective way, serious consideration should be given to:

- Enhancing awareness and providing appropriate tools, equipment and human resources to carry out investigations;

- Reducing any duplication of efforts in activities by consulting international police cooperation agencies and spreading knowledge and proposals;
- Developing closer operational co-ordination of ongoing investigations at national, European and worldwide levels;
- Enhancing close co-operation with Internet Service Providers and the Internet private sector;
- Enhancing close co-operation with non-governmental organisations.

### **Europol activities**

Europol, in close co-operation with the Member States, aims to:

- Identify perpetrators and establish cross-links within the participating Member States;
- Identify cross-border modus operandi and shed light on the methods of communication of criminal networks, with a view to dismantling those networks;
- Identify the victims, with a view to stopping potentially ongoing exploitation and to make it possible to initiate care measures by the competent authorities;
- Co-operate on an operational level via the Europol Liaison Officers (ELO) network, as well as providing strategic and operational analytical support;
- Conduct expert meetings (both operational and strategic) with the aim of exchanging information on ongoing investigations and enhancing mutual co-operation between law enforcement bodies and other competent authorities, by updating the Member States experts about relevant cases, modus operandi, etc.;
- Participate and contribute to several initiatives, e.g. awareness meetings, projects on the implementation of new legislative instruments and training sessions organised by international organisations;
- Support international projects developed by the EU Member States, such as the COSPOL Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project (CIRCAMP) and the European Financial Coalition (EFC), providing expertise and criminal intelligence analysis.

The **CIRCAMP** project was launched in 2004 by the European Police Chiefs Task Force under the Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police (COSPOL) mandate to fight the use of the Internet for the distribution of child abusive material<sup>2</sup>. The project was successful in implementing the Child Sexual Abuse Anti Distribution Filter and disseminating it widely. At the same time, the project members identified new challenges that required a more operational approach and this has led to a new proposal, which is entirely needs-driven. The operational activities will be effective if carried out at a national level and there is a requirement for a European or, even, an international approach, including the involvement of Europol and Interpol. The intelligence generated by the above investigations is to be contributed to Europol for analysis and dissemination of the relevant intelligence packages to the involved countries. Such activity requires stronger support to be provided by AWF Twins to CIRCAMP in order to coordinate the collective actions undertaken by the participating countries and to identify international cross-links.

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<sup>2</sup> This issue, by nature, is cross-border and requires joint effort and actions of national law enforcement agencies. From 2008 till 2010, the CIRCAMP network was funded under the DG INFSO SIP programme.

Europol has supported CIRCAMP since its launch in 2004.

The aim of the EFC is to disrupt the commercial gain behind child sexual abuse images. The major financial, Internet and technology corporations have joined forces with international police agencies, the EU Commission and specialist child protection NGOs to track, disrupt and confiscate commercial gains made by those who profit from the distribution of indecent images. On the policing side, Europol is working with the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) from the United Kingdom to deliver a European wide policing response, supported by the Italian National Police. VISA Europe, MasterCard, Microsoft, PayPal and the NGO Missing Children Europe, assisted by Allen and Overy, are amongst the founding members of the coalition and are joined by the International Center for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC) and the International Association of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE).

Europol has supported the European Financial Coalition since its launch in March 2009, participating in and providing expertise to the Steering Group, the Law Enforcement Cooperation Working Group and the Legal Working Group.

The core activity of Europol is to support the Member States in their actions to prevent and combat serious and organised crime, with the Analytical Work File (AWF) being one of the means of providing support to the Member States. AWF Twins was opened in 2001 to support the participating Member States in preventing and combating the activities of criminal networks involved in the production, sale or distribution of child sexual abuse material, and the associated forms of crime within Europol's mandate. This activity, due to its great success, will continue.

In 2009, the AWF supported several investigations:

Operation "**Typhon**" was concluded with house searches conducted in 19 countries, enabling the identification of 286 child sex offenders, of which 118 have been arrested. The investigation was led by the Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service .BK which detected an ISP that was misused by child sex offender groups to distribute illegal content. Log files collected by the Austrian investigators were sent to Europol together with the child abuse images. After structuring and analyzing the content, Europol provided intelligence packages and analytical reports to EU Member States and those countries with a Europol cooperation agreement that were also affected. The offenders had various professional backgrounds, some of whom were teachers or caretakers and were therefore in close contact with children. Furthermore, this case has led to the identification and rescue of five children, aged between four and twelve, who were the victims of sexual crimes in different countries.

Operation "**Venice Carnival**" resulted in data packages being sent by Europol to some MS and non EU countries concerning URLs of websites infected by a malware which caused internet surfers to be redirected to child abuse images websites. This investigation, conducted by the Venice Italian Postal and Communication Police, revealed malware code stored on servers, the owners of which were not aware that they had been infected. It is believed that the same criminal organization involved in commercial child abuse images websites were also behind the malware-infection process. As a result of this operation, several websites in different MS were "cleaned" by their owners once they had been informed about the presence of the malware.

To date, AWF Twins has led to the identification of around **1,600 suspects** belonging to different

**criminal networks involved in offences related to the distribution of child sexual exploitation material on the Internet, and support has been given to 23 international operations as at the end of 2009.**

### **Training course**

The annual Europol training course, "**Combating the Sexual Exploitation of Children on the Internet**", for law enforcement officers and the judiciary has the aim of developing and increasing their knowledge and expertise with a view to combating and dismantling child sex offender networks, together with the aim of saving the children involved. This hands-on training also aims to build fundamental skills on investigating child exploitation on the Internet and to bring law enforcement investigation standards together, as well as to disseminate the latest investigation techniques and methods and to promote the sharing of mutual experience.

Opening the course up to members of the judiciary, such as prosecutors and judges, contributes to a better understanding of the crime area, the investigation methods used and the possible constraints that investigators are confronted with. As at October 2009, after the 10th training course took place, around 420 law enforcement officers and 40 members of the judiciary from the EU and countries from all over the world had attended.

### **Europol reports**

Scan Notices, for law enforcement use only, are produced on an ad-hoc basis, with the purpose of raising awareness and to inform Europol's partners that are engaged in combating and preventing the sexual exploitation of children about issues that may have an impact on law enforcement agencies operating within the EU and elsewhere. Among other things, these intelligence notices allow external authors to provide contributions that are included in the report in order to share knowledge and best practice within the law enforcement community.

### **Relevant legislation**

#### **EU legislation**

- Decision N° 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 1999 adopting a Multiannual Community action plan on promoting safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful content on global networks (OJ L 33 of 6.2.1999)
- Council Decision N° **2000/375/JHA** of 29 May 2000 to combat child pornography on the Internet ( OJ L 138 of 9.6.2000)
- Council Framework Decision **2004/68/JHA** of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004; currently the only EU legislation in force on the subject of sexual exploitation of children.

- Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, repealing Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. This is the proposed new legislation which is being discussed both in the Council of Ministers and in the European Parliament. See in particular Article 3, Article 14 on "investigation and prosecution" and Article 21 on "Blocking access to websites containing child pornography" which is the object of major controversy in the European Parliament.

#### **Council of Europe Conventions**

- 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (CETS N° 185) (see Article 9, paragraph 2 (a) on child pornography). Entered into force in 2004. In force in the following EU countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. It is also in effect in the Ukraine and in the US.
- 2007 Lanzarote Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (CETS N° 201) (see Article 20 regarding child pornography and Article 23 on grooming). Entered into force on 1.7.2010. In force in the following EU countries: Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands.

#### **UN Conventions**

- 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, entered into force on 2 September 1990 (see Article 34c) on the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials). Ratified by all EU Member States. Not ratified by the US.
- 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (see Article 2 c) defining child pornography). Not ratified by the following EU Member States: the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta.

#### **Related legislation**

- The EU legislation on trafficking also includes trafficking in relation to sexual exploitation. The currently applicable legislation is contained in Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA which is now the object of a proposal for a directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting victims repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA (see Article 2 (3) and (5) with regard to child trafficking for sexual exploitation).
- The International Labour Organisation Convention N° 182 concerning the Prohibition and immediate Action for the elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour also refers to child prostitution and child pornography (Article 3 b).

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for Drugs and Drug Addiction

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EMCDDA–Europol joint publications

Cocaine

A European Union perspective in the global context

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Issue No 2: Cocaine

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## Foreword

Cocaine use and cocaine-related problems in Europe have increased markedly since the mid-1990s. Surveys have shown that in many EU countries — and in Europe overall — cocaine is now the second most commonly used illicit substance among the general population, after cannabis. Three million, or 2.2 %, of young adults aged 15–34 are reported to have used cocaine in the previous year. In addition, targeted studies have observed high levels of cocaine use in some recreational settings (clubs, parties). In a few EU Member States, the demand for treatment for cocaine use has also increased in recent years. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of opioid users in treatment report cocaine as their secondary drug, which may be contributing to their problems and complicating their care. Cocaine is also reported in the toxicological analysis of a high proportion of drug-related deaths in some countries, generally in combination with opioids and other substances.

The picture of cocaine use and trafficking in Europe is complex. Some countries (e.g. Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) have a long-established cocaine problem, while several others (e.g. France, Italy, Portugal) have seen a rapid increase in cocaine use and seizures in recent years. Other countries, mainly in eastern and northern Europe (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania, Finland), still report very low figures for both cocaine use and seizures. However, the European cocaine market could become more homogeneous in the future if consumer demand grows, if increasing amounts of the drug become available, and if new trafficking routes towards and inside Europe continue to develop.

Cocaine is almost exclusively produced in the Andean-Amazonian region of South America and it is believed that during the 1980s and early 1990s the vast majority of the production remained on the American continent. With a significant proportion of the global cocaine output now destined for Europe, new cross-Atlantic trafficking routes have emerged and cocaine use and related health and social problems have been increasing in Europe. In response, the European Union and its Member States have gradually developed national and regional actions against cocaine trafficking, and have become increasingly involved in the fight against cocaine production at the international level.

This report provides an overview of what is known about how cocaine is produced and trafficked into the European Union. It aims to provide a better understanding of the actors involved, the routes taken, and the scale of the problem in Europe. It also reviews some of the supply reduction responses already developed at European level. Its findings are based on the latest data and analysis available from specialised European and international organisations, NGOs and scholars (!).

This publication is structured in a way that provides a condensed review of key issues relevant to understanding how cocaine reaches European markets. Background information on the chemistry and legal status of cocaine and crack cocaine, as well as key European figures, are also provided.

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(!) Data limitations are explored in the box 'Data and sources' on p. 19.

Analysis begins with a summary of coca cultivation and cocaine production in South America, including a review of the issue of the availability of potassium permanganate, an essential chemical for manufacturing cocaine hydrochloride. This is followed by a description of the three main smuggling routes followed by cocaine before it reaches Europe. The report then discusses cocaine trafficking within Europe. Finally, it provides an overview of European initiatives to address the problem of cocaine production and trafficking and its consequences.

## Introduction

Data published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) point to an overall stable annual production of pure cocaine during the last decade, at between 800 and 1 000 tonnes. However, in Europe, the number of cocaine seizures has tripled during this period. Survey data have also shown an increasing trend in cocaine use in many countries in the region. New trafficking routes between the producer countries and Europe have also been identified, indicating a growing interest in the European market among criminal organisations. Such routes also have a detrimental impact on transit countries.

The changing situation of Europe in the international cocaine trade, and the increase in problems related to cocaine use, has recently triggered numerous policy initiatives and scientific publications. For instance, during its Presidency of the EU in 2007 Portugal launched a number of activities to reinforce Europe's response to cocaine trafficking, together with other problems linked to cocaine use. In the same year, the EMCDDA launched three publications exploring treatment and other public health issues related to cocaine and crack cocaine use <sup>(2)</sup>.

### Cocaine in Europe at a glance

- Number of adults (15–64 years old) having used cocaine in their lifetime: 13 million (3.9 %).
- Number of young adults (15–34 years old) having used cocaine during the last year: 3 million (2.2 %).
- Cocaine is reported as the primary drug in about 17 % of all treatment requests.
- Available national estimates of problem cocaine use (only Spain and Italy): between 3.8 and 6 cases per 1 000 adult population.
- Around 500 cocaine-related sudden deaths were reported by 12 European countries. Most cocaine deaths appear, however, to be the result of chronic toxicity leading to cardiovascular and neurological complications.
- 92 000 seizures were reported for 2007, resulting in the interception of almost 77 tonnes of cocaine.
- Countries reporting the largest number of seizures (in descending order): Spain, UK (2006), Italy, Germany.
- Countries reporting the largest quantities of cocaine seized (in descending order): Spain, The Netherlands, Portugal, France.
- Mean retail price: from EUR 44 to EUR 88 per gram. Prices have declined since 2000 in most countries.
- Mean purity: between 20–60 % in most reporting countries, although purity at end-user level may be much lower.

Sources: EMCDDA, 2008, 2009a and 2009b (2007 data unless otherwise indicated).

<sup>(2)</sup> These were as follows: *Drugs in focus No 17, Cocaine use in Europe: implications for service delivery* (online at <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index44778EN.html>); *Selected issue No 2, Cocaine and crack cocaine: a growing public health issue* (online at <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index44746EN.html>); *Literature review, Treatment of problem cocaine use: a review of the literature* (online at <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index40152EN.html>).

## Cocaine


Cocaine is a natural product extracted from the leaves of *Erythroxylum coca* Lamark and *Erythroxylum novogranatense* (coca leaves). These tropical shrubs are cultivated widely in the Andean-Amazonian region, and are the only known natural source of cocaine. It is possible to obtain synthetic cocaine through various methods, but this is rare and is less economic than the extraction of the natural product.



Coca leaves and fruit (Peru, 2005).



Cocaine powder



Crack cocaine.

There are two forms of cocaine in Europe: cocaine powder (HCl, a hydrochloride salt) and the less common crack cocaine (a free base). The drug is typically snorted (powder) or smoked (crack), while injection is less common. The crack cocaine available in Europe is typically manufactured from cocaine HCl in locations close to where it is retailled and used. For this reason, crack generates very little cross-border or long-distance trafficking.

Cocaine is listed among the substances with addictive properties and presenting a serious risk of abuse in Schedule I of the United Nations 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Coca leaf is also separately listed in Schedule I and is defined by Article 1, Paragraph 1, as: 'The leaf of the coca bush, except a leaf from which all ecgonine,

cocaine and any other ecgonine alkaloids have been removed.' Potassium permanganate, an essential processing chemical in the manufacture of cocaine, is listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

Source: EMCDDA, Cocaine and crack drug profile at <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/cocaine>.

## Coca and cocaine production in the Andean-Amazonian region

Historically, cocaine HCl was produced legally on an industrial scale in the 19th and early 20th century. The main manufacturers were Dutch, German and Japanese pharmaceutical firms, which obtained coca leaves from plantations on islands belonging to the Dutch (e.g. Java) and Japanese (Formosa) colonial empires. In the 1910s and 1920s, more coca was produced in Asia than in South America (De Kort, 1999; Karch, 1999).

Today, cocaine HCl is manufactured illegally from coca cultivated in the Andean-Amazonian region of South America. Total global production of coca (and cocaine HCl) is almost fully concentrated in just three countries: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (in descending order of present-day estimated coca output). However, it is estimated that a few hundred hectares of coca shrubs are also cultivated in Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil, and cocaine HCl may be refined outside the three main Andean coca and cocaine producers.



Coca field (Bolivia, 2006).

Coca is regarded as a sacred leaf by some of the indigenous American communities of the Andes and Amazon basin, where it has been used for a variety of purposes for thousands of years (Mortimer, 1974). As a consequence, the legal status of coca is sometimes ambiguous in South America, complicating efforts to control cocaine production. Bolivian and Peruvian laws allow the growing of some coca in order to supply long-standing, licit, local consumer markets for coca leaves ('chewing') and derived products, mostly coca tea, in both countries. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has recently called for the suppression of these legal coca markets under Article 49, 2e, of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which requires the elimination of coca consumption 'within twenty-five years of the coming into force of this convention' (INCB, 2008a). Additionally, some coca is grown legally in Peru and Bolivia for processing into decocainised flavouring agents that are sold to international manufacturers of soft

drinks under Article 27 of the 1961 Single Convention. Finally, the 'chewing' of coca leaves and the drinking of coca tea appears to be tolerated for some communities or in some regions in a number of South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.



Different legal products based on coca leaves, including tea (Colombia, 2004).


## Estimating coca cultivation

In 2007, the global acreage of coca bush cultivation was estimated, depending on the source, to be 181 600 hectares (UNODC, 2008b) or 232 500 hectares (NDIC, 2008). By comparison, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that 523 500 hectares of maize (a staple food for Colombians) were harvested in Colombia in 2007 (FAO, 2009). Most of the coca cultivation was thought to take place in Colombia but acreage estimates varied largely between sources with figures of 99 000 hectares (UN) and 167 000 hectares (US). Peru was considered the country with the second largest acreage, estimated at 53 700 hectares (UN) <sup>(3)</sup> or at 36 000 hectares (US). Finally, estimates for Bolivia, the third largest grower of coca shrubs, were relatively close at 28 900 hectares (UN) and 29 500 hectares (US).

As regards trends, both sources report increases in acreage in Peru and Bolivia over the period 2003–07, but diverge regarding the trend in Colombia: the UN reports a decline between 2003 and 2007 and the US reports an increase. Thus, according to the UN estimate, Colombia in 2007 accounted for 55 % of the total coca bush cultivation for the three countries, yet according to the US estimate this share was above 70 %.

<sup>(3)</sup> UNODC's coca acreage estimates for Bolivia and Peru include areas dedicated to licit coca crops. In Bolivia, for instance, national legislation (Ley 1008) allows the cultivation of up to 12 000 hectares of coca to supply the licit national consumer market.

Figure 1. Global cultivation of coca bush, 1997–2008 (available estimates)



Sources: UNODC, 2007a; UNODC 2008b; WOLA, 2007 (based on ONDCP reports); NDIC, 2008.

NB: The UNODC (2009a) notes that, due to methodological changes, estimates prior to 2004 are not directly comparable with subsequent ones. The United States had not released its 2008 estimate at the time of writing (November 2009).

Taking an overall and long-term view, UN data show a decline of about 25 % in the total coca cultivation surface of the three countries during the period 1990–2006. The US surveys suggest that this aggregate coca cultivation has remained stable or has increased during the last 20 years. Finally, according to calculations based on US official coca acreage estimates (1987–2007) <sup>(4)</sup> the surface under coca cultivation in 2007 in the three countries could have grown to encompass the largest area on record since 1987 (WOLA, 2007; NDIC, 2008) (Figure 1).

### Estimating cocaine production

In 2006, in spite of different results in estimating the land surface dedicated to coca crops, the two existing sources converged somewhat as far as the Andean aggregate potential production of pure cocaine <sup>(5)</sup> was concerned <sup>(6)</sup>. In 2007, differences in acreage estimates were reflected in different

<sup>(4)</sup> United States data for years 1997 to 2006 are from the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA, 2007), an NGO; US data for 2007 are from the NDIC (2008).

<sup>(5)</sup> The figures of illicit cocaine production published by the UNODC and the US government are estimated amounts of 'pure cocaine' (UNODC, 2009c; NDIC, 2008) contained in the cocaine HCl that could be potentially manufactured from the coca leaf output estimated for a given year. Thus, since it is estimated that 600 tonnes of 'pure cocaine' were produced in Colombia in 2007 and that on average the Colombian cocaine HCl contains 85 % 'pure cocaine' (UNODC, 2008b), it may be estimated that in 2007 some 690 tonnes of cocaine HCl could potentially have been manufactured in Colombia (600 tonnes of 'pure cocaine' + 15 %).

<sup>(6)</sup> In 2006, the UNODC estimated the global coca acreage at 156 900 ha and global cocaine production at 984 tonnes (UNODC, 2008a), while the US suggested 220 000 ha and 970 tonnes (NDIC, 2007).

cocaine production estimates, the UNODC (2008a) estimating production at 994 tonnes and the US (NDIC, 2008) suggesting 865 tonnes, or nearly 15 % less <sup>(7)</sup>. However, these estimates are arrived at by different calculation methods, since the US acreage estimate of Andean coca cultivation in 2007 (232 500 ha) was about 28 % higher than the UN estimate (181 600 ha) for the same year <sup>(8)</sup>.

Trends in pure cocaine production in the Andean region over the period 2003–07 appear to be relatively stable overall, with estimates fluctuating around 900 tonnes <sup>(9)</sup>. At country level, both sources report increases in production in Colombia and Bolivia, but diverge regarding Peru, with UN figures showing an increase and US figures reporting a decline over the period.

For 2008, however, the UNODC estimates that global cocaine production decreased by 15 % to 845 tonnes (or 149 tonnes less than the previous year), representing a return to levels recorded in 2003–06 <sup>(10)</sup>. The sudden decline in 2008 is due entirely to a fall in coca cultivation and cocaine manufacturing in Colombia, since the coca acreages and the cocaine outputs of both Bolivia and Peru are estimated to have increased (UNODC, 2009a). The UNODC attributes the decline in coca cultivation in Colombia — 81 000 ha, or 18 % less than 2007 — to enhanced suppression efforts by the Colombian government, which reported the eradication of 229 130 ha of coca shrubs in 2008 (UNODC, 2009a). The even larger drop in pure cocaine production — to 430 tonnes, 28 % less than 2007 — is due mostly to the effects of eradication, which is reported to have had a greater impact in regions where high-yield coca is grown (UNODC, 2009c).

Taking the long-term view, UN data indicate an increase of 28 % in the total pure cocaine production of the three countries during the period 1990–2007 (UNODC, 2008a). This may reflect improvements in cultivation and production techniques, since during the same period the total acreage cultivated is estimated to have shrunk by about 25 %.

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<sup>(7)</sup> According to the UNODC (2009a), authorities around the world seized 41.5 % — some 412 tonnes — of the estimated global pure cocaine alkaloid output in 2007. By comparison, the 2007 interception rate for opiates was much lower, at 19 % of global production, or 143 tonnes of heroin equivalent.

<sup>(8)</sup> Contacted by the EMCDDA, the UNODC confirmed that its estimation methods differ from those used by the United States, although some elements are shared. Thus, for Bolivia and Peru, the methods used to estimate the scope of cultivation and the yield of coca leaves are different, but the UNODC uses the coca leaf to cocaine conversion rates information collected by the United States for its estimation of cocaine production. In the case of Colombia, the UNODC relies on its own coca leaf to cocaine conversion rates, which in recent years were considerably higher than those estimated by the United States.

<sup>(9)</sup> Fluctuations during this period were between 889 and 1 008 tonnes, according to the UN (UNODC, 2009a), and between 790 and 930 tonnes according to the US (NDIC, 2008).

<sup>(10)</sup> No US estimate of Colombian coca or cocaine production in 2008 was available at the time of writing.

## Suppressing coca in Colombia

Colombia is the world's leading illicit producer of coca and of cocaine HCl. It is also one of the countries in the world with the longest experience of using aerial spraying of herbicides to suppress drug crops. This method as an illicit crop suppression measure has been promoted and supported by the federal government of the United States since the early 1980s. The first major aerial spraying campaign was launched in 1982 against cannabis plantations, and in the 1990s regular aerial spraying campaigns were introduced against poppies and then against coca plantations (Guáqueta, 2007). In 2000, the Colombian government launched a new aerial spraying campaign against coca and poppy plantations, using a reportedly highly concentrated herbicidal mixture based on glyphosate. In addition to aerial spraying, a ground eradication campaign involving the manual uprooting of drug plants was initiated in 2001 (Vargas, 2005). Both campaigns were still underway in 2009.

There is ample evidence of the negative impact of drug production on the environment, notably deforestation and the disposal of chemicals used to refine drugs in rivers and streams of often-fragile ecosystems (UNODC, 2006). Large-scale aerial spraying of chemicals has also been blamed for adversely affecting the environment and human health (Jelsma, 2001), but there is little evidence available to assess such claims.

The surface area subjected to eradication measures in Colombia has rapidly increased since 2000, and in 2008 the area subjected to eradication was almost three times larger (230 000 hectares) than the UN-estimated acreage of harvestable coca in that same year (81 000 hectares) (UNODC, 2009a). However, it must be noted that for a variety of reasons — such as replanting after spraying — only a portion of the illicit crops sprayed are effectively suppressed (Vargas, 2005).

In spite of the considerable investment in suppression efforts — probably the world's most substantial — and irrespective of the uncertainty of acreage estimates, there is little doubt that coca continues to be cultivated on a large scale in Colombia. This supports the contention that eradication measures alone are unlikely to be effective if they are not accompanied by other measures to address the broader causes of the problem. While the issue of agricultural drug production and drug trafficking in Colombia is highly complex and underpinned by a wide range of interacting factors (Thoumi, 1995), two issues stand out that are likely to be of particular relevance: the land issue; and the armed conflict.

## From coca to cocaine

Manufacturing cocaine hydrochloride from coca leaves is a multifaceted chemical process, which in the Andean-Amazonian region is typically performed in three stages. During the first stage coca leaves are transformed into coca paste. The leaves are moistened with limewater or other alkali and extracted with kerosene (paraffin, domestic fuel). The dissolved cocaine is extracted from the kerosene with sulphuric acid to produce an aqueous solution of cocaine sulphate. This solution is neutralised with lime, causing cocaine base to precipitate (coca paste). This stage requires little skills or financial investment apart from buying the necessary, widely available, chemicals. Often it is the coca growers themselves who carry out this process, and they then sell the coca paste to middlemen. However, some farmers simply sell coca leaves.

The second stage involves transforming coca paste into cocaine base. Coca paste is re-dissolved in sulphuric acid, and potassium permanganate is added to destroy cinnamoylcocaine and other impurities. The filtered solution is again treated with alkali to precipitate the free base, which is dissolved in acetone or other solvents. This requires additional skills and investment, but many coca growers also perform this stage.

Finally, cocaine base is refined into cocaine hydrochloride by adding concentrated hydrochloric acid to the solution, causing cocaine hydrochloride to settle out as a solid residue. This is a more complex procedure that requires more skills, more chemicals and more financial investment. This is therefore performed in jungle 'laboratories' run by organised crime groups that buy coca paste or cocaine base from the middlemen (Thoumi, 1995; UNODC, 2007c; EMCDDA drug profiles).

The main chemicals used in the process described above are subject to international control measures. Sulphuric and hydrochloric acids, acetone and certain other solvents are listed in Table II, whereas potassium permanganate is listed in Table I, of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

The UNODC, based on its own field surveys in 2008 and 2009 and on information from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), reports the following national average ratios for Colombia (UNODC, 2009c):

- 1 hectare of coca shrubs yields 4.2 tonnes of fresh coca leaves per year;
- 1 tonne of fresh coca leaves yields 1.5 kg of coca paste or 1.4 kg of cocaine base;
- 1 kg of cocaine base yields 0.9 kg of cocaine hydrochloride;
- 1 kg of cocaine hydrochloride contains approximately 85 % pure cocaine;
- 1 hectare of coca shrubs yields 6.6 kg pure cocaine.

In Colombia in 2008, average prices for coca products were as follows (UNODC, 2009c):

- 1 kg of coca leaves: USD 1.10;
- 1 kg of coca paste: USD 963;
- 1 kg of cocaine base: USD 1 450;
- 1 kg of cocaine hydrochloride: USD 2 348.

## Drug production and the land issue in Colombia

In Colombia, most of the coca leaves, coca paste and cocaine base is produced by small farmers, who rely extensively on family labour. An estimated 60 000 to 100 000 families are involved in this illicit agricultural activity (UNODC, 2009c; Calvani, 2005). Most of these families are poor and live in remote agricultural 'frontier' areas located in the Amazon and Orinoco basins, respectively south and east of the country. In many of these regions, state institutions and services are absent, and irregular armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) control the territory. Large numbers of farmers have migrated to the 'frontier' because of lack of access to land, or to escape the violence in their regions of origin. Many of them grow coca for a living because the frontier areas lack the infrastructure — especially transportation — needed for other, licit, crops to be profitable, or because they do not have access to the resources needed to launch sustainable licit agricultural activities. However, especially in the late 1970s, some of them were also attracted to the frontier by the relatively large profits to be made from producing coca paste (Molano, 1987; Mondragón, 1999; Thoumi, 1995).

The concentration of land ownership in Colombia has been cited as a likely cause of the existence of so many 'cocaleros', or coca growers, and their presence in the 'stateless' frontier. In the early 2000s, 0.4 % of registered landowners in Colombia owned 61.2 % of the country's arable land, while 97 % owned only 24 % of it (IGAC/CORPOICA, 2002). This situation results to a considerable extent from the large-scale land purchases made by drug traffickers eager to gain recognition as 'respectable' landowners since the late 1980s. By the mid-1990s 'narcos' were the registered owners of an estimated total of 4.4 million hectares of land in Colombia (Reyes, 1997), which is equivalent to approximately twice the amount of arable land in Colombia, or about 4 % of the country's total land area <sup>(1)</sup>. This concentration process, which is often referred to as 'counter-land reform', has further fuelled the migration of landless farmers to the coca growing frontiers. As the former UNODC representative in Colombia put it: 'land concentration is one of the main causes of rural poverty, internal displacements <sup>(2)</sup>, armed groups, land misuse and illicit crops' (Calvani, 2005). In part because many land purchases have been made for non-agricultural purposes since the 1990s, land is also under-utilised, and just 3.6 % of rural properties are dedicated to agriculture. Thus, land concentration and under-utilisation make alternative development initiatives both more difficult to implement and less productive.

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<sup>(1)</sup> According to the FAO (2008), in 1995 there were 2.4 million hectares of arable land in Colombia, while the country's total land area was approximately 1.1 million square kilometres, or 110 million hectares.

<sup>(2)</sup> With around three million internally displaced persons (IDP) in 2008, 'Colombia continues to have one of the largest IDP populations in the world' (UNHCR, 2009).

## Drug production and armed groups in Colombia

Colombia is affected by a 50-year-old conflict, with armed groups present in many regions where coca is grown and cocaine products are manufactured. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the world's leading illicit producer of opium and possibly of heroin, internal armed conflicts have been recurrent over the last 30 years (Paoli et al., 2009). Historically, at world level, many of the countries that at one point in time became major producers of drug plants had internal conflicts or were at war <sup>(13)</sup>. This strongly suggests the existence of synergies between armed conflicts, especially civil wars, and illicit agricultural drug production (McCoy, 1972; Lamour and Lamberti, 1972; Labrousse, 1991; Vargas, 2005; Calvani, 2005; GTZ, 2007; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007).

Such synergies are in evidence in Colombia, where many sectors of the drug economy have been connected with, or indeed controlled by, irregular armed groups since the mid-1980s (Medina Gallego, 1990; Betancourt and García, 1994; Duncan, 2006). Colombia's internal conflict pits left-wing guerrilla movements, the large FARC and the smaller ELN, against several right-wing paramilitary units that federated under the banner of the AUC in 1997 <sup>(14)</sup> and whose main objective is the suppression of guerrilla movements in the country. Many of the groups that joined the AUC have roots in the private armies set up by drug cartel bosses in the late 1980s (Medina Gallego, 1990; Betancourt and García, 1994; Duncan, 2006). The Colombian military is also actively fighting against the guerrillas, especially the FARC, which it accuses of being a major international drug trafficking organisation.

Taken together, the FARC and the paramilitaries have territorial control of many drug-producing areas (UNODC, 2009c). These rural regions, their population, and the resources that may be extracted from them, form the base of the irregular armies' economic and political power as well as being the location of much of their fighting <sup>(15)</sup>. Typically, in the areas under their rule Colombia's two main irregular armed groups monopolise the purchase and sale of coca paste or cocaine base, and set the prices at which these commodities are bought from producers and sold to cocaine refiners (Jansson, 2005). In addition, they actively promote the illicit cultivation of drug plants, and the 'taxing and protecting' of cocaine laboratories and clandestine landing strips for aircraft (Calvani, 2005). Some of the fighting between the guerrillas and the paramilitaries is rooted in the struggle to gain control of drug-producing regions (Labrousse, 2004). Although the armed groups are involved in lucrative illicit activities other than drugs, including arms trafficking, extortion, robbery, misappropriation of public funds, and kidnapping for ransom (Duncan, 2006), there is little doubt that the drug trade provides a significant — but hard to estimate — proportion of both groups' funds (Labrousse, 2004; Duncan, 2006).

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<sup>(13)</sup> In addition to present-day Afghanistan and Colombia, the historical list includes: China, Guatemala, Mexico, Myanmar, Laos, Peru and Thailand.

<sup>(14)</sup> FARC-EP stands for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army); ELN stands for Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army); AUC stands for Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia). The AUC stopped functioning as the paramilitary umbrella organisation in 2003, but many of the men who belonged to it are still active in 2009.

<sup>(15)</sup> However, the irregular armies' illicit activities and violence are also played out in urban centres (Duncan, 2006).

## Production of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride

Potassium permanganate is an essential chemical in the illicit manufacture of cocaine, and as such it is listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 <sup>(4)</sup>. It is also a chemical that is used extensively, and increasingly, by industry throughout the world (for instance in drinking water treatment): 26 countries reported exporting a total of 23 780 tonnes of potassium permanganate for licit purposes between November 2007 and October 2008 (INCB, 2009b). The trade in potassium permanganate is monitored by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) under 'Project Cohesion', an international initiative to prevent the diversion of chemicals essential to the manufacture of illicit drugs.



Because most of the cocaine available in the world is manufactured in South America, this region is subject to special scrutiny by the INCB. South America (mainly Argentina, Brazil and Chile) was the destination of about 10 % of the licit shipments monitored by the INCB between 1998 and 2006. The majority of these shipments originated from outside South America, and intraregional licit trade in the chemical was limited. Some of the potassium permanganate imported legally into South America is likely to be diverted to manufacture cocaine. However, the extent of diversion is difficult to ascertain since national authorities rarely investigate and report the source of the illicit shipments of potassium permanganate they seize (INCB, 2008a).

In 2007, worldwide seizures of illicit potassium permanganate shipments reached a total of 153 tonnes, 52 tonnes more than the previous year. Colombia accounted for 94 % of these seizures (144 tonnes), the Netherlands for 3 % (5 tonnes), and Peru for 1 % (1.5 tonnes). Another source for the potassium permanganate used in cocaine laboratories is the illicit manufacture of the chemical

<sup>(4)</sup> The corresponding EU legislation is set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3677/90 (as later amended), which governs trade between the EU and third countries.

in Colombia. In 2007, the Colombian authorities destroyed four facilities (and 15 in 2006) from which they seized a total of 45 tonnes of potassium permanganate (INCB, 2009b). The INCB (2009b) notes that while quantities seized increased in South America in 2007, fewer cases of attempted diversion of permanganate potassium were reported in the rest of the world, suggesting that traffickers have found new ways to circumvent controls. In 2007, attempted shipments of potassium permanganate to Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Morocco were suspended, while the Democratic Republic of Congo reported the attempted diversion of 500 kilograms (INCB, 2008a). The INCB has warned that Africa may be used as a transit territory by South American illicit potassium permanganate importers, especially in view of the recent increase of cocaine seizures in that region (INCB, 2008a). However, it is also likely that Africa, especially West Africa, is used to carry out the final stages of the cocaine manufacturing process (UNODC, 2009d), i.e. transformation of base into cocaine HCl.

## Cocaine laboratories

The vast majority of the laboratories manufacturing HCl from coca paste or cocaine base dismantled worldwide in 2007 were located in Colombia (285 labs), with Peru (16 labs) and Bolivia (seven labs) far behind (UNODC, 2009a). Colombia is also the world's largest confiscator of cocaine (HCl and base), with 195 tonnes seized in 2007 (UNODC, 2009b).

It should also be noted that unknown, but probably lower, amounts of cocaine HCl are refined elsewhere in Latin America since coca leaves, coca paste and cocaine base (the two intermediary products) may all be exported to neighbouring countries for further processing into cocaine HCl. Laboratories for processing cocaine were found in countries such as Argentina (nine labs found in 2006), Chile (five in 2007), Venezuela (18 in 2005) and Ecuador (one in 2007) (UNODC, 2009b). Some cocaine HCl is also likely to be refined in Brazil, Panama and Paraguay.

Cocaine labs have also been dismantled outside of South America in recent years: in 2007, three labs in the United States and one lab in Mexico (UNODC, 2009a, 2009b); in 2006, one in South Africa, and four in the United States (UNODC, 2008c); in 2004, five labs were found in Australia and one in Hong Kong (UNODC, 2007b) <sup>(17)</sup>.

There are also laboratories that are processing cocaine base into HCl in Europe, but the scope of cocaine base exports to Europe is difficult to ascertain given current reporting practices, which, outside Latin America, rarely differentiate between seizures of cocaine base and seizures of HCl.

Among the cocaine laboratories seized in Europe, Spain reported the dismantling of 10 cocaine labs in 2006, a figure on a par with the previous year (11), but a significant increase from the four labs seized in 2001. There were indications that Spain dismantled at least seven labs in 2007 and a further five in 2008 <sup>(18)</sup>. Outside of the Iberian Peninsula, one lab was discovered in France in

<sup>(17)</sup> According to the UNODC (2008c, 2009b), problems of reliability may affect the data concerning cocaine-product laboratories reported by UN Member States.

<sup>(18)</sup> Spain's Cuerpo Nacional de Policía (<http://www.policia.es/index.htm>) and Guardia Civil (<http://www.guardiacivil.org/index.jsp>).

## Data and sources

The collection of systematic and routine information, which would give a clear picture of the supply of cocaine from the Americas to European markets, is both methodologically and practically challenging. Consequently, any analysis in this area must be made with caution.

Illicit cultivation of coca leaf — and therefore production of cocaine HCl — is extremely difficult to estimate, and only two public sources of data are available on the matter: the Crop Monitoring Programme of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) <sup>(1)</sup>; and the annual production surveys carried out by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and published by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) <sup>(2)</sup>.

The coca cultivation and cocaine production estimates are based on sampling on the ground and aerial and satellite surveys. They also involve working out yields of coca fields and extraction rates of cocaine alkaloid from harvested leaves. These estimates are affected by different problems including cloud cover, changes in cultivation and detection techniques (ONDCP, 2007; Bussink, 2008) and variations in the alkaloid content of the coca leaves and extracting methods (UNODC, 2009a; Terán, 2008). The results of the surveys must therefore be considered as approximations, and require careful interpretation. Large differences between some UN and US estimates (see sections 'Estimating coca cultivation' and 'Estimating cocaine production') also point to a need for caution.

Drug seizures are another data source that may be taken as an indirect indicator of the supply, trafficking routes and availability of drugs. Nonetheless, these may be influenced by variations in law enforcement resources, priorities and strategies. Data on price and purity may also be used to understand the dynamics of cocaine supply in Europe, and potentially reflect prevailing conditions in production areas and along the trafficking routes. However, issues of data availability, reliability and comparability limit the potential use of these data. Lastly, law enforcement intelligence, where available, may be used to complete the picture.

The information presented in this document is based on EMCDDA, Europol and UNODC information systems and analyses, complemented by ONDCP and NDIC reports. As far as essential chemicals are concerned, information is based on the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) analysis drawn from international initiatives set up to prevent the diversion of chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. Data on cocaine seizures, prices at street level and purity are collected by the EMCDDA, and provide routine information on the European situation, together with the national reports of the EMCDDA Reitox network of national focal points. Finally, information and analysis from a number of relevant qualitative studies have also been used.

<sup>(1)</sup> Online at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/index.html>; see also the chapter on methodology in the Colombia coca cultivation survey for 2008 (UNODC, 2009c).

<sup>(2)</sup> ONDCP: <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/>; NDIC: <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/>.

## Main trafficking routes to Europe

The UN estimates that, in 2007, the European share of the global cocaine seizures (in volume) declined to 11 %, its lowest level since 2004 (UNODC, 2009a). In 2007, the total quantity of cocaine seized in Europe dropped to 77 tonnes (120 tonnes in 2006). This variable should be interpreted with caution since it is influenced by a range of factors, including national law enforcement policies, resources and priorities. Together with the reported decline in global cocaine production mentioned above it might indicate that cocaine availability in Europe has decreased. Yet the fact that the number of cocaine seizures in Europe has increased for the fifth consecutive year in 2007 and that cocaine consumption remained high and was not diminishing while price trends continued to decline would seem to point in the opposite direction.

Cocaine is transported from South America to the European Union across the Atlantic Ocean by air or maritime routes. Multi-tonne maritime shipments are made from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Suriname and Venezuela to the coastal areas of Spain and Portugal. At the same time, cocaine is also shipped to the major container ports of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Project Cola) <sup>(19)</sup>. Although maritime shipments pose the greatest problem because large quantities can be transported at any one time, and detection is difficult, use of individual couriers and of air freight also play an important role.


Three main sea routes to Europe have been identified: the Northern route, leading from the Caribbean via the Azores to Portugal and Spain; the Central route from South America via Cape Verde or Madeira and the Canary Islands to Europe; and, more recently, the African route from South America to West Africa and from there mainly to Spain and Portugal (Figure 2) (Project Cola).

The Northern route departs from South America and reaches Europe via the Caribbean. The INCB (2008b) has estimated that 40 % of the cocaine entering Europe passes through the Caribbean, where some of the cocaine destined for the North American market also transits. In a first stage, the drug can be flown or shipped directly to Caribbean islands but also transported overland to the Caribbean coast of South America, for instance through countries like Venezuela (UNODC, 2008a). From the islands, transshipment and onward transportation to Europe are organised. Maritime transportation is frequently used, especially pleasure boats, cargo freighters and container ships. Aircraft are also used for dropping cocaine bundles in international waters to await pick-up vessels. Air couriers (sometimes colloquially referred to as 'mules') are another transportation technique, with cocaine being smuggled through European airports on commercial flights.

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<sup>(19)</sup> Project Cola and its Analysis Work File (AWF Cola) offer support to the competent authorities in Member States to prevent/combat specific forms of criminality within Europol's mandate. For more detail, see page 33.

**Figure 2. Main cocaine trafficking flows from Central and South America and Africa to Europe**



Notes: Trafficking flows represented on the map are an attempt to synthesise the analysis of a variety of international and national organisations (Reitox national focal points, Europol, INCB, UNODC, WCO). Such analyses are based on information related to drug seizures along the trafficking routes, but also on other intelligence information from other sources, such as law enforcement agencies in transit and destination countries, and anecdotal reports. The main trafficking routes represented on the map should be considered as indicative rather than accurate descriptions of the main flows, based on the knowledge that there may often be deviations to other countries along the routes, and that there are a multitude of secondary sub-regional routes that are not represented on the map. Such 'stopovers' may change very rapidly depending on constraints (e.g. law enforcement control points) and facilitating factors (e.g. commercial routes, corruption).

The large volume trafficked through the Caribbean can be explained by the region's geographical position, its historic and present-day links with Europe and by the fact that languages are shared with destination countries. For example, the Netherlands Antilles are the origin of supplies to the Netherlands; Jamaica is used as a platform to the United Kingdom; while Martinique and Guadeloupe play an important role in the transshipment of cocaine to France. The Azores is also exploited to tranship cocaine from the Caribbean to the Iberian Peninsula.

The Central route runs from South America, for instance Brazil (UNODC, 2009a), to the Iberian Peninsula with possible transit in Cape Verde, the Azores, Madeira or the Canary Islands. Trafficking is frequently carried out by sea, with larger cargo ships loading the cocaine in South America, often supplied by so-called 'go-fast boats'. The drug is then transhipped to locations such as Cape Verde or the Canary Islands and carried to the Iberian Peninsula in smaller crafts, especially fishing vessels, and speedboats (Zaitch, 2002). Air couriers have also been used on the Central route, notably using Madrid's Barajas airport.



*Large go-fast boat seized on a Spanish beach (2009).*

The West African route, notably the countries along the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Cape Verde, has been used for some time as a transshipment and storage region for cocaine from South America destined for the European Union. Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and, more recently, Mauritania and Togo are reported to be seriously affected by the trafficking of cocaine (UNODC, 2007a; JIATFS, 2007b).

UNODC reports for 2007, depending on the source, 6.4 tonnes of cocaine seized in West Africa (UNODC, 2009e) or 5.5 tonnes seized in Africa (UNODC, 2009a). The latter figure amounted to more than a seven-fold increase since 1998. The quantity of cocaine seized in Africa (0.8 % of the global total in 2007) remains, however, modest in comparison to the likely cocaine flows affecting the continent.



*Go-fast boat smuggling drugs in the Alboran Sea (2006).*

Cocaine is also transported by air from West African countries to European airports, by small aircrafts, by couriers or by air-freight (JTIAFS, 2007a). Couriers from Africa are sent on commercial flights, as 'body-packers' or 'swallowers', frequently applying the 'shotgun approach' — i.e. relying on the limited capacity of law enforcement to check a large number of passengers, several couriers are placed on each flight. EU Member States have also reported an increase in the arrest of cocaine couriers from West Africa who have transited through North African countries such as Algeria, Libya or Morocco, in order to disguise their point of origin (Project Cola). Contacts have also been made with Moroccan criminal groups in order to traffic cocaine via existing cannabis smuggling routes (Project Cola) and polydrug consignments (with cannabis resin) have been reported (Europol, 2007a).



*Semi-submersible vessel seized off the Galician coast (2006).*

Europol reports that in recent years Colombian groups, as well as groups from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, have all been involved in cocaine trafficking towards West Africa. These groups have established air and sea supply routes, storage facilities and a variety of lawful businesses to cover their illicit activities and justify their presence. They have closely cooperated with West African criminal groups and fully exploited the unstable social, political and economic situation in the region. Their illegal activities are furthermore facilitated by porous and uncontrolled borders between states, poor governmental control over large tracts of territory, high levels of corruption, legal difficulties and problems linked to national and international law enforcement cooperation.

Cocaine trafficking between West Africa and Europe is also facilitated by regular maritime trade and regular flight connections, as well as by historical ties (e.g. Ghana and Nigeria with the United Kingdom; Côte d'Ivoire with France; and Cape Verde with Portugal), which may translate today in the presence of West African drug distribution networks in Europe.

There are indications that the use of the 'West African' route may be declining, at least for the time being. In 2008 the UN reported a 'substantive decline' in seizures of cocaine transiting Africa (8 %), as well as a sharp decrease in the number of detected African cocaine couriers arrested at European airports (UNODC, 2009e). Based on an analysis of European seizures of known origin, the UNODC estimated that 6.8 % of the cocaine seized in Europe had been smuggled through West Africa, down from 28 % in 2007, but still above the 2.7 % estimated in 2005 (UNODC, 2009a). While additional data are needed to confirm a real decline of cocaine flows through West Africa, initiatives such as MAOC-N (see below) have probably had an impact on cocaine trafficking in the region and dissuaded some organised crime groups (OCGs) from using it as a transit point en route to Europe, or led them to change trafficking methods and routes.


Another factor for changes in the West African route could be the recent political instability, particularly in those states where South American OCGs became established. Continual shifts of power could have made operating there more difficult, at least for some time. This would be ironic, since the political instability of these countries was probably one of the factors that had attracted the OCGs to the region in the first place.

## Importation to Europe and distribution

Cocaine importation and distribution in Europe <sup>(20)</sup> is mainly concentrated in western European countries. The Iberian Peninsula is considered the main entry point for cocaine into Europe. In 2007 the Spanish authorities seized almost 38 tonnes of cocaine, much of it at sea, representing about 50 % of the estimated total quantity intercepted in Europe. In Portugal, the amount of cocaine seized has increased rapidly since 2005, with a peak in 2006 at 34 tonnes accounting for 28 % of the European total, whereas in 2007 a total of 7.3 tonnes were seized. This development in Portugal since 2005 points to the use of the Iberian Peninsula by cocaine traffickers as a gateway to the European market. It may also point to a diversification in the unloading points throughout the Iberian Peninsula, in response to the likely intensification in the controls of the traditional cocaine maritime route to the Spanish north-western coast in Galicia (Figure 3).

**Cocaine 'secondary extraction' laboratories in Europe**

While the laboratories seized in South America manufacture cocaine base or HCl from coca leaves or coca paste, it is likely that the majority of the cocaine laboratories seized in Europe are of a different type, that is, 'secondary extraction' labs. These are used to remove the cocaine from other materials in which it has been incorporated — and therefore concealed — before importation.



Cocaine base and more frequently HCl may be incorporated into a range of materials including beeswax, fertiliser, various types of plastic, clothing, herbs, liquids, guano, upholstery, etc. The incorporation process may be fairly simple, for instance by soaking pieces of clothing in a mixture of cocaine and water. But it may also be more complex and require a chemical process, for example in order to incorporate cocaine HCl within plastic. In this case, a reverse chemical process will be required to extract the cocaine from the plastic. After secondary extraction, the cocaine can then be adulterated with different cutting agents (see box on adulterants) and pressed into the form of traditional cocaine bricks embossed with logos, probably to convince buyers that they are purchasing original high purity cocaine.

Cocaine brick with embossed lyre logo.

<sup>(20)</sup> In its 2008 *World Drug Report*, the UNODC suggests, quoting different law enforcement agencies including Europol, a figure of 250 tonnes of cocaine entering Europe every year, with a rising trend (UNODC, 2008a). However, the report does not specify how this figure was calculated.



Cocaine press seized in Oosterhout, the Netherlands (2007).

Recent reports from Member States have revealed that more than 38 cocaine 'secondary extraction' laboratories of all sizes were seized in the European Union during 2008 (Europol, 2009). For example, a mid-scale 'secondary extraction' laboratory removing cocaine from cacao powder and liquor was seized in the Dutch city of Roosendaal in December 2008. In September 2007, Dutch Authorities dismantled two illicit cocaine 'secondary extraction' laboratories in Oosterhout and Steenberghe, seizing a total of 8 tonnes of polypropylene (a plastic), samples of which were tested and found to contain cocaine. According to documentation recovered at the scene, more than 50 tonnes of polypropylene had been imported from Colombia since the beginning of 2007, although it is not known if cocaine was present in all of it (Europol, 2009).

There is also information that criminal organisations use EU neighbouring countries, such as Albania and Moldova, to set up such laboratories (Project Cola)

## Cocaine adulterants


When sold in Europe, cocaine is almost always adulterated. Common adulterants or cutting agents include the local anaesthetics lignocaine (lidocaine) and benzocaine; painkillers such as phenacetin (a carcinogenic substance) and paracetamol; and other agents such as hydroxyzine, boric acid, glucose, manitol, lactose and caffeine.

A relatively recent trend is the use of Levamisole (leva (l)-Tetramisole), a veterinary anti-parasitic agent used in the past in human medicine as an immunostimulant. When used over a longer period of time and in higher doses, Levamisole may cause a number of adverse effects, of which agranulocytosis (1) is the most alarming.

Levamisole has been reported as a cocaine adulterant in the United States and in Europe at least since 2004. In 2009, over 70 % of cocaine seizures that were analysed in the United States contained this substance (SAMHSA, 2009). In Europe, recent information from the EMCDDA–Europol Early Warning System indicates an increase both in the percentage of the cocaine samples adulterated with Levamisole and in the concentration of the substance in the samples. Thus, several countries reported Levamisole in about one third (Belgium, Spain, France and Sweden) and one half (Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK) of the cocaine seizures analysed. Levamisole is widely used in South America, and it is likely that the adulteration of cocaine takes place not only at the point of import in Europe, but also immediately after production or just before export.

(1) Agranulocytosis is a haematological condition that involves severe leukopenia (decrease in the number of white blood cells) that can lead to rapidly developing life-threatening infections.

**Figure 3. Number of cocaine seizures and quantities seized (kg) in the EU, Croatia, Turkey and Norway, respective shares of Spain (ES) and Portugal (PT) 2001 to 2007, as reported to the EMCDDA**



Notes: The total amount of cocaine seized is based on data from all EMCDDA reporting countries (27 EU Member States, Croatia, Turkey and Norway), whereas 5 EU Member States (Italy, Cyprus, The Netherlands, Poland and Romania) were not included in the total number of cocaine seizures due to unavailability of data. For countries included in the totals per year, missing data have been extrapolated from adjacent years. (PT=Portugal, ES=Spain).

Cocaine also enters Europe via other countries, in particular Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, each of which seizes several tonnes of cocaine every year. Other countries are also used to import cocaine into Europe, as flights from the main trafficking routes are increasingly subjected to enhanced controls. One example is the '100 % control policy' implemented between 2002 and 2008 at Schiphol airport (Amsterdam) in the Netherlands — that is, the control of all passengers on direct flights from risk countries for cocaine importation in South America and the Caribbean (Aruba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Netherlands Antilles, Peru and Suriname). This initiative, together with preventive measures (controls, radar, body scans) in departing countries, seems to have achieved some results, as both the quantities of cocaine seized and the couriers arrested decreased over the period. Displacement of trafficking to other airports in neighbouring European countries would, however, need to be investigated.

### Trying to link cocaine supply with demand

Cocaine seizures reflect the supply side of the drug market. Even if the focus and intensity of police work influence the number of seizures, this figure can be seen as a proxy to indicate the supply situation of a country. Given the illegal status of cocaine no perfect statistics on its supply exist. In order to take into account the different sizes of the EU Member States, the number of seizures is calculated per 100 000 inhabitants (age 15 to 64 years), resulting in an overall number of 24 seizures per 100 000 population.

In terms of demand for cocaine, there is a lack of reliable data on the total amounts consumed. The prevalence of cocaine use is therefore used as a proxy to describe the country situation. Cocaine use during the last 12 months as assessed by population surveys provides us with this information.

Supply as measured by the number of seizures is above EU average in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the UK. In four of these countries the prevalence of cocaine use is also above EU average. This suggests that there are several links between supply and use. Only one other country, Italy, shows prevalence rates above average but a relatively low number of seizures. Due to a lack of more recent prevalence data no conclusions may be drawn on Belgium.

**Table 1. EU Member States where prevalence of cocaine use is above the EU average**

Country	Year of survey	Last year prevalence	Seizures/100 000 inhabitants
Belgium	1994	0.2	52
Denmark	2008	1.4	34
Ireland	2006-07	1.7	59
Spain	2007-08	3.1	149
Italy	2007	2.2	18
United Kingdom	2006	2.7	51
EU and Norway		1.2	24

Note: The Netherlands, Malta and Poland do not report number of seizures and therefore were not included here.

With regard to cocaine importation and distribution, Europol (2007b) has identified two main criminal hubs <sup>(21)</sup> in Europe: the 'South-west hub' with criminal groups located in the Iberian Peninsula, which then use France as an important transit country; and the 'North-west hub', with

<sup>(21)</sup> Europol defines a criminal hub as 'an entity that is generated by a combination of factors such as proximity to major destination markets, geographic location, infrastructures, criminal group types and migration processes concerning key criminals or organised crime groups in general. A criminal hub receives flows from a number of sources and spreads their effects in the EU so forging criminal markets and creating opportunities for the growth of criminal groups that are able to profit from these dynamics. These hubs can be seen as 'routers' attracting and re-directing external flows, such as cocaine from South America, coming to the EU directly or through West Africa' (Europol, 2007b).

criminal groups located in and around the Netherlands and Belgium. The latter exploit the 'major transport infrastructures, generating huge volumes of commercial traffic with connections to worldwide markets', (Europol 2007b) that are present in the region. This was corroborated by an ethnographic study of Colombian 'cocaine entrepreneurs' based in the Netherlands, which concluded that cocaine importers view the region's transport infrastructure as a key asset for their activities (Zaitch, 2005). According to Europol, the 'North-west hub' acts as a redistribution centre to other European countries, mainly in western Europe (Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom), for both the cocaine entering via the Iberian Peninsula and that being unloaded in major sea ports in the region itself (Europol, 2007a). Europol reports a recent increase in the number of couriers recruited by organised crime groups in the North-west region to distribute cocaine to other European markets. Most noticeable are West African organised crime groups, who recruit African and European nationals as 'mules' who travel overland (car, coach, train) with relatively small quantities of cocaine (1 or 2 kg). The drugs are concealed inside the body, wrapped around the body, in luggage or in the vehicle used for transport.


While the majority of shipments of cocaine from South America continue to be directed to Western Europe (Figure 4), substantial seizures of cocaine, usually concealed in containers, has occurred in recent years in important ports in the Balkans (Project Cola, UNODC 2009a). For instance, in January 2009 authorities in Constanta, Romania, seized 1.2 tonnes of cocaine concealed in a consignment of wood. The subsequent investigation led to the discovery of a further 3.8 tonnes of cocaine at the original point of loading, in the port of Paranagua, Brazil. In July 2009, law enforcement in Varna, Bulgaria, seized 1 020 bottles containing a mixture of cocaine and wine shipped from Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The total weight of the cocaine was estimated at 100 kg. In August 2009, at Piraeus, Greece, almost 450 kilos of cocaine concealed in a shipment of scrap metal were confiscated.

An increasing number of nationals of Balkan countries have also become involved in cocaine trafficking in recent years, according to Europol. In addition, Albania has been used as a storage country for cocaine, alongside its traditional role in the Balkan Route for heroin trafficking (Europol, 2007a). This, together with an increase in the involvement of organised criminal groups from that region, may indicate that the already-established trafficking infrastructure developed in the region, especially for cigarettes and heroin, is now being used for the shipment of increasingly large amounts of cocaine.

This suggests a diversification of trafficking routes and points towards an eastward expansion of cocaine trafficking in Europe, which may eventually contribute to the diffusion of cocaine use into countries that are comparatively unaffected at present.

Trade liberalisation in the Balkan area, the region's proximity to the European Union, as well as the presence of pre-established transnational criminal networks are likely to be important explanations for the transit of cocaine through the region. Criminal groups present in the region have control over long-established trafficking networks of the Balkan Route that have traditionally facilitated the movement not only of heroin but also cannabis, contraband cigarettes and human beings, as well as illegal immigration.

Figure 4. Evolution of the number of seizures and quantity of cocaine seized in Europe, 2001 and 2007



Source: Reitox national focal points, EMCDDA Statistical bulletin 2009, seizures data (SZR).

Tables: SZR-9 - <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats09/szrtab9> and SZR-10

<http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats09/szrtab10>

## Supply reduction initiatives at EU level

The European Union (EU) and the Member States are engaged in a range of initiatives to address cocaine trafficking and the changing dynamics of the cocaine market. Some of these initiatives have been developed at the political and diplomatic level, while others are focused on operations 'in the field'.

At political level, the EU has implemented a set of initiatives directly aimed at tackling cocaine production and trafficking from Latin America and the Caribbean into Europe. The EU drug strategy (2005–12) <sup>(22)</sup> and EU drugs action plan 2009–12 set specific objectives for the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region.

In December 2007, the EU Council adopted conclusions welcoming continued cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean in tackling trafficking along the cocaine routes (Council of the European Union, 2007). In this respect, the Council expressed support among others for alternative development, demand reduction efforts and supply reduction, including sharing best practices achieved in the EU–LAC Intelligence Sharing Working Group, which concluded its activities in 2009.

The EU–LAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs was launched in 1995. This mechanism is the key forum for inter-regional cooperation on drug-related problems, especially cocaine. It operates in the form of an annual plenary meeting and several technical meetings throughout the year. The XIth high-level meeting took place in Quito in May 2009. It resulted in the 'Quito Declaration' <sup>(23)</sup>, which reaffirms the political will to strengthen bi-regional EU–LAC cooperation against drugs.

In recognition of the responsibility of the EU and the Andean Community (CAN) to work together to deal with the challenges posed by illicit drugs, a unique EU–CAN (Andean Community) High Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs — the only such dialogue at sub-regional level — has been underway since 1995, with annual meetings at senior official level. The EU has also signed agreements with each of the four CAN member states (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs (known as 'precursor agreements'). High-level experts from the EU and CAN meet regularly to coordinate and exchange information on implementing these agreements.

The European Union (European Commission and EU Member States) is a major donor for operational projects to prevent drug production and trafficking in Latin America. At the end of December 2009, European funding to anti-drug projects in the region totalled about EUR 360 million. The focus for EU international efforts is support for alternative development initiatives. For instance, in Colombia, three 'Peace Laboratories' to promote alternative development and peaceful conflict resolution were financed, with total funding of about EUR 68 million. Building on this work, a regional development programme for peace and security with funding of EUR 26 million started in 2009.

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<sup>(22)</sup> Online at <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/index.cfm?nNodeID=6790>.

<sup>(23)</sup> Online at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st10/st10758.en09.pdf>

In April 2007, the European Commission signed the regional strategy for cooperation with the Andean Community, allocating EUR 50 million for the period 2007–13. One of the three priority areas for cooperation is to support the Andean countries in the CAN in the fight against illicit drugs. A first intervention in this field was approved within the 2008 Annual Action Programme, namely PRADI-CAN (Progama Antidrogas ilícitas en la Comunidad Andina). One of its main objectives is to establish a network between national observatories on drug trafficking. PRADI-CAN will also reinforce and develop further the control of essential chemical precursors in the CAN countries. The EU is contributing EUR 3.25 million out of the programme's total budget of just over EUR 4 million.

In 2009, the European Commission launched the bi-regional project COPOLAD (Latin America and EU Cooperation in Antidrug Policies) with an EC contribution of EUR 6 million. The project aims to facilitate cooperation between national agencies responsible for drug policy in Latin America and the EU.

With respect to cocaine trafficking routes through West Africa, many initiatives are underway at European level. The European Commission is funding a number of bilateral projects in West Africa under its European Development Fund (EDF) that aim to combat organised crime, including drug trafficking. At the regional level, the Commission initiated a three-year project in 2006 on 'Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation Against Cocaine Trafficking from Latin America to West Africa' (CO-LA-CAO), and a major capacity-building project in West Africa is planned to complement this project in 2009–10. Moreover, under the EDF the EU, with an overall budget of EUR 15 million, is ready to assist West African law enforcement agencies in the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Action Plan on Drugs.

Among the initiatives taken by the European Union, the Council, through the horizontal working party on drugs (HDG), has placed West Africa high on its agenda and has presented a resolution on strengthening international support to West Africa to the 2008 UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. An important step forward in the operational effort to curb cocaine trafficking through West Africa was taken when in September 2007, seven EU Member States <sup>(24)</sup> signed a formal Treaty to set up the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre–Narcotics (MAOC-N) in Lisbon, Portugal. MAOC-N is a regional initiative supported by EC funding. It is designed to coordinate the interdiction of illicit drugs trafficked by air and maritime conveyances in the Atlantic region in order to prevent drugs from reaching European markets, to deny traffickers the revenue from the delivery of the drugs, and in general to provide long-term deterrence of illicit drug smuggling. During its first two years of existence MAOC-N, on behalf of its partners, coordinated the seizure or led to the jettisoning of a total of about 45 tonnes of cocaine. European countries are currently considering other similar initiatives. For example, in September 2008 France launched another anti-drug coordination centre focused specifically on maritime drug trafficking in the Mediterranean — aiming mainly to combat cannabis resin (hashish) and cocaine trafficking. The Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti Drogue en Méditerranée (CeCLAD-M) of the French National Police

<sup>(24)</sup> The co-founders of this project are Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, but it is open to other Member States. On 1 January 2008 the European Commission, Europol and Greece gained the status of observers, as did the US Joint Inter Agency Task Force–South (JIATF-S, based in Key West, Florida), Canada, Cape Verde.

is a military-supported law enforcement centre based in the port of Toulon. CeCLAD-M is open to participation from the CIMO countries <sup>(25)</sup>, Member States with coastlines on the Mediterranean, and others, such as the United Kingdom and Senegal.

Europol has taken specific measures against cocaine trafficking in Europe — Project Cola and its Analysis Work File (AWF Cola). These offer support to the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing or combating specific forms of criminality within Europol's mandate. AWF Cola seeks to collect intelligence associated with the activities of suspected criminal organisations and networks involved in the production, processing or trafficking of cocaine, including intelligence relating to precursor chemicals and cutting agents. The AWF currently has 17 participating Member States, whilst Third Party States and Organisations (Third Parties) such as the United States (DEA), Eurojust and Interpol are also associated. The Project works closely with Member States' Law Enforcement agencies providing on-the-spot support to investigations, dismantling of cocaine laboratories and operational analysis.

Project Cola includes the Europol Cocaine Logo System (ECLS), the Europol Specific Means of Concealment System (ESMC) and its Alert System. The ECLS collates information on modus operandi, photographic and basic forensic information on cocaine seizures and on logos or markings on the drugs and their packaging. This enables Project Cola to identify matches between seizures with a view to promoting international law enforcement cooperation, initiating information exchange and further investigations for the targeting of criminal groups.

In the framework of the Europol Cocaine Logo System, the ESMC focuses on the specific means of concealment or packaging of cocaine. This sub project collates and stores in its database, relevant information of specific means of concealment that have been reported by the Member States and Third Parties. In those circumstances where new information concerning such specific means of cocaine concealment is received, the information is immediately forwarded to all Member States and other partners via an Alert Message through the Europol Information Exchange. Its principal objectives are to:

- update European Union Law Enforcement Agencies on new trends and methods of cocaine smuggling;
- display drug-related activities in member countries;
- heighten awareness of global trafficking trends; and
- improve the targeting of suspect persons and goods through the efficient and timely dissemination of intelligence developed by Europol and other law enforcement agencies via the respective Alert Messages.

Related criminal data arising from the findings of the ECLS and ESMC is analysed within AWF Cola as well as contributing to the aims and objectives of the European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) COSPOL Project 'Cocaine'.

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<sup>(25)</sup> CIMO is the '5+5' Intergovernmental Conference of the Ministers of the Interior of western Mediterranean countries, comprising Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal, together with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

## Conclusions

There is little doubt that Europe has become an important destination for cocaine manufactured in South America. In 2007, an estimated 73 800 seizures in EU Member States, Croatia, Turkey and Norway resulted in the interception of almost 77 tonnes of cocaine. So Europe today ranks third in the world for the amount of cocaine confiscated, after South and North America. Law enforcement data also suggest that cocaine landing points may have shifted within the main gateway regions, the Iberian Peninsula and the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) and that trafficking networks are spreading eastwards. This increases the risk of a diffusion of cocaine use into eastern and central European countries, which have been comparatively little affected until now.

Cocaine is smuggled into Europe via different routes using a wide variety of concealment methods and means of transport, from cargo ships and private yachts or fishing boats, to commercial airliners and unscheduled small planes. A particularly sophisticated concealment and smuggling method analysed in this report involves incorporating cocaine into other materials and then removing it in 'secondary extraction' laboratories set up in Europe. The growing importance of the West African route, where major cocaine seizures have been carried out in recent years, illustrates the diversification of drug trafficking itineraries. And several initiatives have been launched in Europe to address cocaine trafficking, such as the EU-LAC cooperation, the setting up of the MAOC-N, or Europol's Project Cola.

Most of the cocaine available in the world is produced in Colombia in coca plantations, where coca makes a significant contribution to the local economy. Different measures to prevent coca cultivation and to offer alternative lifestyles to coca growers have been developed and supported, notably by the EU and its Member States. However, both the concentration of land ownership and the ongoing armed conflict make it difficult to implement effective and long-term action. It is important to enhance efforts to intercept cocaine products at source and on trafficking routes and consumer markets. Yet there is also a strong argument for launching complementary initiatives, to restore civil peace and promote the de-concentration of land ownership in Colombia, while fostering land use for productive, licit agricultural purposes, as they enhance the impact of other measures.

Nevertheless, understanding of cocaine production in South America — and trafficking towards and within Europe — is still limited. Additional or better-developed information systems are needed for the future. In particular, the level of precision of cocaine production estimates could be further explored, since differences between various estimates need to be better understood. In addition, there is a lack of information on how much cocaine European markets may be consuming, and on how this aggregated consumption may compare with the estimated cocaine output of South America. Developing a sound methodology to assess the size of the European consumer market for cocaine would be a significant first step towards such an analysis.

Obtaining a better understanding of the cocaine trade in Europe calls for more insight on issues such as the merging of cocaine routes, multi-drug consignments, incorporation of cocaine into other 'carrier' materials, organised crime groups and trafficking networks. It also highlights the need to carry out additional studies of the intra-European cocaine markets, focusing especially on their structure, organisation, actors and dynamics.

For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to draw a clear picture of cocaine supply and trafficking in Europe, based on traditional quantitative indicators such as seizures, prices and purity data. Indeed, these need to be developed further so that comparability and reliability issues can be addressed and more detailed data may be analysed <sup>(26)</sup>. For example, it would be useful to distinguish between cocaine HCl and cocaine base in routine data on seizures, thereby enhancing our analytical capabilities regarding the global supply of illicit coca-derived products. Furthermore, there is also a need to develop innovative alternative monitoring strategies that may be based on sources other than law enforcement, and which may rely on more qualitative data.

Better and more systematic information on illicit sources and trafficking routes of potassium permanganate, and other chemicals used to manufacture cocaine, would contribute to a clearer picture of potential processing sites in South America and elsewhere, especially in Europe. Information on precursors would also help in designing adequate responses to countering cocaine production. As we face a need to target supply reduction efforts effectively, both inside and outside Europe, it is vital to improve our understanding of the dynamics of the illicit trade in coca-derived products and essential chemicals.

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<sup>(26)</sup> See the Council of the European Union document 12411/1/01 STUP 26 on a draft Council recommendation on the alignment of law enforcement drug and diverted precursor statistics.

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## EMCDDA–Europol joint publication series

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and the European Police Office (Europol) stepped up their cooperation on drugs and crime in the spring of 2009, by defining a series of collaborative activities for the period 2009–12. The commitment was made in the framework of a 'Cooperation Agreement' signed in Brussels in November 2001, under which the organisations exchange information and expertise on drug-related issues, money laundering and the diversion of chemical precursors. The two bodies also collaborate actively in detecting and monitoring new and potentially threatening psychoactive substances and in assessing the involvement of organised crime in their manufacture and trafficking. This activity is carried out under the terms of a specific legal instrument, adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2005 ([www.emcdda.europa.eu/drug-situation/new-drugs](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/drug-situation/new-drugs)).

Among the collaborative activities planned for 2009–12 is an EMCDDA–Europol joint publication series covering key aspects of European drug markets. While the first titles in the series are dedicated to illicit substances — e.g. methamphetamine, amphetamine, ecstasy, cocaine, heroin and cannabis — future editions will be developed in line with ongoing and emerging information needs.

The series is designed to inform policymakers, drug experts and the general public on important aspects of the drug situation. Bringing together EMCDDA information and data on prevalence, health consequences and drug research, with Europol data and knowledge on production, trafficking, markets and drug-related crime, the publications will offer an integrated analysis of the topics chosen and constitute a joint EMCDDA–Europol view on key drug issues. The analysis will be informed by complementary information provided by the organisations' respective national networks — the Reitox national focal points and the Europol national units.

### About the EMCDDA

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is the hub of drug-related information in Europe. Its mission is to provide the EU and its Member States with 'factual, objective, reliable and comparable information' on drugs, drug addiction and their consequences. Established in 1993, it opened its doors in Lisbon in 1995 and is one of the EU's decentralised agencies. With a 100-strong multidisciplinary team, the agency offers policymakers the evidence base they need for drawing up drug laws and strategies. It also helps professionals and researchers pinpoint best practice and new areas for analysis. As well as gathering information on the demand and reduction of the demand for drugs, the agency in recent years has extended its monitoring and reporting on drug supply, supply reduction and illicit drug markets.

[www.emcdda.europa.eu](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu)

### About Europol

Europol is the European Union's law enforcement agency. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness of, and cooperation between, the competent authorities in the EU Member States in preventing and combating serious international organised crime and terrorism. Operational since 1999 and based in The Hague, the organisation employs some 600 staff to support national law-enforcement agencies in their everyday work, including efforts to tackle illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, cyber crime and terrorism. Europol comes into play when an organised criminal structure is involved and two or more EU Member States are affected. Among others, it facilitates cross-country information exchange and provides analysis of operations.

[www.europol.europa.eu](http://www.europol.europa.eu)



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
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PAGINA BIANCA

 **EUROPOL**

# EUROPOL REVIEW

GENERAL REPORT ON EUROPOL ACTIVITIES



PAGINA BIANCA

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## FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR



Welcome to the first edition of the *Europol Review - General Report on Europol Activities*, which presents an overview of Europol's work in 2009.

2009 was a symbolic year for Europol as the agency celebrated its tenth anniversary. It was also one of the most productive years in Europol's history. From its founding roots in the early 1990s as the Europol Drugs Unit, the organisation has grown beyond all recognition and developed into an agency of the European Union (EU).

Today Europol is a modern agency occupying a central place in the field of law enforcement cooperation in Europe. It has unique crime-fighting capabilities tailored to combat serious international crime and terrorism. European law enforcement agencies rely on Europol's 24/7 operational service centre. Europol employs some of the best criminal analysts in Europe, produces high-quality strategic and operational analysis and coordinates over 10 000 cross-border investigations each year.

As Europol moves into a new decade, the change in its legal basis will consolidate its position at the centre of the new internal security arrangements and information pathways in Europe. This will enable Europol to function even better as a pioneer of change, identifying and responding to new threats, and developing new techniques.

As a stable and prosperous community of 27 democratic states, with nearly half a billion people, Europe is an undeniably attractive target for criminals. Working together and in cooperation with law enforcement partners in Europe and beyond, Europol's main goal in the coming years will be to coordinate a carefully calculated response to these challenges. Using our unique tools and increased powers, we will continue to facilitate the exchange of criminal intelligence between law enforcement services to improve the internal security of the European Union and the safety of European citizens, and therefore have a major impact on reducing serious crime and terrorism.

The publication of this report fulfils Europol's obligation to present an annual general report on Europol's activities in accordance with article 37(10)c of the Europol Council Decision. *The Europol Review - General Report on Europol Activities* is submitted to the Council of the European Union for endorsement and the Council forwards it to the European Parliament for information.

Rob Wainwright  
Director of Europol

# 1. ABOUT EUROPOL

## 1.1 MISSION, PRIORITIES AND VISION

As the European Union law enforcement agency, Europol's mission is to support European Union (EU) Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime and terrorism. Its role is to help achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens by supporting EU law enforcement authorities through the exchange and analysis of criminal intelligence.

Large-scale criminal and terrorist networks pose a significant threat to the internal security of the EU and to the safety and livelihood of its people. The biggest security threats come from terrorism, international drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of the euro currency and payment cards, fraud, corruption and money laundering as well as other activities related to the presence of organised crime groups in the economy. New dangers are also accumulating, in the form of cybercrime, VAT fraud and other sophisticated crimes which abuse modern technology and the freedoms offered by the EU internal market. All of these have been declared priority areas by the European Union's Council of Ministers.

Strengthened by a reform to its mandate and capabilities in 2010, Europol is pioneering a new response to these dangers. Europol acquired a new dynamic on 1 January 2010 when it became a fully-fledged European Union agency, through the adoption of the Europol Council Decision. This has meant the implementation of a new strategy and new legal status with enhanced powers. As a result, Europol has become more open and accountable and its new legal framework will spell quicker and less bureaucratic cooperation between partners, which is especially important for police work.


Europol's vision is to contribute to a safer Europe by providing the best possible support to law enforcement authorities in the Member States. It will achieve this by delivering a unique set of operational services for the European Union, developing as the principal:

- Support centre for law enforcement operations
- Criminal information hub, and
- Centre for law enforcement expertise.

## 1.2 RESOURCES AND STRUCTURE

Europol uses its unique information processing capabilities and the expertise of 662 personnel, including 100 analysts, to identify and track the most dangerous criminal and terrorist networks in Europe. Law enforcement agencies, represented at Europol by 121 Europol liaison officers working in conjunction with Europol's 24/7 high-security operational service centre and its secure databases, have been successful in disrupting many criminal and terrorist networks, arresting thousands of dangerous criminals, recovering millions of euros and rescuing hundreds of victims of crime, including trafficked children.

In 2009, Europol was funded by contributions from Member States according to their gross national income. The Europol budget for 2009 was €68.5 million. As Europol's host state, the Netherlands covers security-related costs. As of 1 January 2010, Europol became an EU agency, financed from the EU community budget. The Europol Management Board, European Commission, Council of the European Union and European Parliament play a role in the establishment of Europol's budget. The initial adopted budget of Europol came to €80.1 million. To facilitate the transition to becoming an agency, appropriations carried from 2009 to 2010 have been integrated into the 2010 budget. The amount involved comes to almost €12.5 million, making a total amended 2010 budget of €92.6 million.



### BASIC FACTS ABOUT EUROPOL (2009)

- **Headquarters:** The Hague, the Netherlands
- **Staff:** 662 personnel at Headquarters, including 121 Europol liaison officers
- **Budget:** €68.5 million
- **Servicing:** 27 EU Member States, 500 million EU citizens
- **Supporting:** 10 000 cross-border law enforcement investigations.



## 2. HOW EUROPOL WORKS

International crime and terrorist groups operate worldwide, making use of the latest technology. To ensure an effective and coordinated response, Europol needs to be equally flexible and innovative, ensuring its methods and tools are up-to-date. Europol maintains state-of-the-art databases and communication channels, offering fast and secure facilities for storing, searching, visualising, analysing and linking key information. The gathering, analysis and dissemination of this information entails the exchange of large quantities of personal data. In discharging these functions, Europol adheres to the highest standards of data protection and data security.

All Europol databases and services are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We also send experts and make our services available via an on-the-spot mobile office, whenever requested by a Member State.

### 2.1 NETWORK OF EUROPOL LIAISON OFFICERS

Europol liaison officers ensure and maintain a live link between Europol headquarters in The Hague and 27 national capitals in Member States. The Eu-

ropol National Units are based in these capitals, and are a key part of the national law enforcement services. We have a unique network of 121 liaison officers who play an important role in everyday law enforcement activities by facilitating the exchange of information, as well as providing support and coordination for ongoing investigations. Europol also hosts liaison officers from 10 third countries and organisations who work together with Europol on the basis of cooperation agreements. This network is supported by secure channels of communication provided by Europol. In addition, to foster cooperation and information exchange with the US federal agencies, as well as Interpol, Europol has seconded two liaison officers to Washington DC and one to Interpol's headquarters in Lyon.

### 2.2 SECURE COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE

In order to support its operations and deliver a growing range of operational and strategic services to Member States, Europol needs to constantly maintain and further develop a technically-advanced, reliable, efficient and secure telecommunication infrastructure.

Europol has been supporting the development of this target investigation in a proactive manner since 2008. The case came to a successful conclusion in July 2009 and resulted in the:

- Arrest of more than 40 suspects
- Seizure of 65 kg of heroin
- Seizure of 5 kg of ephedrine
- Seizure of 1 kg of hashish
- Seizure of 0.550 kg of cocaine
- Seizure of a considerable number of heavy weapons and ammunition.

This can be seen as a good example of international police cooperation and a valuable result for the COSPOL Western Balkans Organised Crime initiative. All those involved agreed to consider Operation Gasoline as a model example to be followed in the future for similar investigations.

The backbone of Europol's infrastructure is its network, connecting all Member States and a growing number of non-EU states and third parties with which Europol has established cooperation agreements. During 2009, five new network connections were initiated with Balkan states.


In 2009 the Europol network became linked to non-EU states and third party networks via the secure interconnection, enabling more effective end-to-end communication and information exchange with those partners.

The security of its infrastructure is of primary concern for Europol, since state-of-the-art security is the basis for maintaining trust among all the parties that share information and intelligence with and through Europol. Following a thorough assessment process in 2009, the Europol network received re-accreditation for its security by the Europol Management Board.

Besides being the foundation for the delivery of advanced information analysis, collaboration and exchange, search and retrieval, and knowledge management services, the Europol network provides core secure communication services for use by Member State law enforcement officers to communicate among themselves and with Europol.

### 2.3 EUROPOL INFORMATION SYSTEM

The primary purpose of the Europol Information System is the detection of matches among data contributed by different Member States and third parties (via Europol). The number of matches increased from 140 at the end of 2008 to 241 at the end of 2009. 241 Cross-Border Crime Check events, consisting of 187 on persons and 54 on other objects, were available in the Europol Information System by the end of 2009.



#### Content:

- 135 489 objects
- 135 154 relationships
- 29 964 'person' objects

Compared to December 2008, the number of objects in the Europol Information System increased by 57%.

#### Major crime areas:

- Drug trafficking, 24.09% of all objects
- Forgery of money, 21.51%
- Trafficking in human beings, 19.11%
- Robbery, 7.81%
- Illegal immigration, 5.88%.

#### Usage:


- 130 313 insertions of new data were performed in the Europol Information System in 2009
- 149 237 searches were run through the system in 2009.

Germany was the main provider of data into the system, followed by France, Belgium, Europol (on behalf of third parties) and Spain. The 10 Member States who use automatic data loading systems provide 81% of the data to Europol.

Functional improvements were also made during 2009, according to the requirements of Member States. A new version of the system was deployed in early 2010. The changes include, among others, improved handling codes. The full enforcement of these changes will give Member States the opportunity to share more sensitive data while still receiving top-level protection for their data.

## 2.4 SECURE INFORMATION EXCHANGE NETWORK APPLICATION

The Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) is a new generation of communication tool designed to enable the swift, secure and user-friendly exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information and intelligence between Member States, Europol and third parties with whom Europol has a cooperation agreement.



- 10 487 new cases were initiated, monthly average: 874  
- Increase of 25% compared to 2008
- 26% of new cases were drug related, followed by forgery of money (15%), fraud and swindling (11%), terrorism (7%), and illegal immigration (7%)
- 303 613 operational messages were exchanged, monthly average: 25 301  
- Increase of 7% compared to 2008.

SIENA has been in use from 1 July 2009, when the first version was released, replacing the information exchange application (Info-Ex) that had been in use since 1996.

In the design and functioning of SIENA, significant emphasis was put on data protection and confidentiality, to ensure compliance with all legal requirements. Equally, security is deemed vital and all necessary measures have been taken to enable the secure exchange of restricted information. Furthermore, best practice in law enforcement information exchange has been taken into consideration, like the reliability and use of handling and evaluation codes specifying the conditions for use.

In subsequent stages, the functionalities of SIENA will be expanded and its availability extended to competent authorities and cooperation partners, like Eurojust, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, USA and Interpol. Currently, third parties do have indirect access to SIENA through Europol's 24/7 operational centre.

## 2.5 ANALYSIS SYSTEM

Analysis constitutes a cornerstone of all modern intelligence-led law enforcement activities and is crucial to all of Europol's activities. Our analytical capabilities are based on advanced technology adjusted to the needs of law enforcement.

## HANDLING CODES

Handling codes, tailored to the needs of EU law enforcement, are a means of protecting an information source. The codes ensure security of the information and its safe and adequate processing, in accordance with the wishes of the owner of the information, and with full respect to the national legal rules of Member States. The handling codes indicate what can be done with given information and who has access to it in the future. This helps Europol to have effective control over the supply of information, the purpose of transmission and its final use. The codes can be seen as facilitating the process of communicating operational information by using the same terms of reference across the whole Europol system.

Analysts employed at Europol use state-of-the-art methodologies and techniques which help identify missing links in many ongoing cross-border investigations within the European Union. Operational information is processed within the Europol system using Analysis Work Files (AWFs), which are focused on a given area of crime. Analysts working on these files provide information to ongoing operations being conducted by law enforcement officers in EU Member States and this information is often a breakthrough for many international investigations.

The Europol analysis system is the operational information system hosting data contributed by Europol's stakeholders.

The different components of the analysis system offer the following benefits:



- Centralisation and management of information
- Customised text-mining solutions
- Analytical capacities through a wide range of analysis tools.

The Europol systems are interconnected which means that all information inserted in one system can be also identified in the others.

## SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (SNA)

Europol has adopted state-of-the-art Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an innovative way to conduct intelligence analysis and support major investigations on organised crime and terrorism. The valuable expertise and experience gained so far has produced excellent operational results.


Intelligence analysts are now able to deploy mathematical algorithms to map and measure complex and/or large data sets and quickly identify key players, groups of target suspects and other hidden patterns that would otherwise remain unnoticed. SNA is a valuable approach that complements conventional link analysis techniques, enhances the quality of intelligence reporting and helps to prioritise investigative work.


## OPERATION MOST

On 14 April 2009, 27 persons suspected of being part of a counterfeit euro distribution network, were arrested in Poland with the support of Europol, the *Brigada de Investigacion Del Banco de España* (BIBE), the *Mossos d'Esquadra De Catalunya*, as well as *Guardia di Finanza* from Italy.

The Polish investigation was an offshoot of an extensive exchange of information which originated in 2007. Europol and Spanish police officers were present at the location, supporting the operation with a mobile office which allowed direct access to Europol databases.

Operational analysis carried out at Europol identified links to other EU Member States where the criminals were also active in distributing 50 and 100 euro counterfeit banknotes. The SNA tool allowed Europol analysts to identify 25 key suspects from one million international call records transmitted by Poland. As a result, 65 suspects in total were arrested, including 25 main targets identified by Europol.





Criminal hubs as defined by the OCTA

Strategic analysis is yet another important dimension of Europol's analytical activities. The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) is the most important strategic analysis document drafted by Europol. Commissioned by The Hague Programme in November 2004, the OCTA was first produced in 2006 and has now reached its fourth edition. It is the document on which the Council of the EU bases its priorities and recommendations on the fight against organised crime in Europe. Drafted in adherence to intelligence-led policing principles, the OCTA is acknowledged as a pioneering project, and in its short life has introduced innovative concepts – such as the criminal hubs and organised crime group typology – which have been accepted and adopted at political, law-enforcement and academic levels.

#### ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT ON WEST AFRICA (OCTA-WA)

In October 2009, a Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment on West Africa (OCTA-WA) was delivered. This report acknowledges the growing threat of organised crime from West Africa and particularly its impact on the internal security of the EU. It identifies the principal features of the threat and offers an insight into its effective combating. In doing so, the report assesses the main organised crime activities that link the criminal situations in West Africa and the EU, in particular in the fields of drug trafficking, trafficking human beings, illegal immigration and fraud. It also describes the main types of organised crime groups in West Africa and their links to organised crime dynamics in the European Union.

#### RUSSIAN ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT (ROCTA)

The Russian Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ROCTA) was first drafted in 2008. This specific threat assessment explores current and expected threats from Russian organised crime across the European Union. When producing specific threat assessments, Europol implements the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM). Under this model Europol drafts specific threat assessments on topics which OCTA identifies as priorities or as significant intelligence gaps. The findings of these specific threat assessments are then translated into operational projects both at EU and national levels.

## EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT (TE-SAT)

In 2009, Europol produced its third annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). The report aims to inform the European Parliament and the Council on the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU from a law enforcement perspective.

The TE-SAT is an unclassified document and is available on the internet to inform the public. Member States have all contributed information from criminal investigations on terrorist offences conducted by their law enforcement organisations. Eurojust has contributed information on prosecutions and convictions. The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation, i.e. Islamist, separatist, left-wing, right-wing, and single-issue terrorism.



### Analysis training

During 2008 Europol established a new training concept which was intended to both harmonise and raise the level of knowledge in the field of analysis and the necessary IT tools, in order to enhance our ability to carry out our daily work and to produce accurate and timely analysis for Member States. The outcome of this training concept was a completely redesigned, two-week analysis training course called Operational Integrated Analysis Training.

In addition to internal requirements for harmonisation, the Member States requested increasing levels of analysis training, delivered in their own countries, which could not be fulfilled with the resources available at Europol.

As a result of this agreement the analytical training team developed two separate versions of the Operational Integrated Analysis Training, one with the 'Train-The-Trainer' concept in mind, and one for analysts and specialists working at Europol. The training

Thanks to products such as OCTA, ROCTA, OCTA-WA and TE-SAT, more support is given to decision makers who can identify specific priorities in the complex area of organised crime. Based on political guidelines, law enforcement officers can then tailor their operational work nationally, regionally and locally. They can also use existing regional cooperation mechanisms embodied by Europol, the Baltic Sea Task Force or the Southeast European Co-operative Initiative (SECI).

## TRAINING PROVIDED BY EUROPOL IN 2009

331 internal or external training sessions took place during 2009 provided by Europol staff. The audience were staff members as well as participants from Member States.

was specially designed for potential trainers in Member States, to cover the essential elements of the intelligence cycle and to focus especially on analysis.

During 2009, Europol delivered four courses to a total of 46 trainees from 22 different countries. Several Member States have already used the material, methods and exercises from the Operational Integrated Analysis Training to develop and deliver their own operational analysis courses in their countries.

## 2.6 CENTRAL PLATFORMS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE

### 2.6.1 Witness protection

Witness protection is one of the cornerstones in the fight against organised crime and terrorism. The sophisticated and entrepreneurial skills of organised crime groups require effective and professional investigation tools. Europol deals with this special area of law enforcement and responds to the challenges facing law enforcement agencies across Member States and beyond.

Elements of Europol's witness protection services include the harmonisation of different national programmes, development of new witness protection units and programmes, the standardisation of processes such as the relocation of witnesses, and the education of witness protection officers.

Europol's network on witness protection is the biggest one worldwide.



### 2.6.2 Informants, cross-border surveillance and controlled deliveries

The informant is a crucially important aspect of police activities. Involvement of an informant early in the criminal intelligence gathering process is likely to result in a successful outcome for the investigation. The quality of intelligence gathered is directly proportional to the quality of the informant.

Serious organised crime is not restricted by national boundaries so informants may provide intelligence to support law enforcement in a number of countries.

The current legal situation within the EU is not uniform with regard to using informants, although cooperation with informants is a common and widespread practice. To support Member States, Europol has provided some tools, such as details on best

EUROPOL KEY DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE MAJORITY OF WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAMMES IN EUROPE:

- Basic Principles of European Union Police Cooperation in the Field of Witness Protection
- Common Criteria for Taking a Witness into a Witness Protection Programme.

**PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS****Europol platform for witness protection experts**

Europol will provide an internet-based platform, within a closed user group (designated experts in Europe and beyond) which will aim to provide legislative advice, details on new trends, and good and bad practice. Furthermore, the user group will have access to an online discussion forum to address issues with Europol or other European witness protection units.

**Cooperation with Russia**

Europol will support the establishment of a witness protection programme and witness protection unit by providing training and education to Russian authorities.

**Higher education course on witness protection**

This UK-Europol project aims to provide, for the first time, a standardised education programme for witness protection, on a European level. The two-week course will be established in autumn 2010.

practices for informant handling and protocol on international informant payment.

The use of covert surveillance is one of the key modern investigative tools for obtaining important and decisive information on criminal structures and how criminal proceeds are disposed of. However, due to the transnational nature of modern organised crime groups, law enforcement authorities are increasingly confronted with cases of cross-border observation and surveillance which create issues at both legal and operational levels.

Europol is a member of the Cross-Border Surveillance Working Group, whose purpose is to encourage international cooperation and provide a forum for the discussion and development of safe and effective law enforcement surveillance techniques for use against serious and organised crime.

Another key investigative tool for obtaining important and decisive information on criminal structures, and the disposal of their criminal proceeds, is the deployment and systematic operational use of covert surveillance areas in conjunction with controlled

**EUROPOL IS CREATING EXPERT PLATFORMS FOR:**

- Informant experts
- Cross-border surveillance
- Controlled deliveries experts

which will be equipped with internet-based tools for these closed user groups consisting of designated experts from Europe and beyond. The aim is to provide details on new trends, legislation, obstacles, as well as good and bad practice. Furthermore, the user groups will be able to discuss current issues through an online forum.

## EUROPOL HOMICIDE WORKING GROUP

In 2009, the UK proposed that Europol establish a focal point for homicide matters. This proposal was supported by the Heads of Europol National Units in 2010. The working group will be the expert authority on strategic homicide-related issues and will be based on extensive practitioner involvement, using a linked network of European homicide investigators. Another important part of the proposal was to establish a central repository for knowledge on defined homicide-related subjects. The focus will primarily be on:

- Serial killers
- Homicide in relation to organised crime
- Specific modi operandi in cases such as honour or school killings
- New trends in the field and new investigation techniques.

These objectives will be reached by developing a technical solution to support web-based networks for the exchange of information, best practice, and communication amongst the experts. The Europol platform for experts, currently in development, will also become a tool for the Europol Homicide Working Group to enhance the effectiveness of their network.

Expected products include, among others:


- Europol manual for murder investigations
- Intelligence notifications on various topics related to the above
- Other documents created in close cooperation with Europol and made available through the Europol platform for experts.

## EUVID

EuVID is an operational tool for law enforcement which facilitates the identification of vehicles and vehicle documents. Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Europol participate in the EuVID project.

EuVID currently holds information on 83 different vehicle brands and types, information on genuine vehicle documents from 55 countries, a catalogue on vehicle keys and a guideline on how to investigate motor vehicle crime.

EuVID is made available for joint operations organised by Frontex and Interpol and used as a basis for vehicle identification training. The EuVID products are only available to law enforcement agencies.



### MAIN ACTIVITIES

- Response to over 300 data subject requests for access
- Integration of Check the Web portal to the Analysis Work Files system
- Implementation of rules for the Data Protection Office
- New Security Manual to harmonise the systems of protection for classified information at Europol and the Council
- Establishment of Compliance Officer function
- Positive report issued by the Data Protection Supervisory Authority
- Positive report issued by the Council Security Office.

deliveries. A CD-ROM compilation of the different Member States' legislation on controlled deliveries is made available to inform experts about the problems that might occur in cross-border cooperation.

security requirements have been integrated into the system in accordance with new confidentiality rules.

## 2.7 DATA PROTECTION

Europol has one of the most robust data protection regimes in the area of law enforcement. The Europol Data Protection and Confidentiality Unit ensures legal compliance with the data protection framework including the processing of data related to Europol staff. The main task of the unit is to create a tailor-made policy framework which serves the needs of the operational units and at the same time protects the fundamental rights of the data subjects.

Amongst other achievements, the Data Protection and Confidentiality Unit has contributed considerably to the successful replacement of Info-Ex by SI-ENA. Data protection and security related requirements were taken into account from the start of the development phase. Both internal and external stakeholders have valued this approach as a role model for the successful establishment of future systems.

The unit enforced the link between data protection principles and data security requirements. When personal data is processed by Europol, the data

## 3. EUROPOL OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

### 3.1 TERRORISM

Nearly 10 years after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to EU Member States. Extremist and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, ETA and others, are active in the European Union and impact the lives of its citizens in various ways. Therefore, the fight against extremism and terrorism remains a top priority for the European Union and Europol.


Europol assists law enforcement services in the Member States in conducting successful investigations by providing the following products and services:

- analysis and analytical products such as reports, threat assessments and missing links for ongoing international investigations
- information exchange and access to Europol's databases and exchange systems
- expertise through Europol's mobile office which enables on-the-spot assistance
- other tailored products and services such as **Modus Operandi Monitor**, **First Response Network**, **European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network**, **EU Bomb Data System** and more
- Europol produces the **EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)** annually, which defines and monitors major terrorist threats facing the EU.

In 2009, terrorist activities took place in several states, while law enforcement agencies undertook investigations and adopted preventative measures.

#### 3.1.1 Modus Operandi Monitor

The Member States' commitment to exchanging sensitive intelligence on terrorist activities with Europol allows for a better assessment of new modus operandi and has resulted in the development of more efficient counter-measures. The Modus Operandi Monitor is a means of developing an over-



arching activity model that continuously assesses terrorist events and/or investigations which affect the security situation in the Member States, by focusing on specific elements of the terrorists' modus operandi. Additional value is given by the fact that the outcome is linked to other Europol intelligence products and aims to provide real-time expertise and intelligence to the Member States' relevant agencies.

#### 3.1.2 First Response Network

The First Response Network is a tool developed by Europol which enables law enforcement agencies to respond to a terrorist attack in Europe in a timely way. Based on a decision by Europol's Director and the head of the competent authority of the

affected Member States, a team of Europol and Member State counter-terrorism experts can be mobilised immediately to assist the affected Member States in all operational and technical matters. In such cases, this team will use Europol's operational centre to ensure efficient information exchange with all involved parties.

In addition to offering support in a crisis situation, the First Response Network also aims to provide high-level terrorism experts with strategic advice, tailored to the evolving *modus operandi* of an attack.

In 2010, in its first year as an EU agency, Europol will actively participate in the activities of the Inter-Service Group 'Community Capacity in Crisis Management', which is led by the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, with the participation of several Directorate-Generals and other EU agencies.

The First Response Network will also participate in the EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) activities and, more specifically, will be tested during a CCA exercise in 2010.

### 3.1.3 European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network

The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network is a network of experts providing a platform for the exchange of knowledge about the disposal of explosive materials. The network contributes towards identifying best practices and organises training in partnership with EU Member States and third parties. It also keeps explosive ordnance disposal units up to date with the latest relevant developments.

The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network is open to all police, government and military

units that deal with explosives. Training sessions, as well as a set of other activities, are carried out by the network.

### 3.1.4 EU Bomb Data System

The EU Bomb Data System (EBDS) provides a platform for Member States to share timely and relevant information and intelligence on explosives, incendiary and explosive devices, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials (CBRN). The EBDS is an EU instrument enabling competent governmental bodies, both at EU and Member State level, to share technical information and intelligence on this issue, such as analysis, technical reports and assessments.

The EU Bomb Data System also comprises incident databases for explosives and CBRN, as well as libraries and experts' forums. It is planned to be fully operational in 2010.

## 3.2 DRUGS

### 3.2.1 Synthetic drugs

The European Union is a significant region for the illicit production of synthetic drugs, particularly amphetamine and ecstasy. Each year around 60 to 90 large-scale production sites are identified and dismantled. Storage sites for potentially dangerous precursor chemicals used in the drug manufacturing process are often discovered during the course of investigations in Member States.

Major synthetic drug production across the world is based on historic, current knowledge and technical expertise, as well as trading and logistical positions with regard to the acquisition of precursors (ingredients), essential chemicals, materials and equipment. The market and demand also play a key role. Principal synthetic drug precursors and essential


## CLANDESTINE LABORATORY

An illicit operation consisting of a sufficient combination of apparatus and chemicals that could be used for the manufacture or synthesis of controlled substances.

chemicals are traded worldwide in large quantities for legitimate purposes. Their production requires heavy infrastructure and as such they are rarely produced by the criminal networks that use them for the manufacture of synthetic drugs. Criminals tend to either smuggle main precursors into the European Union or divert essential chemicals from lawful EU trade.

The drugs phenomenon is a major concern to the citizens of Europe - it has an impact on collective and individual health and safety.

The operational support Europol offers is on the increase. This support includes the coordination and initiation of criminal investigations plus on-the-spot assistance to law enforcement agencies in Member States during the dismantling of illicit synthetic drug production facilities. Both the quality and quantity of information received and disseminated has improved, which is largely due to the direct contact




between Europol and operational law enforcement teams in the Member States.

Member States' investigations, some of which were initiated by Europol via its Illicit Laboratory Comparison System, indicate that there are a limited number of criminal facilitators playing a crucial role in supplying precursor chemicals, equipment and tableting powders for synthetic drug production, often to different producers at the same time.

Since 1999, Europol has provided regular training on combating illicit synthetic drug production to

## IF YOU FIND A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY



## GET OUT!

1. DO NOT touch or handle anything
2. DO NOT operate light or power switches
3. If you become contaminated, immediately flush with water for 20-30 minutes
4. Call for help as soon as possible
5. Secure the area and wait for help.

**Europol experts support EU and non-EU Member States in the secure dismantling of illicit drug production units and the collection of evidence.**

Europol experts also carry out technical investigations on custom-made and industrial equipment seized from production and storage units.




numerous EU and global partners. The training is very popular and requests for participation were received from countries in the European Union and beyond. Since 1999, more than 23 training courses were provided to over 600 participants from all Member States, plus third parties such as:

- Serbia
- US Drug Enforcement Agency
- Russian Federation
- Australian Federal Police
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- South American and Caribbean countries.

### 3.2.2 Cocaine

The Andean region remains the main area for coca bush cultivation in the world. Most coca paste, cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride is processed in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. According to UN figures, 2008 saw an estimated output of 845 tonnes of cocaine in 2008 - a decrease of some 15% on the previous year. This was a result of a significant reduction in output in Colombia, which was not matched



Production, routes of transit and final destination of cocaine

by increases in production in neighbouring Peru and Bolivia.

Europe's share in global cocaine seizures remain relatively stable having decreased from 14% in 2005, down to 11% by 2008. This reflects the rapidly growing trafficking flows and spread of cocaine use in Europe. Next to the United States, the European

## OPERATION ANDROMEDA

In December 2008 Eurojust provided Europol with information about an investigation in the early stages of development. This was originally an Italian inquiry carried out by the *Guardia di Finanza* of Pisa under the direction of the Anti-Mafia District Directorate (DDA) of Florence. It concerned suspected organised criminals of Albanian origin, located in Antwerp (Belgium), and involved in the trafficking of drugs (cocaine) into EU countries (Italy and the UK). Three different coordination meetings were held at Eurojust during 2009, which paved the way to a joint initiative.

Police activities carried out in several European countries corroborated elements stemming from technical investigations. The investigation and action produced the following results: 48 877 kg of cocaine, 10 kg of heroin, 6000 ecstasy pills, two guns, five false ID documents, €43 000 in cash, 15 people arrested red-handed.

The execution of European Arrest Warrants and official requests for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters against 42 suspects led to the arrest of 30 individuals and the seizure of: 2 kg of hashish; 100 g of cocaine and €127 000 in cash. The operation was finalised in December 2009.

Europol produced seven reports on acknowledged cross-matches and a comprehensive analytical report depicting the identified criminal network. The work carried out by Europol on huge quantities of data required one analyst dedicated to the case and, at times, a second analyst to help with data processing. Support was also provided with real time cross-checking of entities, coordination and assistance via the mobile office deployed at the place of operations and an operations room running at Europol.

Union remains the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world. An estimated 250 tonnes of cocaine enter the EU annually via maritime shipments, air freight and couriers.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of conversion laboratories discovered in the European Union. Law enforcement authorities in France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain have all carried out actions resulting in the dismantling of illicit laboratories. In order to minimise the risk and to maximise their profits, criminal organisations are increasingly importing cocaine in a variety of different forms instead of the traditional manner (e.g. cocaine brick). Outside of the Iberian Peninsula, in recent years



laboratories have been discovered in France, Greece and the UK. The Netherlands, known for many years as being significant in terms of synthetic drug manufacture, has also seen a rise in the number of cocaine laboratories seized. Recent reports to Europol from Member States have revealed that in excess of 38 cocaine conversion laboratories of all sizes were seized in the European Union during 2008. It also seems that non-EU Member States are not immune to this phenomenon with countries such as Albania and Moldova being utilised by criminal organisations to set-up cocaine conversion laboratories.

At Europol, cocaine-related organised crime networks are the responsibility of a dedicated project incorporating an Analysis Work File (AWF). Analysts and experts within the AWF collect intelligence associated with the activities of suspected criminal organisations and networks involved in the production, processing or trafficking of cocaine, including intelligence about precursor chemicals and cutting agents. The project provides operational support to

live investigations in participating Member States. It also seeks to enhance the strategic intelligence picture by providing insights into criminal groups of all nationalities whose activities impact upon the trafficking of cocaine as well as providing expertise and knowledge in this area.

### 3.2.3 Heroin

The European Union is a significant global consumer market for many types of illicit drugs including opiates. Although demand and supply of opiates, namely heroin, is relatively small in comparison to synthetic drugs and cannabis, the social, economic and health problems associated with its use are significant and heroin remains a major threat to the security and health of European society. Even though heroin consumption is stable, or slightly decreasing in some Member States, it is increasing in others, and particularly in some of the newer Member States and parts of Eastern Europe. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, an estimated 100 tonnes of heroin are needed annually to supply the EU heroin market, while

#### OPERATION MELISSA

Since 2007, a number of uncoordinated investigations in various countries had been conducted against an international drug trafficking network. This network was active in the production of synthetic drugs in the Netherlands, the import of cocaine from South America and large scale poly-drug trafficking within the European Union and beyond (e.g. to the Russian Federation, Iceland and Australia). In January 2009, Europol's Project Synergy took the initiative for cooperation and coordinated analysis, launching Operation Melissa.

Twelve suspects were arrested in Ecuador, Germany, Latvia and the Netherlands; 61.2 kg of amphetamine, 10 000 ecstasy tabs, 50 kg cannabis and 2.5 tonnes of cocaine plus a large quantity of money were seized in Ecuador, Germany, Iceland and Latvia.

Europol's contribution included operational analysis; facilitation and coordination of operational meetings; financial investigative support provided by coordinating asset tracing requests from several AWF members' jurisdictions; and offender financial profiling.

approximately 8 to 15 tonnes are seized annually by EU law enforcement authorities.

The Europol project on heroin seeks to disrupt criminal organisations engaged in heroin production and trafficking, and supports Member States in their investigations to do so. A number of successful sub-projects have helped Member States achieve their objectives to counter this phenomenon and more are planned during 2010.



### 3.3 TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS

Trafficking in human beings (THB) for sexual and labour exploitation is a crime affecting all EU Member States. Men, women and children are exploited by both individual criminals and organised crime

groups on a daily basis throughout the EU. Globally it is estimated that trafficking generates criminal profits in excess of US \$31 billion every year.

#### PUSH FACTORS:

- High unemployment
- Labour market not open to women and gender discrimination
- Lack of opportunity to improve quality of life
- Sexual or ethnic discrimination
- Poverty
- Escaping persecution, violence or abuse
- Escaping human rights violations
- Collapse of social infrastructure
- Other environmental conditions including conflict and war.

#### PULL FACTORS:

- Improved standard and quality of life
- Better access to higher education
- Less discrimination or abuse
- Enforcement of minimum standards and individual rights
- Better employment opportunities
- Demand for cheap labour
- Higher salaries and better working conditions
- Demand for workers within the sex industry, with higher earning potential
- Established migrant communities/diasporas.

In 2009, according to data recorded in the Europol system, identified trafficked victims came mainly from:

- the South East criminal hub
- West Africa
- Asia.

Trafficking in human beings remains a growing crime due to a combination of elements, referred to as 'push' and 'pull' factors. 'Push' factors refer to conditions in source countries which encourage victims to leave. 'Pull' factors refer to relatively attractive conditions in destination countries.

The main forms of exploitation in the EU remain sexual exploitation through forced prostitution and labour exploitation in the construction, manufacturing, agriculture and service sectors. Domestic servitude is also likely to be an area where many vulnerable people are exploited but the levels are not known due to its very 'hidden' nature. Whilst many victims continue to be

trafficked across borders, either legitimately or otherwise, the levels of internal or domestic trafficking have increased and this includes EU nationals being trafficked within the European Union.

Operational support for Member States' people-trafficking investigations is provided by a project team who work closely with 22 EU Member States and three other supporting countries. During 2009 the team focused on Romanian and Nigerian trafficking networks, child trafficking and labour exploitation.

The use of children by traffickers is now seen, **not only** as a means to earn money, but also to ensure that police investigations are hampered by the involvement of child suspects and witnesses. Additional measures need to be taken in order to deal with these particularly vulnerable people. In many instances the children have been 'trained' not to cooperate with the authorities.

#### OPERATION LONGSHIP

In August 2009, in the framework of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) between the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police Service and Romanian authorities, Europol supported an operation carried out mainly in London, to identify and rescue young victims of trafficking who were being exploited by an organised crime group to beg and commit street crime offences. In the course of the operation based around a series of house searches, as well as achieving the primary objective, a significant amount of evidence was uncovered regarding large-scale organised benefit fraud. The operation brought the following results:

- 24 addresses visited
- 214 individuals encountered and checked
- 27 nominals identified and interviewed
- 5 primary victims identified
- 12 'hearings' conducted by the Romanian authorities
- £1500 of cash seized
- 4 children placed in police protection as possible victims of THB.

On-the-spot assistance was provided by the Europol mobile office, allowing real-time access to Europol databases and the development of tactical intelligence for investigators dealing with suspects, witnesses and victims alike.

## OPERATION BLACK LEAVES

Since 2008 Europol has supported Operation Black Leaves - a large-scale investigation into a Nigerian organised crime group responsible for the trafficking of young Nigerian women for the purpose of sexual exploitation in eight European countries. Following a request from the Italian *Carabinieri*, in June 2009, Europol set up a coordination platform for the arrest phase of the operation.

On 24 June 2009, the Black Leaves investigation was concluded with the arrest of 34 main suspects in Italy. Additional arrests were made in France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Republic of San Marino and Spain. Europol provided a secure venue to meet and discuss operational issues and on the day of action, a Europol officer was in place at Europol HQ to provide real-time support throughout the duration of the operation.

Europol's operational support for Member States' investigations is most obviously delivered by the deployment of the mobile office.

The law enforcement response to people trafficking across the EU is becoming more effective and is apparent in the increased number of cases being identified and referred to Europol for support and assistance. Areas where a more effective response would be productive are victim identification, the



**In 2009 Europol worked closely with several key organisations, such as:**

- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

**Common projects delivered in 2009 for police officers and prosecutors from:**

- Belarus
- Georgia
- Moldova
- Russia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Ukraine
- Western Balkans.

development of transnational trafficking investigations, financial investigations and the tackling of domestic trafficking. Europol supports many external partners with training and awareness raising for law enforcement officers and the judiciary.

### 3.4 FACILITATED ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

In general, organised crime groups involved in the facilitation of illegal immigrants tend to be structured in loose networks of smaller groups, and most of them have ethnic or other cultural connections to the illegal immigrants they are facilitating. The organised crime groups involved in illegal immigration generally display a high degree of adaptability and a strength for collaborating well across borders, regardless of ethnic differences - also in regions where there is a tradition of ethnic conflict. The facilitators are quick to detect and make use of various changes in society, such as law enforcement responses and changes in legislation or regulations, as well as the opening of new or cheaper transport routes or new border crossing points.

The involvement of legitimate business structures in relation to facilitated illegal immigration has grown in importance. For example, organised crime groups use travel agencies to arrange travel packages including the procurement of visas. Employment agencies, shipping agencies and marriages of convenience are other frequently abused routes.

The term 'facilitated illegal immigration' covers a number of different serious crimes, all aimed at assisting, for financial gain, the entry into or residence in a country, in violation of the country's laws. Facilitated illegal immigration thus covers the production and procurement of falsified travel documents or permits obtained under false pretences, and the provision of clandestine transportation or other assistance, in order to obtain illegal entry or stay - often connected to a number of other criminal activities.

Since 2007 Europol has received a steady increase of reports and requests relating to the facilitated illegal immigration of Iraqi and Vietnamese nationals. During common action days within the EU, Europol

#### OPERATION SEBEKE

Operation Sebeke focused on a group of mainly Iraqi suspects smuggling Iraqi and Afghan nationals from Iraq / Afghanistan via Turkey into Europe. The criminal group had been active at least one year.

On 19 November 2009 a total of 22 arrests were made and several house searches were carried out in the countries mentioned. Seven illegal immigrants were found in one house in the United Kingdom.

The arrests and house searches were supported by the Europol team and intelligence was shared with other Member States.

The main suspects and new criminal links were discovered in close cooperation with national experts after indepth analysis. Four operational meetings were held at Europol and several other meetings within the Member States. Various intelligence reports were produced and disseminated to the participating countries. During the action day, a coordination centre was set up at Europol.

## OPERATION GARNET

Operation Garnet, a joint law enforcement operation between the UK Borders Agency, Serious Organised Crime Agency and the Italian State Police, supported by Europol, started in November 2008, and has resulted in the dismantling of an international organised criminal gang facilitating the arrival of Chinese illegal migrants by air to the UK. Since the start of the operation, the number of Chinese nationals arriving in the UK illegally without valid travel documents has been cut by 75% and continues to fall. In the first two months of the operation, 53 people involved in criminal facilitation were arrested by the Italian State Police with a further 49 arrested in 2009. Six further arrests were made in the first few weeks of 2010.

This joint law enforcement operation has resulted in the dismantling of a significant criminal gang operating in Italy and other EU Member States, who were also linked to wider criminal operations in China, and were facilitating the travel of Chinese illegal migrants from China to the UK on counterfeit identity documents for a fee of €17 000 per migrant.

The UK Borders Agency stated that Operation Garnet represents a significant success for the Italian State Police (Florence), Europol and the UK, in tackling a well-organised criminal gang engaged in the exploitation of Chinese migrants for financial gain.

Europol's contribution to this complex investigation has been instrumental in creating the right synergy among the various law enforcement agencies in Europe (especially France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom), in particular by means of analytical support. Europol analysed all collected data, helping to identify links between the different EU investigations, and issuing seven analytical reports.

supported three main operations which led to the arrest of 76 suspects in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Europol delivered on-the-spot support at the operational centres by sending analysts and experts, and deploying a mobile office. That way, our experts and analysts are able to use all available online analytical resources as if they were based at Europol HQ. Europol's Analysis Work File team supported the investigation teams with analytical and expert knowledge.



Organised crime groups gain a lot of money from facilitated illegal immigration. For instance, immigrants pay between €700 and €2000 for a trip from

Paris to the UK or Sweden. Transport in a truck costs between €700 and €1000 and in a car with driver, around €2000. Organised crime groups charge

between USD \$4000–\$8000 to smuggle people to Italy. The money is usually paid via wire transfer. The journeys of the illegal immigrants are conducted in very difficult conditions, sometimes lasting as long as 10 months and may result in the deaths of people en route to their destinations.

Besides the dangers to the individual immigrant, the facilitating of illegal immigration also has a negative effect on the regular democratic system of migration. Money transfer systems are abused for transferring financial gains from the crimes, visa application systems are abused and travel documents falsified. The whole regular and legal migrant movement is undermined.

By dismantling this international criminal network of illegal immigration facilitators, Europol has proved its effectiveness in assisting European law enforcement agencies. New operations or investigations of these international criminal networks are foreseen, working in cooperation with EU Member States, Interpol and Eurojust.

### 3.5 CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

The production and distribution of illegal content depicting the sexual exploitation of defenceless children is mainly facilitated by the improper use of the internet. The apparent anonymity offered by this means of communication makes it very difficult to successfully locate and identify offenders and save the child victims from further exploitation. It must be emphasised that the discovery of illegal material is only part, and possibly the beginning, of an investigation into the actual sexual exploitation of a child (e.g. rape, sexual assault).

The internet as a mass medium is used extensively for the distribution of sexual material. Not only for the sale and purchase of adult pornographic material, sexual devices and advertising contacts for explicit sexual purposes, but also for distributing child sex abuse content and providing a platform for online grooming of innocent children, unaware of the dangers facing them. Once the abusive material reaches the internet, it constitutes a permanent re-victimisation of the depicted child.

#### CURRENT TRENDS

- There is an increasing involvement of criminal networks who offer pay-per-view websites from which huge profits are made. The obvious interest of paedophiles and child sex offenders in receiving new material has possibly led - and will lead to - the production of new material, which implies that there is ongoing exploitation of victims and also new victims
- Child sex offenders and their networks make more and more use of sophisticated software in order to try to protect their anonymity, to make use of online storage and to use advanced encryption techniques to counteract digital forensic examination executed by police
- Child sex offenders travel to specific countries where children are offered by their families, or other facilitators, and where they are sexually exploited and used to produce illegal material that is distributed for commercial or non-commercial purposes
- Sometimes the illegal material is self-produced by teenagers or children who underestimate the risks of distributing their images or movie files. In some cases they are convinced or coerced into producing the material by child sex predators through a grooming process on the internet.

Online grooming is the proposal by an adult to meet a child who has not reached the age of sexual consent under national law, with the purpose of engaging in sexual activities with the child.

## OPERATION TYPHON

One of the cases supported by the AWF - Operation Typhon - was concluded on 10 December 2009 in 19 countries. The investigation was led by the Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service (.BK) who detected an internet service provider that was being misused by child sex offender groups to distribute illegal content on the internet. Log files collected by the .BK were sent to Europol together with the abusive images of children. After structuring and analysing the content, Europol provided intelligence packages and analytical reports to EU Member States and those countries with a Europol cooperation agreement. The analysis performed by the AWF team was concluded at the beginning of 2009 but national enquiries had been ongoing for around 1.5 years. The Operation Typhon case led to the identification of 221 suspects, 115 arrests and five child victims were identified and rescued in four different countries.

### 3.5.1 Analytical and operational support

An Analysis Work File (AWF) was created in 2001 to support the participating Member States in preventing and combating the activities of criminal networks involved in the production, sale or distribution of child sexual exploitation material, and the associated forms of crime within Europol's mandate. This activity has had great success and will continue. In 2009, the AWF supported several international investigations.

Overall, this analysis work file has so far supported 23 international operations and contributed to the identification of around 1600 suspects belonging to different criminal networks – but all involved in offences related to the online distribution of child sexual exploitation material.

### 3.5.2 Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project

Europol supports the COSPOL Internet Related Child Abuse Material Project (CIRCAMP) which promotes the use of a filtering technology in EU Member States that blocks users' access to commercial child abuse websites. The filter is currently in place in Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The data originating from the blocking activ-



ity of the Member States' filters is sent to the AWF team for analysis purposes.

### 3.5.3 Funnel Web

A project called Funnel Web has recently been finalised to deal with requests coming from the registrants of websites that are wrongly blacklisted by the CIRCAMP filter in the Member States mentioned above. Europol, in partnership with CIRCAMP, has set up a reporting mechanism for owners of blocked domains. This system aims to centralise the complaints and requests for revision of domain statuses in order to guarantee that the requests can be processed in all countries where the domain is blacklisted.

Europol facilitates contact between the owners of domains and competent law enforcement agencies. However, it is at the discretion of the Member States to decide upon possible judicial consequences induced by revision requests.

### 3.5.4 European Financial Coalition

Europol is a member of the steering, legal and law enforcement working groups of the European Financial Coalition, formed by EU law enforcement agencies, banks, credit card companies, other financial intermediaries, Microsoft, NGOs (such as Missing Children Europe), Eurojust, and others. The aim of this coalition is to fight the proliferation of commercial child abuse websites on the internet.

### 3.5.5 Training

The annual Europol training course, 'Combating the sexual exploitation of children on the internet' - which is aimed at law enforcement officers and the judiciary - develops and increases the participants' knowledge, expertise and ability to combat and dismantle child sex offender networks, and also increases the potential to help save the children involved. So far Europol has provided 10 training courses. Around 400 law enforcement officers and 30 members of the judiciary from EU and non-EU countries have attended and benefited from these courses.




Fig. 106 - VAT fraud in the Carbon Market (Source: Europol)

**OPERATION BEIJING**

Members of the Europol Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC) project team deployed their mobile office at the headquarters of the Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard (VPOP) in Budapest, to provide support during a large-scale operation targeting Asian organised criminals in Hungary.

The Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard launched a coordinated operation against several criminal networks involved in the fraudulent import of goods to the European Union which were causing substantial losses in customs duties and VAT. More than 200 officers, including special arrest teams of Hungarian customs and police, searched 64 premises in Budapest and several locations across the country.

Ten people of Chinese, Vietnamese and Hungarian nationalities were arrested and, based on the evidence found during the searches, further national and international (European) arrest warrants were issued against four Chinese and one Hungarian national. Cash equivalent to around €250 000 was seized by the authorities.

**3.6 EU VAT FRAUD**

Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC) is a form of organised, sophisticated tax fraud carried out by criminals who attack the Value Added Tax (VAT) regimes of EU Member States. The basic model of transnational intra-community VAT fraud involves at least two Member States.

The fraud schemes make use of structures spreading their activities over several Member States at

the same time, in order to exploit the different particularities and weaknesses of the national tax systems and to disguise the real links between participants.

In practice, Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud is carried out by organised criminals who put in place a structure of linked companies and individuals. Those involved in VAT fraud schemes, who are initially responsible for the tax damage - the

**Europol provides high quality and dynamic investigation support to EU law enforcement, and also worldwide on behalf of EU law enforcement, in the field of VAT carousel fraud and related spheres such as combating money laundering and tracing the proceeds of crime.**

**The Europol Analysis Work File on Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC) is the only EU-level database for storing MTIC-related criminal information. This is why it has become the principal source of reference for law enforcement operations. The knowledge and data stored within Europol enables the development of a solid picture of this area of crime and identifies the most prominent criminal targets.**

Europol has become a centre of excellence for fighting cross-border MTIC fraud and related offences.

**OPERATION TULIPBOX**

On 19 August 2009, UK HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) officers conducted 27 premises searches - 24 in the UK and a further three were carried out in New Zealand. Nine people were arrested and approximately €3 million was restrained in a New Zealand bank. Those arrested are believed to be members of a criminal network heavily involved in MTIC VAT fraud related to emission allowance trading (also known as carbon credit fraud).

During the operation, Europol provided analytical support and deployed its mobile office at the premises of the investigators.

so-called missing traders - only operate for a short time, sometimes only weeks, before disappearing. have extended their criminal activities into the environmental or energy markets.

The schemes are based on either virtual or real 'carousel' transactions where the same 'goods' are sold and resold several times. This is commonly referred to as VAT carousel fraud. 2009 was a milestone in this respect as major fraud scandals surfaced which showed the possibility for large-scale VAT fraud in the trading of emission allowances or European Union Allowances (EUAs).

However, traditional goods-based Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud is no longer the sole concern. Recently, a clear mutation into service-based MTIC fraud has been experienced, as fraudsters Cross border, or transnational, VAT fraud does not only affect the financial interests of the European Community but also has an impact on lawful businesses which find themselves unable to compete on

**OPERATION BEEHIVE**

An organised crime group involved in tobacco smuggling organised containers of cigarettes to be manufactured in China and transported to the EU via a deep sea vessel. A 40-foot container with cigarettes inside was identified, bound for the European Union after departing from China on 16 October 2009. Intelligence indicated that, if successful, the organised crime group would attempt numerous further imports on a weekly basis. If left unchallenged, this would have caused the destination Member State an annual revenue loss that ran into millions of euros.

On 14 January 2010 French authorities seized 8.5 million Marlboro cigarettes from the Chinese container in the port of Le Havre. The intervention has prevented at least €592 000 in tax losses. Five members of the organised crime group have been identified.

Europol enhanced the initial intelligence contribution by identifying the vessel transporting the container. Once the ship was located, we were able to identify the destination port and provide an accurate date and time of arrival to the interested parties. This crucial support facilitated further operational work.

a level playing field in those sectors affected by significant VAT fraud. Non-competitive businesses risk going bankrupt, which in turn may have a negative impact on employment levels.

The scale of the revenue losses attributable to Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud since EU borders were opened to free trade in 1992 may never be precisely quantified. According to different sources the level of harm caused by MTIC fraud varies. For example, the European Commission estimates that VAT fraud costs the Member States around €60 billion annually. However, according to an estimate from Eurocanet (the European Carousel Network - a project of the European Commission in Brussels), between June 2005 and June 2006, the combined MTIC losses from the five biggest Member States – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom - totalled almost €21 billion.

Europol estimates that the loss to carbon credit fraud between June 2008 and December 2009 was approximately €5 billion.

Moreover, the profits from VAT fraud may finance other types of criminal activity, for example cigarette smuggling or drugs trafficking, which has a further negative impact on the EC and national budgets, as

well as on the operation of the internal market and on honest businesses.

Europol renders support to the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) managed by the European Commission by organising seminars with the aim of enhancing experience and good practice between law enforcement officers and prosecutors from EU Member States and neighbouring countries. Cooperation with third countries is essential in fighting VAT fraud as the fraudsters often launder their ill-gained profits outside the EU. By promoting the exchange of information and best practice, the participating law enforcement agencies in these TAIEX workshops hope to become better in eradicating MTIC fraud and related money laundering.

### 3.7 MONEY LAUNDERING

Europol supports Member States in preventing and combating criminal money-laundering activity, particularly that relating to the analysis of suspicious transactions and any other financial intelligence.

The Europol Criminal Assets Bureau (ECAB) assists Member States' financial investigators to trace the proceeds of crime, when assets have been concealed outside the investigators' jurisdictional boundaries, within the European Union.

#### THE CAMDEN ASSETS RECOVERY INTER-AGENCY NETWORK (CARIN)

Europol hosts the permanent secretariat for CARIN. CARIN is an informal network of judicial and law enforcement asset recovery experts. CARIN currently has 55 registered member jurisdictions, including all 27 EU Member States and nine international organisations. One law enforcement and one judicial contact have been nominated from each jurisdiction, to assist in cross-border cooperation in relation to tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of criminals' assets. These contacts assist with general questions about asset recovery in their own jurisdictions, but also provide operational support via available legal channels.

The term 'boiler room' refers to an offshore entity which is not authorised or exempt from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Boiler rooms typically target private individuals ('investors') to encourage them to buy shares. The types of shares promoted tend to be those of unlisted companies at a pre-Initial Public Offering (pre-IPO) stage, high-risk shares or shares in newly-listed companies. When sold to investors, the shares are, at best, significantly overpriced and, at worst, worthless or untradeable.

A boiler room transaction typically begins with an unsolicited or 'cold call' from a salesman to an investor. The salesman seeks to persuade the investor

#### MOBILE OFFICE

At the request of Member States, a live connection to Europol's centralised databases and expertise platforms can be provided on-the-spot by way of a Europol mobile office. Manned by designated Europol officers, the mobile office is a valuable support tool for ongoing investigations or events.

to buy shares in a company and typically promises a substantial increase in the share price within a relatively short period of time, thereby claiming to offer a rapid return on the money invested. The illegally

#### 'BOILER ROOM' INVESTIGATION

Since April 2009, Europol has been providing support to the investigation of an international 'boiler room' fraud scheme and related money-laundering activities. The case, which was led by the UK Financial Service Authority, also involved Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland.

The boiler room case that Europol coordinated targeted a UK-based criminal group operating internationally who have been charged with conspiracy to breach the general prohibition, defraud and launder criminal proceeds. The organised crime group was the beneficiary of £28 million of provable criminal assets, stolen from thousands of victims (7500 just in the UK), plus many other victims in New Zealand and the Nordic countries. The operation was supported by the Europol team, who also established investigative leads, and it was coordinated by Eurojust.

On 8 April 2009 an operational meeting took place at Eurojust with representatives from Europol and all involved jurisdictions. Priorities and operational loopholes were identified with a view to arresting the main targets. The Europol network was mainly used to exchange intelligence and conclude the first phase of the operation.

On 6 May 2009 UK authorities arrested seven members of the organised crime group. Assets worth £8 million were identified and restrained. Based on the evidence collected, further measures will take place in the coming months. These activities will be coordinated by Europol's specialised unit, working with Eurojust. The implementation of a reliable international network able to quickly exchange information and expertise was crucial for the positive outcome of this complex boiler room fraud and money laundering enterprise.

## DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOBILE OFFICE

### Operation Monet V

Under the remit of Operation Monet V, live analytical support was provided via the mobile office to Spanish law enforcement authorities in Gran Canaria, following a request from the Spanish Guardia Civil. One Europol analyst was present throughout the operation, which targeted cash couriers within high-risk destination environments. As a result of the operation, the Guardia Civil seized €402 090, 1.2 kg of cocaine and other illicit products.

### Operation Atlas

In October 2009 the Europol team deployed the mobile office at the World Customs Organization (WCO) to support the Joint Customs Operation Atlas. Europol analysts performed approximately 400 searches on people, locations, identity documents and organisations.

This Joint Customs Operation was led by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement with support from the Operational Coordination Unit at the World Customs Organization in Brussels. The main aim of this operation is to promote international cooperation to combat transnational illegal cash couriers and bulk cash smuggling. The operation was conducted worldwide and has involved the customs authorities of most European Union Member States.

## OPERATION ROSA

Four jewellery shop robberies took place in Paris. Another robbery in a jewellery shop took place at Boulevard Barceló (Brussels, Belgium). Austria also suffered six jewellery shop robberies, committed in Vienna and Salzburg by suspects from Estonia and with similar modus operandi.

On 31 March 2009 Europol organised a preparatory meeting on Operation Rosa which was attended by Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France and Germany. A joint police operation was carried out in Estonia.

This operation led to the identification and arrest of eight suspected members of an Estonian-based criminal organisation, believed to be responsible for a series of armed robberies of high-class jewellery shops in Austria, Belgium and France, during 2007 and 2008.

During the operation, all the suspects were arrested and house searches were carried out at their residences. Many cellular phones, SIM cards, notes and other records were seized. Europol analysed this data to identify further international links. Physical evidence linking the suspects to the robberies was also found.

Europol has been actively supporting these investigations since 2007. The data received from countries involved was constantly analysed and several reports were issued to the concerned Member States. On the day of action, arrests and house searches were supported by a Europol team: one specialist and one analyst were present at the coordination centre set up in Tallinn. An on-the-spot mobile office was used to support the operation.

According to the latest figures, in 2008, 178 million counterfeit and pirated articles (79 million in 2007), involving 49 000 cases in 2008 (43 671 in 2007), were detained by customs at EU borders. These figures do not take into account 'intra-EU seizures' and do not consider activities conducted by customs services that have the capability to control and to investigate within their respective national territory. Nor do the figures include activities by other law enforcement agencies, including police and other bodies such as the Drug Regulatory Agency who are also active in this area. Additionally, it does not take into account the detection of counterfeit products manufactured within the EU nor the seizures made by border police.

obtained proceeds in the offshore entity are generally controlled by the money launderer who transfers them to the accomplices involved in the boiler room scheme.

Europol supports and provides training on the subject of money laundering. The most recent examples include: TAIEX Seminar held in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Financial Crime Conference held in Stockholm, Sweden. Active participation since the preliminary phase of the training programme has

also been ensured to the CEPOL training, Money Laundering Common Curriculum, held in Portugal.

### 3.8 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME

Intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement refers to the violation of two main categories of recognised and protected rights. The first one is related to industrial property which covers various fields such as distinctive signs (trademarks), patents, designs and models (counterfeiting). The second refers to

#### OPERATION DIABOLO

Europol contributed to the joint customs operation Diabolo II which took place in September 2009, targeting counterfeit goods, including cigarettes. This operation saw cooperation between customs authorities from the 27 EU Member States and 16 Asian countries under the auspices of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). It resulted in the seizure of more than 65 million counterfeit cigarettes and 369 000 other counterfeit items (shoes, toys, cameras, headphones, hats, caps, gloves, handbags, etc), representing over 20 different trademarks. Europol and Interpol reported that 89 individuals or companies involved in criminal organisations were identified by cross-checking the information provided by customs authorities.

Thanks to 88 missing links generated by the various Europol analysis work files, the operation also resulted in further potential international investigations into criminal activities.

The Europol mobile office was used to: detect links with data currently stored in Europol databases; explore all follow-up opportunities; update information concerning the main maritime routes used when importing counterfeit goods; and to gather data for analysis work files affected by the hits generated.

<sup>3</sup> Figures published by the European Commission's Taxation and Customs Union, 7 July 2009.

## OPERATION KUSSEN

*Guardia di Finanza*, supported by Europol, has disrupted a huge criminal network involved in the massive illicit production and distribution of counterfeit commodities. The investigation has been going on for two years and has focused on counterfeit clothing originating from Turkey and Italy. The clothes were distributed throughout the EU via a criminal network linked to Chinese, Italian and Turkish syndicates.

The case, which was presented in Italy earlier this month, resulted in:

- The discovery and dismantling of 16 illicit factories in Italy where the majority of the counterfeit products were manufactured
- The arrest of 12 suspects in Italy and France
- A successful controlled delivery organised between *Guardia di Finanza Bolzano* and the French Customs Investigative Service, Marseille
- The seizure of 3 million counterfeit items in Italy, Germany and France affecting more than 10 different brands representing a value of more than €150 million
- The collection of evidence which linked the transnational organised crime groups to other criminal groups from Belarus, Canada, Israel, Mauritius and San Marino.

Besides generating huge profits for the criminals, the illicit actions also fuelled the establishment of black markets, illegal immigrants operating the production centres and knock-on crimes such as customs and VAT frauds.

Our operational success, based on teamwork, was achieved thanks to close cooperation between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Marino and Spain under the effective guidance of *Guardia di Finanza*, supported by Europol, Eurojust and Interpol.

The partnership developed with the private sector, in particular with Intelligence and Investigation Services through the United Kingdom liaison bureau at Europol, was also important in establishing the links to the companies behind the brands primarily affected.

copyright of literary and artistic works such as film, musical work and software programmes (piracy).

According to the World Health Organization, trade in counterfeit medicines represents 10% of the trade of legal medicines around the world, with huge differences between the regions. It could be less than 1% of sales in developed countries, rising to over 10% in developing countries.



### OPERATION GOMORRAH I

In the field of combating intellectual property crime, Operation Gomorrah I targeted Italian organised criminal networks that were trafficking unsafe counterfeit commodities such as power tools and generators.

This operation involved actions in several EU Member States, and achieved the following results:

In June 2009, French Customs and Gendarmerie deployed 350 officers nationwide resulting in the arrest of 9 criminals and the search of 98 warehouses where counterfeit products were seized.

Evidence indicated that 74,8 tonnes of such items, representing an estimated value of 11 200 000 euros, were sold through these outlets since 2007. Close French cooperation with German Police led to a further simultaneous arrest in Germany.

In September 2009, 130 German police officers were involved in the arrest of 19 criminals and 30 premises searches where more than 30 tonnes of illicit products were seized. Evidence was also simultaneously gathered in both Austria and Italy.

On both occasions, actions were coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, with technical on-the-spot support provided by Europol.

Counterfeiting is no longer limited to luxury products but is now a global problem affecting all types of goods including a large range of commodities from cigarettes to clothing, accessories and also products which could affect health and safety such as electronic equipment, beverages, foodstuffs and medicines.

The widespread use of the internet is a factor which may affect this phenomenon and may be a facilitator for helping this illicit activity to develop under an anonymous umbrella. The internet can easily be used for advertising counterfeit products, taking orders and paying for purchases. The internet also potentially increases our exposure to piracy, due to the advances in technology and the ubiquitous use of computers, making it much easier for pirated software, CDs, DVDs and other types of intellectual property to be widely and easily distributed.

Europol participates in the Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Training Seminar. Since the beginning of this initiative, Europol has contributed and taken part in four training seminars which were hosted by the Guardia di Finanza police academy in Rome, where nearly 130 officers from various countries and several continents benefited from the courses.

Europol organises an annual workshop on intellectual property crime which has been delivered to intellectual property crime experts from EU Member States, and Europol partners, with support from the Belgian authorities.

Europol supports other initiatives in close coordination with TAIEX, such as cooperation with the Russian Federation in this field. In 2009, high level

**ATM CASH WITHDRAWALS - PROTECT YOURSELF:**

- **Be aware of others around you.** If someone is behaving suspiciously or makes you feel uncomfortable choose a different machine.
- If you spot **anything unusual** about the cash machine do not use the machine and report it to the bank or police immediately.
- **Be alert.** If someone is crowding or watching you, cancel the transaction and go to another machine.
- **Stand close** to the cash machine.
- Always **shield the keypad** with your spare hand and your body to avoid anyone seeing you enter your PIN.

representatives and intellectual property crime experts from police and customs took part in a week's study visit on intellectual property crime at Europol.

**3.9 PAYMENT CARD FRAUD**

Payment card fraud is a growing global problem. Financial transactions worldwide are migrating from cash into non-cash and electronic means of payment, and forgery of these methods of payment within the European Union (EU) causes huge financial losses. Simultaneously, these losses constitute assets for organised crime groups and illegal income is invested to develop other forms of criminal activity for the organised crime groups.

The damage in 2009, caused by skimming alone in the EU, is estimated to exceed **€350 million**

**DISRUPTION OF ILLEGAL SKIMMING DEVICE PRODUCTION SITES**

Europol has supported cooperation between law enforcement agencies from Austria, Bulgaria and Poland, resulting in the disruption of two illegal skimming device factories on Bulgarian territory and the arrest of 10 criminal gang members. The skimming devices seized in these factories were ready to be fitted to many different types of ATMs (Automatic Teller Machines) used all over Europe. Hundreds of counterfeit payment cards, raw card data, skimming devices, electronic equipment (micro cameras, PIN pads), and tools used for the production of counterfeit credit cards were also seized during the final raid. With this operation, law enforcement prevented significant financial losses, which could have amounted to several thousand euros per illegally-cloned payment card.

## OPERATION FJORD


In 2008 as a result of a joint operation between the Payment Card Section, Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation and Irish Customs, a Romanian suspect was arrested in Dublin for possessing ATM skimming equipment. The individual had arrived in Ireland as part of an organised crime gang with the intention of using the equipment to illegally acquire card information and PIN numbers from unsuspecting ATM customers. The card data and PINs would then be scanned and videoed by the criminals' sophisticated equipment while customers used the ATMs. The gang then planned to use the details scanned from the cards to clone the customers' debit or credit cards and then withdraw cash illegally from the victims' bank accounts.

Codenamed Operation Fjord, the successful operation culminated in the arrest, prosecution and conviction of an organised crime gang member and the disruption of the gang. It is estimated that the seized ATM card skimming equipment would have cost the gang up to €15 000 to acquire.

The information and shared intelligence in this case initially originated from Romanian law enforcement authorities. By use of the Europol Information Exchange channel, Garda and Irish Customs liaison officers based at Europol - in conjunction with various Member States law enforcement agencies that included Denmark, Sweden and Norway - were able to track the movements of the suspects as they travelled across Europe before reaching their ultimate destination of Dublin. The equipment seized was technologically advanced and had never before been encountered in Ireland or by Europol experts.

This is another example of the level of cooperation possible between law enforcement agencies based at Europol to effectively target and disrupt transnational organised crime gangs and bring the perpetrators to justice.

In this case the 'skimming' crime was committed by the perpetrator placing a device over the card slot of an ATM which reads the magnetic strip as the users pass their cards through it. These devices are often used in conjunction with a pinhole camera to read the users' PIN code at the same time. Details of copied payment cards are then used for illegal cash withdrawals.



## OPERATION CREIEUR

An operation against a large international skimming network, coordinated from the Europol operational centre, led to 24 arrests in September 2009. Eurojust coordinated the judicial part of the operation, which involved Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Romania.

Italy's **Polizia di Stato**, who led the investigation, considered this its biggest operation against a payment card fraud gang. So far the network is suspected of skimming at least 15 000 payment cards in the EU, with over 35 000 fraudulent transactions in total and losses amounting to around €6.5 million.

From the Europol operational centre, police officers, judges and prosecutors from the Member States concerned coordinated the joint operation via video link. Direct communication with prosecutors and police officers in the Member States during the three-day joint operation resulted in a total of 24 persons arrested: eight in Italy, twelve in Romania, two in the Netherlands and two in Belgium. In several house searches illegal equipment, counterfeit payment cards, drugs, weapons and a large sum of cash were seized.

During the operation two of the offenders were traced in Belgium and arrested red-handed. The arrestees had been targets of the Dutch Police for some time. The quick communication provided by the Europol liaison officers' network facilitated the short-term involvement of the Belgian Police, who succeeded in arresting the wanted persons. The suspects had made fraudulent withdrawals of €20 000 and were in possession of hundreds of duplicated bank cards.

The operational analysis carried out at Europol identified links to criminal offences in Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.



**Skimming:** The copying of a payment card's magnetic strip - without the knowledge or consent of the cardholder - generally happens when a payment card is used at a genuine Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) or Point of Sale terminal by the cardholder. The data is then written (cloned) to new cards which are used to make illicit cash withdrawals, commonly done outside the cardholder's country of residence.

The safety of non-cash transactions in the EU is important for card users and the banking industry (banks, payment institutions, clearing and settlement infrastructures, card processors and card schemes).

Europol responds to the needs of law enforcement agencies across the European Union. It assists Member States in combating payment card fraud by putting Europol's organisational, technical and legal capabilities at the disposal of law enforcement agencies. The vast experience and knowledge of Europol's officials has proven to bring additional value to investigations carried out in the European Union.

Europol, as a centre for assisting law enforcement agencies at an EU level, along with a network of assigned liaison officers from non-EU countries, is also able to facilitate cooperation of law enforcement agencies on a global level.

Most Member States are affected by card fraud and face specific problems related to this phenomenon. Based on intelligence received from Member States, Europol prepares analytical reports and threat assessments on this criminal activity. Joint Investigation Teams are also applied to combat payment card fraud on an EU level.

In 2009, Europol supported many EU law enforce-

ment investigations aimed at disrupting international criminal structures dealing with payment card fraud. Europol also provided specialised technical and forensic support and dispatched forensic reports to assist payment card fraud investigations. Europol's forensic mobile tool kit is ready to be deployed on-the-spot in any country.

Europol regularly organises expert meetings on the forensic examination of skimming devices. The last one took place at the forensic laboratory of the *Institut de Recherche Criminelle de la Gendarmerie Nationale* in France.

Criminals continuously develop more sophisticated techniques to compromise payment card data, therefore further proactive measures are needed to tackle this problem. Europol strongly supports forensic experts to develop their skills and we exchange best practices on the forensic examination of skimming devices.



### 3.10 CENTRAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING EURO COUNTERFEITING

Europol has the mandate to prevent and combat the forgery of money, in particular the euro, and Europol has been designated as the European Union's Central Office for combating euro counterfeiting. This legal status qualifies Europol to act as a worldwide contact point for combating euro counterfeiting.

To fulfil this central office function, Europol offers a wide range of products and services to EU Mem-

ber States and other partners. Europol actively supports law enforcement authorities by facilitating the exchange of information, gathering, analysing and disseminating criminal intelligence, as well as providing other expertise and knowledge to support investigations. That also includes participation in Joint Investigation Teams and granting financial support and on-the-spot assistance when requested. Moreover, Europol provides forensic support to law enforcement agencies. Forensic support aims to determine the origin of materials and devices used for the manufacturing of counterfeits. Additionally, Europol provides technical support and training on

#### EURO COUNTERFEITING TRENDS, 2009

A comparison with previous years demonstrates an increasing trend in the quantity of counterfeit euro banknotes being produced. However the total value of counterfeit euro banknotes detected in 2009 declined, when compared to 2008. This is attributed to the reduction in the number of high-denomination counterfeits, on the one hand, and growth in the number of counterfeits of 20 and 50 euro denominations. A noteworthy decrease has been observed in the quantity and total value of counterfeit coins.

#### DISMANTLING A PRINT SHOP IN BULGARIA

On 10 March 2009, a joint investigation team (JIT) was set up at Europol. Bulgaria and Spain decided to carry out a joint investigation into an organised criminal group producing and distributing counterfeit euros. The JIT was supported by Europol and Eurojust.

On 25 June 2009, the Bulgarian police, supported by the Spanish *Brigada de Investigación del Banco de España (Comisaria General de Policía Judicial)*, Europol and Eurojust disrupted a criminal group of 17 people who were behind the distribution of a large quantity of counterfeit euro notes. Twenty house searches were carried out in the region of Plovdiv, Bulgaria, where raw material and devices were seized. The counterfeit notes of 100, 200 and 500 euro denominations were printed by the criminal group and mainly distributed in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain. An assessed face value of the counterfeit euros was €16 million.

This operation was an excellent international police cooperation led by the Bulgarian authorities and a great example of the potential of joint investigation teams. Europol assisted with operational analysis, coordination and information exchange, forensic, technical and operational support on-the-spot.

## JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM (JIT)

Member States can set up joint investigation teams to improve police cooperation. The teams consist of judicial and police authorities from at least two Member States. They are responsible for carrying out criminal investigations into specific matters for a limited period. Europol and Eurojust can participate in and coordinate the work of JITs.

tactical and technical issues related to protecting the euro from counterfeiting.

Europol cooperates closely with European Union Member States, the European Central Bank, European Commission, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Interpol and other partners.

### 3.11 HIGH-TECH CRIME

The High Tech Crime Centre at Europol provides support to Member States in the general fight against cybercrime. The High Tech Crime Centre is developing a European platform which can service the direct and indirect needs of Member States in this important emerging area of criminal activity.

#### 3.11.1 Cybercrime

Malicious activity on the internet continued to grow in 2009. Through attacking services on the web, for example through the use of malware (malicious software), end users are increasingly vulnerable to hackers. At the same time the underground economy where cybercriminals trade their illegally obtained information, skills and tools, continues to flourish.

The increasing threat of cybercrime in the EU has led to a situation where cybercrime is now a priority on Europe's agenda and consequently for Europol, too.

#### 3.11.2 Europol Cyber Crime Platform

In 2009, the implementation of the Europol Cyber

## OPERATION PARAISO

In August 2009, in Gandia (Spain), material and equipment for the production of more than 660 million counterfeit euros was seized, and an illegal print shop producing counterfeit 500 euro banknotes was dismantled near Valencia. Sixteen persons of Spanish and South American origin were arrested. More than 2 tonnes of high quality paper, fake documents, weapons, ammunition and 70 mobile phones were also confiscated. The operation named 'Paraiso' was carried out in collaboration between *Brigada de Investigación del Banco de España* (BIBE), the Judicial Police of Valencia and Europol. At the end of 2008, the Spanish investigations started focusing on an organised crime group dealing with the import of large quantities of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Valencia, hidden in shipping containers. The profit generated by the drugs business was invested in the financing of counterfeit euro banknote production.

The criminal group invested more than 400 000 euros in equipment, acquiring the highest quality printing technology on the market. The perpetrators spent years preparing the illegal print shop and changed the layout of the counterfeits several times to improve their appearance. Europol became involved in the investigations after the first international criminal links were detected, and supported the investigations on-the-spot with technical and analytical assistance.

Crime Platform (ECCP) began. The ECCP rests on three pillars:

- The Internet Crime Reporting Online System (I-CROS), a European hub in a network of national online reporting points in the Member States, and third parties to Europol, where all offences noted on the internet can be reported and escalated to a European level if necessary. The primary tool that is used to host this information at Europol is the Information System (IS).
- The dedicated Europol analysis work file targets internet and ICT-driven organised crime aimed at financial gain. The focus is on identifying and eventually dismantling groups active in the cybercrime area. In general, cybercriminal activity is directed towards attacks on computer systems or networks. More specifically, the crimes committed include the



#### OPERATION ATLAS

On 10 August 2009, Europol received a request to support Operation Atlas, which concerned the hijacking of an Arctic sea ship in Swedish waters. Europol was requested to support an already-established joint investigation team involving Finland, Sweden and Malta. Based on the request, Europol immediately sent an analyst with a mobile office to Helsinki to support Operation Atlas on-the-spot. A back office was also created where up to five analysts worked and, during the weekend, four analysts were employed to work on the case. On 18 August, another Europol staff member - an expert in kidnapping - was sent to Helsinki.

The information derived from the joint investigation team was provided to the serious crime front office via the SIENA network, and expertise, advice and analytical support were constantly given to the JIT members.

In total 3814 entities were created; 14 436 links and 877 Mb of information were stored; more than 40 analysis charts and maps were produced directly to the investigators. A substantial amount of financial information on Russian companies was found and also a lot of maritime information came from Europol. An analysis of all calls also took place.

Europol's quick assistance to the operation was highly appreciated by the joint investigation team members. Europol's analysts and expert were well received and integrated quickly into the JIT team, rapidly contributing to moving the inquiry forward. The operation also proved the viability of using the newly-established environment to provide instant analytical and information exchange support to Member States' operations.

<sup>6</sup> Third parties are the bodies with which Europol has an operational agreement.

development of malware, hacking, identity theft and complicated phishing and e-commerce attacks. The work file is one answer to the request from EU Member States to be able to tackle cybercrime at an international level.

- The Internet FOREnsic EXPertise (I-FOREX) platform consists of a portal-based facility and comprises all information not related to personal/operational data that is in fact included in the two above-mentioned pillars. The information contained in this platform will mainly relate to police best practice and training, although it will not exclude other important cybercrime areas in the law enforcement community. This I-FOREX is considered a fundamental tool for Europol in supporting investigations on EU cybercrime and will help investigators to keep their technical skills up-to-date with respect to their cases.

### 3.12 MARITIME PIRACY

Over the last two years piracy off the coast of Somalia has become a cause for major international concern. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million dollar or euro ransom payments. Intelligence has it that piracy could tie in with other criminal phenomena such as the smuggling of human beings, weapons and drugs.

The overall pirate hijacking success rate for 2009 is significantly lower than the average in 2008 of 40%, and is probably due to the increased naval patrols and heightened security practices of the merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden. Despite the relative decline in the pirate's success rate, there is an alarming increase in the absolute number of pirate attacks and an unprecedented expansion of pirate activity in the Indian Ocean.

In May 2009, Europol received a delegation from the Dutch National Crime Squad who were dealing with investigations into two hijacked vessels. The Dutch



delegation stressed the fact that there is a need for a common approach by analysing shared information and by looking at a harmonised, coordinated way of dealing with this evolving threat affecting a number of European Union Member States.

In response to the Dutch request, Europol hosted an ad-hoc expert meeting to discuss the criminal phenomenon of maritime piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa. In its conclusions, a number of participating Member States committed to engage with Europol in order to open an analysis work file on the subject.

Additionally, an operational meeting took place with the participation of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. At this meeting the three participating Member States discussed the information available and which could be shared with Europol. Following this development, the decision was taken to set up a core team within Europol that will deal with this phenomenon. Moreover, Europol received a formal request from the Dutch Head of Europol National Unit to open an analysis work file on piracy. This was formally done, then signed by Europol's Director on 18 January 2010.

Europol's involvement in this phenomenon is focused on the identification of key perpetrators, logistical assets and financial flows linked to this criminal activity. Europol has committed itself to work together with Interpol and the international community at large in order to effectively tackle this issue.

## 4. EUROPOL'S REACH

### 4.1 EU MEMBER STATES' LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES





#### **4.2 EUROPOL'S EXTERNAL COOPERATION**

Europol cooperates with a number of EU partners, and with third countries and organisations. The exchange of information with these partners takes place on the basis of cooperation agreements.

Two types of agreement determine the nature of cooperation with third parties. Strategic agreements make it possible for the two parties involved to exchange all information with the exception of personal data, while operational agreements also allow the exchange of personal data.

Europol finds its cooperation with the Member States' and third partners' law enforcement authorities on the one hand, and other EU agencies and institutions on the other hand, vital.

Currently Europol cooperates with 17 non-EU countries, 9 EU bodies and agencies and 3 other international organisations, including Interpol, which features in many aspects of Europol's operational work. Europol collaborates closely with the EU's agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, namely CEPOL, Eurojust and Frontex. Together they have produced a report which focuses on exploiting their potential more fully by means of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The report draws up concrete proposals to overcome any shortcomings, and objectives to further improve existing cooperation methods. This streamlined approach will benefit law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

Europol also cooperates with other EU actors such as OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office), SITCEN (EU Joint Situation Centre) and the European Central Bank. All of these actors are part of the big EU family of institutions and agencies who work together to make the European Union safer.

## 5. MOVING AHEAD: STRATEGY AND GOALS

Europol is at a key point in its evolution, and is ready to take its place as the central player within the field of EU law enforcement. For the next five years, Europol's new strategy will be the frame of reference for Europol's daily business in order to ensure the best support for law enforcement cooperation in the European Union.

The strategy has identified the most important challenges ahead. Europol will use its unique strengths, and exploit all opportunities, to address these challenges. The new strategy is both focused and ambitious, and Europol will move on a planned five-year path to implement its main goals by delivering a unique set of operational services for the EU in three main areas:

- **To function as the principal EU support centre for law enforcement operations**

More will be done to maximise the operational value of information held by Europol and to streamline the delivery of analysis and other services. The new Europol strategy will allow for stronger, more effective cooperation and actions between agencies and law enforcement partners, including Eurojust and Interpol.

- **To become the criminal information hub of the European Union**

Coordination between Member States, in identifying common information gaps and priorities for the investigation of the most prominent criminal targets, is essential and will be strengthened. Europol's unique capabilities provide the opportunity to grow as a central 'information powerhouse' in the EU to address these issues and build an information platform capable of facilitating a more effective operational response to key security threats. Further development of Europol's

Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) will add enhanced intelligence analysis tools to the already efficient and user-friendly information exchange tool.

- **To develop further as an EU centre for law enforcement expertise**

Europol pioneers new techniques based on innovation and best practice as well as providing quality training in key techniques, thereby strengthening the knowledge of specialist areas such as euro counterfeiting, terrorism and the dismantling of drug laboratories.

We will address any gaps in knowledge and expertise by developing and promulgating best practice, and assisting Member States through support, advice and research in the areas of training, technical support, crime prevention, technical and forensic methods and analysis, and investigative procedures.

In summary, Europol has great potential which needs to be used more effectively by the EU Member States. At both EU and national levels, a smarter response is needed to fight serious international crime which can be achieved by Europe-wide integration of knowledge, operations and values coupled with an increase in EU law enforcement cooperation, and use of existing capabilities and tools.

These developments will make Europol pivotal in EU security architecture and a stronger Europol means a higher success rate and better protection of EU citizens against the threat of serious international crime and terrorism.

 **EUROPOL**

# TE-SAT 2010

EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND  
TREND REPORT



PAGINA BIANCA

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## 1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR



The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2010 is Europol's first major public awareness product under our new legal framework. On 1 January 2010 Europol became an EU agency, acquiring a broader mandate and an enhanced capability to fulfil its mission of supporting its Member States.

The TE-SAT aims to provide law enforcement officials, policymakers and the general public with facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU, while also seeking to identify trends in the development of this phenomenon. It is a public document produced annually on the basis of information provided and verified by the competent law enforcement authorities in the EU Member States. The TE-SAT reports are available at Europol's website (<http://www.europol.europa.eu>).

Terrorism continues to impact on the lives of Member States' citizens both inside and outside the EU. In 2009, seven people (five police officers and two soldiers) were killed and scores of individuals injured as a result of terrorist attacks in Greece, Northern Ireland and Spain.

In some cases it is difficult to differentiate between criminality and acts of terrorism or extremism. Terrorism is not an ideology but a set of criminal tactics which deny fundamental principles of democratic societies. EU Member States have agreed to regard terrorist acts as those which aim to intimidate popu-

lations, compel states to comply with the perpetrators' demands, and/or destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The TE-SAT respects the classifications made by the EU Member States.

In 2009, the total number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU continued to decrease. This is a welcome development which, however, must not be understood as an invitation to lower the guard. Islamist terrorists inside and outside the EU continue to aim for indiscriminate mass casualties. Separatist terrorists killed more people in the EU in 2009 than in 2008. Left-wing and anarchist terrorism is increasing in the EU. Extremists, in particular animal rights extremists, have used methods similar to those of terrorists. Thus, the threat from terrorism persists in the European Union.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all Member States and Eurojust for their continuing contributions of quantitative and qualitative data, which are essential to the annual production of the TE-SAT. I would also like to express my gratitude to Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America for their initial contributions.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the 'Troika' (EU Council Presidencies of Sweden, Spain and Belgium), Eurojust, the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) and the representative of the Heads of Europol National Units, for their support throughout the year and their valuable contributions to the 2010 edition of the TE-SAT.

Rob Wainwright  
Director

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) contains basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests and activities in the EU. The TE-SAT is based mainly on information contributed by EU Member States resulting from criminal investigations into terrorist offences. Terrorism and related phenomena in the EU are summarised in terms of both quantity and quality, and trends are identified for the period 2007 to 2009.

The Member States of the EU continue to be exposed to a serious threat from Islamist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, as well as from left-wing and anarchist terrorism. However, the overall number of terrorist attacks in all Member States in 2009, excluding the United Kingdom (UK), decreased by 33 % compared to 2008 and is almost half of the number of attacks reported in 2007. For 2009, six Member States reported a total of 294 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks, while an additional 124 attacks in Northern Ireland were reported by the UK. Thirteen Member States, excluding the UK, arrested a total of 587 individuals on suspicion of offences related to terrorism, a figure which marks a decrease of 22 % in comparison to 2008 and of about 30 % to 2007. The majority of arrests were carried out on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. Other arrests were made for attack-related offences which include the preparation of attacks, propaganda, financing of terrorism and facilitation.

Substantial amounts of money are transferred, using a variety of means, from Europe to conflict areas in which terrorist groups are active. In relation to Islamist terrorism, financing of terrorism and membership of a terrorist organisation remain the most common reasons for arrests.

Many terrorist or extremist organisations are sup-

ported by active youth branches. These are of particular concern to some Member States as potential targets for radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities.

The internet and communication tools that were developed for use over the web, such as social networking sites and instant messaging programmes, are used by terrorist and extremist organisations to promote their agenda, organise campaigns, collect information on future targets, claim attacks, inform other members of the group, and even recruit with greater ease. A terrorist group's ability to communicate and propagate its views is crucial for financing and recruitment.

The number of women arrested for terrorism-related offences remains low. Women accounted for 15 % of suspects arrested in 2009, compared to 10 % in 2007. The majority of these arrests were related to separatist terrorism.

In 2009, a total of 125 court decisions related to terrorism offences took place in 11 Member States. This involved 391 individuals and one non-governmental organisation (NGO). The majority of court decisions pronounced in 2009 were related to separatist terrorism, in contrast to 2008 when the majority related to Islamist terrorism. The percentage of acquittals decreased from 23 % in 2008 to 17 % in 2009. Once more, since 2008, there has been an increase in the number of individuals tried. Of the 391 defendants tried in 2009, 43, i.e. almost 11 %, were women, the majority of whom (29) were tried for offences related to separatist terrorism. Five of the 43 female defendants were acquitted.

Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the biggest threat to most Member States, despite the fact that only one Islamist terrorist attack - a bomb attack in

Italy - took place in the EU in 2009. Islamist terrorists have threatened EU Member States with perpetrating attacks aiming at indiscriminate mass casualties. The number of arrests relating to Islamist terrorism (110) decreased by 41 % compared to 2008, which continues the trend of a steady decrease since 2006. The threat emanating from Islamist terrorism inside the EU is influenced, to a certain extent, by developments in conflict zones and politically unstable countries such as Afghanistan, the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. At the same time, the EU is used as a platform to prepare and initiate terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world.

Separatist terrorism continues to be the type of terrorism which affects the EU most in terms of the number of attacks carried out. This type includes Basque separatist terrorism in Spain and France, and Corsican separatist terrorism in France. Although, in 2009, the total number of separatist terrorist attacks decreased by 40 % compared to 2008, the number of fatalities increased from four to six. The Basque separatist terrorist organisation ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*) killed three police officers. Ninety per cent of the 237 attacks that were claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist organisations in France (89) and Spain (148) were successfully executed. Portugal appears to be used for purposes of logistical support by ETA. In Spain, *Batasuna* and other political parties, such as ANV (*Acción Nacionalista Vasca*) and PCTV (*Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas*), have been classified as terrorist organisations since 15 June 2009. In the UK, Irish Republican and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland, principally the RIRA (Real Irish Republican Army) and the CIRA (Continuity Irish Republican Army), increased the number of terrorist attacks and killed two soldiers and one police officer.

In 2009, the total number of left-wing and anarchist

terrorist attacks in the EU increased by 43 % compared to 2008 and more than doubled since 2007. Left-wing and anarchist groups were responsible for 40 attacks while 29 individuals were arrested in 2009 in a total of six Member States. In Greece, *Epanastatikos Agonas* continued its violent actions and claimed responsibility for an attack on police officers, which caused serious injuries to one officer. *Sekta Epanastaton*, a newly-active organisation in Greece, claimed another attack which killed a police officer.

Hungary reported four right-wing terrorist attacks in 2009. All other Member States reported right-wing criminal activities as extremism. Individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views who act alone continue to pose a threat.

Two single-issue terrorist attacks were reported in 2009. The illegal activities of single-issue extremism continue to be dominated by Animal Rights Extremism (ARE) activists, whose campaign has intensified with criminal acts perpetrated across Europe. Some violent ARE attacks in 2009 used *modi operandi* similar to those used by terrorists, e.g. improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs).

### 3. TE-SAT 2010: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (USA), as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. The contents of the TE-SAT reports are based on information supplied by EU Member States, some third states, and information drawn from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview of the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to establish basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report also aims to present trends that can be deduced from the information available.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It neither attempts to analyse the root causes of terrorism nor assess the threat posed by terrorism. Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, despite the fact they form an important part of the phenomenon.

The current methodology for producing the report was developed by Europol in 2006 in consultation with the Advisory Board, which at the time included representatives of the Finnish and German Presidencies of the EU Council. It was endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006. This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in accordance with the 2010 Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the present, past and future EU Presidencies, i.e. Spain, Sweden and Belgium (the 'Troika'), along with the EU

Situation Centre (EU SITCEN),<sup>1</sup> the representative of the Heads of Europol National Units, Eurojust and Europol.

The TE-SAT is an unclassified document and does not contain confidential information or information that could jeopardise ongoing investigations.

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU and data on arrests of individuals on suspicion of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by Member States. Similar data was collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside the EU. Eurojust contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States.

Included as 'arrests' are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact on the calculation of the number of arrests.

'Terrorist offences' have been defined as indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002 (2002/475/JHA), which all Member States have implemented in their national legislation.<sup>2</sup> This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population; or
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act; or

<sup>1</sup> The EU SITCEN provides early warning, situational awareness and intelligence analysis to assist policy development in the areas of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) and counter terrorism. Focus lies on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU SITCEN functions under the authority of Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

<sup>2</sup> See Annex 3.

- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international organisation.<sup>3</sup>

In cases where the wording of Article 1 of the Framework Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2010 respects the Member States' definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event qualifies as an act of 'terrorism' or as an act of 'extremism'. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar *modi operandi*. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2010 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflects incidents reported as terrorism by Member States. In contrast to previous years, Member States reported details on extremism, a fact which is reflected in the TE-SAT 2010.

### 3.1. TYPES OF TERRORISM

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations according to their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Islamist terrorism is perpetrated by individuals, groups,

networks or organisations which evoke a certain interpretation of Islam to justify their actions.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups, such as ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*) and PKK/KONGRA-GEL (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*)<sup>4</sup> seek international recognition and political self-determination. They are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.

Left-wing terrorist groups, such as *Epanastatikos Agonas*, seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist left-wing model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all Member States distinguish between activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the same chapter of this report.

Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political, social and economic system following an extremist right-wing model. The ideological roots of European right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.

Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. The term is generally used to describe animal rights and environmentalist terrorist groups.

### 3.2. DATA COLLECTION

Although the UK provided Europol with quantitative data regarding terrorist attacks and qualitative data regarding terrorist activities, the quantitative data is not included in

<sup>3</sup> Article 1 of the Framework Decision includes a list of criminal acts, which has not been printed here due to lack of space.

<sup>4</sup> The names of groups/organizations will be in their original language in the body of this document. For translations and an explanation of acronyms, please see Annex 1.

the figures on attacks because of differences in the statistical criteria applied.<sup>5</sup> All quantitative comparisons made to previous years in this TE-SAT exclude UK data.

The EU Council Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA) obliges Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the result was cross-checked with the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps, was corrected and complemented, and then validated by the Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision, according to which, the Member States are equally obliged to collect all relevant information concerning prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences and send the data to Eurojust. Eurojust cross-checked the collected data with the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps, this data was also corrected, complemented and then validated. If convictions that took place in 2009 were appealed, but were concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the decisions as one. The arrests and convictions may be related to terrorist offences that took place before 2009 and, consequently, may not be related to activities and attacks referred to in the TE-SAT 2010.<sup>6</sup>

Ten Member States reported information on concluded trials to Eurojust: Austria, Denmark, France, Ger-

many, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

With the approval of the TE-SAT Advisory Board, neighbouring countries of the EU with a Liaison Bureau at Europol, and other non-EU States with which Europol has signed cooperation agreements, were approached to provide qualitative data for the TE-SAT 2010 when their information could shed light on a certain situation or phenomenon in the EU. Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America reported information relevant to the security situation in the EU.

### 3.3. DATA ANALYSIS

The TE-SAT is both a situation and a trend report. A trend can be defined as 'a general tendency in the way a situation is changing or developing'. The TE-SAT 2010 presents trend analysis for the period 2007 to 2009.

Although Member States continue to report on terrorist attacks and arrests with varying degrees of depth, it can generally be stated that the data contributed by the Member States for 2009 was of high quality. The analysis of the quantitative data was, however, affected by the fact that the UK's official statistics do not use the same methodology as that of Europol and other Member States.

Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be due to the fact that the investigations into the terrorist attacks or activities in question are still ongoing. In addition, a number of criminal offences committed in support of terrorist activities are not systematically prosecuted under terrorism legislation.

<sup>5</sup> The UK publishes a fully detailed breakdown of statistics related to persons arrested in connection with terrorism investigations, but they are not included in the TE-SAT due to differences in criteria. However, the statistics for Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) can be found at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfsog/hosbi809.pdf> and for Northern Ireland at [http://www.pni.police.uk/index/updates/updates\\_statistics/updates\\_security\\_situation\\_and\\_public\\_order\\_statistics.htm](http://www.pni.police.uk/index/updates/updates_statistics/updates_security_situation_and_public_order_statistics.htm)

<sup>6</sup> The UK did provide Eurojust with statistics on convictions for terrorist offences.

## 4. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU IN 2009

- In 2009, 294 terrorist attacks were carried out in six Member States and 587 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences in thirteen Member States.
- The majority of suspects were arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation.
- In 2009, 391 individuals and one NGO were tried on terrorism charges in the Member States, resulting in a total of 125 court decisions.

The TE-SAT provides an overview for each of the different types of terrorism, as well as extremism linked to that type of terrorism, if it is of added value. This general overview shows the differences and similarities between these types. A complete overview of the number of terrorist attacks and arrests for terrorism-related offences per Member State, between 2007 and 2009, can be found in Annexes 4 and 5.

### 4.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2009, six Member States reported 294 failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks. Furthermore, an additional 124 attacks were carried out in Northern Ireland.<sup>8</sup>

The number of attacks decreased by 33 % in comparison to 2008 and is almost half the number of attacks carried out in 2007.

In 2009, there was only one Islamist terrorist attack, directed at a military target in Italy.

Separatist terrorist organisations were responsible for 237 attacks; all of which were carried out in France and Spain. The decreasing trend in the number of separatist attacks, already noticeable in 2008, continued in 2009.

Greece, Italy and Spain reported 40 attacks by left-wing and anarchist terrorists.




Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects, 2007-2009.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>8</sup> In line with the methodology, these attacks are not included in the statistics.

Member State	Islamist	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Single-issue	Not specified	Total 2009
Austria	0	0	0	0	1	5	6
France	0	89	0	0	1	5	95
Greece	0	0	15	0	0	0	15
Hungary	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
Italy	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
Spain	0	148	23	0	0	0	171
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>294</b>

Figure 2: Number of failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks in 2009 per Member State and per affiliation.<sup>9</sup>

Member State	Islamist	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Single-issue	Not specified	Total 2009
Austria	2	0	0	0	0	6	8
Belgium	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Bulgaria	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
France	37	255	11	6	1	5	315
Germany	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
Greece	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Hungary	0	0	0	16	0	0	16
Ireland (Republic of)	0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Italy	20	0	9	0	0	0	29
Lithuania	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
The Netherlands	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Spain	40	127	2	0	0	0	169
<b>Total</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>587</b>

Figure 3: Number of arrested suspects in 2009 per Member State and per affiliation.<sup>10</sup>

Hungary reported four right-wing attacks; Austria and France each reported one single-issue attack.

The number of reported casualties and fatalities remains limited; however, seven government officials

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 5.

(five police officers and two soldiers) were killed in separatist, left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in Greece, Spain and the UK.<sup>11</sup>

In 2009, 587 individuals were arrested in 13 Member States for terrorism-related offences. In comparison to 2008, the total number of arrests in Member States decreased by 22 %; in comparison to 2007, the number of arrests decreased by 30 %.<sup>12</sup>

Eight Member States reported 110 arrests related to Islamist terrorism in comparison to 187 arrests reported by 10 Member States in 2008.

The majority of the individuals were arrested for offences related to separatism.

In 2009, 29 individuals were arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences. Twenty-two individuals were arrested in relation to right-wing terrorism and two individuals were arrested for single-issue terrorist offences.

The majority of arrests were made on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. Almost 30 % of the arrests were related to attacks and 17 % to the financing of terrorism. Other activities of which the suspects were accused include propaganda and facilitation.

The average age of the arrested suspects is 34 years. As in previous years, almost 40 % of the arrested suspects are younger than 30. Suspects arrested for Islamist terrorism are, on average, older than those arrested for separatist terrorism.

Although the number of women arrested for terrorism-related offences remains low, there is a small increase in comparison to previous years. 15 % of the arrested suspects were women, compared to 10 % in 2007. The majority of these arrests were related to separatist terrorism. In Lithuania, a woman was arrested for the preparation of a suicide terrorist attack.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4.2. TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

##### Financing

No terrorist or extremist activities can take place without the availability of financial resources. It has been established that the cost of terrorist attacks is often very low and can easily be covered; however, all organisations need funds for their daily expenses, including salaries, training, logistics, websites, travel and other expenses.

Illegal sources for the financing of terrorism cover a wide range of criminal activities including fraud, counterfeit products, drugs smuggling, kidnapping, trafficking of human beings, and extortion.

Alongside criminal activities, funds can also be derived from legitimate sources. Charitable organisations, NGOs and media outlets continue to be misused by individuals who misappropriate voluntary contributions destined for genuine purposes in order to fund terrorist activities. Recent research at Europol indicates that women are often involved in the misuse of funds derived from charitable organisations.

<sup>11</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Greece, Spain, UK.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>13</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Lithuania.

Information indicates that various means are used to transfer substantial amounts of money from Europe to conflict areas where terrorist groups are active.

Terrorist organisations such as ETA, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and the DHKP-C (*Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi*), collect funds by methods that include extortion or taxation campaigns. Publications of these organisations are sold and raffles are organised for fundraising.<sup>14</sup>

In November 2009, 17 Algerians were detained by Italian authorities and later charged with a variety of crimes, including forgery of documents, robberies and thefts, providing an estimated turnover of one million euros in three years. The money was used to finance AQIM (*al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*).<sup>15</sup>

#### Youth organisations

Many terrorist or extremist organisations have an active supporting youth branch. These branches have a significant potential for violence, which may be exploited by terrorist organisations for radicalisation, recruitment and the financing of terrorist activities and are attractive to, and approachable by, young people. The social alienation and economic deprivation of youngsters play into the hands of terrorist and extremist organisations interested in recruiting them.

SEGI is linked to ETA and has long been involved in the execution of attacks in Spain. *Komalen Ciwan*, the youth organisation of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, is

active in protests in the EU.<sup>16</sup> Recent developments in Northern Ireland show that youngsters linked to CIRA (Continuity Irish Republican Army) have begun a new campaign and plan to attack military targets.

Some Member States reported that marginalised Somali youth are of particular concern as a potential target for radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities. It has to be noted that their travel to Somalia to join the armed struggle against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), or to visit training camps, do not always depend on organised radicalisation or recruitment – they can also be self-directed and occur without any clear indications.<sup>17</sup>

#### Internet

New and low-cost communication tools such as social networking sites and instant messaging programmes are used by terrorist and extremist organisations for various reasons: to promote their agenda or organise promotion campaigns; to collect information on future targets; to claim attacks; to inform other members of the group, and even recruit with great ease.<sup>18</sup> These modern ways of communication are complementing traditional means, such as telephone and personal contacts. A terrorist group's ability to produce convincing propaganda is crucial for financing and recruitment.

Some Member States reported that radicalisation and recruitment in the EU increasingly take place over the internet and, simultaneously, via traditional communication means.<sup>19</sup> In October 2009, a 20-year-

<sup>14</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, Spain, Turkey

<sup>15</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

<sup>16</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany, Turkey

<sup>17</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Finland.

<sup>18</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain, UK.

<sup>19</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium.

old Lithuanian woman was arrested before she travelled to Russia to commit a suicide attack there. She had converted to Islam and was self-radicalised via the internet.<sup>20</sup>

The development of social networking websites allows extremist and terrorist groups to retrieve information on people, their families and locations to a degree previously unimaginable.<sup>21</sup>

Many terrorists try to counter government-controlled sources of information and media reporting by propagating an alternative interpretation of events which justifies their violent actions or denies acts for which they are blamed.

In 2009, additional prominent websites advocating Islamist terrorism developed new sections in Western languages. The increased use of languages other than Arabic in propaganda audios and videos is also pointing to the presence of foreigners, including EU nationals or residents, in conflict areas.

#### 4.3. CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES

In 2009, there were 125 court decisions reported in 11 Member States, as opposed to 187 court decisions in 10 Member States for 2008. Greece reported one court decision, in which three defendants were acquitted.<sup>22</sup>

Member State	2007	2008	2009
Austria	0	0	2
Belgium	5	12	0
Denmark	11	16	10
France	54	75	76
Germany	7	10	7
Ireland (Republic of)	6	9	15
Italy	47	25	24
The Netherlands	8	12	2
Spain	231	141	217
Sweden	0	1	1
UK	33	59	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>391</b>

Figure 4: Number of individuals tried in 2009 for terrorism charges per Member State.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Lithuania.

<sup>21</sup> Source: Europol 2009, internal report.

<sup>22</sup> This information is not included in any of the figures or text of this section.

<sup>23</sup> According to the information provided by the Spanish national authorities, five persons received three imprisonment sentences in three different court decisions and six persons were tried twice for terrorist offences in two different decisions. The individuals have been counted only once in figure 4, whereas in figure 5 the number of convictions/acquittals is higher due to the double or triple sentencing.

In 2009, 391 individuals were tried on terrorism charges in 10 Member States, an increase compared to 2008. In addition, one organisation was brought to trial in 2009 on charges of financing terrorism in France. Of the 391 individuals, 43 were women. The majority of the women (29) were tried for offences related to separatist terrorism.

The highest number of individuals tried for terrorism charges in 2009 was reported by Spain. In the past three years, France and Germany saw a similar number of individuals brought before court; Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK saw a steady decrease, whereas Austria reported a procedure on terrorism charges for the first time.

A large trial took place in France against 22 LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) members, most

of them arrested in 2007,<sup>24</sup> and the organisation CCTF (*Comité Coordination Tamoul France*). They were prosecuted for funding terrorism in Sri Lanka, and sentenced to up to seven years' imprisonment. Only one of the individuals was acquitted. The court also ordered the dissolution of the CCTF, viewed as the 'legal arm' of the LTTE. This judgement is now under appeal.

In another LTTE-related trial in the UK, the alleged leader of the United Tamil Organisation in Britain, before it became outlawed in 2001, was convicted of supplying bomb-making equipment to the LTTE and receiving documents for the purpose of terrorism. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. At the time when the offences were committed, the Tamil Tigers were not banned in the UK.

Member State	Islamist	Left wing	Right wing	Separatist	Not specified	Total
Austria	2					2
Denmark	3				7	10
France	18			59		77
Germany	3	3		1		7
Ireland (republic of)				15		15
Italy	3	21				24
The Netherlands	2					2
Spain	25	15		190	3	233
Sweden	1					1
UK	32		1	3	1	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>408</b>

Figure 5: Number of convictions/acquittals for terrorism charges in 2009, per Member State and per affiliation.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> TE-SAT 2008, page 33.

<sup>25</sup> Some cases are pending appeal, such as the LTTE judgement in France. The court decision against the organisation CCTF has been included in figures 5 and 6.

In a judgement regarding the dissolution of the political parties *Herri Batasuna* and *Batasuna* by virtue of a decision by the Spanish Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights considered that the national courts and the Supreme Court in Spain had arrived at reasonable conclusions that there was a link between the applicant parties and ETA. This link could objectively be considered as a threat to democracy. The judgement became final on 6 November 2009.

The majority of reported court decisions relate to separatist terrorism, in contrast to 2008 when the majority related to Islamist terrorism. As in 2008, the UK had the highest number of trials for offences related to Islamist terrorism and Spain had the majority of separatist cases. The highest number of individuals tried for left-wing terrorism offences was in Italy.

A court in the UK convicted three individuals who had plotted to blow up transatlantic planes with home-made liquid bombs in 2006. The men had

prepared a home-made mixture, intending to take it on board in sports drinks bottles stored in hand luggage. The defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to murder using explosives on an aircraft and were sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum to be served of between 32 and 40 years. Four other defendants received hung verdicts in relation to the plot and another was cleared of all charges. In a related trial later in the year, the court convicted three more individuals. One of them was found guilty of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum of 18 years to be served. The other two were sentenced to 8 years and 15 months respectively.

The percentage of acquittals decreased from 23 % in 2008 to 17 % in 2009. Of the 43 known women defendants, five were acquitted. One of the women received three convictions.

Reported court decisions related to separatist and left-wing terrorism have the highest acquittal rate (15 %). Austria, Germany, Ireland and the Nether-

Member State	Convicted	Acquitted	Total	Acquitted %
Austria	2		2	0%
Denmark	8	2	10	20%
France	71	6	77	8%
Germany	7		7	0%
Ireland (republic of)	15		15	0%
Italy	20	4	24	17%
The Netherlands	2		2	0%
Spain	182	51	233	22%
Sweden		1	1	100%
UK	30	7	37	19%
Total	337	71	408	17%

Figure 6: Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per Member State in 2009.

Member State	Average
Austria	3
Denmark	3
France	6
Germany	4
Ireland (republic of)	5
Italy	8
The Netherlands	≤1
Spain	10
UK	8

Figure 7: Average penalty per convicted individual.<sup>26</sup>

lands have a full conviction rate. France has had mostly successful prosecutions.

As in previous years, not all arrested individuals in one year will be brought to trial in the following year. It is clear that national authorities still try to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring, which explains the relatively high number of arrests. Investigations into terrorism suspects may have been prematurely unsuccessful or may have led to charges other than terrorism, such as falsification of documents, possession of weapons or illegal entry into a country; trials have either not yet started or not come to a conclusion.

In any event, judicial authorities have to find evidentiary support for the charges of planning, intent, membership of a terrorist organisation or promotion of terrorism, which is less tangible than evidence of a successfully executed terrorist attack. As was the case in previous years, no consistent information is available on the charges and offences for

which a sentence was given, so that a comparison of convictions or acquittals is perhaps rather abstract.

The average penalty imposed in Europe is now approximately five years.<sup>27</sup>

In the UK, there were four so-called hung verdicts, where the jury was unable to reach a verdict. In the airline bomb plot case, life sentences were given for conspiracy to murder.

<sup>26</sup> Please note that, aside from imprisonment, France often imposes a penalty of banishment from the national territory. Also, in some cases a financial penalty was imposed. Spain has a similar type of punishment, taking away individuals' civil rights.

<sup>27</sup> Eurojust made a calculation of the reported sentences imposed in Figure 7. For the purpose of the overview, sentences exceeding 40 years have been counted as 40 years.

## 5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM

### KEY FINDINGS

- In spite of the fact that only one attack was committed in the EU, Islamist terrorists still aim to cause mass casualties, as demonstrated by the attempt to create an explosion on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit in December 2009.
- Islamist terrorism is often facilitated through transnational contacts between individuals residing in many EU Member States and other parts of the world.
- Self-radicalised individuals may, if undetected, become serious security risks.
- EU nationals travelling to conflict areas or attending terrorist training camps may pose a serious threat to the security situation in Member States on their return.
- The security situation in the EU with regards to Islamist terrorism is influenced by political developments in countries and areas outside the EU that include Iraq, Afghanistan, the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, Somalia and Yemen.
- Islamist propaganda is attempting to influence Member States' policies, including the outcome of general elections in EU countries.

The number of attacks worldwide that have caused mass casualties have confirmed that there is still a willingness by Islamist terrorists to commit mass murder. An example of this intention is the attack on 25 December 2009, when a Nigerian national aboard a US airliner flying from Amsterdam to Detroit attempted to blow up the aircraft. The suspect

failed to detonate an IED that he had assembled in-flight from component parts he managed to carry, undetected, on his body. The suspect, who had studied mechanical engineering in the UK and later went to Yemen after becoming radicalised, was in possession of a valid visa for entering the USA. The airline company had been granted permission by the US authorities to carry the suspect. The man claimed to have been armed and dispatched on his mission by AQAP (*al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*).<sup>28 29</sup>

This incident marked the end of a year in which only one Islamist terrorist attack occurred in the EU, in Italy. However, arrests of individuals on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes committed indicate that a range of activities took place in 2009.

Similar to previous years, Member States reported that the threat remains real and serious, despite the fact that none of them, with the exception of Italy, had been directly affected by an Islamist terrorist attack. The arrests in October 2009 in the US of two men charged with preparing terrorist attacks against the newspaper that published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, and other targets in Denmark,<sup>30</sup> are an illustration of terrorists from abroad focusing on Member States of the EU.<sup>31 32</sup> The attack on the US airliner showed how the EU can be used as a platform for launching attacks on the US, and demonstrated the ability of terrorist groups to employ explosives that are not detected by conventional scanning equipment.

<sup>28</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, December 28, 2009.

<sup>29</sup> AQAP claimed responsibility for this attack in the media in January 2010.

<sup>30</sup> NRC Handelsblad, 28 October 2009.

<sup>31</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Denmark.

<sup>32</sup> The reprinting of the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in February 2008 has rendered Denmark and Danish interests prime potential terrorist targets for leading militant extremists abroad. The attack of 1 January 2010, on the artist who created the cartoons in 2005, is proof of the acuteness of this threat.

Member States' contributions show a common understanding that global trends contribute to the specific risks to which Member States are exposed. These include the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but are also determined by developments in Somalia, the Maghreb and Yemen.

EU Member States with a military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, or which participate in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), once more report being at risk of being targeted by Islamist terrorism,<sup>33</sup> but with less emphasis on that specific issue in comparison to previous years. While considered a 'legitimate' target by Islamist terrorists for being part of the 'Western crusade' - as evidenced by the country's participation in the international forces in Afghanistan - France is also specifically threatened because of its support to Algeria's 'apostate' leaders. It is also held accountable for its alleged 'hostility' toward Muslims, symbolised by a law against veils in schools and, more recently, the debate about the use of the full-body veil (*niqab* or *burqa*) by Muslim women.<sup>34</sup>

Other circumstances that give cause for vigilance are video messages published on the internet targeting specific Member States. The presence of individuals suspected of, and convicted for, terrorism-related offences in jails could also act as a trigger for extremists to take action against the Member States concerned.<sup>35</sup>

Another point of interest is the fact that the threat against Western states, in general, and Member

States and EU interests in particular, is increasingly likely to originate from self-radicalised individuals and a diversity of militant extremist groups, including those who are, or claim to be, affiliated with al-Qaeda as a movement, rather than linked to AQSL (*al-Qaeda's senior leadership*) on a personal level.

Of particular concern are radicalised EU nationals who travel to conflict areas with the intent to take part in acts of illegal violence or join training camps. On their return, they may use their newly-acquired skills and experience to act on their terrorist intentions, in actions that may be ordered by terrorist organisations from abroad. Furthermore, they can encourage others to follow their example. Several Member States specifically mention their concerns regarding this phenomenon.<sup>36</sup>

Several Member States also mention the fact that, despite the lack of terrorist incidents in their country, there are indications that individuals or groups are active in facilitating terrorist activities abroad, for instance through financial and/or logistical support.<sup>37</sup> This is yet another illustration of the transnational character of Islamist terrorism.

## 5.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

On 12 October 2009, a Libyan national tried to gain access to the Santa Barbara military barracks in Milan while vehicles were entering the compound. When the soldiers on guard duty intervened, the suspect started shouting in Arabic and then explod-

<sup>33</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain.

<sup>34</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France.

<sup>35</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

<sup>36</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK.

<sup>37</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, UK.

ed the device he was carrying with him. One of the guards trying to stop him was slightly wounded. The suspect himself suffered severe burns in the explosion. Shortly after the incident, the authorities arrested an Egyptian and another Libyan national who were believed to be involved in procuring the explosives and manufacturing the device. The attacker had been in possession of an Italian residence permit since October 2003 and had never before drawn police attention in a political-religious context.<sup>39</sup>

According to information from the Member States, of the 587 persons that were arrested in the EU in 2009, 110 individuals were reported as having been arrested in relation to Islamist terrorism. This is a decrease of 41 % compared to 2008, when 187 persons were arrested, and continues the trend of a steady decrease since 2007 when the number of arrested persons was 201. Once more, and similar to previous years, the largest number of arrests took place in Spain (40) and France (37).

The number of Member States which reported arrests related to Islamist terrorism decreased from ten in 2008 to eight in 2009. The Member States reporting arrests in 2009 were Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Spain and the Netherlands.

Individuals born in North African countries<sup>40</sup> represent 42 % of all arrested persons. Nearly one-third of all suspects (30 %) were EU citizens. The proportion of 'home-grown' terrorists<sup>41</sup> remained unchanged compared to 2008 at around one-fifth of all arrested suspects.



Figure 8: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism in Member States in 2009.<sup>38</sup>

Suspected membership of a terrorist organisation and the financing of terrorism were the two most common reasons for arrests related to Islamist terrorism. Further reasons for arrests included the forging of documents and other acts of facilitation, as well as the planning, preparation of, and attempt to carry out attacks. As in 2008, two-thirds of the individuals arrested on suspicion of involvement in Islamist terrorism could not be linked to specific terrorist organisations known to the authorities. This is consistent with the existence of individuals or groups unaffiliated to a terrorist organisation but

<sup>38</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>39</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

<sup>40</sup> Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

<sup>41</sup> 'Home-grown' terrorists are terrorists that have been born in the EU and are citizens of one of the EU Member States.

adhering to an ideology similar to those promoted by Islamist terrorist groups such as *al-Qaeda* and its affiliates.

## 5.2. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

### Radicalisation and recruitment

Radicalisation, especially among the young, and the adoption of extreme views are significant problems in several Member States.<sup>42</sup> The internet is a facilitating factor for (self-) radicalisation,<sup>43 44</sup> a functionality that is aided by the development of social networking sites. In 2009, prominent websites advocating Islamist terrorism also developed new sections in Western languages, to widen their reach.

### Propaganda

The Netherlands were targeted in a video released on 12 April 2009 by *al-Sahab*, the media outlet of AQSL. In this video, an individual is making a threat in German against the Netherlands and Denmark, because these countries allegedly insulted the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>45</sup> The extent to which Islamist terrorist groups rely on the internet for disseminating their message became apparent in the summer of 2009, when several *al-Qaeda*-affiliated internet forums experienced technical problems, culminating in their ultimate closure on 10 September. This resulted in a delay of several days in the dissemination of propaganda addresses commemorating the eighth

anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001.

Germany has become the focus of a determined propaganda campaign, in which threatening videos featuring German nationals are being broadcast on the internet.<sup>46</sup> This campaign was an attempt to influence the outcome of the general elections in Germany and the country's foreign policy.

## 5.3. THE SITUATION OUTSIDE THE EU

In 2009, several EU nationals became victims of Islamist terrorist acts outside the EU. In January 2009, a group of four tourists, including a German and a British national, were abducted in the Niger/Mali border region. The British national was killed. AQIM claimed responsibility for the abduction and the killing.<sup>47</sup> The kidnappings of a French national in Mali in November 2009, of three Spanish volunteer workers in Mauritania on 29 November 2009, and of two Italians in December 2009, are other examples of terrorist activity directly victimising citizens of Member States.

Unlike many other forms of terrorism, Islamist terrorists invoke transnational links for justifying their actions: terrorist attacks in Europe or against European interests abroad are legitimised as retaliation for crimes allegedly committed, condoned or tolerated by the targets in other parts of the world. Devel-

<sup>42</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

<sup>43</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden.

<sup>44</sup> The EU Action Plan on Terrorism reflects the concern of Member States on this issue - it states that, to prevent radicalisation and recruitment, further measures against illegal extremist literature and other media have to be considered. In this context, the role of the internet remains central. In summer 2009, the European Commission contracted two studies on non-legislative measures to prevent the distribution of violent radical content on the internet, and on methodologies or adapted technological tools to efficiently detect content promoting violence on the internet (15358/03 ENFOPOL 277, 26/11/2009).

<sup>45</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: the Netherlands.

<sup>46</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany.

<sup>47</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany.

opments and events in relation to Islamist terrorism in certain regions or countries which have impacted Member States, or could become of relevance to the EU, are briefly described in the following paragraphs.

### Iraq

The potential threat to the EU from trained fighters returning from Iraq has been significantly reduced as Iraq is being replaced by other theatres of conflict as the focus of attention. In 2009, terrorist discourse, while continuing to portray Iraq as a legitimate *jihād*, focused mostly on Afghanistan or Somalia. The shift, already observed in 2008, was confirmed by statements of AQSL and by coalition forces on the ground.

Following a decrease in the number of civilian casualties as a result of inter-faction violence near the end of 2009, the parliamentary elections to be held in March 2010 may reignite terrorist violence. The deadly attacks of 8 December 2009, claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), could be an early example of such resurgence of terrorist acts.<sup>48</sup>

Over the years, a number of EU nationals have been held hostage in Iraq. On 30 December 2009, the only survivor of a group of five British nationals captured in 2007 by *Shia* militants was released in Baghdad, having spent 31 months in captivity.<sup>49</sup>

### Pakistan

Government bodies and security forces remain the primary targets of attacks by the Pakistani *Taliban*, as indicated by attacks on the police training centre in Manawan and the military headquarters in Rawalpindi. The attacks committed on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar in June 2009 and the




Figure 9: Terrorist organisations and conflict regions outside Europe influencing terrorist activities in the EU.

Shalimar Hotel in Rawalpindi in November 2009 are examples of terrorist acts partly aimed at foreigners, as both hotels provided accommodation to foreign businessmen and women. The attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009 is an example of terrorist groups targeting sports events. A number of EU citizens were arrested in Pakistan for involvement in activities related to Islamist terrorism. Pakistan remains one of the important areas for *al-Qaeda* and its affiliated groups. AQSL is believed to be in hiding in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area.

### Afghanistan

The number of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan more than doubled in 2009 compared to 2008; these incidents included the attack on the German Embassy in Kabul in January 2009. The majority of

<sup>48</sup> 'Iraq Status Report', US Department of State, 16 December 2009 and 27 January 2010.

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/30/peter-moore-iraq-hostage-freed>, accessed on 7 February 2010.

suicide attacks were committed using IEDs in suicide belts or rucksacks, as well as Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). Such attacks mainly focused on military targets, closely followed by Afghan security and governmental targets.

Since 2001, 23 EU Member States have deployed troops to the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Separately, several Member States are also contributing to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. The EU military presence in Afghanistan, as well as in other conflict zones, is believed to be putting Member States at risk of being targeted by Islamist terrorist attacks. Several Member States<sup>50</sup> have indicated that such presence is a factor that could bring about terrorist acts against their country and its interests abroad.

#### Yemen

There are growing concerns that Yemen is developing into a new area of operation for terrorist activities as evidenced by recent events, including the establishment of AQAP in January 2009. AQAP's stated goal is to bring down the Yemeni Government and to turn the country into a caliphate. Their reported strategy is to attack the tourism and oil industries. AQAP has been accepted by AQSL as one of its affiliates and has declared its solidarity with AQIM in Algeria and *al-Shabab* in Somalia, thereby confirming its transnational orientation.

AQAP targets non-Muslims, including foreign tourists and diplomats, in line with its maxim of 'expelling the unbelievers from the Arabian Peninsula',

which it uses as justification for attacks on individuals and groups from countries considered to be engaged in a war against Islam. Civilians from these countries, the group claims, are not to be differentiated from soldiers. Hostages taken by AQAP in Yemen in 2009 include a British citizen,<sup>51</sup> seven Germans and a South Korean.<sup>52</sup>

AQAP also claimed attempted terrorist attacks outside Yemeni territory. On 27 August, a suicide attack in Saudi Arabia, subsequently claimed by AQAP, targeted the Saudi Arabian deputy interior minister in charge of counter terrorism matters, who was only slightly injured. The attack was perpetrated by a Saudi member of the group with a concealed IED. AQAP also claimed responsibility for the failed suicide attack on 25 December 2009 aboard a trans-Atlantic airliner flying from Amsterdam to Detroit, discussed earlier.

#### Somalia

Violence by several militant Islamist groups against the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia escalated further in 2009. The main Islamist terrorist group associated with this violence is *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin*, or *Mujahideen Youth Movement* in Somalia, generally referred to as *al-Shabab*. This is the militant wing of the Somalia Islamic Courts Council, which took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. *Al-Shabab's* senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaeda and some of its members are believed to have trained and fought with the latter in Afghanistan. The self-proclaimed goal of *al-Shabab* is the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia. Nev-

<sup>50</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands.

<sup>51</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

<sup>52</sup> Aljazeera.net, 25 June 2009: <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/20090625256572259.html>, accessed 15 February 2010.

ertheless, *al-Shabab* has also professed to be part of a transnational movement. In several messages released in 2009, *al-Qaeda's* leadership praised the activities of *al-Shabab* in Somalia and encouraged the group to continue its struggle. AQAP also commended *al-Shabab* and urged Muslims to support them. The Yemeni *al-Qaeda* affiliate called on Islamist terrorists in Somalia to step up their attacks in the Gulf of Adén and Djibouti.

The country continues to attract volunteers who, in most known cases, travel there to join *al-Shabab*. It is estimated that around 300 foreign nationals are presently in training camps or fighting with *al-Shabab* or other radical groups in Somalia. As a consequence of the increasing pressure on AQSL and its affiliates in western and north-western Pakistan, some terrorists view Somalia as a safer place to receive military training and combat experience.

The situation in Somalia is relevant to the Member States for several reasons, which include the targeting of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and co-operation missions providing humanitarian and development aid. A number of foreigners were kidnapped in Somalia in 2009. As a result of a number of suicide bombings in 2009, four government ministers and 17 soldiers of the AMISOM were killed. In December 2009, a Danish-Somali man dressed in women's clothing committed a suicide attack in Mogadishu, killing at least 22 people.<sup>53</sup> *Al-Shabab* denied involvement in the attack. The worsening humanitarian and security situation in Somalia leads to increasingly large numbers of refugees travelling to the EU. The threat posed to the EU by individuals returning from Somalia who either have combat experience or specific tasking to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe is of concern.

The transnational orientation of *al-Shabab* is manifested in its statements and demands. On 17 September 2009, *al-Shabab* demanded that France stop its financial and military support for the TFG and end anti-piracy patrols in Somali waters in exchange for the release of a French security adviser held hostage since July. The group also called for the withdrawal of AMISOM forces. On 30 October, the commander of *al-Shabab* protested against Israel's recent raid on the *al-Aqsa* Mosque in Jerusalem and threatened to attack Israel. The group also threatened Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, Ghana, Sudan and Uganda.

#### North and West Africa

In 2009, AQIM tried to further promote its image as the regional representative of *al-Qaeda* in North Africa and the Sahel and received ideological support from AQSL. In June, a member of the younger generation of AQSL urged Muslims in North Africa to offer support to their brethren in Algeria, particularly those belonging to AQIM.

Contrary to 2008, the number of suicide attacks committed and claimed by AQIM in Algeria in 2009 was limited. AQIM claimed a suicide attack on a military barracks in Algeria on 7 March 2009. Nevertheless, in 2009, AQIM continued its claims of a high number of ambushes, assassinations and bomb attacks targeting members of the Algerian security forces. This strategic change can be understood as a reaction to the negative publicity linked to the use of suicide attacks, which may have impacted on the organisation's capacity to recruit volunteers.

In 2009, as in 2008, AQIM placed particular importance on Mauritania. On 23 June, an American aid worker was assassinated in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott. AQIM claimed responsibility for the

<sup>53</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: US Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

attack, saying the victim was known for his missionary activities. On 8 August, a suicide attack targeted the French embassy in Mauritania. Three people, two of them French gendarmes, were slightly injured. In its claim of responsibility, AQIM stated that the attacker was a Mauritanian and that the attack was a response to the aggression of the 'crusaders', particularly France, and Mauritanian leaders against Islam and Muslims. In addition to Mauritania, AQIM seems to have also expanded into Mali.

In addition to attacks, AQIM also remains involved in the abductions of nationals of Western countries in the Sahel region. In December 2008, two Canadian UN diplomats were kidnapped in Niger, an incident followed by the abduction, in January 2009, of four European tourists - one British, one German and two Swiss nationals - also in Niger; responsibility for the kidnappings was claimed by AQIM in February 2009. In March, the media reported that AQIM demanded that 20 Algerian, Mauritanian and Moroccan AQIM members detained in Mali and other countries be freed as a condition for releasing the six western hostages. In April, the two Canadians, a Swiss and a German were released. In a communiqué released on 2 June on the internet, AQIM announced the execution of its British hostage on 31 May. The remaining Swiss hostage was freed on 12 July in northern Mali.

A second wave of abductions took place in late 2009. On 25 November 2009, a French citizen was abducted in Mali. On 29 November, three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped in Mauritania. AQIM claimed responsibility for the abductions in early December, arguing that the kidnappings were a reaction to the West's war on Islam and Muslims. On 18 December 2009, two Italian nationals were kidnapped in Mauritania. In late December 2009, AQIM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the Ital-

ian couple, linking it to Italy's military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

## 6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

### KEY FINDINGS

- Separatist terrorism continues to target government officials. In 2009, a total of four police officers and two soldiers died in attacks in Spain and the UK.
- The number of attacks and arrests continued decreasing in 2009. A total of 237 terrorist attacks were carried out in continental Europe and 124 in Northern Ireland, while a total of 413 individuals were arrested.
- The majority of the arrests and attacks were carried out in France and Spain, where several ETA cells were dismantled. France remains the most important logistical base for ETA; Portugal also appears to be used for logistical support.
- Europe is important for financial and logistical support to the PKK, the LTTE and the FARC.
- Youth organisations related to separatist terrorism or extremism have a significant potential for violence.

### 6.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS

In 2009, 237 attacks were claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist organisations in France and Spain, while a further 124 attacks were carried out in Northern Ireland (UK).<sup>54</sup>

The number of separatist attacks decreased by 40 % compared to 2008, with 90 % of the attacks successfully executed.

In Spain, 14 attacks were carried out by ETA, where this organisation had claimed 35 attacks in 2008. The number of *Taludes Y* attacks also decreased in 2009. *Resistência Galega* and *Independentismo Radical Galego*, who operate in the Spanish autonomous region of Galicia, carried out nine attacks.

In France, 89 attacks were carried out by separatist terrorist groups. The vast majority of the attacks were linked to Corsican separatist terrorism; eight




Figure 11: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects for separatist terrorism in Member States, 2007-2009.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>55</sup> See footnote 5.

attacks were committed by Basque separatist terrorist groups.

Despite the decrease in number of attacks, the number of fatalities increased from four in 2008, to six in 2009. As was the case in previous years, government officials are still a target for separatist terrorist organisations.

In June and July 2009, three police officers died in two separate ETA bombings in Spain.

On 19 June, an IED located under the private vehicle of a member of the National Police exploded in Arrigorriaga. The explosion caused the immediate death of the police officer.

On 29 July, a van loaded with about 200 kg of explosive materials went off in Burgos, targeting the provincial headquarters of the Guardia Civil. The targeted building, used as residence for officers and their families, was totally destroyed and more than 60 people were injured. In this case, no warning call was made, which indicates ETA's intention to carry out indiscriminate attacks. The van used in the attack was stolen in France and carried Spanish licence plates instead of the original French ones.<sup>57</sup>

On 30 July, two Guardia Civil agents were assassinated in Palmanova (Balearic Islands) when an IED placed under a patrol vehicle parked outside a police station exploded. Another IED was found under a patrol vehicle parked close to the police station in Calvia (Balearic Islands).

The decreasing trend in the use of commercial

<sup>56</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>57</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

<sup>58</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.



Figure 10: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects for separatist terrorism in Member States in 2009.<sup>56</sup>

explosives by ETA that began in 2007 continued in 2009. In most cases, the explosives used were home-made.<sup>58</sup>

In France, there has been a continuing decrease in the number of terrorist attacks since 2007. The level in 2009 is the lowest in the last 30 years.

As in previous years, separatist groups in France and Spain carried out attacks against different types of targets. Although secondary residences and businesses owned by inhabitants of the French mainland and foreign nationals (the tourist sector) remain privileged

targets of the separatist groups in France, French law enforcement authorities have also been targeted on several occasions. The police buildings of Bonifacio and Porto-Vecchio were targeted by firearms on 6 and 11 April 2009, respectively. On 22 July 2009, there was an attack, claimed by the Unified FLNC (*Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse*), against the building of the gendarmerie in Vescovato.<sup>59</sup>

A total of 124 attacks were carried out by Irish Republican and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland. In 2009, there was an increase in the number of attacks by terrorist groups, principally the 'Real' IRA (RIRA) and the 'Continuity' IRA (CIRA). In March 2009, two soldiers and a police officer were murdered. During the year, there were also other attempted attacks on members of the security forces and the public.

## 6.2. ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2009, a total of 413 people were arrested in France, Spain and Ireland for offences related to separatist

terrorism. The vast majority of the individuals were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation, 25 % for involvement in attacks, while almost 20 % were arrested for the financing of terrorism.

In Spain, 127 individuals were arrested for offences linked to separatist terrorism, a number comparable to 2008. The majority of the individuals arrested were members of SEGI, 20 % were members of ETA and 14 % were linked to *Batasuna*. This party, as well as other political parties, such as ANV (*Acción Nacionalista Vasca*) and PCTV (*Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas*), have been classified as terrorist organisations since 15 June 2009, according to Common Position 2009/468/PESC of the Council.

In November and December 2009, 40 top SEGI leaders and prominent members were arrested in the three Basque provinces and Navarre in the framework of two different operations. Another person linked with street-fighting activity was arrested in November.<sup>60</sup>




Figure 12: Number of Taldes Y / SEGI and ETA attacks in Spain, 2007-2009.

<sup>59</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France.

<sup>60</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

In France, the majority of suspects were arrested for Corsican separatist terrorist offences. Of the individuals arrested, the majority were suspected of involvement in attacks and financing terrorism.

Fifty percent of the individuals arrested in France for Basque separatist terrorism were linked to ETA and suspected of financing of terrorism. The cooperation between Spanish and French authorities enabled the detention of ETA leaders in France. Thirty women related to ETA or SEGI were arrested for terrorism-related offences.

On 4 July 2009, some of the most wanted ETA terrorists were arrested in Pau. On 19 August, three ETA members responsible for providing weapons, ammunition and explosives were arrested in Villaremberet.<sup>61</sup> The chief of ETA's military wing was ar-

rested in France and a commando was dismantled in Vitoria (Basque Region).<sup>62</sup>

Basque separatist terrorism in France, targeting the tourist sector in the Basque region in France, can be considered as residual and of low intensity. The terrorist organisations are more than ever characterised by their operational weakness. The number of militants continues to decrease. The founder of *Irrintzi*, the organisation responsible for two-thirds of the attacks in the Basque region since 2005, was arrested in December.

In Ireland, 31 individuals were arrested for offences related to separatist terrorism. The vast majority of the individuals were arrested for membership of terrorist organisations such as the CIRA, RIRA and the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), or for possession of arms and explosives.




Figure 13: Type of targets in attacks by Corsican and Basque separatist terrorists in France, and Basque separatist terrorists in Spain, 2007-2009.

61 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France.

62 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

### 6.3. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

#### ETA

Extortion continues to be the main source of income for ETA. In 2009, the organisation launched several extortion campaigns, sending letters to businessmen from the Basque region and Navarre demanding that they pay the so-called 'revolutionary tax'. In some cases, in order to increase the threat, the letters were sent to their relatives.

In July, three SEGI supporters were arrested in the Basque region for their activities as webmasters in charge of organising raffles to fund SEGI. The result of the raffles and propaganda related to SEGI were published online, on the website under investigation.<sup>63</sup>

Almost a tonne of bomb-making materials including precursors, home-made explosives, detonators and IEDs manufactured, or in the process of being assembled, were seized in a counter-terrorism operation carried out in France, where a total of 14 caches were discovered, mainly in wooded areas. The findings of this operation are evidence of change in ETA's methods of hiding its weapons and explosive materials: they prefer using several small caches disseminated in a wooded area instead of a big one, in order to minimise the impact of successful police operations. The above-mentioned police operation can be considered as a severe blow to ETA's military logistic wing.<sup>64</sup>

The discovery of a vehicle abandoned in Salamanca in February 2009, which was rented by an ETA member in Portugal, indicates that ETA uses that country, besides France, as a logistical base.<sup>65</sup>

#### PKK/KONGRA-GEL

In 2009, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL did not carry out any terrorist attacks in the Member States; there were only protests and violent incidents or riots in Germany and Austria. These were mainly related to the PKK/KONGRA-GEL's youth organisation '*Komalen Ciwan*'. Although there were no major incidents, there is evidence that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL continues to have a significant potential for violence, which may be deployed if needed.<sup>66</sup>

The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is collecting money and requesting logistical support from Turkish individuals living in Europe.<sup>67</sup> In order to reinforce its operational wing and capability in Iraq, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL relies mainly on activities such as extortion, human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling, and money laundering, raising large amounts of revenue.<sup>68</sup> House searches in Austria in February 2009 resulted in the seizure of lists of donation collections, notes on income and donation receipt books.<sup>69</sup>

#### LTTE

Contrary to previous years, no arrests of members of the LTTE were reported by Member States in 2009.

<sup>63</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

<sup>64</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

<sup>65</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Portugal, Spain.

<sup>66</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France, Germany.

<sup>67</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, Turkey.

<sup>68</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Turkey.

<sup>69</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Austria.

The LTTE's conventional forces were defeated in the military conflict in Sri Lanka in early 2009, leaving the organisation leaderless and facing a power struggle. Several large protests were staged in the UK and Belgium in the spring and summer, attracting thousands of people.<sup>70</sup>

Although the LTTE has faced considerable setbacks in Sri Lanka, its vast global network and strong control over the *Tamil Diaspora* and various Tamil associations with structures of fundraising, procurement and propaganda is still active and firmly in place. The *Tamil Diaspora* abroad is still the most important supporting element of the LTTE; the organisation has built efficient mechanisms to control Tamils living in the EU and worldwide. One of the core activities of the LTTE in the EU is the collection of funds from the *Tamil Diaspora* on a monthly basis to finance its organisation, activities and military-related procurement.

Several EU countries initiated investigations into the LTTE's financing methods in the past years. In France, a large trial took place during 2009 (see chapter 4.3, Convictions and penalties).<sup>71</sup>

#### FARC

In 2009, there were no arrests of individuals related to the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas*) for terrorism-related offences in Member States. A Swedish national was kidnapped by the FARC in Colombia in May 2007 and released on 17 March 2009.<sup>72</sup>

The FARC has identified Europe as a main area of strategic interest in its ambitions to expand its activities. Making use of its contacts in Europe, the FARC has sent representatives to some Member States. Their tasks include the dissemination of information and the creation of clandestine cells to facilitate drugs trafficking and the procurement of arms.<sup>73</sup> Uncorroborated open sources report that FARC is planning to open an office in Amsterdam, Brussels or Paris.

70 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, UK.

71 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK, Switzerland.

72 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Sweden.

73 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Colombia.

## 7. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

### KEY FINDINGS

- Continued increase in the number of terrorist attacks since 2007.
- The majority of incidents were arson attacks in 2009 while the use of IEDs dominated in 2008.
- Attacks using firearms increased in Greece (from one in 2008 to four in 2009). One police officer was killed and another was injured.
- Actions by anarchist groups are becoming more violent and sometimes well planned.
- Violent clashes between right- and left-wing groups continued.



Figure 14: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in Member States in 2009.<sup>74</sup>

### 7.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS

Spain, Greece and Italy reported a total of 40 attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups for 2009. This constitutes an increase of 43 % compared to 2008; the number of attacks more than doubled since 2007.

As in previous years, most attacks were carried out successfully and mainly targeted government and business interests.<sup>75</sup>

The majority of these attacks were arsons, reported by Spain, and caused only property damage. The percentage of IED attacks decreased from 43 % in 2008 to 20 % in 2009; the majority of these bombings occurred in Greece.

In Greece, six left-wing terrorist organisations carried out a total of 15 attacks in 2009. Attacks using firearms increased from one in 2008 to four in 2009

and can be attributed to the organisations *Epanastatikos Agonas*, *Sekta Epanastaton* and *OPLA (Organoseis Proletariakis Laikis Aftoamynas)*. They mainly target police, governmental and business interests and use firearms and grenades in their attacks. *Sekta Epanastaton* appeared for the first time in 2009 and claimed responsibility for an attack on 16 June 2009, in which a police officer was killed while on duty guarding the house of a witness involved in an investigation against *Epanastatikos Agonas*. The latter claimed responsibility for an attack on police officers on duty at the Ministry of Culture in Athens in January 2009. The attackers opened fire and threw a hand grenade, seriously injuring one officer.<sup>76</sup>

The increase in Spain from 13 attacks in 2008 to 23 in

<sup>74</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>75</sup> Governmental targets include government and police offices, and buildings of institutions. Business targets include ATM's, bank branches, private and commercial companies (oil companies, car dealers, etc).

<sup>77</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Greece.




Figure 15: Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks by target, 2007-2009.<sup>77</sup>

2009 can be attributed to anarchist groups with an important presence in the region of Cataluña. Following an internet support campaign for an imprisoned activist, attacks spread to other areas in the second half of 2009.<sup>78</sup> The majority were arson attacks targeting government and business interests; 7 out of 23 attacks failed.

Italy reported two successful arson attacks targeting a political party's head office in Rome. The attacks were part of a series of low-profile actions which occurred in Rome in 2009, claimed by the organisation *Cellule di Resistenza Proletaria*.<sup>79</sup>

## 7.2. ARRESTED SUSPECTS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

A total of 29 persons were arrested in 2009 for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in six EU Member States: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain. This is half of the number reported for 2008, when France arrested a high number of individuals linked to the dismantling of the French arm of the Turkish left-wing party DHKP-C.<sup>80</sup>

The majority of those arrested were suspected of involvement in attacks and membership of a terrorist organisation. Almost 40% were younger than 30.

In France, one left-wing activist was killed and another one severely injured while handling sodium

<sup>77</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>78</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Spain.

<sup>79</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

<sup>80</sup> TE-SAT 2009, page 33.

chlorate to manufacture an IED in a disused factory. A total of four people were arrested during the investigation.<sup>81</sup>

A lengthy investigation in Italy, which resulted in the arrest of six suspects in June 2009, revealed the existence of a Marxist-Leninist subversive organisation mainly based in Rome, Genoa and Milan. The aim of its members was to re-launch armed struggle according to the strategy pursued by the *Brigate Rosse*.

In November 2009, several Italian newspapers received a 4-page leaflet entitled 'A strategic resolution', in which readers are invited to resume armed struggle. The document was sent by a previously unknown group, *Nuclei di Azione Territoriale (Luca e Annamaria Mantini)*, thought to be inspired by the *Brigate Rosse*.

This confirms the activism of groups who are ideologically inspired by the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy.<sup>82</sup>

Greece reported a total of five arrests, all related to the terrorist organisation *Synomosia Pynon Fotias Athina-Thessaloniki*. The investigation into a bomb attack on 23 September 2009 against the residence of a senior member of the Pasok political party resulted in the arrest of four individuals. They are suspected of being behind a series of bomb attacks.<sup>83</sup>

### 7.3. EXTREMISM

In 2009, the trend of increasing activity by left-wing and anarchist extremists continued.<sup>84</sup> Germany noticed a substantial increase in criminal offences connected to left-wing and anarchist extremism, mainly property damage, with a marked increase in vehicle arsons.<sup>85</sup>

After a quiet period of two years, the FAI (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*) claimed two attacks in Italy which targeted the director of the CIE (*Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione*), and the Bocconi University in Milan.<sup>86</sup>

Traditionally, anarchist extremists support a number of key ideological themes such as anti-capitalism, anti-militarism, anti-fascism and the 'No Borders' campaign.<sup>87</sup> The UK has seen a shift in direction in some anarchist protest activity during 2009. Extremists normally associated with the anarchist movement have shown support for environmental issues.<sup>88</sup> Sweden also reported a change in focus towards climate change, house occupations and the migration issue.

Most actions by anarchist extremists are unprepared, impulsive acts committed by small groups. However, violent incidents in the French city of Poitiers on 10 October 2009 showed that these groups are also capable of leading quick and violent

81 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France.

82 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

83 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Greece.

84 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden.

85 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany.

86 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

87 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, UK.

88 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

actions of street rioting, thereby targeting the law enforcement authority and properties representing governmental and economical power. Similar tactics were observed in Belgium in two attacks against business interests.<sup>89</sup> The French and Belgian cases appear to contradict the generally acknowledged impulsive nature of anarchist activities, in that they appear to have been well prepared in advance and organised down to the minutest details of their execution.

The most active left-wing extremist group in the Czech Republic, *Antifašistická Akce*, is known to organise training camps where martial arts, street-fighting tactics and 'how to react against Police actions' are practised.<sup>90</sup>

Actions by anti-fascist groups against right-wing targets intensified in 2009.<sup>91</sup> During recent election campaigns it was observed that demonstrators of UAF (*Unite Against Fascism*) in the UK showed a greater willingness to confront right-wing activists and the police.<sup>92</sup> In Germany, a number of right-wing party candidates were violently attacked and injured, and vehicles of members or functionaries were burned.<sup>93</sup> During an anarchist campaign against right-wing political parties in Sweden, several elected politicians were physically attacked. On some occasions, these attacks were well prepared through surveillance of the targets. The ability of anarchist groups to translate violent ambitions into action seems to have grown stronger.<sup>94</sup>

89 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, France.

90 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic.

91 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Germany, UK.

92 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

93 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany.

94 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Sweden.

## 8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

### KEY FINDINGS

- Hungary reported four right-wing terrorist attacks. All other Member States reported right-wing criminal activities as extremism.<sup>95</sup>
- Individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views who act alone continue to pose a threat.
- Ethnic minorities have been targeted in a number of Member States.
- Disputes and threats among right-wing extremists consistently lead to fragmentation of this scene and the formation of splinter groups.
- The number of criminal offences committed by right-wing extremists remains high, in particular against the extreme left-wing.
- Right-wing movements have been involved in paramilitary training in Member States.

### 8.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS

In 2009, right-wing terrorists attempted four attacks in Hungary. Three of them were interrupted by the Hungarian authorities during the preparatory phase while, in the fourth case, the perpetrators abandoned their plans to commit the criminal act. All cases can be linked to the HANLA (Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army). They were planning to blow up explosives hidden in footballs placed in front of the homes of four Members of Parliament (representatives of the government party). Most of those arrested are suspected of acts of terrorism, attempted murder, the misuse of explosives or explosive devices, and the misuse of firearms or ammunition.<sup>96</sup>

### 8.2. ARRESTED SUSPECTS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In France, six people were arrested for right-wing terrorism. Three of them were arrested for racist propaganda on the internet.

In the UK, two men were arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 for their involvement with an extreme right-wing website. A house search at their addresses revealed that both were in possession of explosives and toxins. At one of the addresses a jar containing a white residue was discovered and later tested positive for Ricin. As a result of enquiries relating to this investigation, two other men were arrested in December 2009 and charged. In another criminal trial in 2009, a man received an indeterminate sentence, of at least six years, for eight terrorist offences. He was arrested in October 2008 at a railway station following a minor incident. A search of his bag found a suspected explosive device. A search of his room at his parents' house found a handwritten notebook entitled the *Waffen SS UK Members Handbook*. He is the archetypal 'lone wolf' and there is no real evidence of any associations with extreme right-wing groups, but he possessed articles expressing right-wing views. Police investigations and arrests or convictions in the UK have highlighted the fact that, at present, individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views, acting alone, pose far more of a threat than the current networks or groups.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>95</sup> The UK did not provide any quantitative data on terrorist attacks. However, a number of right-wing extremists were arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000.

<sup>96</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Hungary.

<sup>97</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

### 8.3. EXTREMISM

In 2009, ethnic minorities were targeted in a series of events in various Member States.<sup>98</sup> *Blood and Honour* continues to attract a lot of support. Right-wing extremists within the EU maintain close contact, as seen widely in the WPM (White Power Music) scene, where extremists travel around Europe for concerts. Disputes and threats among the right-wing extremists consistently lead to fragmentation of the scene and the formation of splinter groups.<sup>99</sup>

There were a number of significant events in the lead up to and during 2009 that raised the profile of right-wing extremism in the UK. An anti-Islamic extremism movement emerged during 2009 following a small but well-publicised militant demonstration by militant Muslims which resulted in significant disorder. The incident led to the formation of an anti-Islamic extremism movement predominantly organised by UK individuals associated with football hooliganism. Extraordinarily, the football groups have been able to set aside their inter-club rivalries to join together for this common purpose. They have held protests in a number of cities throughout the UK demonstrating against the perceived 'Islamification of the UK', 'Sharia Law' and 'Muslim extremists'. The protesters have since splintered and campaigned under various names including *March for England*, *Real March for England* and more recently the *English Defence League* or *Welsh Defence League*. This has quickly become a well-organised movement using established networks in locations throughout the UK. Their protests have provoked counter-demonstrations from

ANTIFA (anti-fascist) groups associated with local Muslim youths and left-wing groups such as UAF. These clashes resulted in considerable public disorder.

In June, a number of Roma families were targeted by arson attacks in South Belfast forcing them to flee their homes and to take refuge in makeshift shelters.<sup>100</sup>

In 2009, several Member States confirmed both international links between right-wing extremists and activities motivated by right-wing extremism which became evident in WPM concerts, demonstrations, processions and marches. The number of criminal offences committed by right-wing extremists against left-wing extremists remains high. Right-wing extremists targeted Jewish institutions and minority groups, while physical confrontations with dissenters were frequently accompanied by anti-Semitic slogans with the aim of humiliating victims, even in cases where they were not of Jewish faith.<sup>101</sup>

The Czech authorities arrested 41 right-wing extremists on charges of promoting movements that seek the suppression of human rights and freedoms. The criminal procedure against 33 of these extremists is ongoing. In November, in the course of this complex operation, the Czech authorities dismantled a group of right-wing extremists, called *Bílá Spravedlnost*, before it could put its plans into action. The group kept a database with the names of 300 'ideological foes' they wanted to intimidate and fight against, including 'Jews in high

<sup>98</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, UK.

<sup>99</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, Sweden, UK.

<sup>100</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

<sup>101</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany, Italy.

posts', policemen and politicians. *Bílá Spravedlnost* was also involved in organising paramilitary training camps.<sup>102</sup>

The most radical criminal act carried out by another four of these extremists in the Czech Republic was an arson attack against a Roma family in April. Four Molotov cocktails, that caused serious injury to some family members and total destruction of their house, were used to terrorise the entire Roma community.

Another example of growing segregation is the number of killings of Roma in Hungary. Since November 2008, people of this minority group were killed in nine attacks. Although four right-wing extremists were arrested for these killings in Hungary, it is not proven at this stage of the investigation whether there was a racist intention behind the serial murders. Furthermore, Hungarian authorities found that a number of extreme right-wing movements have organised paramilitary training in the country.<sup>103</sup>

The German police seized thousands of recordings of suspected neo-Nazi music in a number of raids in 2009. According to ongoing police investigations, the production sites of the right-wing extremist recordings are not in Germany but rather in countries where the production, possession and distribution of this type of music are not punishable by law. Besides their extreme right dispositions, the owners of the recordings are probably also driven by commercial interests.<sup>104</sup>

In 2009 in the Czech Republic, a new trend appeared, consisting of a change in terminology. The groups began to openly use the term 'National Socialism'. This change evokes the propagation of Nazism and harks back to the heritage of the 'Third Reich' and the Nazi dictatorship in Germany between 1933 and 1945. This tendency was noted in the propaganda, slogan banners and website presentation of the *Narodni odpor* and the *Delnicka strana*.<sup>105</sup>

102 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic.

103 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Hungary.

104 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Germany.

105 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Czech Republic.

## 9. SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

### KEY FINDINGS

- Austria and France each reported one single-issue terrorist attack; other Member States reported all ARE criminal activities as extremism.
- The ARE campaign is becoming more serious.
- IEDs and IIDs are increasingly used by ARE.
- Contributions to Europol show that criminal activities by ARE are expanding throughout Europe.
- Both SHAC and ALF extremists continue to target companies and financial institutions linked to contract animal-testing in the UK and their employees, who are often targeted at their home addresses.

### 9.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In Austria, an arson attack on the hunting lodge of the chief executive of a pharmaceutical company, which caused damage of approximately 400 000 euros, was classed as a terrorist attack. The attack was carried out using an IID consisting of a large receptacle filled with several containers of fire accelerant. The fire was triggered by woodchips using a method that has not, so far, been established. Responsibility for the attack was claimed in English on the American internet site 'Bite Back Magazine'. On this site, the MFAH (Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Sciences - Austria), claimed responsibility for the attack and uttered additional threats against chief executives of pharmaceutical companies.<sup>106</sup> The company and its chief executive have long been targets of attacks by militant animal rights extremists.

ists. Since December 2008, property owned by the company and its members of staff in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and France has been increasingly targeted.<sup>107</sup>

France reported one successful terrorist bomb attack causing material damage which was attributed to the CAV (*Comité d'Action Viticole*). This organisation is active in the south of France and campaigns against the import of foreign wines.<sup>108</sup>

### 9.2. EXTREMISM

An animal-testing company in Cambridge (UK), and businesses associated with it, continue to be the main focus of activity for ARE (Animal Rights Extremism) under the banner of SHAC (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty) and the ALF (Animal Liberation Front). ARE actions targeted research facilities, universities, circuses, farms, fast food restaurants, hunters, the pharmaceutical, food and fur industries, etc.<sup>109</sup> Unfortunately, some of the incidents were cases of mistaken identity.

In January 2009, seven leading SHAC campaigners received prison sentences of between 4 and 11 years in the UK for their part in the campaign.<sup>110</sup> There are four suspects still awaiting trial in 2010, all of whom are charged with conspiracy to blackmail. The arrests of these campaigners were followed by a sharp drop in criminal activity associated with SHAC in the UK. However, despite a much-reduced threat in Great Britain, the animal-testing company in Cambridge remains a high profile target of

<sup>106</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Austria.

<sup>107</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, France, Switzerland.

<sup>108</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: France.

<sup>109</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, UK.

<sup>110</sup> These convictions are not contributed to Eurojust as terrorist offences.

ARE internationally, with direct action resulting in serious offences being committed in the European mainland. Although ARE groups in Europe are largely autonomous, their attention is still fixed on this animal-testing company in the UK and associated companies, while their tactics mirror those of SHAC UK. Strong links between European and UK extremists are known to exist.<sup>111</sup>

In 2009, there was an increase throughout the EU in the number of criminal activities conducted by ARE and in the acts resulting in damage to properties by the use of IIDs and IEDs, compared to previous years. The IIDs and IEDs are placed under vehicles owned by companies or their employees, or at the main entrance to their homes. These actions are carried out regardless of whether or not the buildings are occupied. In Europe, ARE targeted 11 Member States, as well as Norway and Switzerland in 2009, and there are indications that some of the criminal actions were conducted in concert with ARE groups in other countries, both inside and outside the EU. Other types of criminal actions carried out by ARE are: arson, spray painting, vandalism, liberation of animals from farms or laboratories, blackmail, desecration of graves, etc.<sup>112</sup>

In the UK, SHAC also targeted a bank. This campaign ceased following the announcement that the bank had sold their shares in the Cambridge animal-testing company in May 2009.<sup>113</sup>

The threat posed by ARE to employees of the industry and the resulting feeling of fear create the risk that the industry may lose knowledge (employees), suppliers, contractors, or have difficulties in recruiting new staff.<sup>114</sup> Consequently, the financial situation of some ARE targets might be at stake.

In the Netherlands, several persons were arrested in connection with the release of 2500 minks on 15 March 2009 and in December 2009.<sup>115</sup>

In Belgium, the homes of employees of two pharmaceutical companies were targeted on several occasions in May. The offenders spray-painted graffiti tags with the initials ALF, urging their victims to break off relations with the company in the UK which uses animals for laboratory experiments. A car was also damaged by a caustic substance (acid). A few days later, bottles filled with a fire accelerant, to which a box with batteries and matches were attached, were found under the car of the director of a pharmaceutical company.<sup>116</sup> It should be noted that, in May 2009, similar incidents took place in Germany when the home of an executive member of a pharmaceutical company was damaged. There were similar incidents (burning cars, arson attack to houses, damaging cars with acid, etc) in France, Germany and Luxembourg in 2009.<sup>117</sup>

In France, ARE targeted, *inter alia*, a butcher school and the home of a pharmaceutical company's CEO

111 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, UK.

112 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, UK.

113 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: UK.

114 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: the Netherlands.

115 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: the Netherlands.

116 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium.

117 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Belgium, France, Luxembourg.

(Chief Executive Officer), both in central Paris. A car was burnt out in the parking basement of the school in an attack that was claimed by ALF. The attack on the CEO's home, where the wall of the building and the pavement in front of the entrance were plastered with graffiti, was claimed by MFAH-France. The arson attack against the clubhouse (sports facility) of another pharmaceutical company in France, with its headquarters in Switzerland, was also claimed by MFAH.

In Sweden, ALF (Swedish DBF, *Djurens Befrielsefront*) carried out a number of arson attacks: they burned down a truck that belonged to a wholesale company within the fishing industry, and set fire to the clubhouse at a dog-racing track and a hunting facility, both of which burned to the ground. In another incident, a Molotov cocktail was placed on the stairs of the residence of a steakhouse owner. An attached note warned the owner that, in the future, the bottle would be thrown through a bedroom window unless he closed down the restaurant.<sup>118</sup>

In Italy, arsonists using bottles of inflammable liquid with a trigger started a fire at some structures situated near the entrance to a park's offices. The fire, which caused considerable damage, was claimed via the inscription 'This is for the imprisoned animals, ALF'.

ALF is simply an acronym used by groups or individuals taking part in direct actions ranging from throwing stones at the shop windows of fur shops, to breaking into laboratories to rescue animals. Any actions undertaken with the objective of liberating animals or inflicting financial damage on the companies who exploit them support ALF's policy. In

practice, any group that acts following these objectives considers itself a member of the 'Front'.<sup>119</sup>

<sup>118</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Sweden.

<sup>119</sup> Contribution to the TE-SAT 2010: Italy.

## 10. TRENDS

1. The decrease in attacks that started in 2008 continued in 2009.

In 2009, six Member States reported 294 attacks. The number of fatalities increased from four to seven; all victims were government officials. Although the number of separatist attacks decreased in 2009, these attacks continue to account for the majority of terrorist incidents and fatalities. A total of 237 separatist terrorist attacks were carried out during 2009, a decrease of 40 % in comparison to 2008. As in previous years, separatist terrorist attacks were reported by France, Spain and the Republic of Ireland.

2. A number of Member States are indicating, that, despite the fact that the number of arrested suspects decreased in the last two years, the threat emanating from terrorist groups remains real and serious.

In 2009, 587 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences. Suspects of terrorist activities continued to be arrested for membership of terrorist organisations, financing of terrorism and logistical support, corroborating the enduring threat. Although an increased number of women were arrested in 2009, their numbers remain low.

3. Islamist terrorist groups are still aiming to cause mass casualties.

The attempted attack on an American airliner in December 2009 is proof of the intent and capability of Islamist terrorists to stage terrorist attacks with potentially large numbers of casualties.

4. The EU is being used as a platform to prepare and initiate terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world.

The attack on the American airliner in December 2009 was preceded by other instances of using aircraft flying from the EU to the USA. These include: the attack on Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988, which crashed above the Scottish village of Lockerbie; the attempted attack on American Airlines flight 63 by the so-called 'shoe bomber' on 22 December 2001; and the 2006 plot to blow up an aircraft travelling from the UK to the USA. Furthermore, a number of Member States are reporting the activities of individuals supporting terrorist groups that are operating outside of the EU.

5. Islamist terrorist activities are increasingly being perpetrated by self-radicalised and often self-instructed individuals, acting alone instead of in groups.

As mentioned in Member States' contributions, this development is facilitated by the availability of instruction manuals, effective propaganda and recruitment materials on the internet.

6. Weak states with ungoverned spaces, large Muslim populations, economic problems and social grievances can be breeding grounds for Islamist terrorism.

Somalia and Yemen are examples of countries that match this profile and are now facing an issue with Islamist terrorism which is further destabilising these countries. Other countries matching that profile could have similar problems in the future, presenting an increased risk to Western interests.

Nationals of EU Member States and other

Western countries risk being targeted in Muslim countries that have a significant presence of Islamist terrorist groups. Islamist terrorists are kidnapping tourists and other visitors from non-Muslim countries to finance their activities and achieve notoriety.

7. In addition to traditional means, terrorist and extremist organisations exploit all available new technologies in the fields of communication, propaganda and money transfers to facilitate their activities.

Wireless modems and portable computers give terrorist and extremist organisations access to networked data wherever they go. Internet-equipped cell phones are even more convenient for access to e-mail, instant messaging and money transfers. The internet provides terrorists with new ways of collecting intelligence and information. In an effort to emphasise the authenticity of their message, terrorist groups create online identities for their propaganda output, such as "production companies" with distinct logos and designs.

8. Western converts are increasingly being used by Islamist terrorist groups for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Native speakers have appeared in videos produced by terrorist organisations and disseminated on the internet, broadcasting messages to potential recruits in EU Member States in their own language.
9. Home-made explosives remain the type most used to carry out attacks. Increased monitoring of commercial explosives by security services and law enforcement organisations is forcing terrorist and extremist

groups to use home-made explosives instead. Some ARE attacks in 2009 carried out violent acts using a similar *modus operandi* as terrorists, e.g. using IEDs and IIDs.

10. Activities by left-wing and anarchist, right-wing and single-issue terrorist and extremist organisations are a relatively minor factor in the EU compared to Islamist and separatist terrorist activities, but are now becoming more serious. The activities of left-wing and anarchist, right-wing and single-issue terrorist groups are developing a transnational character. Violence is being increasingly used against individuals and property.
11. The security situation outside the EU continues to have an impact on terrorist activities in Member States. Member States with a military presence in conflict zones continue to be the focus of attention by Islamist terrorist groups. Radicalised EU-based Islamists have been known to travel to conflict areas to participate in armed struggle or to visit training camps. These individuals pose a risk to Member States on their return to the EU because of their acquired skills and experience, and the fact that they still may be under the influence of terrorist organisations and willing to receive instructions to provide logistical support or engage in terrorist activities.

# 11. ANNEXES

## ANNEX 1: ACRONYMS AND TRANSLATIONS

ALF	Animal Liberation Front
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANTIFA	Anti-fascist groups
Antifašistická Akce	Anti-Fascist Action
ANV	Acción Nacionalista Vasca Basque Nationalist Action
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Tanzim qa'idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-'arab
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic, Maghreb Tanzim al-qa'ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
AQSL	Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership
ARE	Animal rights extremism
Bilá Spravedlnost	White Justice
Brigate Rosse	Red Brigades
CAV	Comité d'Action Viticole, Committee for Viticultural Action
CCTF	Comité de Coordination Tamoul France Tamil Coordinating Committee France
Cellule di Resistenza Proletaria	Proletarian Resistance Cells
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIE	Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione (formerly CPT: Centro di Permanenza Temporanea), Identification and Expulsion Centre
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
Delnicka strana	Worker's Party
DHKP-C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
DBF	Djurens Befrielsefront, Animal Liberation Front
Epanastatikos Agonas	Revolutionary Struggle
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
EU	European Union
EU SITCEN	European Union Situation Centre
FAI	Federazione Anarchica Informale Informal Anarchist Federation
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FLNC	Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse National Front for the Liberation of Corsica
HANLA	Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army
IED	Improvised explosive device

IID	Improvised incendiary device
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KONGRA-GEL	Kongra Gelê Kurdistan People's Congress of Kurdistan
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFAH	Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Sciences
Nardodni odpor	National Resistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
Nuclei di Azione Territoriale (Luca e Annamaria Mantini)	Territorial Action Cells (Luca and Annamaria Mantini)
OPLA	Organoseis Proletariakis Laikis Aftoamynas Proletarian Popular Self Defence Groups
PCTV	Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas Basque Nationalist Action
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers' Party
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
Sekta Epanastaton	Revolutionaries' Sect
SHAC	Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias Athina-Thessaloniki	Conspiracy of Fire Cells Athens-Thessalonica
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TWP	Terrorism Working Party of the EU Council
UAF	Unite Against Fascism
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WPM	White power music

**ANNEX 2: EXCERPT FROM THE COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION ON COMBATING TERRORISM**

According to Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed.

**Terrorist offences are committed with the aim of:**

- seriously intimidating a population; or
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act; or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

**Terrorist offences include:**

1. attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
4. causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
6. the manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
7. the release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions, the effect of which is to endanger human life;

8. interfering with, or disrupting, the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life;

9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed above.

Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that directing a terrorist group, participating in its activities, including supplying of information or material resources, or by funding its activities, are punishable.

Article 3 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences include the following intentional acts: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment for terrorism; training for terrorism; aggravated theft; extortion; drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing certain terrorist offences. For an act as set out in paragraph 2 to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed.

According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or abetting offences referred to in the Framework Decision should also be made punishable.

### ANNEX 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU FRAMEWORK DECISION ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN THE MEMBER STATES – CHANGES IN MEMBER STATES DURING 2009

Listed below are countries where there have been changes in legislation or legislative initiatives in the fight against terrorism.

**Czech Republic:** A new Criminal Code entered into force on 1 January 2010. Terrorist offences are the subject of Article 311 of the new Criminal Code.

**Estonia:** Amendments to the Estonian Penal Code came into force on 4 June 2009. The amended provisions of Article 237, regarding funding and supporting a terrorist crime and its execution, envisage two to ten years prison sentence for individuals and a monetary fine or forced liquidation for legal persons, as well as an extended property seizure for any property gained through the crime. On 11 December 2009, the Estonian President signed the amendments to the Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prevention Act, adopted by Parliament on 26 November 2009. The amendments include: heightened attention to business relations or transactions involving a third country, or on a territory where no sufficient measures for prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing have been applied, or if that country or territory does not cooperate internationally in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing; cases in which a credit and financial institution shall apply enhanced due diligence measures upon creating a correspondent relationship with a credit or financial institution of a third country; the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in the event of suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

**Germany:** The Act on the prosecution of the preparation of serious violent acts endangering the state, which came into force on 4 August 2009, amends several important legal instruments. The amendments include several new sections in the Criminal Code, 89a and b, 91 and 138.

The first two new sections, 89a and 89b, concern the preparation of a serious violent act endangering the state and the initiation of contacts for the commission of such serious violent acts. Imprisonment for section 89a is up to 10 years; infringement of section 89b can be punished with a fine or up to three years' imprisonment. The law shall apply equally if the preparation or initiation or maintenance of contacts is undertaken in a foreign country: if the preparation, initiation or maintenance of contacts is committed outside of the Member States of the European Union, this shall only apply if it is committed by a German national or a foreign national with a centre of interest inside Germany, or if the serious violent act endangering the state as prepared is to be committed inside Germany or by, or against, a German national.

The third new section, 91, concerns directions for the commission of a serious violent act endangering the state. It provides for imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.

Anybody who learns of the commission of a criminal offence in accordance with section 89a, and who fails to duly report it to the authorities, is punishable according to new section 138 (2).

The new Act of August 2009 amends the Banking Act by including a definition of terrorist financing, and amends the Money Laundering Act and the Insurance Supervision Act accordingly.

**Luxembourg:** On 9 March 2009, Luxembourg implemented Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences.

**The Netherlands:** A legislative proposal was made in 2009 amending criminal law and criminal pro-

cedure law in relation to several subjects, including terrorism training camps. According to the bill, someone who participates at a terrorist training camp, and thus obtains knowledge on or is trained in how to commit terrorist attacks, commits a serious punishable offence. Even if such camps are situated outside of the Netherlands - if the training is aimed at committing terrorist crimes in the Netherlands, it is possible to take legal action. Instructors at terrorist training camps may also be subject to a prison term.

This proposal is connected to Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism adopted in Warsaw in May 2005, requiring Member States to establish 'training for terrorism' as a criminal offence under their domestic law. The participation and cooperation in terrorist training camps are criminal offences that carry a maximum prison sentence of eight years.

Although a part of the legislative proposal act came into force on 1 July 2009, the provisions concerning terrorist training camps need to be reviewed before entry into force.

**Poland:** New legislation connected directly with combating the financing of terrorism came into force on 22 October 2009. According to Article 165a of the Penal Code, whoever collects, transfers or offers means of payments, instruments, securities, foreign currency values, property rights, as well as other movable and immovable property, for the purpose of financing an offence of a terrorist character, shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between two and twelve years.



## ANNEX 5: ARRESTS IN 2007, 2008 AND 2009 PER MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION

Member State	Islamist			Separatist			Left-wing			Right-wing			Single-issue			Not specified			Total			
	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	
Austria	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Belgium	9	17	4	1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	22	4
Bulgaria	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
Denmark	9	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	3	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	91	78	37	315	283	255	3	37	11	0	0	0	6	0	3	1	3	5	409	402	315	
Germany	3	8	4	8	1	0	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	12	5	
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
Ireland (Republic of)	0	3	0	24	49	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31
Italy	21	9	20	0	35	0	23	7	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	52	31	
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	0	0
Romania	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Slovakia	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Spain	48	51	40	196	129	127	17	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	261	197	169
Sweden	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0
The Netherlands	4	4	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	4	2
UK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>501</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>841</b>	<b>753</b>	<b>587</b>		

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