

counter terrorism legislation. The main elements proposed in the new bill are: a possible extension of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects beyond the current limit of 28 days; a requirement for convicted terrorists to provide the police with personal information on their release from prison and to notify any changes to this information; introduction of a foreign travel order that will enable convicted terrorists to be banned from travel-

ling overseas; changes to enable post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing of adverse inferences from a refusal to say something that is later relied on in court; enhanced sentences for those convicted of terrorist related offences; putting the police counter terrorist DNA database on a sound statutory footing and making other changes to enable the full use of DNA in terrorist cases.

Annex 4: Failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 2006¹³³ and 2007 per member state and affiliation.

| Member State | Islamist | | Separatist | | Left Wing | | Right Wing | | Single Issue | Not Specified | Not Specified | Total | Total |
|-----------------|----------|----------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 |
| Austria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bulgaria | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Denmark | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Estonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | 0 | 0 | 283 | 253 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 14 | 294 | 267 |
| Germany | 1 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 20 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 2 |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 9 |
| Latvia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Poland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Romania | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Slovakia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 0 | 0 | 136 | 264 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 145 | 279 |
| Sweden | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| the Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UK | 0 | 2 | 4 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | 1 | - | 5 | 2 |
| Total | 1 | 4 | 424 | 532 | 30 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 24 | 472 | 583 |

¹³³ Excluding disputed data concerning attacks in Belgium and Greece for 2006.

Annex 5: Arrests in 2006 and 2007 per member state and affiliation

| Member State | Islamist | | Separatist | | Left Wing | | Right Wing | | Single Issue | Total | Total |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 |
| Austria | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Belgium | 1 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 10 |
| Bulgaria | - | 4 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 4 |
| Czech Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Denmark | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| Estonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | 139 | 91 | 188 | 315 | 15 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 342 | 409 |
| Germany | 11 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 15 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0 | 4 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 24 |
| Italy | 34 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 44 |
| Latvia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Malta | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Poland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Portugal | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 32 |
| Romania | - | 1 | - | 2 | - | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 3 |
| Slovakia | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 51 | 48 | 28 | 196 | 6 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 85 | 261 |
| Sweden | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| the Netherlands | 6 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 6 | 16 |
| UK | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 156 | 203 |
| Total | 257 | 201 | 226 | 548 | 52 | 48 | 15 | 44 | 0 | 706 | 1044 |

PAGINA BIANCA

OCTA 2008 EU ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means – graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or information storage and retrieval systems – without the permission of Europol.

Europol
Corporate Communications
Postbox 90850
2509 LW The Hague
The Netherlands

Phone: +31-70 302 50 00
Fax: +31-70 345 58 96
Internet: <http://www.europol.europa.eu>

© European Police Office, 2008

PAGINA BIANCA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Foreword by the Director | 5 |
| 1. Introduction | 7 |
| 2. General assessment of the Organised Crime groups | 11 |
| 2.1. Non-EU-based groups | 14 |
| 2.2. Intermediary situations | 15 |
| 2.3. EU-based groups | 16 |
| 2.4. Functionality as a defining factor of Organised Crime | 17 |
| 2.5. Trends and developments | 18 |
| 3. Criminal markets | 19 |
| 3.1. Drugs trafficking | 21 |
| 3.2. Crimes against persons | 23 |
| 3.3. Fraud | 25 |
| 3.4. Counterfeiting | 26 |
| 3.5. The horizontal dimension of the criminal markets | 28 |
| 4. The Organised Crime landscape | 31 |
| 4.1. The North-West region: The Atlantic region | 33 |
| 4.2. The North-East region: Approximating the Baltic Sea region | 36 |
| 4.3. The South-East region | 38 |
| 4.4. The South-West region: The Iberian Peninsula and beyond | 40 |
| 4.5. Nodes of attraction: Criminal hubs | 42 |
| Notes | 49 |

FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR



I am delighted to present the third European Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). The OCTA is a core product of the intelligence-led law enforcement concept and its drafting is one of Europol's top priorities.

The OCTA is, as its name suggests, a threat assessment of current and expected new trends in organised crime (OC) across the EU. The assessment is based upon existing knowledge and expertise and it is drawn up in order to enable decision-makers to take the appropriate action to counter the anticipated threat.

The OCTA marks a new approach to the way in which Europol and the Member States operate and it is a first step to a change of paradigm in policing. The OCTA fits in firmly with the aim of

'The Hague Programme' to provide a forward-looking approach to fight OC in a more proactive than re-active manner. The OCTA allows the EU to develop complementary measures to countering OC, linking those at the ministerial and political levels with those of practitioners and law enforcement agencies who operate at the front line.

The OCTA as a tool, and the ensuing Council Conclusions based on the OCTA from 2006 and 2007, have already had a significant impact on the law enforcement community throughout Europe in terms of practices and priorities. This is the case, for instance, through the European Police Chief Task Force (EPCTF/COSPOL) framework at the common EU level, the Baltic Sea Task Force, the Operational Inter-organisational Action Plan to Fight Human Trafficking in Greece (ILAEIRA), the Maritime analysis and operations centre – narcotics (MAOC-N) in Lisbon, at Europol and within the individual Member States.

A great number of people and various organisations have contributed to the production of the 2008 OCTA. This deserves to be recognised. All Member States have provided their respective contributions. Valuable contributions have also been received from other institutions at the EU-level such as ECB, EMCDDA, Eurojust, Frontex and OLAF. Additionally, a number of

third parties provided valuable assistance in building up the picture of OC as it impacts upon the EU. We are grateful to our law enforcement partners in Canada, Colombia, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and the US as well as to ICPO/Interpol and SECI for their cooperation. The novel approach taken in producing this work has also seen consultation with a number of partners from the private sector and academia and their cooperation has added significant value to the OCTA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the staff of Europol deserve recognition for their efforts


to produce this document. I appreciate and thank them for their on-going efforts in the production and development of this significant and pioneering work.

The 2008 OCTA will be another important step to raise the level of cooperation between various competent authorities in the Member States as well as with the EU institutions and agencies as such. This will contribute to further develop the common space of freedom, security and justice in the European Union.



Max-Peter Ratzel
Director of Europol

1. INTRODUCTION



PAGINA BIANCA

1. INTRODUCTION

In response to 'The Hague Programme', the first OCTA was introduced and later endorsed by the Council during their meeting on 1-2 June 2006. The OCTA, and the ensuing Council Conclusions based on the OCTA from 2006 and 2007, have already had a significant impact on law enforcement work throughout Europe. This third OCTA will provide an important platform for the evaluation of the Council Conclusions of 2006 and 2007.

The OCTA covers the EU. However, it cannot be neglected that Europe, due to its geography and its cultural, social and historical differences, is not a homogeneous structure and so may also require a regional priority setting. Therefore, although the European dimension is the prime focus, the OCTA also accounts for regional divergences. In order to enhance the understanding of events within the EU, consideration of the international arena is at times necessary.

To support decision-makers in the best possible way, the OCTA provides a well-targeted qualitative assessment of the threat from OC. The OCTA is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and non-law enforcement contributions. These include various European agencies as well as the private sector. A specific emphasis is put

on elaborating the benefits of an intensified public-private partnership. The OCTA helps to close the gap between strategic findings and operational activities. The OCTA helps to identify the highest priorities, which will then be effectively tackled with the appropriate law enforcement instruments. The OCTA suggests strategic priorities, but it needs to be realised that the OCTA itself is not detailed enough to pinpoint specific criminal investigations.


The structure of the 2008 OCTA follows the general conceptual model for the analysis, starting with an assessment of the OC groups, followed by an analysis of the criminal markets and ending with an assessment of the regional dimension of OC impacting on the EU.

The OCTA is always being enhanced. Methodological and other issues are continuously being addressed in close cooperation with the Member States to allow for the further enhancement of the OCTA. The methodology and procedures for its completion have been amended. Overall, the changes which have been introduced have all contributed to enhancing the quality of the OCTA.

The OCTA does not cover terrorism or terrorist networks.

PAGINA BIANCA

2. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS



2. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS

Organised Crime (OC) groups can be assessed by using a typology based on the OCTA indicators. This typology helps to identify specific types of OC groups in any Member State and also to assess their most threatening aspects. The typology is not a scientific statistical exercise but is created to evaluate and showcase functional differences in the OC groups.

In the 2007 OCTA, much of the analysis was focused on assessing the seven individual indicators related to the OC groups, that is:

1. The international dimension;
2. Group structures;
3. Use of legitimate business structures;
4. Specialisation;
5. Influence;
6. Use of violence;
7. Counter-measures.

This focus is built upon in the 2008 OCTA. Based on the indicators, the OC groups reported by the Member States can roughly be divided into three main categories. These are tradi-

tionally indigenous OC groups or *EU-based groups*; traditionally non-indigenous or *non-EU-based groups*; and finally the *intermediary situations* including both second generation OC groups and groups that combine aspects of both non-EU and EU-based groups.

A way of visualising the main types is represented below in Figure 1. The development of the groups along the line of the strategic centre of gravity takes into consideration how the international dimension is used by the group, what structural indications can be discerned and whether there are any apparent changes in these, where the groups' leaders and assets are placed, where and how effectively they use corruption and violence, what are the groups' capabilities to exploit legal business structures, and how well and for which specific purposes they exploit specialists and counter-measures. Another factor in defining the groups' strategic centre of gravity is to consider whether and how the groups hinge on an ethnic community of reference to facilitate their criminal activities.