

5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM

The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain reported that the general threat of an attack by Islamist terrorists on their territory increased during 2007. In France and Italy, the threat remains high.¹³ The UK has estimated the risk of an attack as highly likely.¹⁴

In addition, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal consider that the increasing activities of *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) aiming at international targets have an impact on the threat level in their member state. Italian authorities also estimate that, due to their geographical proximity to

the Maghreb, they face the risk of terrorists linked to AQIM attempting to enter the EU via Italy.

5.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, Europe saw four failed and attempted Islamist terrorist attacks. The UK experienced two failed terrorist attacks, while Denmark and Germany both reported one attempted attack each.

Failed attacks – the UK

On 29 June, two car bombs failed to explode in central London. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found in the cars, one of which was parked outside a popular night club, while the second was stationed just a short distance away. The IEDs consisted of gas cylinders, containers filled with petrol and an initiation system. Bags of nails had been placed on the gas cylinders and on the vehicle floors in order to increase the number of casualties. The UK police believe that a number of attempts were made to detonate the IEDs whilst the night-club was still open. Approximately 1,700 people were on the premises at the time.

The day after the vehicles were found, a burning car loaded with gas cylinders was driven into the Arrivals Terminal at Glasgow International airport. The gas cylinders failed to explode; a limited number of people sustained minor injuries in this failed attack. The two male perpetrators were arrested at the scene. One of the men later died in hospital from severe burn injuries, which he suffered after throwing around petrol inside the burning car.




Figure 9: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks and number of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism in member states in 2007

¹³ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Spain.

¹⁴ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

It quickly emerged that the attacks in London and Glasgow were linked. Three men were arrested and charged in relation to these attacks. One of the men was charged with withholding information about a terrorist offence. The other two are accused of conspiracy to cause explosions.¹⁵ The trial is expected to start in October 2008.

Attempted attack – Germany

Three men — a 28-year-old Turkish national and two German nationals aged 22 and 28 — were arrested on 4 September 2007, suspected of planning several coordinated bomb attacks in Germany with the aim to cause mass casualties. At the time of their arrest, the three men were in the process of making highly powerful explosives using hydrogen peroxide and military detonators. Although the targets had not yet been definitively selected, the investigation revealed that possible targets included US military facilities in Germany. Had the suspects succeeded in building the bombs, they would have had a higher explosive effect than the bombs used in the 2004 attacks in Madrid¹⁶, where 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.¹⁷

The suspects had acquired the know-how to build the bombs mainly through specialised explosives training courses in training camps in Pakistan, run by the *Islamic Jihad Union* (IJU). Instructions for building similar bombs are also available on the Internet. The IJU, which originates from Uzbekistan, was founded in March 2002 by former members of the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (IMU). It is believed to have close links to al-Qaeda.

On 11 September 2007, the IJU posted a claim in Turkish on a Turkish *jihadist* Internet site in which they referred to the arrested suspects as members of the IJU. They also claimed responsibility for the attempted attack in Germany, naming the US Air Base at Ramstein and the US and Uzbek consulates-general in Germany as the intended targets. According to the message, the aim of the attack was to force the closure of the German Air Base at Termez in Uzbekistan.¹⁸

Attempted attack – Denmark

In the so-called Glasvej case, on 4 September 2007, the Danish police arrested eight people on suspicion of planning an attack in Denmark. The arrested individuals were between 19 to 29 years of age. Two of the arrested—a Pakistani-born Danish citizen and an Afghan citizen living in Denmark—are expected to be charged with planning the attack.

The Pakistani-born main suspect is alleged to have gone through training in Pakistan. After his return to Denmark, he manufactured and tested tricycloacetone triperoxide (TATP). He also made extensive use of the Internet for various operational purposes. The police investigation revealed links between the suspects and people abroad. The trial is expected to start in summer 2008.

On 11 November 2007, police arrested an additional person in connection with the case. The individual is suspected of planning to kidnap Danish citizens abroad. Allegedly, the plan was to pressurise the Danish authorities into releasing the suspects arrested in the Glasvej case.¹⁹

5.2. Arrested Suspects

For 2007, the member states reported a total of 201 suspects arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. In 2006, the number of arrested suspects reported was 257. This decrease can mainly be explained by a 34 percent decrease in arrests in France. Despite the small number of failed and attempted terrorist attacks reported for 2007, 25 percent of all suspects were arrested for offences relating to Islamist terrorism. The number of member states which reported arrests increased from nine in 2006 to fourteen in 2007.

The majority of the arrests took place in France, Italy and Spain. As in 2006, the majority of those arrested came from North African countries, such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. France, however, also reported a high number of arrests of French nationals. In Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium and Germany, the majority of those arrested had the

¹⁵ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

¹⁶ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

¹⁷ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.

¹⁸ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

¹⁹ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.

citizenship of the country of arrest. This may indicate an increase in the number of home-grown terrorists.

As in 2006, the vast majority of the arrested suspects in the UK were in relation to Islamist terrorism. However, since these arrests were not reported as affiliated to any type of terrorism, they were not included in the statistics. For 2007, the arrests in the UK increased by 30 percent.

As in 2006, the arrested suspects originating from North Africa were often loosely affiliated with North African terrorist groups, such as the *Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group* (GICM) and *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM).

The percentage of women among all arrested suspects remains low. In 2007 fifteen women were arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. This repre-

sents seven percent of the total number of those arrested for Islamist terrorism. As in 2006, no women were arrested for planning, preparing or executing an attack. Furthermore, no women were reported arrested for recruitment or training. Three women were arrested for an offence related to propaganda.

The statistics of offences reported for 2007 include propaganda as a new category for Islamist terrorism. Six percent of the arrested were accused of offences related to the production and spreading of propaganda. At the same time, the UK had its first convictions in relation to the spreading of propaganda on the Internet. In July 2007, three men were found guilty of using the Internet to incite murder. The men had distributed films of beheadings and published bomb-making instructions as part of al-Qaeda's propaganda campaign.²⁰




Figure 10: Percentage of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism per offence in 2006 and 2007

²⁰ "Trio fuelled al-Qaeda propaganda", *BBC News*, 4 July 2007.

As in 2006, almost half of the suspects arrested in 2007— 45 percent—were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. Another 13 percent were arrested for attack-related offences, such as planning, preparing and/or executing an attack. These arrests took place in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

The average age of the arrested suspects was 33 years. Two thirds of the arrested were between 23 and 43 years old. The pattern described in TE-SAT 2007 regarding the correlation between age and type of offence continues to be observed in the data for 2007: arrested suspects aged between 31 and 40 were linked to financing of terrorism and handling of false documents to a greater extent than those under 30. Activities such as recruitment and facilitation, on the other hand, were more frequently linked to arrested suspects aged between 17 and 30. All suspects arrested in relation to the publication and spreading of propaganda were younger than 31.

The vast majority of suspects arrested for an offence relating to an attack were between 26 and 30. By contrast, suspects arrested for offences related to training were mainly found in the age category 41 to 50.

The arrests in relation to financing of Islamist terrorism decreased slightly compared to 2006. In 2007, France arrested six people suspected of providing financial support to AQIM. In Denmark, two members of the *al-Aqsa Association* in Denmark were charged with financing of terrorism. The suspects were accused of sending money to the military branch of *Hamas*. Both suspects were acquitted in the city court. The case has been appealed to the high court.²¹

The number of suspects arrested for recruitment increased in 2007. Twenty-nine individuals were arrested in four member states: Belgium, Rumania, Spain and Sweden. The majority of those arrested were suspected of recruitment for *jihād* in Iraq. One of the suspects was arrested for recruitment on behalf of AQIM.

In December, the French security services arrested one Algerian and one French national suspected of shipping material—binoculars, maps, telephones, portable computers, radios and navigating systems—to AQIM. The filming equipment was intended to be used for filming future attacks. One of the suspects planned to join the organisation on location in Algeria.²²

In May 2007, a French citizen of Algerian descent was arrested after contacting AQIM via the Internet. He had identified potential American and French military, political and civilian targets in France and Luxembourg, and made reconnaissance videos. A number of bomb-making components were found in his possession.²³

5.3. Terrorist Activities

Radicalisation and Recruitment

The member states continue to report on EU nationals and residents who are being recruited for *jihād* in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, Iraq attracted the largest number of recruits from EU member states. In Belgium, an investigation into the recruitment of suicide bombers for Iraq revealed a network of intermediaries for al-Qaeda spread across Europe and the Middle East. The investigation started in 2005 after a Belgian woman became the first European female suicide bomber in Iraq.

Routes and logistics to smuggle recruits from France, Spain and Italy to Iraq continue to be dominated by North African Islamists.²⁴ North African cells in Europe were also found to be recruiting young EU nationals for training in North or West Africa. In June 2007, three Moroccans were arrested in Spain attempting to transfer recruits to training camps in the Sahel region.²⁵

Dutch authorities reported an increasing number of Dutch nationals and residents willing to participate in *jihād* outside the EU. In the Netherlands as well as in France, the country's military participation in Afghanistan—but also

²¹ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Denmark.

²² Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

²³ "Nancy: le djihadiste avait décidé de passer à l'action", *Le Figaro*, 14 October 2007.

²⁴ "Spanish police arrest 6 suspected jihād recruiters", Associated Press, 28 May 2007.

²⁵ "Spain arrests three al Qaeda suspects in Barcelona", Reuters, 26 June 2007.

in Lebanon—is a motivating factor for the *ihadists*.²⁶

In France, police and intelligence services found increasing evidence that Somalia is becoming a new alternative destination for people willing to fight *ihad*.²⁷ In early 2007, UK authorities estimated that British passport holders fighting with the Islamists in Somalia were “in their dozens”.²⁸ There are also indications that terrorist training and planning of attacks—with a focus on the UK—is taking place in Somalia.²⁹

In the past few years, a number of terrorist groups have pledged allegiance to *al-Qaeda* and its leaders. Two groups have been confirmed as part of the organisation by its leadership: *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia* in Iraq in September 2004 (now part of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria in September 2006 (now *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*). In addition, former leading personalities of the *Egyptian Islamic Group* and the *Libyan Islamic Fighting Group* have, in 2006 and 2007 respectively, committed themselves to the ideals of *al-Qaeda*. However, the relationship between these groups and networks and the *al-Qaeda* leadership is characterised by different levels of autonomy, sophistication and motivation. Nevertheless, this expansion of the “*al-Qaeda* franchise” has the potential to constitute a threat to the EU’s security. It could provide *al-Qaeda* with access to new centres of support which it can motivate and exploit.³⁰

Over the last five years, much of the command, control and inspiration for planning attacks came from *al-Qaeda*’s remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In the UK, the plans often

included the use of young, radicalised British citizens to mount the actual attacks.³¹ The foiled attacks in Germany and Denmark in 2007 demonstrated that contacts between networks in the EU and *al-Qaeda*-affiliated groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region are not a problem for the UK alone.³²

The UK reported a significant and increasing number of suspects that are under investigation on suspicion of Islamist terrorism. At the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, approx. 250 Islamists were under investigation on charges of terrorism in the UK. Since then, there has been a major increase in numbers: from 500 people under investigation in July 2004, the figure reached 1,600 by the end of 2006.³³ In November 2007, the British Security Service was looking at no fewer than 2,000 individuals posing a direct threat to national security.³⁴

Some of these individuals, both British and foreign, were involved in planning attacks. However, a still larger proportion provides support through financing of terrorism and making ideological and military training available.³⁵

Propaganda

Terrorist propaganda aims at providing a coherent interpretation of the world which justifies terrorist activities as acts of war or self-defence. It is an important tool for attracting resources and recruits to terrorist groups and networks.

The *al-Qaeda* leadership used the year 2007 for an unprecedented public relations campaign. In September 2007, Osama bin Laden appeared in a video tape for the first time since 2004. The video

²⁶ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands, France.

²⁷ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

²⁸ “Backed by British money and men”, *The Times*, 10 January 2007.

²⁹ “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk

³⁰ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.

³³ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

³⁴ “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.

³⁵ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

was followed by several audio messages.³⁶ At the same time and throughout 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri continued to issue a great number of prepared speeches and interviews through al-Qaeda's media wing *al-Sahab Media Production Company*.

Since mid-2006, *al-Sahab* has become the exclusive label of multimedia and multilingual propaganda for al-Qaeda leading figures. The speeches published by *al-Sahab* are often accompanied by English subtitles. Where the speaker uses English, Arabic subtitles have been added. *Al-Sahab* has also started to use other languages such as Pashto and, very recently, German.

Propaganda material is also produced by supporters of Islamist terrorism who act on the Internet without necessarily being members of a particular terrorist group. Much of the material is published in several languages under the name of the *Global Islamic Media Front* (GIMF). The GIMF first appeared in 2002 and was initially only publishing material in Arabic. Today, it produces documents in various languages, including English, French and German. In 2007, the German-speaking GIMF published two videos, threatening Austria and Germany with attacks unless they pulled their troops out of Afghanistan.³⁷

The recent investigation in the UK which led to the conviction of three men for using the Internet to incite murder shows how the Internet can facilitate the *ihadists'* activities. The investigation revealed a large international network of people who jointly provided support to *ihadist* movements on a global scale without ever having met in person.³⁸

Videos and films calling on Muslims to take part in the global *ihad* continue to play a significant role

in the recruitment process. The ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia are dominant issues for al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in relation to propaganda. The increasingly sophisticated methods of promoting this agenda, in particular using the Internet and other electronic media, have been identified as factors contributing to the increasing number of Islamist terrorists.³⁹

In Bulgaria, four persons were arrested for distribution of Islamist terrorist propaganda on the Internet. Two of the arrested were female converts. The four suspects had, among other things, translated material from Chechen sites and posted it onto their website.⁴⁰

Law enforcement agencies in Luxembourg have identified a group of Islamist extremists who are radicalising young Muslims. Both self-produced videos and propaganda obtained from other groups are used for this purpose.⁴¹

In Denmark, a Moroccan-born Danish citizen was sentenced to three years and six months in prison in April 2007 for distributing Islamist terrorist propaganda with the purpose of instigating terrorism. The man owned his own publishing company which he used for disseminating terrorism propaganda.⁴²

In November 2007, the European Commission presented to the European Council a proposal to amend the 2002 Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism with a view to criminalising the use of the Internet to provide terrorist training.⁴³

Training

An increasing number of EU nationals attended training in Pakistan and were later involved in, or suspected of, terrorist offences in the EU. The

³⁶ Guido Steinberg, "The Return of al-Qaeda", SWP Comments 22, December 2007.

³⁷ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.

³⁸ "UK terrorism convictions", *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, 12 September 2007.

³⁹ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

⁴⁰ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria.

⁴¹ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Luxembourg.

⁴² Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.

⁴³ "Justice and Home Affairs: Commission adopts counter-terrorism package", Europe Information Service, 8 November 2007; "Proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism", Communication of the European Commission (COM (2007) 650 final), 6 November 2007.

majority of the arrested suspects in the foiled attacks in Germany and Denmark had received some form of training in Pakistan.⁴⁴ The trial, in 2007, of the perpetrators of the failed attack in London on 21 July 2005 revealed that they had received training both in Pakistan and in the UK.⁴⁵

In 2007, Italian police arrested three Moroccans accused of providing terrorist training at a small mosque in central Italy. The training allegedly consisted of the use of arms, explosives and toxic substances in terrorist operations. During a house search, Italian counter-terrorism police found barrels of chemicals and instructions on how to pilot a Boeing 747.⁴⁶ The suspects had contacts with the members of the GICM arrested in Belgium in 2005.⁴⁷

Logistical support

A majority of the member states continue to report on EU-based suspects providing logistical support to terrorist groups and networks based outside the EU. The logistical support generally consists of providing material, funds, and false identity documents. These types of terrorist activities are also frequent in member states which otherwise reported a general low risk from Islamist terrorism.

Although for 2007 the member states reported fewer arrests in relation to financing of terrorism than for 2006, financing activities are still frequent within the EU. Recent terrorist cases show that organisations or individuals involved in financing of terrorism use a great variety of methods to raise funds. In Italy, nine people suspected of ties with AQIM were arrested in June.⁴⁸ Allegedly, the cell's high revenues mostly originated from drug deal-

ing and counterfeiting money. Other counter-terrorism operations in Europe uncovered the use of front companies in the real estate sector, as in Spain,⁴⁹ or the transfer of funds to aid terrorist organisations, as in France⁵⁰ or Germany.⁵¹

Financing of terrorism does not only imply the transfer of money but also of material goods which, upon arrival at the final destination, can be sold and converted into money. This was noted in the investigation into a Moroccan network operating in southern Portugal and Spain. The network was involved in the theft of high value vehicles which were then shipped to North African countries and sold in order to fund local Islamist terrorist groups.⁵²

Besides financial support, European-based terrorist networks provide other logistical support to Islamist terrorists travelling to, from or within the EU. In France, Islamist terrorists were found to provide logistical support to AQIM.⁵³ Italy reported on logistical support in the form of providing false documents for terrorist operations outside Italy.

Member states, such as Finland, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, which reported a generally low threat from Islamist terrorism, nevertheless highlighted the risk that their country may be used as a logistical base for terrorists operating outside of the EU. The majority of these countries, together with Romania and Estonia, also reported on the potential risk that their countries may be used as transit countries by terrorists trying to enter other EU countries. Romania reports an increase in the number of individuals attempting to enter the country illegally from Pakistan with the aim of continuing to other member states. Pakistani individuals in Romania with links to

⁴⁴ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.

⁴⁵ "Europeans get terror training in Pakistan", *International Herald Tribune*, 10 September 2007; "Pakistan to Europe: a pipeline of terror", *Boston Globe*, 17 October 2007; "Danish intelligence said to hold pictures of terrorist suspect at training camp", *Politiken*, 18 January 2008.

⁴⁶ "Italy's underground Islamist Network", *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, 16 August 2007.

⁴⁷ "Italy holds 3 on terror charges", *Associated Press*, 21 July 2007.

⁴⁸ "Al-Qaeda-linked cell was planning attacks in Milan", *Adnkronos International*, 7 June 2007.

⁴⁹ "Detenidos dos presuntos islamistas que reinían dinero para financiar atentados", *La Vanguardia*, 25 July 2007.

⁵⁰ "13 Kurds arrested in France over terror financing", *Agence France Presse*, 5 February 2007.

⁵¹ "German prosecutors charge man founding terror group", *Associated Press*, 16 May 2007.

⁵² Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.

⁵³ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

Islamist extremism were involved in such activities. Lithuania reported an increasing number of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorism transiting the country in 2007.

5.4. Situation outside the EU

In 2007, French and Spanish and German nationals were killed in terrorist attacks outside the EU. On 2 July, eight Spanish nationals were killed in a terrorist attack in Yemen. Yemeni government officials believe that the attack was carried out by al-Qaeda.⁵⁴ French nationals were the target of two separate terrorist attacks: one in Saudi Arabia on 26 February and one in Mauritania on 24 December. Both attacks claimed four fatalities each.⁵⁵ In Mauritania, local prosecutors announced that they believed the suspected perpetrators of that attack belonged to AQIM.⁵⁶ In August 2007, three police officers working at the German Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, were killed in an attack which was claimed by the Taliban.⁵⁷

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

In 2007, AQIM further adapted its tactics and propaganda to the model of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Iraq. It committed several suicide attacks with high numbers of casualties. AQIM demonstrated the threat it poses to Europe by specifically targeting European citizens and international bodies in Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM claimed an attack which, according to its claim of responsibility, targeted the Interpol office in Algiers. French nationals in Algeria were specifically targeted and injured on 21 September when a vehicle convoy of a French company was attacked.⁵⁸ Europeans were also amongst the fatalities and casualties of AQIM's attack on UN offices in Algiers in December 2007.⁵⁹

On 29 December 2007, AQIM published a statement in which they criticised the Mauritanian

government for their support of the Dakar Rally, referring to it as a "collaboration with the Crusaders". In view of the possible threat against the event, the Dakar Rally 2008 was cancelled.

AQIM, which until 24 January 2007 was known as *the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat* (GSPC), has received massive international publicity since changing its name and adopting al-Qaeda's modus operandi. Whilst the Algerian government and France remain AQIM's principal propaganda targets, 2007 saw increased AQIM media-output identifying all Western nations as potential targets. In 2007, direct threats were made by both AQIM and al-Qaeda towards the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Both AQIM and al-Qaeda were also advocating attacks against US, French and Spanish interests in North Africa.⁶⁰

So far there has been little indication that radicalised Islamists seek to travel from Europe to join AQIM as part of the wider *jihad* against the West. Nonetheless, as indicated by the 2007 arrests in France, there is evidence to suggest that radicalised individuals may offer to act on behalf of AQIM to attack European targets.

Pakistan/Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda and affiliated pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly recognised as one of the main drivers of Islamist extremism and terrorism in the EU. In 2007, terrorism investigations in at least three countries showed links to groups in this region.

The tribal areas of Pakistan host a number of terrorist training camps operating in support of the Afghan Taliban, pro-Taliban Pakistani groups and foreign *mujahideen*. Both Germany and Denmark reported that several suspects in the attempted terrorist attacks in 2007 had received training in Pakistan.

⁵⁴ "Muere la turista española que quedó ingresada en Yemen tras el atentado", *La Vanguardia*, 2 July 2007.

⁵⁵ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

⁵⁶ "Two held over Mauritanian killings", *BBC News*, 11 January 2008.

⁵⁷ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

⁵⁸ "French open probe on Algeria attack that injured two French", *Associated Press*, 25 September 2007.

⁵⁹ "UN raises toll in Algeria bombing to 17 dead", *Associated Press*, 14 December 2007.

⁶⁰ "El 'número dos' de Al Qaeda incita otra vez a atacar a España", *El País*, 4 November 2007.

Afghan Taliban and pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan have links to the increasingly active core-structure of al-Qaeda that is currently based in the Pashtun tribal areas in western Pakistan. There it is believed to have reorganised and rebuilt its capabilities as well as its command and control functions.⁶¹

Terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan increased significantly in 2007, compared to 2006. These attacks were mainly directed at foreign troops in Afghanistan and government troops in Pakistan. In the course of 2007, Afghanistan saw an increase in the use of IEDs and suicide bombers. Statistics on terrorist attacks in Pakistan show a three-fold increase from 2006 to 2007.⁶²

In July 2007, the frequency of attacks in Pakistan more than doubled and remained high throughout the rest of the year. This shift happened virtually overnight and coincided with the storming by Pakistani security forces of the besieged complex of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, in the capital Islamabad on 11 July, during which the pro-Taliban militants inside the complex were defeated.⁶³ The same day, al-Qaeda issued a statement calling for *jihād* against the Pakistani government as a response to the siege of Lal Masjid.⁶⁴ Immediately afterwards, an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings struck the capital and other parts of the country, mainly targeting the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services.⁶⁵ Fighting escalated in the Pakistani tribal areas, especially in Waziristan, where Pashtun militants clashed with government troops as well as with Uzbek foreign fighters.⁶⁶

Afghanistan and Pakistan in general, and the Pashtun areas in particular, are of utmost importance to EU counter-terrorism. In the past, terrorist links between Pakistan and the EU were almost exclusively focused on the UK. The foiled plot in Germany, related to an Uzbek group based in the Pakistani tribal areas, and recent cases in the UK and Denmark indicate an increasingly assertive and efficient Pakistani-based command and control of Islamist terrorism in the EU.

Somalia

In 2007, leaders of militant Islamists in Somalia, as well as the leadership of al-Qaeda, renewed the call for *jihād* against Ethiopian forces in Somalia and the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. In the EU, the former spokesman of the proscribed UK group *al-Muhajiroun* posted a statement on the Internet calling followers to join the *jihād* in Somalia.⁶⁷ In January 2007, the US launched air strikes in the south of the country, targeting senior al-Qaeda operatives. This provoked agitation by the Islamist group *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* on the streets of London.⁶⁸ In Greece, the far-left militant group Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility for a rocket-propelled grenade attack against the US embassy in Athens in response to US intervention in Somalia and elsewhere.⁶⁹

The success of the Somali Islamists in 2006 attracted some foreign fighters to join, but the new calls to *jihād* likely engaged additional volunteers from abroad. More than 90 suspected foreign Islamist

⁶¹ "Intelligence counter terrorism and trust", speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.

⁶² Approx. 10 percent of the attacks are attributed to the non-Islamist Balochistan separatist movements. "Country statistics: Pakistan", *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ "The Aggression Against Lal Masjid", audio speech by Ayman al-Zawahiri, 11 July 2007.

⁶⁵ There were a total of 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 of which targeted the military and intelligence services. See: Abbas, Hassan, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan", *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, January 2008; "Suicide Attacks Spread to Islamabad", *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 4, Issue 25, 31 July 2007.

⁶⁶ Richards, Julian, "Terrorists in the Tribal Areas: Endgame for Musharraf?" Pakistan Security Research Unit, 22 September 2007; "Open borders and the militant Uzbeks of Pakistan", *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, 25 January 2008.

⁶⁷ "UK preacher in secret web call for *jihād*", *Sunday Times*, 14 January 2007.

⁶⁸ "Islamists use raid to stir up UK Somalis", *Sunday Telegraph*, 14 January 2007.

⁶⁹ "Greek militants claim US Embassy attack responsibility", *Dow Jones International News*, 25 January 2007.

insurgents were reported captured or killed during 2007; among them were five Swedish and five British nationals.⁷⁰

The Islamist insurgents employ guerrilla tactics against military targets as well as acts of terrorism against civilian targets. The frequent suicide bombings, perpetrated by both men and women, are a new phenomenon in Somalia suggesting a foreign, al-Qaeda-driven, influence from other scenes of global *jihād*.⁷¹

Iraq

The overall security situation in Iraq improved during 2007. Although ethno-sectarian violence continues to be of concern, civilian casualties and attacks with IEDs decreased. The number of attacks with IEDs fell from 1,700 in June 2007 to less than 700 in December. The number of reported security incidents is now down to the same level as in 2005. Targets of terrorist activity in Iraq include Iraqi civilians as well as foreigners employed by private businesses.

Since 2005, 14 of the 667 suicide attacks have been committed by women. Although the overall number of attacks decreased, the number of women involved in suicide attacks increased in 2007.⁷²

Kidnappings of foreign nationals in Iraq continue to be frequent. In May 2007, five British nationals were kidnapped by an Iraqi group who demanded the withdrawal of all British armed forces from Iraq.⁷³ A German national and her son were taken hostages in Iraq in 2007. While the woman was later released, her son is still missing. An Austrian national kidnapped in 2006 is also still missing. A video of this hostage was disseminated by his captors in January 2007.

Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, under the umbrella of the *Islamic State of Iraq*, remains a major and direct obstacle to peace and stability in Iraq. However, the terrorist organisation appears to face increasing opposition across Iraq from armed groups led by tribal leaders. There are strong indications that its military capabilities and its ability to fund operations have been significantly affected.⁷⁴

By the end of 2007, the majority of *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia's* leadership and many of its fighters were foreign-born. Likewise, over 90 percent of suicide bombers were foreign terrorists.⁷⁵ As the security situation improves, foreign terrorists may leave Iraq or relocate their *jihād* activities to other regions, including the EU.

5.5. Key Findings

- In 2007, the EU saw two failed and two attempted attacks related to Islamist terrorism; 201 suspects were arrested.
- The failed and attempted attacks in the member states aimed at causing indiscriminate mass casualties by means of detonating a main charge composed of home-made explosives. In two cases the suspects attempted to produce TATP.
- Manuals on how to build bombs, together with Islamist terrorist propaganda, are increasingly spread on the Internet. In 2007, al-Qaeda launched an unprecedented media campaign. Islamist terrorist propaganda is increasingly available in European languages.
- Al-Qaeda's remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan is exercising command and control on and inspiration for planning

⁷⁰ "Four Swedes arrested in Somalia", *CNN*, 20 February 2007; "Official says Western *Jihadists* killed in Somalia", *Reuters*, 3 June 2007; "Secret SAS mission to Somalia uncovers British terror cells", *Daily Mail*, 23 June 2007.

⁷¹ "Foreign Fighters Face Obstacles Joining the Somali *Jihad*", *Terrorism Focus*, 24 July 2007; "Veiled Threats", *Washington Post*, 12 August 2007.

⁷² "Increase in female bombers raises concern", *CBS News*, 4 January 2008.

⁷³ "Briton held in Iraq for 8 months is put on TV", *Times online*, 27 February 2008.

⁷⁴ "DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq", Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense, 17 January 2008.

⁷⁵ "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Update", press conference with Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Multi-National Force-Iraq's Communication Division, Baghdad, 20 January 2008.

attacks in the EU. A number of EU-nationals who attended training in Pakistan were later involved in terrorist offences in the EU.

- The member states are threatened with violence by Islamist terrorist groups outside and within the EU in an attempt to influence national policies in conflict areas.
- Although the majority of all arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism continue to be North African citizens, the member states reported a high number of arrested suspects with the nationality of the country of arrest.
- The number of persons arrested for recruitment increased. The majority of the suspects were arrested for recruiting for *jihād* in Iraq, while Somalia was reported as a new destination for *jihādists*.
- Suspects arrested in relation to financing of terrorism, handling of false documents and training are generally older than those arrested for recruitment, facilitation and the production and spreading of propaganda.
- The member states on the eastern border of the EU may be used as transit countries for terrorists in order to reach other parts of Europe.

6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

6.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, 91 percent of the attacks in the EU were claimed by, or attributed to, separatist terrorist groups. A total of 532 terrorist attacks were reported in three member states: France, Spain and Germany. Of these, 97 percent were claimed by, or attributed to, Basque and Corsican separatist terrorist groups.




Figure 11: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks and number of arrested suspects for separatist terrorism in member states in 2007

The number of casualties and fatalities caused by separatist terrorist attacks in Europe remains limited. However, Spanish law enforcement officials remain an explicit target for Basque separatist terrorism. In 2007, this was further evidenced by the deadly attack on two Guardia Civil officers in France.⁷⁶ The attack was claimed by ETA.

France saw a slight decrease in the number of attacks compared to 2006. Spain, on the other hand, reported a 95 percent increase. This can partly be explained by the end of the ceasefire between ETA and the Spanish government. In early 2007, ETA stated that, despite the attack on the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006, they still considered the unilateral ceasefire declared in March 2006 to be valid. However, on 6 June 2007, ETA publicly announced the end of the ceasefire. In 2007, ETA claimed responsibility for a total of ten attacks in Spain and one in France.

Taldes Y attacks are perpetrated in support of ETA activities by a network of individuals with links to ETA's youth organisation SEGI. *Taldes Y* attacks decreased in frequency immediately after the ceasefire of March 2006. However, during the second half of 2006, the number of attacks increased again and remained high throughout the reporting period. For 2007, the vast majority of all attacks reported by the member states in relation to Basque separatist terrorism were categorised as *Taldes Y* attacks. See figure 12.

In Spain, the vast majority of the attacks committed were arson attacks. Eighty-nine percent of all

⁷⁶ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

attacks were reported as successfully executed. Basque separatist terrorists in Spain mainly attack governmental⁷⁷ and business⁷⁸ targets. Twelve percent of the attacks were directed at critical infrastructure⁷⁹ and the vast majority of these were attributed to Taldes Y. The majority of the attacks in Spain were carried out in the Basque region.

In France, two regions were targeted by separatist terrorist groups: the Basque region and Corsica. In the Basque region, thirty-three percent of the separatist terrorist attacks targeted private property⁸⁰, a decrease compared to 2006. Forty-one percent of the attacks were directed at business

targets.⁸¹ In Corsica, fifty-five percent of separatist terrorist attacks targeted private property such as private holiday apartments. Only sixteen percent were directed towards governmental interests, a small decrease compared to 2006. See figure 13.

In Corsica, 31 percent of the attacks carried out were attributed to FLNC or FLNC UDC. Two attacks were attributed to ARMATA CORSA 1774. The remaining 154 attacks either were not claimed or could not be attributed to a particular group.

Germany reported fifteen separatist terrorist attacks for 2007. Fourteen were claimed by the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK/KONGRA-GEL). The




Figure 12: Number of Taldes Y attacks and attacks by ETA in Spain in 2006 and 2007

⁷⁷ Governmental targets in Spain include government offices, court houses, and political parties.

⁷⁸ Business targets in Spain include ATMs, bank branches, real estate agencies.

⁷⁹ Critical Infrastructure in Spain includes highways and railways.

⁸⁰ Private property includes holiday apartments and cars.

⁸¹ Business targets in France include real estate agencies and the tourist sector.

remaining attack was not claimed by PKK/KONGRA-GEL, but has been attributed to the organisation by German authorities. The attacks took place in February and March 2007. Most of them were arson attacks, directed at Turkish interests in Germany, such as Turkish travel agencies, banks and mosques in Bottrop, Dortmund and Hagen.

6.2. Arrested Suspects

For 2007, eight member states reported the arrest of a total of 548 people suspected of separatist terrorism offences. Fifty-seven percent of the arrests took place in France, followed by thirty-six percent in Spain.

The total number of suspects arrested for separatist terrorism in 2007 increased by over 100 percent compared to 2006. This is caused by an increase in arrests related to both Basque and Corsican separatist terrorism. In Spain, sixty percent of the arrested suspects were linked to ETA and nine percent to ETA's youth organisation SEGI. France reported an increase of eight percent in arrests related to Basque separatist terrorism compared to 2006. The majority of the arrested were linked to ETA. Seven percent of the arrested suspects were linked to SEGI.

In France, the increase in arrested suspects linked to Corsican separatist terrorism can be explained in part by the numerous arrests carried out after




Figure 13: Targeting of separatist terrorist groups in France and Spain in 2006 and 2007

Yvan Colonna, a prominent figure within Corsican separatist terrorism, was sentenced to imprisonment. After Colonna's conviction, the youth of the island, considering him a hero, mounted a wave of violent protests. Several of the protesters were arrested.⁸²

Twelve percent of all suspects arrested for separatist terrorism were women. For ETA the figure is eighteen percent, which is the single highest percentage for all terrorist groups in the member states, regardless of affiliation.

Suspects arrested for Basque separatist terrorism are generally younger than those arrested for Corsican separatist terrorism. Fifty-five percent of those arrested for Basque separatist terrorism in France and Spain were younger than 30 compared to only thirty-one percent under 30 for Corsican separatist terrorism. This may be explained by the fact that most reported suspects arrested relating to Basque separatist terrorism were linked to *Taldes Y* attacks.

In Spain, just over 70 percent of the suspects were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. This high percentage may be explained by a ruling of the Spanish supreme court determining that three or more acts of collaboration with a terrorist organisation automatically are to be considered as membership of a terrorist organisation. By contrast, in France, the majority of suspects arrested for Corsican separatist terrorism were arrested for attack-related offences.

In 2007, 38 persons were reported arrested in relation to PKK/KONGRA-GEL in five member states:

Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia. The majority of all suspects were arrested for attack-related offences. The arrests caused a series of protests amongst the Kurdish populations in several of these countries. Although the majority of the protests were peaceful, in some instances violence erupted, mainly directed towards Turkish interests.⁸³ In February, Belgian authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL on suspicion of financing terrorism via drug trafficking.⁸⁴

In Ireland, the number of arrested suspects went up from four in 2006 to twenty-four in 2007. The majority of the arrested suspects were members of the *Irish National Liberation Army* (INLA). The arrests were linked to an increase in criminal activity by this group in 2007. The majority of the arrested were charged with membership of an unlawful organisation.⁸⁵

French law enforcement arrested a total of 25 members of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE during 2007. All arrested suspects were men. The vast majority of the suspects were arrested on suspicion of financing terrorism through extortion. Seventy-two percent of the arrested were Sri Lankan citizens.⁸⁶ The LTTE has a vast global network of ethnic Tamils and associates in the diaspora, with structures of fundraising, procurement and propaganda firmly in place.⁸⁷ One of the core activities of the LTTE in the EU is the collection of funds from the Tamil diaspora on a monthly basis to finance military and military-related procurement.⁸⁸

⁸² Contribution to the TESAT 2008: France.

⁸³ *Zwischenbericht 2007: Entwicklungen und Analysen des Extremismus in Nordrhein Westfalen*, North Rhine-Westphalia Office for the Protection of the Constitution, September 2007.

⁸⁴ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.

⁸⁵ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.

⁸⁶ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

⁸⁷ "Funding the 'Final War': LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora", Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No. 1(C), March 2006.

⁸⁸ "Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan insurgents fund their war", *Jane's Intelligence review*, 1 August 2007.

6.3. Terrorist Activities

For the second half of 2007, Portugal reported an unusual increase in the number of ETA activities in Portugal. The activities seemed to be confined to renting vehicles that were later used in ETA operations. This may be an attempt by ETA to avoid detection from law enforcement agencies in France and Spain. Portuguese and Spanish law enforcement agencies responded by creating joint investigation teams.⁸⁹

Traditionally, ETA carries out its activities in Spain, France and, to a lesser extent, in other EU countries. France is mainly used as an operational rear base from which ETA develops its logistic means. It is also used for housing and training ETA reserve activists.

In the course of 2007, Spanish authorities noted a decrease in the use of commercial explosives in ETA-related attacks. In the past, ETA mainly used a combination of commercial explosives and home-made explosives (HMEs). Recent attacks, however, have been based mainly on HMEs.⁹⁰ This change in tactics may be the result of increased security measures taken by the French authorities to protect explosive factories, depots and explosives transportation, which prevents ETA from getting access to commercial explosives.⁹¹

In summer 2007, ETA released several versions of a recruitment video which showed some of their activities. The videos were released just after ETA had called off the ceasefire. The aim was probably to encourage young people to join ETA. This method of recruitment has rarely been seen in

the past and may indicate a new modus operandi for ETA.

Financing of terrorism by extortion is reported in relation to Corsican and Basque separatist terrorism as well as the LTTE. According to open sources, extortion is an important source of income for ETA. In 2007, Spanish media reported on several extortion campaigns directed at businessmen in the Basque region and Navarre.⁹² Fourteen of the arrests reported by France in relation to extortion were linked to Corsican separatist terrorism. The majority of the arrested suspects were members of FLNC, targeting private businesses such as real estate agents.⁹³

In Ireland, law enforcement authorities witnessed an increase in the number of terrorism-related arrests in 2007 compared to 2006. This, however, is mainly due to an increase in criminal activity by INLA. Based on capability and intent, the threat from the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) is estimated to be moderate to substantial.⁹⁴

The year 2007 saw great strides forward in the political process in Northern Ireland, including the restoration of full power to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May. An important milestone was the announcement by the nationalist party, Sinn Féin, that it would recognise and support the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and participate in policing bodies.⁹⁵ In view of this historical decision, the dissident terrorist group RIRA vowed to continue attacks against Police and British forces until a full withdrawal of troops.⁹⁶

⁸⁹ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain, Portugal.

⁹⁰ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.

⁹¹ *Evaluation of the Cosmetics and Explosives Directives: Final report (Explosives)*, submitted to DG Enterprise and Industry, European Commission, by the E E C (GHK, Technopolis), 21 September 2007.

⁹² "ETA amenaza en nuevas cartas a los empresarios con 'tomar medidas' si no pagan", *El Mundo*, 5 August 2007.

⁹³ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

⁹⁴ Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.

⁹⁵ "Power-sharing begins in Northern Ireland", *International Herald Tribune*, 8 May 2007.

⁹⁶ "Attacks on police will go on in New Year'—Real IRA", *Derry Journal*, 8 January 2008.