NATO
2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement
Analysis and
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO
·
Introduction
·
Part One: Summary of Findings
·
Part Two:
Further Analysis and Recommendations
·
Members of
the NATO Group of Experts
·
Advisers to
the Group of Experts
·
Military Advice
·
Chronology
Introduction
At their Summit in
Strasbourg/Kehl in April, 2009, Alliance leaders directed
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to convene a broadly-based group of
qualified experts to prepare the ground for a new NATO Strategic Concept. The
Group of Experts, led by its chair Madeleine K. Albright (United States)
and vice-chair Jeroen van der Veer (The Netherlands),
began work in September 2009. In line with its mandate to encourage an open
discussion of NATO’s organisation and purpose, the Group engaged in an
extensive series of seminars and consultations with scholars and officials,
civilian and military alike, from within and outside the Alliance. The Group,
which submitted an interim statement to NATO’s governing body (the North
Atlantic Council) on November 24, 2009, presents now its
final report. The document includes a summary of findings (Part One) and a more
detailed discussion of leading issues (Part Two). The analysis and
recommendations are intended to assist the Secretary General in drafting a new
Strategic Concept for submission to NATO heads of government at the November
2010 summit in Lisbon.
The Group of Experts is grateful to the
hundreds of men and women who assisted in its work, including Secretary General
Rasmussen and his planning staff (headed by Dr. Jamie Shea), the governments of
the Alliance
and its partners, seminar hosts and participants, military and civilian
advisers, and all who contributed their ideas and thoughts.
Part One:
Summary of Findings
New Perils, New Resolve
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
enters the second decade of the twenty-first century as an essential source of
stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world. Looking ahead, the Alliance has ample grounds
for confidence. The democratic principles that initially brought it together
remain valid. The Cold War rivalry that once stirred fears of nuclear
Armageddon has long since disappeared. NATO’s role in maintaining the unity,
security and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. Its status as the
globe’s most successful political-military Alliance is unchallenged.
Yet NATO’s past accomplishments provide no guarantee for the future. Between
now and 2020, it will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided
demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself
efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical,
and resources tight.
NATO needs a new Strategic Concept because the
world has changed significantly since 1999, when the current concept was
adopted. Most dramatically, the 9/11 and subsequent attacks demonstrated the
deadly connection between technology and terror, triggering a response that has
drawn NATO troops far from home, illuminated the need for timely
intelligence-sharing, and complicated planning for defence. Further, the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime is under increasing stress; incidents of
instability along Europe’s
periphery have revived historic tensions; innovative modes of gathering,
sending and storing information have brought with them new vulnerabilities; the
security implications of piracy, energy supply risks and environmental neglect
have become more evident; and a worldwide economic crisis has spawned
widespread budgetary concerns. Meanwhile, the Alliance has grown to
twenty-eight, enlarging both NATO’s capabilities and its commitments. Clearly,
the time is right to take a fresh look at the Alliance’s missions,
procedures and plans.
The development of a new Strategic Concept provides
an opportunity to introduce NATO to populations who know little about it and
who may be sceptical about the organisation’s relevance to their lives.
Although NATO is busier than it has ever been, its value is less obvious to
many than in the past. Alliance leaders must use
this opening to highlight NATO’s many contributions to international stability
and peace. Otherwise, the organisation could fail to retain the public backing
and financial support it must have to perform critical tasks well.
The new Strategic Concept must also serve as an
invocation of political will or -- to put it another way -- a renewal of vows,
on the part of each member. Threats to the interests of the Alliance come from the
outside, but the organisation’s vigour could as easily be sapped from within.
The increasing complexity of the global political environment has the potential
to gnaw away at Alliance
cohesion; economic headaches can distract attention from security needs; old
rivalries could resurface; and the possibility is real of a damaging imbalance
between the military contributions of some members and that of others. NATO
states cannot allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could
not: divide their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new
Strategic Concept must clarify both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and
what each Ally should be doing for NATO.
NATO’s Legacy of Success
The Alliance began work in
1949 when the Cold War was just underway, sharply dividing the democratic West
from a communist East. NATO’s purpose, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty,
was to protect the freedom and safety of its members. In Article 4, Allies
pledged “to consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties
is threatened.” In Article 5, members agreed “that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe
or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all.”
Until 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, NATO
ensured the unity of the West by defending against possible attack from the
communist bloc and by supporting democratic principles against totalitarian
ideologies. NATO’s resolve helped to keep the continent at peace and ultimately
to facilitate the reunification of Germany
and a new beginning for millions of people in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the 1990s, NATO’s primary goal (in
association with the European Union (EU)) was to consolidate a Europe whole and free. For the first time,
it engaged in military action, putting a halt to ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans. The Cold War’s end enabled the Alliance to establish
partnerships with former adversaries, including Russia,
and to admit new members who embraced democratic values and who could contribute
to NATO’s collective security. The result was a Europe more democratic, united, and
peaceful than it had ever been.
The turn of the century brought with it new and
varied challenges for the Alliance. In earlier
decades, NATO’s defence preparations emphasised the massing of troops to deter
or repel a cross-border attack. Today, Alliance members remain
concerned about the possibility that regional disputes or efforts at political
intimidation could undermine security along its borders. However, NATO must
also cope with hazards of a more volatile and less predictable nature --
including acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other advanced
weapons technologies, cyber attacks directed against modern communications
systems, the sabotage of energy pipelines, and the disruption of critical
maritime supply routes. Often, an effective defence against these
unconventional security threats must begin well beyond the territory of the Alliance.
Already, NATO has responded to this new reality
by assisting the government of Afghanistan
in its fight against violent extremism, combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, contributing to seaborne security
in the Mediterranean,
training and equipping Iraqi defence forces, and helping to construct more
stable societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As this list indicates,
shifting defence imperatives bring with them new needs -- for a transformation
in military capabilities, a more sophisticated approach to NATO partnerships,
more extensive security consultations, and a more streamlined and efficient
Alliance structure.
A new Strategic Concept must recognise the
urgency of further change while remaining true to the founding ideals that bind
the Alliance
together and that have earned for it a positive international reputation. This
calls for a blend of reaffirmation and renovation aimed at creating the optimum
mix of old and new.
An Enduring Foundation
In 1967, a team comparable to today’s Group of
Experts was assembled under the leadership of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre
Harmel. The Harmel report observed that “The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot
be treated in isolation from the rest of the world.” It also described NATO as
an Alliance
that is “constantly adapting itself to changing conditions” and that had two
core functions: the first to maintain the strength and solidarity required to
deter aggression and the second to pursue a more stable long term political
environment. Forty-three years later, this description still fits. NATO is an
ever-evolving part of an also-evolving international security framework; its
mission of self defence has always hinged, in part, on events beyond its
borders. The fact that NATO troops are now deployed in distant locations is not
a departure from NATO’s fundamental purpose.
The Strategic Concept adopted in 1999 conformed
to the security needs that had arisen during the first decade of the post-Cold
War era. The document set forth a host of ideas that ring as true today and
that should be reaffirmed in the 2010 Concept. These core building blocks
include, but are not limited to, the following:
·
NATO’s
central purpose is to safeguard -- by political and military means -- the
freedom and security of all its members.
·
The
Alliance
embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security
of Europe.
·
the security of all
Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all.
·
The
combined military forces of the Alliance must be able to
1) deter any potential aggression against it and 2) ensure the political
independence and territorial integrity of its members.
·
Alliance success depends
on the equitable sharing among members of roles, risks and responsibilities, as
well as benefits.
·
NATO
will make full use of its links to other countries and organisations to help
prevent and mitigate crises.
·
The
stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and
verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation
agreements support NATO’s political and military efforts to achieve its
strategic objectives.
·
In
fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to
respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful
resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.
As these assertions signify, the Alliance needs a new
Strategic Concept, but it does not require wholesale change. NATO’s fundamental
identity, as the organisation that lends muscle and spine to democratic ideals,
is constant. However, the NATO of 2020 will not be the same as the NATO of
1950, 1990, or even 2010. As the Alliance matures, it must
prepare itself to confront an array of fresh perils.
Moving Toward NATO 2020
Reaffirming NATO’s Core Commitment:
Collective Defence. NATO’s core commitment -- embodied
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty -- is unchanged, but the requirements
for fulfilling that commitment have shifted in shape. To remain credible, this
pledge to shield member states from armed aggression must be backed up not only
by basic military capabilities but also by the contingency planning, focused
exercises, force readiness, and sound logistics required to preserve the
confidence of Allies while minimizing the likelihood of miscalculation on the
part of potential adversaries.
Protecting Against Unconventional
Threats. Provided NATO stays vigilant, the
prospect of direct military attack across the borders of the Alliance is slight, at
least for the foreseeable future. We have learned, however, that in our era less
conventional threats to the Alliance could arise from
afar and still affect security at home. These dangers include attacks involving
weapons of mass destruction, terrorist strikes, and efforts to harm society
through cyber assaults or the unlawful disruption of critical supply lines. To
guard against these threats, which may or may not reach the level of an Article
5 attack, NATO must update its approach to the defence of Alliance territory while
also enhancing its ability to prevail in military operations and broader
security missions beyond its borders.
Establishing Guidelines for Operations Outside Alliance Borders. For all its assets, NATO is by no
means the sole answer to every problem affecting international security. NATO
is a regional, not a global organisation; its authority and resources are
limited and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and
countries can handle successfully. Accordingly, the new Strategic Concept
should prescribe guidelines for NATO as it makes decisions about when and where
to apply its resources outside Alliance borders.
Creating the Conditions for Success
in Afghanistan.
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan
is the largest ever attempted by the Alliance. Every Ally is
contributing to this operation and many have recently increased their
participation. NATO countries are also donating generously to the economic and
political development of the country. The Alliance is committed to
the creation of an Afghanistan
that is stable and that does not serve as a platform for international
terrorist activity; it should continue working with its partners to achieve
this strategically important objective. Looking to the future, the Allied
experience in Afghanistan
is a rich source of lessons to be learned. Many of the principles that should
be featured in the new Strategic Concept are in evidence. These include the
requirement for Alliance
cohesion, the desirability of unified command, the value of effective planning
and public diplomacy, the aptness of a comprehensive civilian/military
approach, and the need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended
period of time.
Consultations to Prevent or Manage
Crises. Given the changing character and
growing variety of dangers to the security of member states, the Allies should
make more creative and regular use of the consultations authorized by Article
4. These consultations, which highlight the Alliance’s function as a
political community, can be important both for preventing and managing crises
and need not await an imminent Article 5 threat. Indeed, consultations are
singularly well-suited to the review of unconventional dangers and to
situations that might require an emergency international response. Article 4
provides an opportunity to share information, promote a convergence of views,
avoid unpleasant surprises, and clear a path for successful action -- whether
that action is of a diplomatic, precautionary, remedial, or coercive nature.
A New Era of Partnerships.
The new Strategic Concept must recognize that, as NATO moves toward 2020, it
will generally not operate alone. Partnerships, in all their diversity, will
occupy a central place in the daily work of the Alliance. To make the most
of this reality, NATO must strive to clarify and deepen relations with key
partners, to establish new relationships where appropriate, to expand the range
of partnership activities, and to understand that each partner and partnership
must be dealt with on its own terms.
Participating in a Comprehensive
Approach to Complex Problems. Healthy
partnerships provide an opening for NATO to pursue solutions to complex
problems that affect its security; in most instances, the preferred method will
be a comprehensive approach that combines military and civilian elements. NATO
is strong and versatile but it is by no means well-suited to every task. Other
organisations, national governments and nongovernmental entities can lead the
way toward such vital goals as economic reconstruction, political
reconciliation, improved governance, and the strengthening of civil society.
Depending on the needs in any particular case, NATO may serve as the principal
organiser of a collaborative effort, or as a source of specialized assistance,
or in some other complementary role.
Engaging with Russia.
The NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a means for fostering security in
the Euro-Atlantic region; the Alliance remains dedicated
to that goal. The principal forum for communication through the Alliance has been the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC). This venue -- which has not always been adequately
employed -- was designed to provide the means for preventing crises, analyzing
events, broaching ideas, and agreeing on joint actions to deal with mutual
concerns. Although the Alliance neither poses a
military threat to Russia,
nor considers Russia
a military threat to the Alliance, doubts persist
on both sides about the intentions and policies of the other.
Consistent with the NATO-Russia Founding Act,
the new Strategic Concept should reaffirm NATO’s desire to help build a
cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order which includes security cooperation
with Russia.
Bearing this principle in mind, NATO should pursue a policy of engagement with Russia
while reassuring all Allies that their security and interests will be defended.
To this end, the Alliance should demonstrate its commitment to the NRC (and
invite Russia to do the same) by focusing on opportunities for pragmatic
collaboration in pursuit of such shared interests as nuclear non-proliferation,
arms control, counter-terrorism, missile defence, effective crisis management,
peace operations, maritime security, and the fight against trafficking in
illegal drugs.
Maintaining the Open Door.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s membership has expanded from sixteen
members to twenty-eight. This open door policy has been an engine of progress
towards a Europe
whole and free and has contributed much to the collective security of Alliance members. Further
enlargement has been under consideration in the western Balkans and with
respect to Georgia
and Ukraine.
Consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles for
enlargement, the process for states that have expressed their desire for
membership should move forward as each state fulfils the requirements for
membership. It should go without saying that NATO is an entirely voluntary
organisation.
New Capabilities for a New Era
(Military Transformation and Reform).
NATO’s military and political commitments will mean little unless matched by
capabilities. The Strategic Concept should include a clear statement of defence
priorities and be accompanied by an agreed set of essential new or improved
capabilities and reforms. NATO forces must have the capacity to defend Alliance territory,
undertake demanding missions at strategic distance, contribute to a more secure
international environment, and respond to unpredictable contingencies when and
where that is required. Thus, there is a continuing need to transform NATO
forces from the powerful but static posture of the Cold War into a posture that
is more flexible, mobile, and versatile. With resources stretched thin in
almost every NATO capital, the Alliance must also make a
firm commitment to smarter spending through a variety of efficiency and reform
measures.
Nuclear Weapons Policy: Solidarity in Pursuit
of Peace. As long as nuclear weapons exist,
NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with
widely shared responsibility for deployment and operational support, at the
minimum level required by the prevailing security environment. Any change in
this policy, including in the geographic distribution of NATO nuclear
deployments in Europe,
should be made, as with other major decisions, by the Alliance as a whole.
The Strategic Concept should also affirm NATO’s
full support for efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
ensure that nuclear materials are handled in a safe and secure manner, and make
progress towards a world free from the fear of nuclear war. In this spirit, the
Alliance
has dramatically curtailed the types and numbers of sub-strategic nuclear
forces in Europe
and should welcome consultations with Russia
in pursuit of increased transparency and further mutual reductions.
The New Mission of Missile Defence.
Defending against the threat of a possible ballistic missile attack from Iran
has given birth to what has become, for NATO, an essential military mission.
President Obama’s decision to deploy a phased adaptive missile defence will
provide more effective, rapid and reliable coverage than earlier proposals. It
also puts missile defence fully within a NATO context, with participation open
to all Allies and all Allies to be protected. Missile defence is most effective
when it is a joint enterprise and so cooperation throughout the Alliance and between NATO
and its partners (especially Russia)
is highly desirable.
Responding to the Rising Danger of
Cyber Attacks. NATO must accelerate efforts to
respond to the danger of cyber attacks by protecting its own communications and
command systems, helping Allies to improve their ability to prevent and recover
from attacks, and developing an array of cyber defence capabilities aimed at
effective detection and deterrence.
Implementing Reforms to Create a
More Agile Alliance.
The Strategic Concept should authorize and encourage the Secretary General to
move ahead with a farreaching agenda of administrative and other reforms aimed
at producing an Alliance that is leaner, better able to make timely decisions,
and more efficient and cost-effective.
Telling NATO’s Story.
As Allies prepare a new Strategic Concept, they should bear in mind how such a
document will be read not only within the Euro-Atlantic community but in every
region. NATO populations should be reminded that the Alliance serves their
interests through the security it provides; people outside NATO should know
that the organisation and its partners are working each day to build a safer
world.
Vision and Purpose
Compared to its first decades, NATO between
2010 and 2020 is likely to appear less often on the centre stage of global
affairs. Instead, it will be cast in a variety of roles, sometimes as a leader,
at other times in a supporting capacity sharing the spotlight with partners and
friends. All the while, it will need to keep a wary eye on dangers that could
arise close to home, while maintaining a farsighted focus on how to respond to
perils that might emerge at distant locations. For the Alliance of the 1960’s,
defence and détente were two sides of the same coin. For NATO 2020, the twin
imperative is assured security for all its members and dynamic engagement
beyond the treaty area to minimize threats.
To succeed, NATO must have the sustained
commitment and united effort of its members. A seat at NATO’s table is not an
entitlement but an ongoing responsibility that each Ally must meet. Together,
the Alliance
must summon the resources needed to back its obligations with capabilities so
that the full range of threats to its security are not only contained but also
defeated or deterred.
Looking to the future, we know that global and
regional risks must naturally command NATO’s attention, but that these
impermanent worries must never be allowed to define the organisation. In 1949,
NATO members came together not because of the forces they feared, but because
of their faith in each other and in the democratic values they embraced. In the
years since, Allied leaders have learned that their Alliance must constantly
adapt to the demands of political and technological change, but they have also
learned what must not change. NATO’s Strategic Concept must begin and end with
NATO’s founding ideals.
Part Two:
Further Analysis and Recommendations
Chapter 1: The Security Environment
Background
Through its policies and actions, NATO has
helped to forge for itself a zone of security, peace, and relative prosperity
in a world that is more tumultuous and uncertain than when, in 1999, the
previous Strategic Concept was adopted. The Alliance remains a
cornerstone of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region thanks to its political
cohesion, commitment to mutual defence, and wide-ranging capabilities. Over the
past two decades, it has successfully integrated twelve new members from
Central and Eastern Europe,
developed vital new partnerships, and taken on a number of missions that
contribute daily to its own security and to that of the world.
It is difficult to offer detailed predictions
about the next ten years. This should not be surprising. Even during the
relatively rigid conditions of the Cold War, unforeseen events of major
geopolitical import took place. In the current day, uncertainty is magnified by
such factors as:
·
The
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
·
The
ambitions of international terrorist groups;
·
The
persistence of corrosive regional, national, ethnic, and religious rivalries;
·
The
world’s increased reliance on potentially vulnerable information systems;
·
The
competition for petroleum and other strategic resources (thereby highlighting
the importance of maritime security);
·
Demographic
changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, hunger, illegal
immigration, and pandemic disease; and
·
The
accumulating consequences of environmental degradation, including climate
change.
Analysis
Despite the hectic pace and fluidity of modern
life, sources of stability do exist. NATO, of course, is one such source but so
is the vast network of economic and political connections that link the major
world powers. Some of the global institutions that were established in previous
decades may be showing signs of age, but they still provide the means for
resolving international disputes in harmony with the rule of law. Although the
spread of nuclear weapons is a growing worry, prominent international leaders
profess their determination to confront it. Emerging global powers such as China,
India
and Brazil
are asserting their rising influence in a peaceful manner. As NATO plans for
the hazards of a new decade, it can do so with knowledge that its desire to
live in concord with others is widely (if not universally) shared. There should
be no question that our future is filled with dangers both known and unknown,
but we should neither sell short nor take lightly the foundation for further
progress that our predecessors have created.
Global Trends.
Between now and 2020, the international security environment will change in
ways both predictable and unforeseen. Certainly, the forces that come under the
general heading of globalization can be counted upon to intensify. This will result
in a rapid, if uneven, growth in cross-border flows of goods, services, people,
technology, ideas, customs, crime, and weapons. This deepening interdependence
will bring the world ever closer but not necessarily make populations more
inclined to live in peace. Globalization has shown a tendency to empower some
while marginalizing others, and has at times heightened the combustible tension
between individual and group identity. Although it contributes to a steady rise
in shared economic interests between and among countries, globalization
provides no sure remedy for international suspicions and rivalry.
From a security standpoint, the most salient
aspect of our era is that events in one part of the world are far more likely
than in the past to have repercussions elsewhere. Anarchy in one country can
create an opportunity for terrorists to find a safe haven from which to operate
across any border. A nation that evades global norms and gets away with it
creates a precedent that others might follow. A cyber attack that leads to
chaos in one city may inspire copy-cat criminals in another. Due to the reach
of modern media, even terrorist groups and pirate bands now have public
relations specialists and NATO, when and wherever it acts (or fails to act),
will do so with a global audience.
With the Cold War long since ended, NATO must
find its place within a less centralized and more complicated international
order. Its new role will be influenced by the emergence of specific threats
from a diverse spectrum of possibilities. Such threats may be directed at the territory of Allies
or at their citizens, economic lifelines, infrastructure, troops, and even
their values. These dangers could come in the form of conventional attacks or
provocative statements intended to serve as a means of political blackmail.
They could arrive in forms with which we are familiar, or in hybrid variations
that combine, for example, the stealth of a terrorist group with the power
normally associated with a nation-state -- including purchased or purloined
weapons of mass destruction.
Because of its visibility and power, NATO may
well be called upon to respond to challenges that do not directly affect its
security but that still matter to its citizens and that will contribute to the Alliance’s international
standing. These challenges could include the humanitarian consequences of a
failed state, the devastation caused by a natural disaster, or the dangers
posed by genocide or other massive violations of human rights.
Less predictable is the possibility that
research breakthroughs will transform the technological battlefield. Allies and
partners should be alert for potentially disruptive developments in such
dynamic areas as information and communications technology, cognitive and
biological sciences, robotics, and nanotechnology. The most destructive periods
of history tend to be those when the means of aggression have gained the upper
hand in the art of waging war.
Regional Trends.
NATO and the EU remain the central pillars of stability and cooperation in the
Euro-Atlantic region. This area of the world is hardly free of problems, but
the likelihood of military conflict -- whether international or civil -- is
relatively low. Lingering grievances do persist in the Caucasus and Balkans, however, and these
will demand sustained international attention. Cooperation within the region
will also be essential to deal with transnational aggravations that include
trafficking in arms, drugs, and humans. Leaders are reminded, as well, of the
potential for any part of the world to produce its share of home-grown
terrorists.
Because of Russia’s
size and stature, it will inevitably play a prominent role in shaping the
Euro-Atlantic security environment. On the positive side, Russia has shown an
increased willingness to support the air and land transport of supplies to NATO
forces in Afghanistan, has engaged in productive strategic arms control
negotiations with the United States, and has expressed strong opposition to
terrorism, piracy, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons states.
Experience teaches, however, that Russian and NATO leaders do not always view
the same set of facts in the same way. Leaders in Moscow have expressed
concerns about past and prospective NATO enlargement, while Allies have voiced
concerns about possible attempts by Russia
to engage in acts of political or economic intimidation. This combination of
shared interests and strained feelings argues for a policy of active and
constructive engagement both on NATO’s part and Russia’s.
The Strategic Concept can be instrumental in
unifying the Allies’ views on Russia,
clarifying NATO’s intentions towards Moscow, and laying the
groundwork for more substantive cooperation. Because Russia’s
future policies toward NATO remain difficult to predict, the Allies must pursue
the goal of cooperation while also guarding against the possibility that Russia
could decide to move in a more adversarial direction.
Several Central Asian governments have welcomed
and supported NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan
as a contributor to regional stability. Obviously, the sustained insurgency in
that country has implications far beyond its borders, beginning with
neighbouring Pakistan
-- which faces a serious and possibly growing terrorist threat of its own. The
future direction of these two countries will do much to determine whether the
danger posed by al-Qa’ida and its allies wanes over time. The evidence to date
is that popular support for these terrorist organisations is low but that so,
too, is public confidence in governments within the region. Thus, political
reform and improved governance could be major contributors to a healthier
security climate throughout Central Asia.
If these changes do not materialize, the region will pose severe dangers both
for those who live in it and for those who do not.
In the Middle East, three significant and interrelated
trends will continue to affect Alliance security: 1)
ongoing extremist violence; 2) simmering Arab-Israeli tensions; and 3) the
policies of the government of Iran,
including its unwillingness to comply with UN Security Council resolutions
related to its nuclear programme. Iran’s
efforts to enrich nuclear fuel, develop nuclear
weapons designs, and stockpile long-range ballistic missiles could create a
major Article 5 threat to the Alliance in this decade.
In addition, Iran’s
conventional weapons programmes, especially its anti-ship cruise missiles,
raise concerns about the security of critical maritime trading routes. Given
the abundant international diplomatic activity focused on Iran
and the obscurity of Teheran’s intentions, it is unclear whether the
difficulties posed by Iran
will multiply or diminish in the years ahead. NATO should do all it can to
encourage the latter possibility, while preparing itself for the former.
In the Asia-Pacific, the major powers, which
include Japan,
the Republic of Korea,
China,
India,
and Australia,
all view regional stability as in their interests and are generally supportive
of international norms. The two primary sources of instability are longstanding
-- the rivalry between India
and Pakistan,
and the dangerous government of the People’s Republic of North Korea
(DPRK). The DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme warrants particular attention.
Africa has made important economic gains
in recent years accompanied by considerable progress in dealing with chronic
plagues of civil strife, disease, and ineffective government. A number of
serious trouble spots remain, however, including most prominently the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Somalia
and Sudan.
Although leaders in the region are determined to cope with their own problems
through the African Union, Allies may receive requests for assistance with
respect to peacekeeping missions, counter-terrorism activities, and military
training.
The area of Latin America and the Caribbean, like North America, has its share of challenges with
crime being among the more prominent. The Organization of American States is
the principal regional body for both continents. Thus, with the possible
exception of a humanitarian emergency, it is hard to foresee direct NATO
involvement in this region.
Conclusions:
·
Conventional
military aggression against the Alliance or its members is
unlikely but the possibility cannot be ignored.
·
The
most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional. Three
in particular stand out: 1) an attack by ballistic missile (whether or not
nuclear-armed); 2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber
assaults of varying degrees of severity. A host of other threats also pose a
risk, including disruptions to energy and maritime supply lines, the harmful
consequences of global climate change, and financial crisis.
·
The
danger posed by unconventional threats has obvious implications for NATO
preparedness, including its definition of security, its conception of what
constitutes an Article 5 attack, its strategy for deterrence, its need for
military transformation, its ability to make decisions rapidly, and its
reliance for help on countries and organisations from outside the Alliance.
Chapter 2: Core Tasks
Background
NATO’s overriding purpose, set out in the North
Atlantic Treaty, is “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and
civilisation” of its members. The treaty signatories proposed to achieve this
objective by uniting “their efforts for collective defence and for the
preservation of peace and security.” These actions have always required that
the Alliance
perform certain core tasks the nature of which has evolved in keeping with
alterations in the international security landscape. In the past two decades,
as threats to the Euro-Atlantic region have grown more mobile and diverse, NATO
has assumed new and broader missions that could hardly have been foreseen in
1949. However, these missions are fully consistent with the original objective
of safeguarding the freedom of Alliance members.
Analysis and Recommendations
It is vital that Allies agree on what their
core tasks are and on the need to maintain the capabilities required to fulfil
them. NATO today is more active than at any previous time, yet its role in
providing security is less obvious to many than it was during the Cold War. The
new Strategic Concept offers an opportunity for reconciling differences of
perspective and for dealing with novel situations. To this end, a fresh
iteration of the core tasks of the Alliance is a necessary
first step.
Recommendation:
1. The Group of Experts recommends that
the 2010 Strategic Concept should highlight the following quartet of core
tasks:
First, the Alliance must maintain the
ability to deter and defend member states against any threat of aggression.
This commitment, embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should be
reaffirmed in unmistakable terms. At the same time, NATO planners must
recognize that the potential sources of Article 5 threats have broadened and
now include dangers that could arise either inside or outside the Euro-Atlantic
region. NATO must be prepared to defend against (and deter) such threats
regardless of their point of origin.
There is, of course, nothing ambiguous about a
cross border military assault by the combined armed forces of a hostile
country. However, there may well be doubts about whether an unconventional
danger -- such as a cyber attack or evidence that terrorists are planning a
strike -- triggers the collective defence mechanisms of Article 5. In the
event, this will have to be determined by the NAC based on the nature, source,
scope, and other aspects of the particular security challenge. For the purposes
of planning, NATO should assume that serious threats will in fact materialize;
preparations for detection, deterrence and response should be calibrated
accordingly. These preparations, which should encompass adequate military
capabilities, appropriate training exercises, information gathering, and
strategic assessments, must correspond to the full range of potential Article 5
threats.
NATO’s second core task should be to contribute
to the broader security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Just as a homeowner
has an interest in the safety of his or her neighbourhood, so NATO has reason
to be concerned about stability throughout the region of which it is a part.
Four decades ago, NATO’s Harmel Report determined that “the ultimate political
purpose of the Alliance
is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security
guarantees.” After the lifting of the Iron Curtain, NATO embraced the goal of
building a Europe
whole, free, and at peace. Over the past twenty years, leaders from both within
and outside the Alliance
have made extensive progress towards that objective. The kind of security that Western Europe has enjoyed for the past half
century has been extended to Central and Eastern Europe. However, the job of constructing a
fully stable order within Europe
is not yet complete.
NATO operates as an important pillar of
Euro-Atlantic security. In so doing, it functions neither in
isolation from other organisations nor as a dominating force. The new
Strategic Concept must identify NATO’s appropriate role as a defender of its
own interests and as a contributor to peace in every part of the region. The Alliance’s close
cooperation in the Balkans with the EU, the UN and the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a prime example of how NATO can
collaborate with other institutions in order to advance the wellbeing of people
throughout the continent.
A number of elements come together in the
performance of this core task, including NATO’s partnerships with countries and
organisations, and its support for -- and adherence to -- the principles that
provide a framework for how governments in the region should act toward one
another and toward their own citizens. These principles, which can be traced
back to the Helsinki Accords (1975), find their present form in the Charter for
European Security signed in Istanbul (1999). NATO also
contributes to stability through its open door policy, which has provided
important incentives within Europe
for democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for human
rights. In addition, NATO’s diplomatic efforts with Russia,
Ukraine,
Georgia
and the other countries of the Caucasus,
and other nonmember states show that nations do not have to be part of the Alliance to join with NATO
on projects that benefit all.
NATO’s third core task is to serve as a
transatlantic means for security consultations and crisis management along the
entire continuum of issues facing the Alliance. As the only
contractual link between North America
and Europe,
NATO remains the essential venue for these functions and for fulfilling the
common security and defence commitments of its members. This task reflects both
the political and military dimensions of the Alliance and merits more
attention in light of the diversity of today’s security threats and the
wide-ranging perspective of the organisation’s current membership. After all,
when the last Strategic Concept was written, the Alliance had far fewer
members with shorelines on the Adriatic,
Black and BalticSeas.
The Alliance has an interest
in protecting global lifelines that sustain modern societies and in promoting
security and stability well beyond its immediate borders. That mission will in
all likelihood be carried out in cooperation with its partners. Even though
NATO’s military tools are not always perfectly suited to address such
challenges, Article 4 can provide a vital mechanism for identifying areas of
common concern, devising an appropriate response, and coordinating NATO actions
with partner organisations and states. To this end, the Alliance must further
improve its crisis management capabilities, including the capacity to identify
and to assess emerging risks, reassure member states, and undertake crisis
response operations within, along, or beyond its borders.
Finally, as will become evident in the next
chapter, the Group of Experts believes that enhancing the scope and management
of partnerships has grown sufficiently important that it should be categorized
as NATO’s fourth core task, even though it represents less an end in itself
than the means by which vital goals may be accomplished.
Chapter 3: Partnerships
Background
The passing years have created the need for a
NATO of greater flexibility and reach, causing the Alliance to turn more
often to partners for help in responding to threats and in making the most
effective use of its resources. Productive relationships with other countries
and organisations enable NATO to be more vigilant, better prepared, and smarter
in what it does. Although NATO’s formal partnership arrangements began in Europe, they have since spread to
encompass the Mediterranean
and Middle East.
In addition, some countries participate in NATO missions but do not fall within
a formal partnership structure; these are categorized as operational partners.
In future missions, as now in Afghanistan, the
Alliance may well function as one part of a broad network of security providers
in which various international actors combine to take a comprehensive approach
to the solution of a particular problem. This conception of teamwork should not
be misunderstood. Some have interpreted the reference to “comprehensive” as a
desire on NATO’s part to assert a dominant global position or to put civilian
organisations under military control. This is not the case: the comprehensive
approach is not about hierarchy but about recognising that security has
military, political, economic and social dimensions. It follows, therefore,
that building security will often require working with an effective mix of partners
to piece together the diverse elements of a single shared strategy. Depending
on the specific circumstances, NATO will play either a leading or a
complementary role. (Chapter five includes recommendations for improving NATO’s
capacity to contribute to a comprehensive approach.)
Analysis and Recommendations
NATO’s first round of partnerships was aimed
primarily at facilitating the entry of new members into the Alliance. A dozen new
Allies later, that function has begun to diminish as other purposes have
increased. A second generation of partnerships focused on adding capabilities
for missions in such places as the Balkans and Afghanistan.
A shift in thinking is needed now to obtain the maximum value from NATO’s
increasingly diverse and vital array of ties to organisations and governments.
In this context, the NAC’s recent decision to establish a single committee to
manage all partnerships is a welcome one. The new Strategic Concept can help to
guide that panel by recognizing that Alliance partnerships have
diverse origins, serve varied purposes, and respond to different expectations.
Each must be dealt with on its own terms; however, all have the potential to
increase in value through continued adaptation and appropriate change.
Recommendation:
1. While strengthening organisational
partnerships, NATO should examine whether its arrangements with countries and
groups of countries can be improved by one or more of the following means:
o
Drafting
a new or revised overall partnership agreement;
o
Expanding
the list of partnership activities;
o
Allowing
for greater differentiation among partners in their relationships with NATO;
o
Introducing
new agenda items, especially those that might lead to operational or diplomatic
cooperation on specific projects; and
o
Modifying
procedures in order to encourage the freest possible exchange of ideas
Before recommending such measures, NATO should
consult closely with all of the partners involved.
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
The PfP and the EAPC provide the framework for NATO’s cooperation with partners
in Europe
and Eurasia.
The former, established in 1994, has been the principal means for forging
security links, while the EAPC was created several years later to provide a
parallel political dialogue. Although the PfP is widely judged a success, the
EAPC has not been used to its fullest potential. The Council was designed to
enable NATO to conduct consultations with partner countries on political and
security issues, but many participants complain that EAPC discussions are
overly stilted and formal.
Recommendation:
1. NATO should strengthen routine and
crisis consultations with EAPC partners as provided for under Paragraph 8 of
the PfP framework document.
Partnership with the EU.
The EU is a unique and essential partner to NATO. The two institutions have a
largely overlapping membership, and these common member states have only one
set of forces and one set of taxpayers. Although NATO and the EU have devised
detailed mechanisms for cooperation, these have not always worked as well as
hoped. Still, expertise and capabilities that countries develop for the EU are
frequently employed in NATO missions and vice versa. By definition, the 24
members have shared interests and so work side-by-side in virtually every
theatre in which NATO operates. Looking to the past, the two institutions have
learned many of the same lessons; looking to the future, they see a common set
of problems.
Full complementarity between NATO and the EU
will be essential if the Allies are to forge a comprehensive and cost-effective
approach to security when both are involved in a stabilisation mission. Better
cooperation can also be helpful in addressing unconventional threats such as
terrorism, cyber-attacks, and energy vulnerabilities. The EU will often have
more relevant expertise than NATO in countering the non-military aspects of
such dangers, even though the line between military and non-military threats is
becoming blurred. It should be noted, however, that full complementarity is
only possible if non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members are accorded the
same degree of transparency and involvement when joint activities are
conducted.
Recommendations:
1. The new Strategic Concept should
recognise that the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon is designed, among other purposes, to
strengthen Europe’s
military capabilities and command structures. Allies should welcome this
development and use the Strategic Concept to affirm NATO’s desire for a truly
comprehensive partnership with the EU, one that is cost-effective, that is
based on the principle of reciprocity and that encompasses the entire range of
the institutions’ mutual activities.
2. In its contacts with the EU, NATO
leaders should avoid the trap of categorising all threats and responsibilities
as distinctly “military” or “non-military.” Instead, they should nurture the
habit of thinking of these issues as developing along a continuum. Many
situations will require a response that includes both forceful and non-coercive
elements; NATO, the EU, and others should bring to bear the capabilities that
add the most value in finding a solution. Accordingly, NATO should seek to
agree with EU leaders on a plan for regular joint participation in meetings,
fuller communications between military staffs, and more extensive coordination
with respect to crisis management, threat assessments, and sharing assets.
3. NATO and EU leaders should do
everything possible to prevent disagreements from interfering with effective
cooperation between the two organisations.
Partnership with the UN.
NATO’s partnership with the UN is also a central one due to the role played by
that body within the world system and by the Allies’ pledge of faith (invoked
in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) “in the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.” The Security Council’s mandate -- to
safeguard international security and peace -- meshes well with the commitment
of NATO members to “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the
preservation of peace and security.” It is clearly in NATO’s interests to
support the UN and to help strengthen its capacity to perform the many missions
assigned to it by the global community.
NATO and the UN have worked together in a
number of conflict zones, with the Alliance providing
operational support and security so that the UN can move ahead on
reconstruction, development, and governance-building. Although their
partnership dates back more than a decade -- and while NATO and the UN signed a
framework agreement in 2008 which has improved practical cooperation in some
cases -- problems remain. UN personnel have been disappointed, on occasion,
with the level of security and support that NATO provides. NATO tends to wait
until a mission begins before starting to coordinate with the UN. When in
theatre, the two institutions sometimes engage in disputes over their
respective responsibilities.
Recommendations:
1. In a world of global threats,
security depends increasingly on a rule-based international order. One of
NATO’s priorities, therefore, should be to strengthen the ability of the United
Nations to fulfil its responsibilities.
2. When NATO and the UN are both
operating in an area, the Alliance should do its
best, if requested, to provide security for UN civilian personnel. Without a
minimum level of security, the UN (and other NATO partners) will be unable to
operate; without partners, NATO is often unable to meet its objectives. The
earlier the need for coordination is identified, the quicker joint planning can
be done and the more likely it is that a mutually satisfactory security
arrangement can be established.
3. NATO and the UN should improve their
institutional links. A NATO liaison office at the UN would allow Alliance leaders to engage
more easily with the Secretariat and with UN members. Additional forms of
cooperation should be explored including participation in each other’s training
and exercise activities.
4. Coordination between the UN and NATO
can prove crucial in the event of genocide, other massive violations of human
rights, or humanitarian emergency. The Strategic Concept should make clear that
NATO is willing to consider requests from the UN to take appropriate action in
such circumstances (possibly in support of other regional organisations),
provided the NAC agrees to the mission and resources are available to carry it
out.
5. NATO should work with the UN to
respond positively to Security Council Resolution 1325, concerning the role of
women in security and peace.
Partnership with the OSCE.
NATO’s relationship with the OSCE is different and more intimate than it is
with most other international organisations. NATO was a co-founder of the
original Helsinki Process and played a significant role in lending substance to
the OSCE’s politico-military dimension. The OSCE, in turn, is busy building
democratic institutions in countries that do or may aspire to NATO membership,
thus reinforcing NATO’s own desire to encourage political stability and good
governance in every corner of Europe.
Recommendations:
1. NATO should make full use of the
OSCE’s toolbox of training resources and expert advice in “soft security;”
these are areas that can complement NATO’s “hard security” tools.
2. The Alliance should actively
pursue, under the framework of the OSCE, the negotiation of conventional arms
control and confidence-building measures.
3. The Allies should also reflect on
how the OSCE, a community rooted in democratic values and freely accepted
commitments, can complement NATO’s own partnerships in building understanding
of and support for the Alliance’s activities.
Partnership with Russia.On the list of NATO partners, Russia
is in its own category. The framework for partnership was spelled out in the
1997 Founding Act and the 2002 Declaration signed in Rome. Both documents
express a commitment to identify and to pursue opportunities for joint action
based on mutual interests and the understanding that security in the
Euro-Atlantic region is indivisible. Cooperation is pledged in, among other
areas, counter-terrorism, crisis management, arms control and
non-proliferation, theatre missile defence, and responding to new threats. The
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) provides the forum for consultation, transparency,
consensus-building, and making and implementing decisions.
NATO members, when asked, may vary in their
descriptions of Russia
while still seeing eye to eye on their prescriptions for engagement with that
country. For reasons of history, geography, and recent events, some countries
are more sceptical than others about the Russian government’s commitment to a
positive relationship. The fact that the NRC was not used to prevent the 2008
crisis in Georgia
is unsettling, as is Moscow’s
oft-expressed wariness about NATO’s intentions. Russia
has sent conflicting signals about its openness to further cooperation with
NATO, and its proposals for an alternative security order in Europe seem designed in part to constrain
NATO’s activities.
Although NATO members view Russia
from diverse perspectives, the Alliance is united in its
desire to engage with the leaders of that country in order to prevent harmful
misunderstandings and to identify and to pursue shared goals. The Alliance does not consider
any country to be its enemy; however, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the
security of any of its member states were to be threatened.
The fact that NATO is a defensive Alliance and that Russia’s
2010 military doctrine is characterized by its authors as “strictly defensive”
in nature provides a good starting point for cooperation. So, too, does the
NATO-Russia joint commitment, expressed in the Founding Act, to create “in Europe a common space of security and
stability, without dividing lines and spheres of influence limiting the
sovereignty of any state.”
Recommendations:
1. The new Strategic Concept should endorse
a policy that combines reassurance for all Alliance members and
constructive re-engagement with Russia.
2. The Strategic Concept should
underscore NATO’s desire for a qualitatively better relationship with Russia
based on shared interests, mutual confidence, transparency and predictability.
From the Alliance’s
perspective, the door to cooperation at all levels is and will remain open.
3. The Allies should work with Russia
to ensure an agenda for the NRC that responds in a frank and forward-looking
way to the security concerns of both sides, and that
identifies specific areas for joint action. The currently ongoing assessment of
common threats and challenges is a helpful step. The two sides should also
strive to enhance cooperation under the 2008 NRC Action Plan on Terrorism and
to coordinate with other regional organisations.
Partnership with Georgia and Ukraine.Georgia
and Ukraine
have tailored partnership structures in the form of the NATO-Ukraine and
NATO-Georgia Commissions. Channels of communication are excellent and both
countries have contributed as partners to NATO missions. For geographic
reasons, the two are touched by issues of longstanding regional concern
including ethnic disputes and energy insecurity. One of the major failures of
NATO’s partnership structure was the 2008 conflict between Russia
and Georgia,
in which two Alliance
partners engaged in hostilities over issues that remain unresolved.
Recommendations:
1. The Allies should make regular use
of the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia commissions to discuss mutual security
concerns and to foster practical cooperation, including on defence reforms. The
clearer NATO articulates its position to the partners and the more accurately
it can assess their perceptions, the more adept the Allies will be at defusing
crises and building trust.
2. The Allies should also employ NATO’s
crisis management mechanisms, in association with the partnership commissions,
to assess and monitor security developments affecting these two countries.
NATO’s Partnerships in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
The area encompassing North Africa
and the Middle East
has long been among the globe’s most strategically important regions. Its
future development will affect NATO’s interests in nuclear non-proliferation,
counter-terrorism, energy security and a peaceful international order. In light
of these interests, the Alliance is engaged in
this vast and varied region through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the
more recent Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
Mediterranean Dialogue.
Begun in 1994, the MD includes seven nations from the Mediterranean region. The
Dialogue provides a framework for confidence building, transparency and
cooperation. Although it is the only functioning region-wide security
initiative, its accomplishments to date are modest. The Dialogue lacks a
founding document of the type developed for other NATO partnerships. Potential
areas of common interest include weapons proliferation and missile defence. The
present MD formula remains workable, but should be flexible enough to allow any
country that desires to deepen its partnership with NATO to do so.
NATO is strongly supportive of efforts to
negotiate a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians, but does
not play an active diplomatic role. The Alliance has, however,
expressed a willingness to assist in implementing an agreement should one be
reached, provided that is requested by the parties and authorized by the UN
Security Council.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
The ICI, launched in 2004, aims to contribute to long term global and regional
security by offering countries in the broader Middle East bilateral security cooperation with
NATO. The initiative is open to all countries in the region who
support its goals, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Although potentially valuable, the ICI has been
held back by a lack of common strategic vision and by rivalries among the
partners and some Allies. Nonetheless, like the MD, the ICI is helping to build
needed security relationships and to open channels for regular dialogue. Each
partnership is also an instrument for changing perceptions, which is helpful
because populations in the region are not always fully or fairly informed about
either NATO or the West more generally.
Recommendations:
1. NATO should approach its relations
with countries in the Mediterranean
and Middle East
with strategic patience. The MD and ICI are still relatively new and the
political discussion and practical cooperation they provide can enhancemutual
understanding, contribute to stability, and improve NATO’s image in the region.
One way to increase the mutual value of the MD and ICI to the Alliance might be to
pursue an agreed statement of shared interests based on new and broader
concepts of security, taking into account conventional and unconventional
dangers, as well as political, economic, social and cultural issues.
2. The Allies should be open to
transparent consultations with its MD and ICI partners on the implications of a
possible nuclear breakout by Iran.
3. NATO should be ready to assist in
implementing a peace agreement between Israel
and the Palestinians consistent with the conditions that have been established
Partners Across the
Globe. NATO now has important operational partners
from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, some of whom have been key contributors to
Allied missions. Australia,
in fact, contributes more troops to Afghanistan
than half the NATO Allies, New Zealand
is also a significant contributor, the Republic of Korea has pledged to
deploy a sizable contingent, and Japan
has committed billions of dollars to the reconstruction efforts there. These
democracies are not only partners of need, but also partners of values -- even
though they do not participate within a formal framework for dialogue such as
that provided by the EAPC. Afghanistan
and Pakistan,
whose cooperation is crucial to the success of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) are also outside any formal
structure for dialogue with NATO.
NATO does not necessarily require a formal
partnership in order to maintain a productive working dialogue with other
countries and organisations. It does need to maintain an active diplomatic
presence in order to take advantage of opportunities for collaboration when
they arise. For example, the People’s Republic of China
has participated alongside units from Allied countries in the course of UN
peace operations and in anti-piracy patrols around the Gulf of Aden. Countries in Central and South Asia have a major stake in maintaining
stability in their region. Members of the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have shown an interest
in working cooperatively with other multinational entities. India,
Indonesia,
and the leading democracies of Africa
and Latin America
share with NATO a commitment to global peace and the rule of law
Recommendations:
1. NATO should do more to deepen its
partnerships with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region by expanding the
list of shared activities while preserving the ability of individual partners
to form tailored co-operative relationships with the Alliance.
2. The Allies agreed in Istanbul in 2004 to expand
the access of operational partners to information and planning and has since made
some progress in this regard. The Strategic Concept should go further and
outline ways to give NATO’s operational partners a regular and meaningful voice
in shaping strategy and decisions on missions to which they contribute.
3. NATO should explore the possibility
of new regional subgroups if there is interest among countries in doing so.
Another, and perhaps preferable, alternative is for NATO to forge more formal
ties to such bodies as the African Union, the Organization of American States,
the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Any such relationship should be based
on the principles of equality, mutual trust, and mutual benefit.
Chapter 4: Political and Organisational Issues
Background
Since 1999, the Alliance has almost
doubled in size, confronted a number of new dangers, engaged in operations more
distant and complex than any previously attempted, lived through a severe
international economic crisis, and established political dialogues and
partnerships that extend far beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. Not surprisingly,
these rapid changes have been accompanied by considerable internal strain. The
new Strategic Concept allows the Alliance to take stock of
recent events and to search for a fresh consensus on issues that are central to
the future management and direction of the organisation. These issues
include:
·
Lessons of Afghanistan
·
Guidelines
for missions outside Alliance
borders
·
Administrative reforms
·
Decision-making procedures
·
Open Door Policy
·
NATO’s
role in conventional arms control
Analysis and Recommendations
Lessons of Afghanistan.
NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in August 2003. Since then, the operation has
grown from 5000 to roughly 100,000 troops, coming from forty-six countries,
including all NATO members. Its mission is to assist the Afghan Government in
exercising and extending its authority for the purpose of stabilizing the
country and fostering peaceful reconstruction and development. To these ends,
it carries out military operations and helps to train and assist the Afghan
National Army and Police. Although ISAF has achieved much, its experience has
led to concerns within the Alliance about unity of
command, restrictions (or caveats) placed on the troops contributed by some
Allies, and questions about tactics and goals. The mission has also suffered
setbacks due to incidents involving civilian casualties, which NATO commanders
have pledged to minimize.
ISAF is, because of its size and duration, an
extraordinary operation. It was also unanticipated. In light of the complex and
unpredictable security climate likely to prevail through the coming decade, it
is not possible to rule out NATO’s future participation in similar (although
hopefully less extended) stabilisation missions. The experience in Afghanistan
thus provides for NATO a valuable list of lessons learned. Many of the
principles that should be included in the new Strategic Concept are present.
Most obvious is the importance of being able to deploy military units tailored
to specific and sustained operations at a distance from Alliance borders. Other
lessons include:
·
To
the maximum feasible extent, NATO’s military forces should operate under a
unified chain of command.
·
Allies
should minimize the national caveats that they attach when contributing troops
to Alliance
operations; any caveats that are imposed should be clearly and explicitly
stated and their impact carefully evaluated during force generation and
operational planning.
·
NATO’s
mission in Afghanistan
has been damaged in the past by its failure to communicate its intentions
clearly and by incidents and accidents involving civilian casualties. Recent
restrictions on close air support and artillery fire implemented by the ISAF
Commander are helping to reduce this problem, but the need to shield civilians
must continue to be stressed in training and in the field.
·
Prisoners
and detainees should be treated in accordance with the principles of
international law. Any other policy leads to unfavourable political
consequences, loss of moral credibility, harm to Alliance cohesion, and
increased danger to NATO forces.
·
Stability
in Afghanistan
will not come through military means alone. As in other counter-insurgency
situations, a primary objective is to create a comprehensive civilian-military
approach that enables the local governing structure to earn the trust and
loyalty of the local population. For NATO, this requires the ability to work
closely with partner organisations to align priorities and to make the best
possible use of available resources. It also places a premium on helping host
nation security forces to improve their own ability to maintain order and to
protect non-combatants from harm.
Guidelines for Missions Outside
Alliance Borders. For all its assets, NATO is by no
means the sole answer to every problem affecting international security. NATO
is a regional, not a global organisation; its financial resources are limited
and subject to other priorities; and it has no desire to take on missions that
other institutions and countries can be counted upon to handle. Accordingly,
the new Strategic Concept should prescribe guidelines for the Alliance as it makes
decisions about when and where to apply resources beyond its borders. Because
every situation is unique, NATO decision-making can only be made on a
case-by-case basis. However, deliberations within the NAC should give weight to
such factors as:
·
the
extent and imminence of danger to Alliance members;
·
the
exhaustion or apparent ineffectiveness of alternative steps;
·
the
ability and willingness of NATO members to provide the means required for
success;
·
the
involvement of partners in helping to ensure an effective and timely remedy to
the problem at hand;
·
the
collateral impact on other NATO missions and needs;
·
the
degree of domestic and international public support;
·
conformity with
international law; and
·
the foreseeable
consequences of inaction.
In the future as in the past, NATO leaders
should bear in mind two cautions: NATO’s commitments should never exceed what
the Alliance
can do; but what NATO can do should never be outpaced by NATO’s security needs.
The Alliance
cannot be so ambitious that it takes on jobs that it is unprepared to perform,
but neither can it be so lethargic that it fails to prepare itself for
necessary tasks.
Accordingly, the Strategic Concept should
include a clear statement of defence priorities. These begin with the ability
to defend Alliance
territory, but include the capacity to undertake demanding missions at
strategic distance, help shape the international security landscape, and
respond to unpredictable contingencies when and where that is required. NATO’s
official Level of Ambition was set out in 2006; there is no need to modify
those benchmarks, although the definition of mission could be broadened to
include new requirements for homeland security, including cyber security.
It is a truism that NATO cannot succeed without
the support of its members. Similarly, NATO missions will not go well for long
unless they are understood and embraced by the populations of NATO countries.
Such backing cannot be taken for granted. The more open NATO leaders are in
their deliberations, and the more clearly they explain the specific goals and
rationale for NATO participation in any operation, the more likely it is that
the Alliance
will be able to attract the level of popular and parliamentary support it must
have to fulfil its missions.
Recommendations:
1. The Strategic Concept should include
a set of guidelines for informing NATO decision-making with respect to
undertaking new missions or responsibilities.
2. NATO should maintain a level of
preparedness and operational tempo that responds to the security needs of its
members, thus avoiding the danger of over-reach on one extreme and complacency
on the other.
3. Through transparency and effective
public communications, the Alliance must strive to
attract and maintain public and legislative backing for its operations.
Administrative Reforms.As NATO has grown, so has its
structure, including the number of its committees, the size of its staff, and
the cost of doing routine business. The Secretary General has identified
internal reform as a priority and Allies have given him a clear mandate to act.
Recommendations:
1. The Strategic Concept should endorse
a far-reaching agenda of reforms. This agenda should include -- but not be
restricted to -- streamlining the international Secretariat, reviewing
financial rules, reducing headquarters operating costs, and shrinking the
number of committees and agencies.
2. The Secretary General should have
added authority to implement his reform agenda.
3. The Allies should establish
quantitative targets for savings in various categories of administrative costs
and should ensure that savings realized through the reform process are
reinvested in NATO’s readiness and operational capabilities.
Decision-making procedures.
There is an inherent tension between a multimember organisation that works by
consensus and a military/political Alliance operating in a
fluid and fast-paced security environment. This tension has not been diminished
by NATO’s larger membership or by the proliferation of its committees. In 2009,
the Secretary General put forward some initial ideas for streamlining the
decision-making process. The challenge for Alliance leaders will be
to identify further steps that do not, in themselves, become a source of
division. The consensus rule has always been a fundamental principle in NATO
and Allies are strongly attached to its preservation. However, the need to
achieve agreement among twenty-eight states (and more in the future) can prove
arduous, sometimes leading to delays that serve no constructive purpose. In
addition, the Alliance
needs to prepare for situations where rapid (indeed almost instantaneous)
decision-making may be required.
Recommendations:
1. In his proposals for administrative
reform, the Secretary General is encouraged to include further proposals for
streamlining the decision-making process. These proposals should: 1) recognize
that any departure from the consensus principle must be approved by the NAC; 2)
preserve the consensus rule for the most important decisions such as those
involving Article 5 commitments, budgets, new missions, or new members; 3)
identify means on less vital questions for Allies to register concerns short of
a veto; and 4) establish the principle that the implementation of decisions
arrived at by consensus should not be delayed by efforts to review those
decisions at lower levels before they are carried out.
2. The Alliance should consider
giving the Secretary General or NATO military leaders certain pre-delegated
authorities, based on agreed rules of engagement, to respond in an emergency
situation such as a missile or cyber attack.
Open Door Policy.
Since its founding in 1949, NATO has increased in size from a dozen members to
twenty-eight. This open door policy was authorized by Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty which provides that the “Parties may, by unanimous agreement,
invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede”
to membership in the Alliance. Since 1995, the process of enlargement has been
guided by certain principles, including the following:
·
Democratic
values and full support for NATO’s political vision within the candidate
country;
·
The
implementation of any necessary military reforms in order to achieve NATO
standards with respect to professionalism and to ensure civilian control over
the armed forces;
·
The
fair treatment of minority populations;
·
The
peaceful resolution of domestic and international disputes;
·
Domestic
political support for NATO membership; and
·
The
overall ability of the candidate to contribute to the security of the Alliance and the Euro-Atlantic
region.
Recommendation:
1. The new Strategic Concept should
reaffirm NATO’s open door policy, including the principles listed above.
NATO’s role in conventional arms control
policy. NATO members have a major stake in
arms control, but the Alliance as an entity has
only a limited formal role. In the past, it has debated developments with a
particular impact on European security, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty of 1987 (even though actual negotiations were conducted
bilaterally between the United States
and the Soviet Union).
More significantly, the Allies were directly involved in negotiating and
signing the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
In recent years, the CFE process has stalled
and is now in danger of crumbling. This is regrettable because the CFE has led
in the past to the destruction of tens of thousands of tanks, armoured
vehicles, and artillery pieces, while increasing predictability and
transparency throughout the region.
Recommendation:
1. The Strategic Concept should
underline NATO’s commitment to a robust and stabilizing conventional arms
control regime in Europe,
based on the principles of mutual transparency, restraint, and host-nation
consent for the stationing of foreign forces. With this goal in mind, the Alliance should support
the revival of the CFE process and express a willingness to engage in
constructive dialogue with all CFE states.
Chapter 5: Alliance Forces and Capabilities
Background
NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept included a
section on “Guidelines for the Alliance’s Forces” which
established goals for transforming capabilities to meet the challenges of a new
century. The document called for a well-trained and equipped force and command
structure able to provide collective defence, respond rapidly to emergencies,
and engage in complex joint operations beyond Allied territory. At the same
summit in Washington,
leaders approved a separate Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to address
five broad NATO force needs: 1) Mobility and Deployability, 2) Sustainability
and Logistics, 3) Effective Engagement, 4) Survivability, and 5) Interoperable
Communications. Although necessary and timely, the DCI also proved to be too
broad in focus. Over the next decade, subsequent capabilities initiatives and
summit declarations provided additional guidance to NATO members and defence
planners.
Guidance in the past decade.
At its 2002 summit in Prague, Allies began to
adapt to the changed security situation generated by the 9/11 attacks and to
the prospect of helping to restore stability to Afghanistan.
The Alliance approved a plan to augment the DCI by developing improved
capabilities in eight defence categories, established Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) to steer the development of those capabilities, and
created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to “move [forces] quickly to wherever
needed.”
At the Riga summit in 2006, Alliance leaders adopted
the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which set out the framework and
priorities for all Alliance
capability issues, planning disciplines, and intelligence for the foreseeable
future. Among its requirements was that NATO members
develop national land forces that were at least 40 percent deployable and 8
percent deployable on a sustainable basis. (These targets were later raised to
50 percent and 10 percent.)
In 2009, at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit, NATO
agreed to a “Declaration of Alliance Security,” which emphasised implementation
of the CPG and envisioned a multinational headquarters for special operations
forces.
Military transformation: a work in progress.
The results of these initiatives and summit directives have been mixed. Due in
the main to limited resources, NATO’s military forces have moved only slowly to
pursue agreed guidelines. Thus, a significant distance still separates
potential missions and available capabilities. Much of the progress that has
taken place towards military transformation has been driven by operational
requirements in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
ISAF operations in particular have underlined the need for forces that are
deployable and sustainable, for common approaches to counter-insurgency
operations, and for interoperable command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.
The primary limiting factor hindering military
transformation has been the lack of European defence spending and investment.
Today, only six of twenty-six European Allies spend 2 percent or more of GDP on
these purposes; only about a dozen have met goals for making military forces
deployable and sustainable. The Alliance benchmark of 20
percent of military spending allocated to investment has been achieved by less
than half of NATO nations (though the trend is slowly improving). The gap is
especially large between U.S.
capabilities and the rest of NATO, an imbalance that if left unchecked could
undermine Alliance
cohesion. Contributing to the problem is the fact that, in the past twenty
years, European defence spending has been consumed disproportionately by personnel
and operational costs. As a result, European national forces generally do not
have nearly enough transformed forces.
Analysis and Recommendations
The new Strategic Concept should provide
direction for the further transformation of NATO’s defence capabilities. Given
the nature of the modern security environment and constraints on fiscal
resources, NATO will need a flexible, deployable, networked, and sustainable
military force posture that can meet the full range of Alliance responsibilities
at an affordable cost. These responsibilities include the deterrence of
aggression, the defence of Alliance territory,
undertaking demanding missions at strategic distance, and preparing for a wide
range of lesser contingencies. The new Strategic Concept should update the
guidelines established in the 1999 Concept and be accompanied by an agreed set
of priority capabilities and military reforms to be endorsed by Alliance
leaders at the Lisbon Summit.
NATO’s Military Missions.
In the coming decade, NATO will have four central interrelated military
missions; these missions will complement the core tasks outlined in Chapter
Two. They are:
·
Deter,
prevent and defend against any threat of aggression in order to ensure the
political independence and territorial integrity of every NATO member in
accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
·
Cooperate
with partners and civilian institutions to protect the treaty area against a
full range of unconventional security challenges.
·
Deploy
and sustain expeditionary capabilities for military operations beyond the
treaty area when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect
the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members.
·
Help
to shape a more stable and peaceful international security environment by
enhancing partner interoperability, providing military and police training,
coordinating military assistance, and cooperating with the governments of key
countries.
Conventional Defence Capabilities.
If NATO is to fulfil these four missions successfully, it must halt the
precipitous decline in national defence spending, implement new reforms and
efficiencies, and set priorities for future capabilities. Important steps need
to be taken at the Lisbon
summit on all three counts. The Secretary General has already undertaken
significant reform efforts; these are well worthy of encouragement and support.
In addition, prior to Lisbon, clear priorities
for capabilities requirements need to be prepared for approval by Alliance leaders. Defence
priorities include those related to Article 5 needs and to the goal of military
transformation.
Recommendation:
1. The new Strategic Concept should address, in
addition to other priorities, the following conventional defence needs:
·
Provide reassurance on Article 5 commitment.
Assuring Allies with regard to Article 5 requires refreshing and maintaining
essential skills and capabilities. The Alliance has developed
adequate military readiness criteria to meet Article 5 commitments but it
should do more to guarantee its readiness in practice. This will require better
contingency planning, preparations for crisis management, equipment
assessments, and appropriate military exercises. Such exercises should not be
provocative, should be announced in advance, and should be open to observers
from neighbouring countries.
·
Achieve deployability and sustainability goals.
Forces offered to NATO by members or partners for any mission within or beyond
NATO territory should be both deployable and sustainable. To this end, Allies
should restructure more of their forces away from traditional fixed territorial
defence missions. Deployability also requires strategic lift, which is in short
supply, although the C-17 consortium is a step in the right direction. Creating
a NATO Deployment Agency is an idea that has merit and should be explored. Such
an agency could take responsibility for consolidating all aspects of Alliance preparations for
rapid deployment.
·
Broaden the role of the NATO Response Force.
The NRF should be prepared to undertake Article 5 as well as non-Article 5
missions and should be a central participant when Article 5 exercises are
conducted.
·
Capitalize on commonality between Article 5 and expeditionary missions.
NATO needs to be prepared for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. To
achieve both goals efficiently, it should review the two mission sets -- which
are neither entirely identical nor wholly different -- for areas of
commonality. The core similarity is that both missions require well-prepared
forces and support assets. The core difference is that a major combat operation
in Europe
against a serious adversary is inherently different from involvement by an
expeditionary force in a stabilisation operation in a distant state. To be
ready for both, NATO must take full advantage of overlaps between the two.
·
Understand C4ISR as NATO’s operational glue.
C4ISR capabilities provide the operational sinew binding NATO and national
forces together into an interoperable, agile, and cohesive whole. They should
be a high priority for future investment by members as well as by NATO itself.
Allies should invest first in compliance with the latest NATO CIS architectures
and ISR platform standards. Likewise, NATO should ensure the same architectural
standards are met and maintained across its command structure. Allies and
partners should emphasise investment in national systems at the tactical and
operational levels that will tie into NATO’s strategic-operational networks.
·
Strengthen Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities.
Much has already been done to bring together the SOF capabilities of members
and partners, including the establishment of the NATO Special Operations
Headquarters. This body is developing common training and doctrine as well as
enhancing intelligence sharing. More can be done to sharpen NATO’s ability to
make use of these expeditionary capabilities. In keeping with the
Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration, the NAC should consider designating NATO
Special Operations Headquarters as a full component command.
·
Upgrade Allied Command Transformation. ACT
needs a bolder mandate, greater authorities, and more resources. It should
champion the development of both transformational capabilities and new
efficiency measures. It should also take full charge of NATO lessons learned,
doctrine, training and education programmes.
·
Transform NATO Education and Training.
Led by ACT, NATO should exploit the information revolution by establishing a
process of continual learning for military and civilian personnel. People are
NATO’s foremost asset and up-to-date knowledge is an essential attribute for
its people. Modern educational tools, including distance learning, exchanges,
and emergency simulations can burnish operational and strategic skills. To the
extent possible, these programmes should include personnel from partner
countries and organisations.
·
Enhance maritime situational awareness.
A new level of secure maritime situational awareness is called for by changing
risks around the periphery of NATO and in the High North, Gulf, Indian Ocean and other areas. NATO should
harmonize investments in such surveillance platforms as unmanned aerial
vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft, land-based radars, surface and subsurface
vessels, and robotic systems. NATO should also agree on specific surveillance
mission areas that underpin Article 5, such as those related to illegal attacks
on shipping, WMD proliferation and terrorist activities.
Reforms and efficiencies.
If NATO is to keep pace with evolving threats, it must improve its capabilities
more rapidly than it has. The challenge of catching up is aggravated by a less
than favourable economic climate. The best and most realistic way to close the
gap is through a commitment to efficiency measures and other reforms. The
economic and military logic behind such reforms is clear, yet nations may still
be reluctant to undertake them. Leadership is required.
Recommendation:
1.
A
balanced package of reform and efficiency proposals should be developed by the
Secretary General in time for presentation to the heads of government at the Lisbon summit. As
part of this package, NATO should encourage:
o
new,
truly multinational formations with unified command and control, interdependent
logistics and integrated civilian-military components;
o
new
informal pooling arrangements, especially for lift;
o
increased
NATO common funding and interoperability for C4ISR;
o
common approaches to
logistics;
o
the
further evolution and coordination of national specialisation and niche
capabilities;
o
exploration
of opportunities for additional multinational procurement programs;
o
development
of a NATO/EU defence capabilities agency;
o
using
common funds for costs related to selected deployments, including an annual
exercise of the NRF; and
o
a further review of
NATO’s command structure for the purpose of reducing costs and enhancing force
flexibility and deployability.
Comprehensive approach.Several years after the concept of a
comprehensive approach was widely accepted as the best means for responding to
complex security challenges, NATO efforts to operate with civilian partners
remain disjointed. As noted earlier, such an approach often requires NATO to
act in partnership with other organisations, whether in a leading or a
supportive role. The Alliance’s
2006 CPG describes NATO’s approach to conflicts as “the coherent and
comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall
effects that will achieve the desired outcome.” The CPG also states that NATO
has “no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes,”
relying instead on its partners. Although true in theory, this logic has not
always proven out in practice. Effective military-civilian relationships
require a good deal of hard work. Military and civilian personnel tend to plan
differently, set different priorities, establish different standards of accountability, recruit and deploy personnel differently,
and often even speak the same language in ways that one has trouble
understanding the other. In fact, NATO today does not work as well as it should
-- indeed, as it must -- with civilian organisations. The Strategic Concept
must address this shortcoming, while also encouraging each Ally to improve the
ability of its military to work with civilian partners.
Recommendations:
1. NATO at all levels should prepare to
be part of integrated civilian-military missions. This requires establishing a
small civilian planning unit within NATO to maintain points of contact, share
information, and engage in joint planning with partner countries and organisations.
2. NATO should maintain up-to-date
memoranda of understanding with such key institutions as the UN, the EU and the
OSCE, as well as other national and regional bodies and major NGOs.
3. NATO’s Defence Planning Process
should identify civilian capabilities -- whether NATO or non-NATO -- to be
deployed along with initial combat forces for immediate post-conflict stability
operations.
4. NATO should ask member states to
identify a cadre of civilian specialists with experience in complex operations
who would be available for rapid deployment for selected missions if qualified
personnel from partner countries or institutions are not. These civilian
reservists should be prepared through NATO training to move into an area in the
wake of conflict and to work with local authorities and combat forces for a
limited period of time in order to provide security and other public services.
5. NATO should strive on a systematic
basis to help potential partners improve their ability to contain and respond
to crisis situations; this can be done through -- among other means --
training, material assistance, and strategic assessments aimed at early warning
and prevention.
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control.
NATO relies upon a mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons for the purpose
of deterring an armed attack. Changes in threats to the Alliance have broadened
the concept of deterrence and allowed NATO to dramatically reduce the types,
numbers and roles of its nuclear forces. At the same time, global leaders --
including many from Allied nations -- have expressed a desire to move toward a
world free from the threat posed by nuclear arms. Looking ahead, the Alliance should be
prepared for in-depth consultations on the future role of nuclear weapons in
its deterrence strategy. Some parameters for those consultations, which will
take place against the backdrop of the larger global nuclear debate, are
suggested below:
·
As
long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in international relations, the Alliance should retain a
nuclear component to its deterrent strategy -- at the minimum level required by
the prevailing security environment.
·
Under
current security conditions, the retention of some U.S.
forward-deployed systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended
nuclear deterrence and collective defence.
·
Broad
participation of the non-nuclear Allies is an essential sign of transatlantic
solidarity and risk sharing. Participation by the non-nuclear states can take
place in the form of nuclear deployments on their territory or by non-nuclear
support measures.
·
NATO
should continue to ensure the absolute physical security of nuclear weapons
stored on European soil.
·
There
should be an ongoing NATO dialogue with Russia
on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines, and transparency. These talks
should help set the stage for the further reduction and possible eventual
elimination of the entire class of sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
·
NATO
should re-establish the Special Consultative Group on Arms Control for the
purpose of facilitating its own internal dialogue about the whole range of
issues related to nuclear doctrine, new arms control
initiatives, and proliferation.
·
NATO
should make clear its full support for efforts to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, to reduce further the prominence of nuclear arms in the
defence doctrines of any country, and to ensure that nuclear materials are
handled in a safe and secure manner.
·
NATO
should endorse a policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation
Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
Recommendation:
1. As long as nuclear weapons exist,
NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with widely
shared responsibility for deployment and operational support, at the minimum
level required by the prevailing security environment. Any change in this
policy, including in the geographic distribution of NATO nuclear deployments in
Europe,
should be made, as with other major decisions, by the Alliance as a whole.
2. NATO should invite an ongoing
dialogue with Russia
on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines, and transparency, and should
convene a Special Consultative Group in order to inform and coordinate its
internal dialogue about nuclear-related issues.
Ballistic missile defence.
The Alliance
should have a fuller role in dealing with the emerging ballistic missile
threat. The new U.S.
phased, adaptive approach to ballistic missile defence provides an opportunity
for the development of an effective NATOwide strategy that would add to the
defence of populations as well as forces. The U.S.
systems to be deployed will be much more effective against the ballistic
missile threat to Europe
from the Gulf than those previously envisioned. They are not directed against Russia,
nor would they threaten Russia’s
nuclear deterrent. A NATO missile defence system would enhance deterrence and
transatlantic sharing of responsibility, reinforce the principle that security
is indivisible, and allow for concrete security cooperation with Russia.
Recommendation:
1. NATO should recognize territorial
missile defence as an essential mission of the Alliance. To that end,
NATO should agree to expand its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile
Defence System to provide the core command and control capability of a NATO
territorial missile defence system.
Responding to Unconventional
Dangers. Throughout the Group’s
investigation, NATO’s response to terrorism, cyber vulnerabilities, energy
security, and climate change was discussed. Some new capabilities may be
needed.
Strengthening NATO’s role in
fighting terrorism. NATO’s military forces are playing
a vital role in the fight against violent extremism in Afghanistan.
Within the treaty area, however, counter-terrorism is primarily the
responsibility of police and other domestic agencies. Nonetheless, the Alliance can play a
supporting part through the protection of vital military facilities, sharing
intelligence, and providing assistance, when asked, in consequence management.
It is worth recalling, for example, that NATO aircraft flew AWACS patrols over
the United States for seven months following the 9/11 attacks. In 2004, the Alliance established a
Defence Against Terrorism Programme that was designed
to develop new technologies to protect troops and civilians against such
dangers as improvised explosive devices, suicide bombs and anti-aircraft rocket
strikes.
Recommendation:
1. NATO’s Defence Against
Terrorism Programme should expand from its current focus on ten areas of
technology-related work to include, among other subjects, collaborative
research on investigative techniques, deterrence, and social networking.
Cyber defence capabilities. The
next significant attack on the Alliance may well come
down a fibre optic cable. Already, cyber attacks against NATO systems occur
frequently, but most often below the threshold of political concern. However,
the risk of a large-scale attack on NATO’s command and control systems or
energy grids could readily warrant consultations under Article 4 and could
possibly lead to collective defence measures under Article 5. Effective cyber
defence requires the means to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from
attacks. NATO has taken steps to develop these capabilities through creation of
a Cyber Defence Management Authority, a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence, and a Computer Incident Response Capability. Nonetheless, there
persist serious gaps in NATO’s cyber defence capabilities. The Strategic
Concept should place a high priority on addressing these vulnerabilities, which
are both unacceptable and increasingly dangerous.
Recommendation:
1.
NATO
should recognize that cyber attacks are a growing threat to the security of the
Alliance
and its members. Accordingly:
o
A
major effort should be undertaken to increase the monitoring of NATO’s critical
network and to assess and furnish remedies to any vulnerabilities that are
identified.
o
The
Centre of Excellence should do more, through training, to help members improve
their cyber defence programmes.
o
Allies
should expand early warning capabilities in the form of a NATO-wide network of
monitoring nodes and sensors.
o
The
Alliance
should be prepared to send an expert team to any member experiencing or
threatened by a major cyber attack.
o
Over
time, NATO should plan to mount a fully adequate array of cyber defence
capabilities, including passive and active elements.
Energy security.
Access to sufficient supplies of energy is a requirement for any modern state.
However, most countries are dependent, to one degree or another, on external
energy sources and on the means for delivering needed supplies via pipelines or
shipping. Any substantial or sudden interruption of supplies to an Ally would
be of concern, especially if the interruption were caused by the sabotage of
energy infrastructure or by unlawful interference with maritime commerce. Such
an occurrence, if prolonged, could lead to consultations under Article 4 of the
North Atlantic Treaty and to a determination by the Allies of an appropriate
response.
As a general matter, energy policy is a
domestic issue, with the EU and the International Energy Agency offering
services at the multinational level related to potential energy supply
disruptions. NATO, however, has an obligation to protect its own energy
reserves in order to ensure the capability of its forces. Also, in 2008 the Alliance agreed at the
Bucharest Summit to take a number of additional steps pertaining to energy
security, including the sharing of intelligence, support for the protection of
critical infrastructure, and support for an expanded dialogue with energy
supplier countries.
Recommendation:
1. The potential for major energy
supply disruptions should figure prominently in NATO’s strategic assessment and
contingency planning activities. Thought should be given in advance to how the Alliance might work with
partners in an emergency situation to mitigate harm to its members and to find
alternative sources of supply.
Climate change.
As an Alliance,
NATO does not have a formal role in regulating the greenhouse gas emissions
that experts believe lead to global warming. NATO could, however, be called
upon to help cope with security challenges stemming from such consequences of
climate change as a melting polar ice cap or an increase in catastrophic storms
and other natural disasters. The Alliance should keep this
possibility in mind when preparing for future contingencies.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
The process of developing a new Strategic
Concept should provide a timely reminder to all that NATO serves unique and
indispensable functions. Without NATO during the Cold War, the Euro-Atlantic
region would have entered the twenty-first century deprived of freedom in its
East and with no common strategy in its West; the world would still be hostage
to a superpower rivalry, with nuclear annihilation a single miscalculation
away.
Without NATO in the 1990s, the newly-freed
states of Central and East Europe
would have lacked a powerful incentive to embrace democracy internally and to
mend fences with external rivals. Meanwhile, the Balkans would have remained a
cauldron of ethnic bitterness, ruled by the sword, and split asunder by the
memory of past conflicts.
If NATO did not exist today, Afghanistan
might once again be ruled by the Taliban, providing a safe haven for al-Qa’ida,
allowing terrorists to train and to plan their attacks systematically and
without fear. Euro-Atlantic states would lack an effective community forum for
responding to traditional threats and emerging perils.
Without NATO in the future, the prospects for
international stability and peace would be far more uncertain than they are.
The Alliance
is not alone in its commitment to these objectives, but its combination of
military capability and political solidarity make it both singularly valuable
and irreplaceable.
NATO thrives as a source of hope because, from
the very beginning, its members have described their common agenda in a
positive fashion: to enhance international security, safeguard liberty, and
promote the rule of law. These objectives are neither tied to any calendar nor
diminished by any advance in technology. They do not depend on any particular
adversary. They are enduring needs and will survive as long as NATO has the
courage to defend them through the unity of its members, the bravery of its
citizens, and the free expression of its collective will.
Members of
the NATO Group of Experts
Chair
·
The
Honourable Madeleine K. Albright (United States)
Vice-Chair
·
Mr Jeroen van der Veer (The Netherlands)
Members of the Group
·
Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona (Italy)
·
Ambassador
Marie Gervais-Vidricaire (Canada)
·
The
Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP (United Kingdom)
(until 24 March 2010)
·
Ambassador Ümit Pamir (Turkey)
·
Ambassador
Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra (Spain)
·
Ambassador
Dr Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz (Germany)
·
Mr. Bruno Racine (France)
·
Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)
·
Ambassador
Aivis Ronis (Latvia)
(until 5 May 2010)
·
Ambassador
Yannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece)
Advisers to
the Group of Experts
Civilian Advisers
·
Dr.
Ronald Asmus, Executive Director, Transatlantic Centre of the German Marshall
Fund, Brussels
·
Dr.
Hans Binnendijk, Vice President for Research and Director, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington
·
Dr.
Stephen Flanagan, Senior Vice President and Kissinger Chair, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington
·
Mr.
Camille Grand, Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris
·
Dr.
Karl Heinz-Kamp, Director, Research Division, NATODefenseCollege,
Rome
·
Mr.
James O’Brien, Principal, Albright Stonebridge Group.
·
Mr.
Thomas Valasek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defence, Centre for European
Reform, London
·
Mr.
Max Valstar, assistant to the Vice-Chair
·
Ms.
Fariba Yassaee, Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group
Policy Planning Unit, NATO International Staff
·
Dr.
Jamie Shea, Director, Policy Planning Unit
·
Mr. Antonio Ortiz, Policy Adviser
·
LtCol Emmanuel Charpy, Policy Adviser
Military Advice
Throughout the course of its work, the Group of
Experts has benefited from regular meetings with the NATO Military Authorities.
The Group of Experts wishes to thank Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of
the Military Committee; Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander
Europe; and General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation;
for their invaluable advice and counsel.
The Group of Experts also invited several
former senior NATO commanders to participate in Strategic Concept seminars or
to offer informal military advice. The Group appreciates the insights provided
by General George A. Joulwan, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General
Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the Military Committee; Admiral John R.
Anderson, former Chief of Defence Staff, Canada; General Bantz Craddock, Former
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General Raymond Henault, former Chairman of
the Military Committee; Admiral Willy Herteleer, former Chief of Defense Staff,
Belgium; General Sergiu Medar, former Director of Military Intelligence, Romania;
Lt.Gen. Yilmaz Oğuz, former Military Representative to NATO, Turkey;
General Sir John Reith, Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; and
General Sir Rupert Smith, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
The Group wishes to take special note of the
contribution to their work made by the late General Franciszek Gągor,
Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, who died in the tragic
crash of President Lech Kaczynski’s aircraft near SmolenskRussia
on 10 April 2010.
Chronology
·
3
- 4 April 2009:
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit: NATO leaders call for development of a new Strategic
Concept for the Alliance
·
7 July 2009: Brussels, Launching of
NATO’s New Strategic Concept
·
August
2009: Group of Experts (GOE) selected to provide analysis & recommendations
to Secretary General (SG) regarding new Strategic Concept
·
4 September 2009: GOE holds first
meeting with SG and North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Brussels
·
15-16
October 2009: Seminar 1 in Luxembourg;
Meetings with military leaders
·
12-13
November 2009: Seminar 2 in Slovenia;
Meetings with military leaders
·
24 November 2009: Interim Report
to NAC; Meeting with Partners (EAPC, MD, ICI, and
others), Brussels
·
7 December 2009: Meeting with NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, Washington
·
15
- 16 December 2009: Meeting with
military leaders; visit to SHAPE; Meeting with EU, Brussels
·
12 January 2010: Conference in Prague
·
13-14
January 2010: Seminar 3 in Norway;
Meeting with military leaders; Meeting with Georgian FM and Ukrainian Deputy FM
·
27 January 2010: Meeting with Defence chiefs;
Meeting with European Parliament, Brussels
·
10 - 11 February 2010: GOE Meetings in Russia
·
22
- 23 February 2010: Seminar 4 in WashingtonDC; Meeting with
NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Meetings with military leaders
·
4 March 2010: Conferences in Helsinki &
Cairo
·
12 March 2010: Consultation with UN, New York
& Conference in Warsaw
·
26 March 2010: Consultation with NAC;
Consultation with EAPC, Brussels
·
1 April 2010: Consultation with MD and ICI, Brussels
·
9 April 2010: Consultation with OSCE
·
March/April
2010: Consultations by GOE in NATO countries
·
May 17, 2010: GOE submits final analysis and
recommendations
08 Oct. 2010
The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement,
Modern Defence
Speech by NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
(GMF), Brussels
Dear Ms. McKerron,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for that kind
introduction. The Transatlantic Centre of the German Marshall Fund is always a
natural home for the NATO Secretary General.
But the GMF has also been
closely associated with NATO’s new Strategic Concept from the outset,
particularly through the unflagging efforts of Ron Asmus, who also contributed
to the work of the Group of Experts.
As you are all aware, we
will agree a new NATO Strategic Concept in just a few weeks, at NATO’s Lisbon
Summit. The NATO Heads of State and Government asked me last year to lead the
process in developing it. I can assure you that I have devoted myself fully to
this assignment. Because I consider this Strategic Concept to be of profound
importance.
NATO is the most successful
Alliance in history. And I fully intend for it to stay that way.
The new Strategic Concept
will have to guide the next stage in NATO’s evolution. The first stage was
obviously the Cold War Alliance: purely defensive, big static armies, facing
down one clear adversary. You might call that NATO Version 1.0. And it worked
very well.
NATO Version 2.0 was the
post-Cold War NATO, from the fall of the Berlin Wall until today.
It has also worked well. We
helped consolidate peace and democracy across Europe. We managed crises from
the Balkans to Afghanistan. And we engaged with new partners, with which we
share common purpose.
The time has now come for
NATO 3.0. An Alliance which can defend the 900 million citizens of NATO
countries against the threats we face today, and will face in the coming
decade. The Strategic Concept is the blueprint for that new NATO.
But before I go into what
will be new, I want to highlight what will not be new. The fundamentals of this
Alliance should not and will not change. Because they make as much sense as
they have done for the past 61 years. And because they continue to be essential
for the security of our citizens.
Most fundamental is the
commitment to collective defence. An attack against one NATO Ally is considered
an attack against all. That is a binding commitment. It is the most powerful
possible signal of solidarity.
And it is clear deterrent to
any potential aggressor, because everyone knows that taking on one NATO country
means taking on all 28.
The second fundamental
pillar: NATO’s military capability. NATO can generate and sustain military
power at a level no adversary could match. It is a powerful deterrent. And it
means that NATO can take on military operations no other organisations could
tackle. That capability remains crucial to Alliance security, and we will
preserve it.
The third enduring pillar:
political consultations. There is no place but NATO where Europe and North
America sit together every day to assess the security issues that affect us,
and figure out how to tackle them together. The NATO Allies are a community of
countries that share fundamental values. Europe and North America are each
other’s number one trading partner. Together, they make over half of the
world’s total production – the GDP. Preserving NATO’s role as the only
transatlantic bridge between these countries is essential.
But with these fundamentals
as the foundation, a lot must change in the way NATO does business. Because the
international security environment is changing quickly.
The threat of a major
military attack against NATO can of course never be ruled out, and many regions
of the world are arming themselves quickly. But that threat is low. The more
likely threats are the ones that are harder to see, but they are just as real -
and potentially just as deadly.
The threat from
international terrorism is clear. Last week, intelligence chiefs from major
countries in Europe sounded the alarm about the risk of a large-scale terrorist
attack. Not September 11 2001; but last week.
Over 30 countries are now
acquiring ballistic missile technology. Some can already hit Europe. Again,
that’s today. And that problem will only get worse.
Cyber attacks can take down
a country’s air traffic control system, shut down the banks, paralyze
government services and cripple an economy. In other words, they can reach a
level that threatens the fundamental security interests of Allies. If anyone
doubts that, they can ask the Estonians, who suffered just that kind of attack
a couple of years ago.
Globalisation has made our economies
ever-more dependent on supplies from around the world. Which means attack on
those supply lines can have dramatic effects for our security - for example, if
oil supplies couldn’t make it through the Straights of Hormuz.
I could go on, but you get
the point. There are fewer military threats to our territory, but more
challenges to our security, from every direction, including cyberspace. Which
is why NATO has to continue to transform to remain effective.
There are three main areas
where I believe NATO must transform.
First: we must modernise our
defence and deterrence.
Collective defence will
remain the essential core of the Alliance. And that continues to require
effective military forces. But to be effective today, we need forces that are
deployable across Alliance territory and beyond. The Strategic Concept must set
out a clear vision for Allies to guide the reform of their forces – less
investment in static forces and concrete, more forces that can move, can stay
and can succeed wherever they are sent.
But today, defence of our
territory and our citizens doesn’t begin and end at the border. It can start in
Kandahar. It can start in cyberspace. And NATO needs to be able to defend
across the spectrum.
That means taking on cyber
defence. NATO must be able to defend itself against cyber attack – and I can
tell you that we already have our systems attacked one hundred times per day.
We also need to be able to support Allies who come under attack, with a
deployable capability. But I believe NATO should also help Allies share
experiences and set common approaches to cyber-defence.
I would also see real value
in cooperation with the EU. Because this is a transnational problem, and it
needs multinational solutions.
I hope that the Strategic
Concept will also be the place NATO stakes out its decision to defend our
populations and territories against missile attack.
There is a real threat to
our territory – of being hit with a missile, which would be devastating, and of
being pressured by nations that have missiles pointed at us. There is
technology available – tested and ready to go – that can defend against a
missile attack.
And we can afford it; the
cost of expanding the current system for protecting our troops, to include all
citizens, would be less than 200 million Euros, from NATO’s common budgets,
over 10 years, divided among the NATO Allies. That is a lot of defence, for a
very good price.
The Strategic Concept will
also have to address another fundamental element of NATO’s defence and
deterrence – our nuclear posture.
I can see a lot of
journalists leaning forward at this point. I’m afraid that if you’re hoping for
a little controversy, I’ll have to disappoint you.
In the discussions we’ve had
until now on the future of NATO’s nuclear posture, I actually see a real
convergence of views.
The exact language will be
discussed in the coming weeks, and I don’t want to prejudge the conclusion. But
I’m pretty confident that we will find the right balance between two very
important principles. First, that we share the commitment to the goals set out
by President Obama of a world without nuclear weapons, and that NATO will
continue to work toward that goal.
But second, that our job
remains to deter attack against our citizens, which means that as long as there
are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO must retain nuclear weapons as well.
Ladies and gentlemen, the
second are, where we need reform is crises management: we must be able to do
21st Century crisis management. No other organisation can marshal, deploy and
sustain NATO’s military power. Which is why I am totally unconvinced by the
media suggestions that after Afghanistan, NATO might never take on another big
mission. First and foremost, because I have no doubt that we will succeed in
Afghanistan.
And second, because there
will be other missions in future for which only NATO can fit the bill. We will
have to be ready.
It is maybe a bit unusual
for a NATO Secretary General to quote the founders of the European Union, but
I’m also a European politician so I’ll do it anyway. Jean Monet said that the
lessons of history are doomed to be forgotten unless they are embedded in
institutions. Afghanistan has taught us some very clear lessons, lessons we
have learned at a very high price. I hope to see those lessons reflected in the
Strategic Concept, because we cannot afford to forget them.
We’ve learned that there is
often no military solution solely to crises and conflicts. It’s true in
Afghanistan, it’s true in many of the other conflicts underway today. The
military is necessary – but it is not sufficient.
What we need is a
comprehensive approach, where the political, civilian and military efforts are
coordinated, and work towards common aims. Where, as much as possible, the
military and civilian actors plan together, operate in complementary ways, and
support each other.
This may seem like common
sense. And it is. But on the ground, and at the political level, there are all
sorts of reasons, good and bad, why this doesn’t happen. Which, speaking very
openly, means our military operations often operate in a vacuum, because the
civilian progress we need isn’t there. It means the political and civilian
efforts are more at risk, because they don’t get the protection they need from
our soldiers. And it means that the whole international effort takes longer
because it’s not nearly as effective as it should be.
That is why the
comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary. NATO needs to
work more closely with our civilian partners, on the ground, and at political
level – especially the European Union and the United Nations. With both
organisation, we already do so much. We hope they want to work more closely
with us. And I believe that NATO needs a small civilian capacity as well, to
interface effectively with our partners.
We’ve also learned we need
to do training from the beginning. Because the sooner local forces can handle
security, the sooner we can go home. It’s as simple as that.
The NATO Training Mission is
now firing on all cylinders. There are about 25,000 Afghan security forces
being trained as we speak. But we didn’t set up the training mission until
2008. Waiting that long was a mistake. We won’t repeat it. I hope the Strategic
Concept will mandate NATO to set up a standing training capacity, so we can
help others stand on their feet, rather than leaning on us.
Ladies and gentlemen. There
is a third area where NATO must take the next step – engaging with the wider
world to build cooperative security. In a nutshell, the Alliance must develop
deeper, wider political and practical partnerships with countries around the
globe.
When our last Concept was
issued in 1999 NATO could still – just about – achieve its goals with its own
membership alone. Partners were welcome but not essential. No more. Today, our
partners provide troops, transit, financial support and political backing.
And we help them, by making
their neighbourhoods safer. Cooperation with our partners is essential, for
them and us.
We’ve already taken that
into account at NATO. You might be surprised how far we’ve come. Today, the 47
countries in the ISAF mission – 28 NATO countries, 19 partners -- shape and
take decisions on the operation together. That’s unprecedented for us. But it
reflects the reality that they are contributing in the same way we are, and
deserve a real voice.
I hope that the Strategic
Concept takes our partnerships to the next level. Our operational partners
should have a structural role in shaping missions to which they contribute. We
should reach out to new and important partners, and be open when they reach out
to us. And I believe we should have flexible arrangements in place to encourage
consultations between Allies and partners around the globe on security issues
of common concern, with NATO as the hub.
All in all, this is an
ambitious agenda. It is the blueprint for an Alliance even more actively
engaged in building international security, and upgraded for modern defence.
Which is exactly what we need to maintain our shared security for the coming
decade.
But I can already hear the
first question I might get, in a few moments: “nice vision – but in a time when
nations are cutting back on defence, how are you going to pay for it?”
To that, I would say two
things. First, we need reform. Taxpayers need the best return for their
investment in defence. In NATO, we will streamline our command structure so it
delivers what we need but costs less. We also need to look at pooling scarcer
resources together, so we can buy and do things together that individually we
couldn’t afford. I hope the Strategic Concept gives a strong mandate for
continuous reform.
But my second point is this:
there is a point where you are no longer cutting fat; you’re cutting into
muscle, and then into bone.
I understand full well why
Allies are cutting into their defence budgets. Given the financial crisis, they
have no choice.
But I also have to say: cuts
can go too far. We have to avoid cutting so deep that we won’t, in future, be
able to defend the security on which our economic prosperity rests. And we
cannot end up in a situation where Europe cannot pull its weight when it comes
to security. The result would be that the EU Lisbon Treaty, which I strongly
support, would be a hollow shell. And the United States would look elsewhere
for its security partner. That is not a price we can afford.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Group of Experts Report
was a real source of inspiration to me, as I drafted the Strategic Concept. Let
me draw on it one more time. The Experts called NATO “an essential source of
stability in an uncertain world”. And that’s right. It was true for the last 61
years. It is true today. And I am quite certain that it will be true for the
next decade as well -- guided, shaped and inspired by the Strategic Concept we
will agree just 6 weeks from now.
Thank you.
Moderator: Now, we have quite some time
for questions and answers. I would like to ask you to introduce yourself and be
as brief as you can, let me put it that way. So who wants to start?
Okay, the gentleman over
there, with the little longer hair. There are microphones in the room. Please
wait till you get them and maybe you could also stand up.
Oh, they're in the seat. I'm
sorry, yes. The microphones are in your seats. And they should work.
Q: I hope so. Okay. I'm
Klaus Hecking of the Financial Times Deutschland. And Secretary General, you
said there is a point at which you don't cut into fat anymore, but you cut...
but you cut into muscle and bone.
I don't know (inaudible)...
well, no, it works.
Are some European states at
that point already where they're cutting into muscle and bone, or are they
still cutting fat? Thanks.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Secretary General of NATO): Well, I will resist
temptation to name specific countries. My message is a general message that
obviously we can still find fat somewhere and cut it. I mean, to reduce
expensive and heavy general administrative overheads make our structures leaner
and more effective as we are right now doing in the Alliance. And maybe also
reduce costs related to what I call static, non-deployable forces. While at the
same time, reallocate resources to investments in modern capabilities,
future-oriented, high tech military capabilities.
In addition to that, I think
we could make more efficient use of resources if these budget adaptations took
place in a coordinated manner. Role specialization. Not all nations should
necessarily have at their disposal all capabilities. Within an alliance
countries could also cooperate. Some countries could specialize in one area,
other countries in other areas and they could cooperate.
We could go for collective
solutions instead of pursuing purely national solutions. One excellent example
that could be expanded, 12 allies and partners have pooled resources together
and acquired three expensive so-called C-17 transport aircraft. Individually
they couldn't afford it, but by pooling resources together they have now
acquired a capability. And for each individual partner and ally at a lower
cost. And finally, we could go for more common funding.
So there are ways and means,
so my point is, well, we have an economic austerity, nations are faced with
budgetary constraints, but let's take it as an opportunity to make more
efficient use of our resources.
Q: (Inaudible...), I'm a
journalist. My question is to you, you were just speaking about Afghanistan
lesson, that there is no military solution, also any conflicts. You was just
visiting Turkey yesterday so it was there.
My question, and this point,
that Turkey is suffering with the Kurdish conflict over 30 years and the NATO
has always supported Turkey, over 50 years. I mean, the technically, military,
also intelligence information. Did you also talk to the Turkish partners or
Turkish president and states Minister about Kurdish conflicts, because there's
about 20 million Kurds who is living in Turkey who has no any human rights in
Turkey and the Kurdish organizations was asking if NATO want to solve their
problems with the peacefully democratic solution, they're ready to give their
gun to the NATO. Do you have any comment on that? That if the Kurdish
organization give their guns to the NATO, NATO will be able to solve the
Kurdish question in Turkey peacefully and democratically. Thanks.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Well, first of all, I have
to say that within NATO we strongly support Turkey as a staunch ally. We are
united in our endeavours to fight terrorism. I also have to say that NATO
allies have been reluctant to accept NATO interference with domestic problems
for good reasons. But NATO is strongly engaged in the general fight against
terrorism.
I also have to say I
consider... we consider PKK a terrorist organization. And I think the new
Strategic Concept will clearly point out terrorism as one of the emerging
security challenges, one of the new threats with which we have to deal and also
improve our capacity to deal with terrorism. Among the concrete examples I can
mention, we have established a new division at NATO Headquarters which will
deal with emerging security challenges, including terrorism.
Moderator: Sorry. The next question,
please.
Q: My name is Ingrid
(inaudible) for the Brussels office of consultancy(?). My question relates to
what you said about cooperative security. And I wonder what you mean by it when
you say that you want to take the partnerships to a new level. What are the
implications for collective security and what kind of reciprocal relationship
do you envisage between NATO and its partners?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: First and foremost I'm
speaking about the existing partnerships. As you know we have a number of
partnerships. We have the EAPC partnership with a number of Eastern European
and Central Asian countries. We have the Mediterranean Dialogue, with six
Muslim countries and Israel. And we have the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
with four Gulf states.
And I would expect the new
Strategic Concept to indicate that we are prepared to consult with partners
within these partnerships on every issue they might find of common interest. We
are also prepared to further develop practical cooperation,
military-to-military cooperation and other kinds of practical cooperation with
these partners. So that's one thing - the existing partnerships.
So that's, I would add, when
we speak about existing partnerships, also our partnership with Russia, which
is a special partner. As you know, we have established in 2002 the NATO-Russia
Council. So every month we have consultations with Russia, within the
NATO-Russia Council.
I would very much like to
see our cooperation with Russia further developed in the coming years.
Practical cooperation in areas where we share interests with Russia;
Afghanistan, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterpiracy, proliferation,
including cooperation on missile defence.
To these existing
partnerships I would add, new partners, new partnerships. And I think that's
one of the lessons learned from Afghanistan, that we can't solve the problems
in Afghanistan without engaging partners across the globe.
Within ISAF we have
excellent cooperation with partners across the globe, including Australia, New
Zealand, South Korea. I could add to that, that Japan, which is not part of the
ISAF coalition, provides a significant financial contribution to our operation
in Afghanistan.
And we need to involve these
partners more closely in consultations, in decision-shaping and
decision-making. When it comes to Afghanistan I think everybody realizes that
we also had to engage Pakistan constructively, if we are to solve problems, and
if we are to maintain regional stability we should also engage with India and
China.
So these examples illustrate
that if we are to accomplish our security mission today we need partnerships
across the globe and that's what I'm thinking about when I talk about raising
our partnerships to a new level.
Q: Thank you. My name is
Jerem(ph). I'm from India. I have two questions to you. You mentioned about
Afghanistan, the lessons learned. But this week we saw consistently every day
we saw a lot of convoys, I mean, NATO convoys, being torched, burned up in the
Pakistan. So how do you explain this factor in terms of the lessons you
learned?
And the second question
about that cooperative security and the new strategic partnership and you
referred India. So what kind of role do you see for India in NATO strategic
partnership? Thank you.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: First of all, I strongly
regret the border incidents we saw last week. One of which also resulted in the
killing of Pakistani soldiers. It was an accident. It was a mistake. We had
apologized. My convey my condolences to the families of the soldiers who lost
their lives.
I've had a meeting with the
Pakistani Foreign Minister. We have discussed this and agreed, firstly, that
we'll investigate this together, find out what really happened and learn from
it.
Secondly, we also agreed
that in order to prevent such unfortunate incidents in the future we have to
improve our communication and coordination along the border.
But we also agreed that it
is essential that we stand firmly together in our fight against extremism and
terrorism, from which Pakistan also suffers.
So I think one of the
lessons learned is that we need a long-term partnership with Pakistan and other
countries in the region.
And as far as India is
concerned, I would very much like to see our relationship further develop. We
have had some contacts, but at a lower level, at a very technical level I think
it would give merit to raise it to the political level and when it's
appropriate also have political consultations because India, as well as
Pakistan, is an important player in the region.
So what I'm first and
foremost thinking about is a political, a more formalized political dialogue
between NATO and India.
Q: Hello? Paul (inaudible)
from European Commission. I wanted to follow up on the earlier question about
the structured cooperation with global partners. You mentioned the NATO-Russia
Council. We all know that Russia has also been asking for something more,
something specifically regarding European security. It seems that some member
states are ready to talk about this and maybe even look something further. What
is your own view on this? Is there a need to engage with Russia on some
legitimate claims they have on European security?
And secondly, regarding
EU-NATO cooperation, you mentioned crisis management, that we should be doing
more there. Are there other areas as well that you could foresee in the future?
I know that Catherine Ashton has been asked to report to the December Council
on ideas. What could you suggest for her? Thanks.
Q: First, on Russia. Yes,
you're right, from the Russian side President Medvedev some years ago presented
a proposal as regards the creation of a European security architecture frame
within a legally binding treaty.
Actually, we have discussed
this in the NATO-Russia Council. The NATO position is very clear that we don't
see any need for new documents and new legally binding treaties, but we see a
need for real progress when it comes to, I would say, the common security. And
one specific example would be cooperation on missile defence.
I would expect the NATO
Summit in November to take the decision that we will develop a NATO-based
missile defence system which can cover the whole of our territory and protect
our populations by linking the existing U.S. system with existing European
systems that are prepared to protect our deployed troops. But why only protect
our deployed troops? Why not expand it to cover the whole population? And
that's what it is about. It's technically feasible, by linking these systems
together we can provide protection for all citizens in NATO countries.
If we take that decision I
think it should also be accompanied by an invitation to Russia to cooperate. It
makes sense militarily because it would give the whole system better coverage,
make it more efficient and it would make sense politically because it would be
clear to everybody that his missile defence system is not directed against
Russia, it is really a common defence system.
And that would be a
Euro-Atlantic security architecture in the real world that matters to people,
the man in the street. I mean, it would be a security roof from Vancouver to
Vladivostok. I mean it doesn't give people security to write a treaty, but it
gives people security to protect against hostile missiles.
So I'm not against a common
security architecture, but I focus on what really matters in the real world,
and not on documents and treaties.
As regards NATO and the
European Union, I would very much like to see a strengthened partnership.
Twenty-one countries are members of both organization, so it's a bit strange
that there is still a lack of cooperation when it comes to operations, in
theatres where we operate together.
When it comes to development
of capabilities there's a clear risk that each organization pursues its own
programs instead of merging programs or instead of coordinating programs.
And finally, when it comes
to political consultations according to the existing framework, the only issue
we are allowed to discuss when I chair common NATO-EU meetings, that's Bosnia.
And while Bosnia, of course, is an important issue, I could think of other
issues of common interest that also deserve consultation, like Afghanistan,
Kosovo, counterpiracy, proliferation, just to mention on terrorism. But we
can't.
So we have to make progress.
I have noted with great satisfaction that European Council tasked High
Representative Ashton to come forward with proposals that go beyond previously
presented proposals and I look forward to consulting with her in the coming days
and weeks as to how we can bring this cooperation forward.
By the way, that was also
one of the issues I discussed in Ankara yesterday.
Q: Mr. Secretary General, my
name is (inaudible). I'm representing the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium.
Building on what you just
said about avoiding duplication and if you talk about a comprehensive approach
to handle crisis management, a military approach is not sufficient. You must
get along with a spectrum of civilian means, like assistance, police justice.
Could these capabilities be supplied in a structured and agreed way by the EU,
like it is the case for Berlin Plus? In other words, would NATO favour a
reverse Berlin Plus scheme to go into its comprehensive approach?
Thank you.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: It sounds a bit technical,
but I think the political part of it is could we imagine a cooperation between
NATO and the European Union where the European Union is in the lead when it
comes to the broader civilian aspects of cooperation? I mean, the comprehensive
approach doesn't mean that NATO will be in the lead necessarily when it comes
to civilian reconstruction and development. On the contrary, we don't have the
capacities to do that. But what I'm talking about is improving our capacity to
interact with other actors on the international scene like the European Union.
So I think the comprehensive
approach constitutes an excellent example of how we could expand the
cooperation between NATO and the European Union. I want to stress that I'm not
saying that the European Union should then deal with civilian aspects alone. I
fully recognize that European Union has also the ambition, and rightly so, to
take on military operations within the new Lisbon treaty. But the European
Union has at its disposal a broader range of instruments that could be useful
as a supplement to the military operation when it comes to crisis management.
And that's also a part of an additional answer to the question raised before,
where could I imagine an expanded cooperation between NATO and European Union.
And comprehensive approach is exactly one of the areas.
Q: Secretary General, David
Brunnstrom from Reuters. I want to go back to Pakistan. Could you give us some
explanation from your side of how you see the recent... the deterioration of relations
between the West and Pakistan recently.
And following on from that,
how can you actually reconcile the different strategic interests that Pakistan
and NATO actually have in Afghanistan? And in the shorter term, how optimistic
are you that this border closure issue can be resolved and that the Torkham
border crossing reopened so that it doesn't... before it affects NATO
operations seriously?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Starting with the latter,
the Pakistani civilian and military authorities have assured us that we could
expect the borders to be reopened for our convoys shortly. And I really hope
that would be the case, because it's also an increasingly security problem. I
mean, the convoys are now lining up and are very easy targets for militants, so
I think also from a security point of view it is a matter of urgency to reopen
the border crossings.
Secondly, I don't think it's
an accurate description of our relationship to use the word deteriorating. We
have had a very unfortunate border incident. We also have to realize that it
has created some, let's call it, concerns in the Pakistani public, the press,
the Parliament. And it's a very difficult situation to handle for the Pakistani
government and the Pakistani military. But in our talks with the Pakistani
leaders they have all assured us that they stay committed to our common fight
against extremism and terrorism.
And the first part of your
question is how can we reconcile all this? And I visited Pakistan a couple of
months ago and in concrete terms I suggested that we prepare a political
declaration framework for a more long-term partnership so that Pakistan clearly
understands that we stay committed to the region, we stay committed to peace
and stability in the region. Our goal is obviously to make the Afghans capable
to take responsibility for their own country, but I can assure you we will not
leave Afghanistan until we are sure that the Afghans can actually take
responsibility themselves.
In other words, we will not
leave behind a security vacuum to the detriment of other countries in the
region. I think that's a way to reassure countries in the region.
Q: (Inaudible...), formerly
with the European Commission. Reading recently in anticipation of your new
concept, reading European papers, American papers, and political journals they
have used expression that you may propose a new global role for NATO. You very
carefully avoided using that expression. I'm wondering you can comment on that?
The other one, my other
question is about China. You mentioned about Russia, India. These three
countries of course they are not member of NATO, and I'm wondering how in any
possible involvement of NATO, new involvement in Asia, how you are going to
deal with the legitimate concerns of China in that respect?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: No, you're right, I've not
spoken about a new role or new missions or new involvement. On the contrary I
have stressed that NATO's core task was, is and will remain territorial defence
of our countries and populations. According to the very famous Article 5 in the
NATO Treaty.
So in that respect there's
no expansion of our ambitions. But what I have been spoken about is the need to
understand correctly what territorial defence is about in today's world. And we
have to understand that effective protection of our own populations may start
beyond our borders. That's a new thing. It’s not an expansion of NATO's
ambitions, but it is to realize that if we are to protect our people against
terrorism then we may have to fight terrorism at its roots, like in
Afghanistan.
So effective territorial
defence in a globalized world may take out of area operations. Yes, our
operations may even start in cyberspace. And it is, I think, it's a well-placed
question because it's very important to understand this correctly. That I'm not
speaking about expanding operations, but making their classical territorial
defence more effective. That's what it is about.
And I think regarding China
and other major players that it makes sense to expand our range of consultations
to also include China and other major players like India in our regular
political consultations. Just one argument in that respect: NATO operates on
the basis of United Nations' mandates. We operate on the basis of a UN mandate
in Afghanistan and likewise in Kosovo, within KFOR.
We have special
relationships, so to speak, with four out of the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council, because three of them are actually allies: the United
States, France and United Kingdom. And with the fourth we have a special
partnership within the NATO-Russia Council, and thereby also a framework for
regular consultations.
But with the fifth member
of... permanent member of the Security Council we don't have an organized
dialogue. This is my argument, among others, for expanding our consultations to
also include India. But as I've said, China and other major players as well.
Moderator: So Secretary, thank you so
much. I know there are many more questions. Unfortunately, the Secretary
General has to go now. I would like to thank you once again for these very
illuminating remarks and reflections on the new Strategic Concept and all the
best for NATO's endeavours and the Lisbon Summit. Thank you again.
(APPLAUSE)
I
componenti del gruppo hanno preso parte ai lavori su base personale e non come
rappresentati dei loro Paesi d’origine. A rimarcarne l’indipendenza, nessuno di
loro è un funzionario della NATO.